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Abstract 
 
In this thesis I investigate the intellectual foundations of International Political Economy 
(IPE) in order to develop a more complex account of agency than that currently provided to 
the subject field by neoclassical economics. In particular, I focus on the thought of Adam 
Smith, whose ideas are gaining interest in IPE owing to an increasing recognition of his 
seminal contribution to the subject field. I investigate the secondary debate on Smith, his 
influences, his distance from his peers in the Scottish Enlightenment and his ongoing 
influence across the social sciences. I also analyse the thought of William James, and argue 
that his similarly influential concept of agency offers a complex view of the self that is 
complimentary to Smith’s account. I suggest that the framework of the self that these thinkers 
provide can present critical IPE theorists with an alternative concept of agency than the 
reductive account currently employed in the subject field. I argue that these theorists are 
unable to countenance such an alternative owing to their implicit acceptance of the analytical 
separation of economics and politics that became institutionalised after the Methodenstreit. I 
suggest that this is obscured by their commitment to normative interventionism, which I 
argue threatens to reiterate the universalist claims that they seek to challenge.  
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There is no way that contemporary international political economy can be 
understood without making some effort to dig back to its roots (Strange 1994: 
18). 
 
 
An important criticism of international political economy (IPE) is that it employs a 
reductive account of agency in which individuals are assumed to act in a rationally 
self-interested, utility-maximising manner (e.g., Griffin 2007: 722; Murphy and 
Tooze 1991: 26; Watson 2005: 27). Despite the weakness of this account, derived 
from neoclassical economics, critical IPE theorists fail to replace it with a more 
convincing notion of the individual in society. Indeed, when attempts are made to 
introduce complex accounts of agency into IPE (e.g., Elms: 2008; Hobson and 
Seabrooke 2007a; Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner 1998; McNamara 2009; 
O’Brien 2000; Odell: 2002), it is usually through a framework that implicitly 
replicates rationalist assumptions of the self. As such, agency remains poorly 
theorised in the subject field. 
 
In this thesis, I attempt to address this problem via a detailed analysis of the thought 
of Adam Smith and William James, which enables me to argue that their concepts of 
the self can provide IPE with a framework through which a more credible account of 
agency can be incorporated into the subject field. In doing so, I attempt to contribute 
to a burgeoning literature at the “cutting edge” of the discipline (Higgott and Watson 
2008: 13) that suggests that such an objective can only be achieved via a critical 
understanding of IPE’s intellectual foundations. As such, my research builds upon 
important efforts already made and currently being undertaken by political economists 
who invoke Smith’s thought in order to re-engage the subject field with its pre-
disciplinary origins (e.g., Higgott 2000; 2007; Strange 1984; Watson 2005; 2007a; 
2009; 2010). 
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As these authors suggest, this re-engagement enables IPE to move beyond the 
orthodox approach that views the subject field as the study of the political economy of 
International Relations (Strange 1991; e.g., Cohn 2000; Gilpin 1987; Skidmore and 
Lairson 2003), a view that dates IPE’s creation to the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
system in the early 1970s (Watson 2005: 11). In my view, this approach reiterates the 
artificial separation of politics and economics that occurred during the division of 
political economy into separate academic disciplines that took place in the late 
nineteenth century, the period in which the neoclassical account of the self was 
institutionalised in the social sciences. As I argue, analysis of Smith’s and James’s 
pre-disciplinary thought can aid a move beyond this approach whilst contextualising 
IPE and highlighting its ability to employ an alternative to the rationalist 
conceptualisations of agency currently employed in the social sciences.   
 
In this thesis I seek to develop the interventions made by Watson et al. by engaging in 
a thoroughgoing analysis of Smith’s work, his influences, the views of his 
contemporaries, and the extensive secondary debate that continues to flourish around 
his thought. I add to this a detailed examination of the ideas of William James, 
“father” of modern psychology, whom I argue aids understanding of Smith’s thought 
whilst providing a complementary and complex account of the self that can be 
employed in IPE. I conclude by arguing that, in addition to providing a more 
convincing account of the individual in society, Smith’s and James’s commitment to 
the  provisional nature of morality and knowledge production demonstrates that a 
critical approach to IPE need not equate to interventionism. To the best of my 
knowledge, this is a novel contribution.  
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I also consider this to be a timely contribution, as attempts to define the role and 
status of IPE are currently being made in a robust manner, often in terms of 
contrasting approaches to the subject field that are allegedly found in different 
geographical locations (e.g., Cohen 2008; Blyth 2009). To my mind, this reflects the 
tendency, prominent in the social sciences since the late nineteenth century, to 
segregate areas of study in terms of methodological preference. As I argue, this is a 
self-reinforcing process that contributes to a widespread failure to reflect upon the 
shared rationalist underpinnings of these disciplines and the opposing “camps” within 
them. As such, I suggest that, despite defining themselves in opposition to 
neoclassical accounts of the self, critical IPE theorists are unable to challenge 
orthodox conceptions of agency in any significant way. Since increasing numbers are 
becoming interested in the subject-field, this is potentially problematic, as failure to 
reflect upon the rationalist underpinnings of contemporary IPE will arguably facilitate 
the unwitting replication of these assumptions. As the current trend to attempt to 
define the subject field perhaps suggests, however, this is also an opportunity to 
address this problem in a meaningful way.  
 
 
Why Smith and James? 
 
The growth in popularity of IPE since the 1970s is coterminous with an increased 
interest in more sophisticated interpretations of Smith’s ideas across the social 
sciences (e.g., Arrighi 2007; Barbalet 2005; Brown 1994; Gamble 1995; Glaze 2008; 
Kuiper 2006; Montes and Schliesser 2006; Linklater 2007; Muller 2009; Murphy and 
Tooze 1991; Sayer 2007; 2003a; Sen 1987; 2000; Watson 2005; 2007a; 2007b; 2008; 
2009; Werhane 1991; Wight 2002; Williams 1999; Wilson and Dixon 2004; 2006).  
These authors are among a growing number that are influenced by heterodox 
Smithian theorists’ holistic approach to Smith’s oeuvre, an approach that has gained 
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some popularity since the publication of the Glasgow Editions of his works and 
correspondence between 1976 and 1987. For these authors, Smith is not the advocate 
of selfishness and laissez-faire as is suggested in canonical accounts proposed by 
neoclassical economists and orthodox International Relations theorists (e.g., Arrow 
and Hahn 1971; Samuelson 1977; Stigler 1975; Waltz 1959). As I explain in Chapter 
One, such a conceptualization implicitly depends upon the Adam Smith Problem, first 
put forward by Gustav Schmoller’s colleagues in the German Historical School, in 
which it is erroneously supposed that Smith’s contribution is undermined by an 
irreparable inconsistency in his published work. As Andrew Sayer (2003: 341) points 
out, however, this reductive account of Smith is “…increasingly recognised by 
intellectual historians as an egregious misrepresentation”.  
 
To be sure, there is a discernible demand among social scientists for a more accurate 
appraisal of Smith’s thought than that usually expressed in mainstream accounts, 
which, as I note in Chapter One, is informed by selective readings of specific passages 
from An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776).1 As I 
also suggest, a holistic approach to Smith’s oeuvre clearly demonstrates that he 
applies his thought to a variety of subjects in a consistent manner, inquiring into the 
potential existence of general principles that guide systems of economics (in WN), 
morality (in The Theory of Moral Sentiments), justice (in Lectures on Jurisprudence), 
knowledge (in Essays on Philosophical Subjects), and aesthetics and language (in 
Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres) without ever separating these spheres of 
life.2
 
  
                                                 
1 Hereafter referred to as WN.  
2 I am aware that this could fall foul of what Quentin Skinner (1969: 7) refers to as the “mythology of 
doctrines”, in which coherence is read into a theorist’s oeuvre when it may not exist. Taking a 
thoroughly holistic approach to Smith’s work enables me to be confident that I avoid such a potential 
hazard, however. 
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As I discuss in Chapter Four, this approach is in contrast to marginalist economists 
such as Carl Menger (e.g., 1950 [1891]), whose reduction of agency to “rational 
economic man” has become the standard view in economics since his victory over 
Schmoller in the Austro-German Methodenstreit in the late nineteenth century, a view 
that is often wrongly attributed to Smith. As I note here, this conceptualisation of 
agency is also dominant across the social sciences, including IPE, owing to the 
artificial separation of economics and politics that took place during this period. As I 
also discuss, this prompted the creation of the new disciplines of economics, 
sociology and psychology, which were subsequently separated into inductive-
rationalist and deductive-rationalist “camps” with which authors in other disciplines 
associated and continue to identify. According to Leonidas Montes (2004: 163) this 
divorce is a development that Smith would lament. To be sure, Smith predates this 
division by over one hundred years, and consequently avoids such a false dichotomy. 
As I argue in Chapter Three, his polymathic approach is echoed in James’ seminal 
contribution to psychology, one that was made during the period in which the 
Methodenstreit occurred. As I argue here, Smith’s and James’s holistic approaches 
ensure their avoidance of rationalist assumptions regarding human agency.  
 
As I suggest, both authors are able to retain reflexive agency for individuals whilst 
countenancing general standards of morality within a context-dependent moral 
psychology, which, I argue, provides a perspective that is of significance today. To be 
sure, as Susan Cross and Hazel Markus (1990: 726) explain, the influence of James’s 
ideas on the self in contemporary psychology is “unparalleled …and references to 
them can be seen everywhere in increasing numbers”. As Michael Lawlor (2006: 336) 
notes, James is also highly influential across a range of current heterodox debates in 
economics, neuroscience, the philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of the social 
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sciences. James’s renown in the social sciences is therefore similar to that enjoyed by 
Smith (Fleischacker 2004b: 278; Montes 2004: 7-8; see also Fig.3, below). However, 
as I discuss, both authors are often perceived through the distorted lens of figures such 
as Paul Samuelson and George Herbert Mead, whose particularistic interpretations of 
Smith and James leads to subsequent misunderstandings of their work within 
economics and sociology. By contrast, I focus on Smith’s and James’s work directly. 
This enables me to argue that both thinkers’ commitment to the evolutionary nature of 
knowledge and morality facilitates their ongoing relevance as, unlike their 
contemporaries, their preference is for inquiry over prescription. As I note throughout 
this thesis, this approach is based upon observation rather than any intention to 
advocate a particularistic normative stance. It is this spirit that guides my inquiry. 
 
This approach also informs my use of terminology. As Keith Tribe (1995: 67-68) 
argues: “[t]oo often effort is devoted to gathering together contemporaries under some 
convenient label, seeking to minimise or ignore convenient differences…no ‘School’ 
ever speaks with one voice all the time”. Tribe makes this comment in reference to the 
use of the term the “Scottish Enlightenment”, which, as I show in Chapter Two, is an 
accurate assessment, as there are a number of significant differences between thinkers 
grouped under this heading (see Fig.2). However, there are also sufficient similarities 
between these thinkers’ influences and methodologies to warrant the use of the term 
when due care is applied. To my mind, Tribe’s comment could also apply to thinkers 
denoted as “orthodox” and “heterodox” theorists in the secondary debate on Smith, as 
well as to figures that are identified as “mainstream” and “heterodox” economists and 
as “orthodox” and “critical” IPE theorists, who also share discernible similarities to 
others with whom they are grouped in terms of influence and methodological 
preferences. As I demonstrate, however, there are a variety of significant differences 
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between thinkers that are placed within these categories. Furthermore, I show that 
authors within these groups are more closely connected to those in their opposing 
“camp” than is usually acknowledged. As such, I employ these categories as 
analytical devices in a conscious manner that enables me to investigate and 
summarise trends within the literature in an accessible way without imbuing them 
with undue causality.     
 
Contribution to knowledge:  
 
In this thesis I demonstrate the connected nature both of Smith’s thought and the 
secondary debate that surrounds it. This enables me to investigate the points at which 
canonical and heterodox views on Smith meet and diverge, and their reasons for doing 
so (see Fig.1). In a similar manner, I highlight the points at which Smith departs from 
his influences and from his contemporaries (see Fig.2), thereby providing a detailed 
comparison of Scottish Enlightenment thought that again highlights the relevance of 
Smith’s views to contemporary IPE. This is also demonstrated through a detailed 
comparison of Smith’s and James’s thought, which enables me to trace their influence 
upon areas such as rational choice sociology, symbolic interactionism, new and “old” 
institutionalist economics, neopragmatism, behavioural psychology, critical realism, 
poststructuralism and social constructivism, areas that are increasingly utilised by IPE 
theorists that attempt to incorporate more complex accounts of agency into their work.  
 
Whilst depicting the present state of IPE in its historical and intellectual context in a 
novel manner, I am also able to reflect upon the influence of Smith and James on the 
subject-field and the social sciences more broadly (see Fig.3). Through this, I suggest 
that a Smith-James framework of the self can aid current attempts to replace the 
predominant inductive-rationalist account of agency whilst avoiding methodological 
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individualism and overly structural accounts of the self. Whilst numerous scholars 
have considered the implications of Smith’s and James’s ideas, no one to my 
knowledge has yet focused directly on the ways in which their ideas have common 
characteristics and can be utilised to aid clearer understandings of the self in IPE in 
such a manner. 
 
Thesis outline:  
 
In Chapter One I analyse key developments in the secondary debate on Smith, in 
which he is variously depicted as a proto-equilibrium theorist, a deist, an enemy of the 
poor, an obscurantist, and, most commonly, as the libertarian founder of laissez-faire 
capitalism and the self-regulating market (Sayer 2003: 341; Montes 2004: 163). I 
suggest that this view stems from the Adam Smith Problem, in which it is erroneously 
assumed that that there are two incommensurable “Adam Smiths” represented by each 
of the two books that were published during his lifetime. As A. L. Macfie (1953; 
1967) rightly notes, the ethical overtones are “damped down” in WN when compared 
to The Theory of Moral Sentiments3
                                                 
3 Hereafter referred to as TMS. 
. As Macfie also explains, however, the theme of 
natural liberty that runs through both books resolves any tension between them. As 
such, rather than following the prevailing tendency in the secondary debate in which 
Smith’s alleged intentions are extrapolated from specific passages of one or other of 
his books, I instead assess his evidently connected oeuvre in terms of its recurring 
themes. This is important since, concurrent with his increasing popularity, and despite 
a gradually growing appreciation for the evidently connected nature of his thought, 
the Adam Smith Problem is still being reiterated in the social sciences, as economists 
cite exclusively from WN, whilst sociologists and others in the humanities refer only 
to TMS (Wight 2002).  
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This division is also reflected in the secondary debate on Smith. Just as orthodox 
theorists focus on WN, heterodox Smithians and economic historians attempt to 
resurrect TMS. As I discuss, these latter arguments centre on Smith’s alleged deism 
and the supposed ironic distortion that he applies to his more radical views. I analyse 
the development of these arguments, and, while stressing their interconnected nature, 
suggest that these authors fail to challenge mainstream accounts of Smith sufficiently 
as they discuss his work on orthodox authors’ terms. Such an overview of the 
secondary debate on Smith has not been previously provided as far as I am aware.  
 
A similar possibility is observable in terms of a discussion of the intellectual context 
through which IPE has developed. According to Jean-Pierre Dupuy (2002: 139), 
political economy’s origins can be traced to the “fertile soil” of the Scottish 
Enlightenment. However, analysis of this body of thought is entirely absent from IPE 
debate. To my mind, this is an important oversight, which I attempt to address in 
Chapter Two. Here, I compare Smith’s views to those of his contemporaries in the 
Scottish Enlightenment in order to discern the classical and immediate influences on 
his thought. This also enables me to present the nature of the intellectual advances 
that he makes upon these sources and upon his peers. As I discuss, unlike his 
contemporaries, Smith is able to demonstrate the compatibility of economic and moral 
progress. Indeed, as I argue, for Smith, propriety is established without an appeal to a 
religiously- or philosophically-inspired objective standard of morality.  
 
This distance from his peers denotes Smith’s emphasis upon self-determination, 
which, rather than representing a commitment to methodological individualism, 
relates to his appeal to different individual and cultural articulations of human 
experience. As I argue, this is reflected in his theory of knowledge and his 
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conceptualisation of a plurality of moral aptitudes and viewpoints that exist within 
society, an approach that is developed through his concept of the impartial spectator. 
As I suggest, it is this concept that enables Smith to avoid moral relativism, as he 
observes common traits that are contextually interpreted. As I also note, this view is 
consistent with his thoroughgoing restraint from advocating a point at which society 
should aim or through which moral behaviour ought to be evaluated. Smith’s flexible, 
optimistic and psychological account of political economy is thus in direct contrast to 
the civic humanism of his contemporaries. By again focussing on what Smith says 
rather than suggesting what he might mean, this comparison highlights the ongoing 
relevance of his thought to contemporary IPE.  
 
As I explain in Chapter Three, this stems in part from Smith’s observation that 
humans have a psychological need to place apparently unconnected phenomena into 
contemporaneously agreeable philosophical systems. This relates to his emphasis on 
the importance of the imagination and aesthetics to the division of labour, the 
development of language, morality, and economic growth, which is informed by his 
commitment to the provisional nature of knowledge that informs the non-dogmatic 
nature of his thought, which I discuss here. I also argue in this Chapter that such an 
approach is similar to that utilised by William James, “father” of modern psychology. 
As I show, like Smith, and unlike his contemporaries in the new disciplines of 
psychology and economics whose rationalist assumptions regarding the self continue 
to implicitly inform IPE, James does not posit a distinction between the “economic” 
and the “moral” self. Instead, he develops a philosophically and psychologically 
sophisticated account of the self and of the provisional nature of knowledge that I 
argue is compatible with Smith’s thought. As I also argue, this compatibility provides 
a framework of the self that might be employed in IPE. 
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In Chapter Four, I demonstrate the intellectual space that exists within IPE for such a 
framework. As I discuss here, Smith and James avoid the catallactic separation of 
economics and politics that has shaped the social sciences since their creation in the 
period following the Methodenstreit. I suggest that their subsequent separation along 
an inductive-deductive divide is reflected in the tendency to bifurcate IPE along 
methodological lines, as is demonstrated by the widespread tendency to characterise 
the subject-field in terms a split between North American and British IPE (e.g., 
Cameron and Palan 2009; Cohen 2007; 2008; Denemark and O’Brien 1997; Murphy 
and Nelson 2001; Tierney and Maliniak 2009; Tooze 1985). As I note, this is also 
accompanied by a desire to bridge the perceived methodological divide, at times via 
compliance with the norms that these authors associate with the North American 
version of IPE (e.g., Cohen 2009; McNamara 2009; Seabrooke 2007a).  
 
I argue that this tendency masks the shared rationalist underpinnings of both “camps” 
in IPE. I demonstrate this through discussion of similar attempts made by rationalist, 
institutionalist and constructivist authors who attempt to bridge the apparent 
methodological divide via the introduction into their analyses of more complex 
accounts of the self than that provided by neoclassical economics. As I show, 
however, these attempts fail to move beyond reductive accounts of agency in a 
meaningful way owing to their implicit commitment to the rationalist separation of 
economics from other areas of life that was instituted behind disciplinary boundaries 
in the post-Methodenstreit period.  
 
I also point out a further common feature shared between these ostensibly disparate 
approaches: the pervasive influence of Smith and James, whose ideas are interpreted 
by these theorists via figures such as Menger, Mead, John Dewey, Thorstein Veblen, 
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Herbert Simon, and Charles S. Peirce. As I suggest, despite representing a distortion 
of Smith’s and James’s thought, this highlights the ongoing importance of their 
insights to contemporary social science. As such, my discussion also demonstrates the 
importance of the provision of an accurate appraisal of their thought. 
 
This approach also facilitates the intellectual and historical contextualisation of IPE. 
This also highlights its ability to transcend post-disciplinary methodological barriers, 
and therefore to employ a non-reductive account of agency. I explore this likelihood 
in the conclusion to the thesis. Here, I suggest that IPE theorists are unaware of their 
subject field’s intellectual roots, a view that is shared by Roger Tooze and Craig 
Murphy (1991), who point to IPE’s origins in the work of Adam Smith. As I suggest, 
however, Tooze and Murphy (1996) attribute to Smith an interventionism that he does 
not advocate. I argue that this is significant since their notion of “ameliorative 
epistemology” demonstrates that a complex account of the self is necessary in order to 
address the current marginalisation of the poor in contemporary IPE.  
 
Despite pointing out the need for such an account of the self, Tooze and Murphy 
neglect to explain how this might be achieved. I suggest that this failure is reflected 
by Hobson and Seabrooke (2007a; 2007b), who attempt to provide a “bottom-up” 
approach to policy formation in their notion of “everyday IPE”. As I explain, Hobson 
and Seabrooke employ this concept in order to attempt to overcome the universalism 
that they correctly identify in the subject field. However, they fail to explicate how 
agency is formed beyond social norms and conventions. As I argue, this latest failure 
to address the problem of agency in IPE is typical of other efforts that I analyse in this 
thesis that demonstrate an implicit acceptance of the post-Methodenstreit rationalist 
split.  
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As I also argue, this again demonstrates the intellectual space that exists within IPE 
for a more sophisticated account of the self than is currently granted by neoclassical 
economics. As I argue here, this can be provided by the seminal contributions of 
Smith and James, who, as I observe, demonstrated the importance of everyday 
knowledge before such a divide was institutionalised. This reflects both figures’ 
commitment to self-determination, which, I argue, can supply critical IPE with an 
alternative to top-down interventionism whilst providing the subject field with a 
complex concept of the self. 
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Fig. 1: Overview of the secondary debate on Smith 
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Author 
Are WN and 
TMS 
inconsistent? 
Is TMS 
important? 
Is Das 
Adam 
Smith 
Problem 
important? 
Is Smith 
a laissez-
faire 
theorist? 
Is Smith an 
equilibrium 
theorist?  
Does 
Smith 
obscure 
his 
views? 
Is the 
invisible 
hand 
theological? 
1790 Du Pont Yes No - Yes - Yes No 
1793    Stewart No Yes - Maybe - Yes No 
1848 Hildebrand Yes Yes Yes Yes - No No 
1850 McCulloch Yes No Yes Yes - No No 
1878 Skarżyński Yes No Yes Yes - No No 
1889 Zeyss No Yes No No - No No 
1896 Cannan No Yes No Yes - No No 
1897 Oncken No Yes No No - No No 
  1907 Schmoller Yes No Yes Yes - No Yes 
1928 Viner  Yes No Yes No  -  No Yes 
1928 Morrow No Yes No Yes - No No 
1932 Robbins Yes No Yes Yes Yes No No 
1940 Bittermann No Yes No No No Maybe Maybe 
1952 Samuelson Yes No Yes Yes Yes No  No 
1954 Schumpeter No No No Yes Yes No No 
1967 Macfie No Yes No No No No No 
1973 Hollander No Yes No Maybe Yes No No 
1976 Raphael & 
Macfie 
No Yes No No No No No 
1976 Stigler Yes No No Yes Yes No No 
1976 Campbell & 
Skinner 
No Yes No No No No No 
1980 Friedman Yes No No Yes Yes No No 
1981 Teichgraeber No Yes Yes No No No No 
1997 Winch No Yes No No No No No 
1999 Griswold No  Yes Yes No No No No 
1999 Peil No Yes No No No No No 
2000 Otteson No Yes Yes No No No No 
2001 Rothschild No  Yes No No  No  Yes No 
2002 Hill No Yes No No No Yes Yes 
2004 Fleischacker No Yes No No No Yes No 
2004 Montes No Yes Yes No No Yes No 
2006 Haakonssen & 
Winch 
No Yes Yes No No No No 
2009 Watson No Yes Yes No No No No 
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Fig 2: Some differences in Scottish Enlightenment thought 
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Fig.3: Smith’s and James’s influence on the social sciences 
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1a) Introduction 
 
For to what purpose is all the toil and trouble of this world? …Is it to supply 
the necessities of nature? The wages of the meanest labourer can supply them 
…From whence, then, arises that emulation which runs through all the 
different ranks of men, and what are the advantages which we propose by that 
great purpose of life that we call bettering our condition? To be observed, to 
be attended to, to be taken notice of with sympathy, complacency, and 
approbation, are all the advantages which we can derive from it (Smith 1976 
[1790], I.iii.2.1). 
 
In TMS (1759),4 Adam Smith observes that an individual’s drive to better her 
condition arises from her needs as a social being. In WN (1776),5
In 1.1.1-2, I provide a brief outline of WN and TMS, and reflect upon their connected 
nature. In 1.2.1-4, I assess mainstream interpretations of Smith, focussing in particular 
on these authors’ views regarding the assumed meaning of his “invisible hand” 
 Smith points out the 
connected nature of the economy, relating national prosperity to individual behaviour. 
In heterodox accounts, these books are viewed as different sections of a consistent 
system of thought. By contrast, two incompatible “Smiths” are implied in orthodox 
readings, based on an assumed inconsistency between the two books: Smith the 
liberal economist of WN, which is emphasised, and Smith the moral philosopher of 
TMS, which is disparaged or ignored. However, these assumptions are rarely rendered 
explicit. A consequence of this is the reproduction of two “Adam Smiths” across the 
social sciences, as scholars attracted to his insights from different fields subsequently 
engage with either “Smith” via canonical disciplinary texts or through specific points 
in the secondary debate. In order to address this important trend, I attempt in this 
chapter to assess the development of key arguments within orthodox and heterodox 
approaches so as to identify the intellectual basis of contemporary views on Smith.  
                                                 
4 The first edition of TMS was published in 1759. All references to the book in this thesis are however 
made to the sixth and final edition (1790), published by Oxford University Press in 1976 as Volume I 
of the Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith.  
5 All references made to WN in the text are to Volume II of the Glasgow Edition of the Works and 
Correspondence of Adam Smith, published by Oxford University Press in 1976. 
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metaphor, his attitude towards self-interest, and the Adam Smith Problem. A similar 
approach is taken in 1.3.1-3 in terms of developments within the heterodox debate, 
where contemporary arguments regarding Smith’s supposed obfuscation of his views 
and his alleged theological leanings are discussed with reference to earlier positions in 
the debate.   
 
In this chapter I therefore aim to emphasise the complex and interconnected nature of 
the secondary debate on Smith’s thought, the inaccuracy of orthodox interpretations 
of it, and the limited extent of the heterodox consensus and its influence on popular 
conceptions of his work. In conclusion, I argue that a thoroughly holistic approach 
facilitates a focus upon recurring themes in Smith’s work, and that this is preferable to 
certain heterodox authors’ attempts aimed at “correcting” mainstream interpretations 
of it. This is consistent with the approach taken in subsequent chapters, in which the 
influences on Smith’s thought and its influence upon the social sciences, in particular 
IPE, are examined. 
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Part One: Smith’s books: an outline 
 
1.1.1) The Wealth of Nations 
 
In WN, Smith inquires into the development and workings of the co-ordinated market 
system in eighteenth century Britain. In Book I, he observes that a domestic division 
of labour increases productivity, the principal factor affecting growth, and suggests 
that this develops from individuals’ natural predisposition to “…truck, barter and 
exchange one thing for another” (Smith 1976 [1776], I.ii.1). Smith also suggests that 
such activity is optimised within a framework of natural liberty, a view that perhaps 
contributes to his enduring reputation as a dogmatic advocate of the merits of self-
interested behaviour and free market economics. 
 
Certainly, Smith assumes average rates of wages, profit, and rent in order to 
determine the “natural” price of a commodity, “…to which the prices of all 
commodities are continually gravitating”. He contrasts this to the “market” price, 
which he defines as that regulated by “…the proportion between the quantity which is 
actually brought to the market, and the demand of those who are willing to pay the 
natural price of the commodity” (Smith 1976 [1776], I.vii.8-15; Fleischacker 2004: 
17-18; Lavezzi 2003: 83). Smith also suggests that the balance between the supply of, 
and demand for, labour determines wages, and highlights the uneven bargaining 
power facilitated by legislation: 
 
The workmen desire to get as much, the masters to give as little as possible. 
The former are disposed to combine in order to raise, the latter in order to 
lower the wages of labour…It is not, however, difficult to foresee which of the 
two parties must, upon all ordinary occasions, have the advantage in the 
dispute, and force the other into a compliance with their terms. The masters, 
being fewer in number, can combine much more easily; and the law, besides, 
authorizes, or at least does not prohibit their combinations...(Smith 1976 
[1776], I.viii.11-12). 
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This point is developed in Book I, Chapter x, where Smith expresses his antipathy 
towards the “spirit of corporation”:  
 
People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and 
diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the publick, or in 
some contrivance to raise prices. It is impossible indeed to prevent such 
meetings, by any law which either could be executed, or would be consistent 
with liberty and justice. But though the law cannot hinder people of the same 
trade from sometimes assembling together, it ought to do nothing to facilitate 
such assemblies; much less to render them necessary. 
 
 
The pretence that corporations are necessary for the better government of the 
trade, is without any foundation. The real and effectual discipline which is 
exercised over a workman, is not that of his corporation, but that of his 
customers. It is the fear of losing their employment which restrains his frauds 
and corrects his negligence (Ibid, I.x.c.27; 31). 
 
Smith also criticises the poor laws’ effect upon the “free circulation of labour” and its 
attendant contribution to needless poverty here (Ibid, I.x.c.45). Indeed, this opposition 
to regulations that obstruct the welfare of the “great body of the people” is reflected 
throughout the latter part of WN, for example in Book IV, where he attacks the 
“absurd” trade restrictions imposed in the interests of mercantilist traders, and in 
Book V, where he observes that the working patterns associated with material 
progress can have deleterious consequences for the mental well being of the workers 
(Ibid, V.i.f.50). This is not to suggest, however, that Smith is engaging in political 
rhetoric regarding the rights of the poor, or indeed the evils of regulation. Rather, he 
considers it to be readily evident that:  
 
[i]n every country it always is and must be the interest of the great body of the 
people to buy whatever they want of those who sell it cheapest. The 
proposition is so very manifest, that it seems ridiculous to take any pains to 
prove it; nor could it ever have been called in question, had not the interested 
sophistry of merchants and manufacturers confounded the common sense of 
mankind (Ibid, IV.iii.2.2-10).   
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It is therefore interesting to consider that economists such as Joseph Schumpeter 
choose to ignore these aspects of Smith’s work. Indeed, despite pointing out that 
Books IV and V account for over half of WN, Schumpeter dismisses them as treatises 
on economic history and policy (Schumpeter 1994 [1954]: 186, footnote 17; 141). 
Echoing Edwin Cannan (1994 [1904]: xxxix), Schumpeter directs attention to the 
supposed influence of the French Physiocrats on Smith’s theory of distribution in 
Book II of WN (Schumpeter 1994 [1954]: 190). To be sure, the Physiocratic model 
influences Smith here insofar as it allows him to develop a descriptive and analytic 
conceptualisation of the economic system, as Andrew Skinner points out (Skinner 
2003: 104). However, this does not imply that Smith is similarly influenced by their 
doctrinaire opposition to governmental intervention, as is commonly supposed.6
[P]rivate frugality and good conduct of individuals by their universal, 
continual, and uninterrupted effort to better their own condition…protected by 
law and allowed by liberty to exert itself [capital] in the manner that is most 
advantageous…has maintained the progress of England towards opulence and 
improvement in all former times, and which, it is to be hoped, will do so in all 
future times (Smith 1976 [1776], II.iii.36).
  
Instead, he relates economic growth to individuals’ self-command and the natural 
propensity for the improvement of their material condition: 
 
7
This advocacy of self-determination facilitated by a framework of natural liberty is 
echoed in Book III, where Smith discusses the “natural progress of opulence”, in 
which “…the greater part of the capital of every growing society is, first, directed to 
agriculture, afterwards to manufactures, and last of all to foreign commerce”. Here, he 
 
 
                                                 
6 Indeed, as William Caldwell points out, Smith “…came by the idea of the necessity of a scheme of 
distribution from the Physiocrats, but his own philosophy of the production of wealth was already too 
far worked out to be altogether changed”. As such, he criticises those that claim that Smith’s “…whole 
doctrine of free enterprise and the natural creation and increase of wealth is simply the laissez-faire, 
‘state of nature’ philosophy of French eighteenth century writers” (Caldwell 1897: 244-256 [italics in 
original]). 
7 As Roy Campbell and Andrew Skinner point out, Smith observes that the natural desire to improve 
one’s material condition ensures that individuals save part of their income, which enables some 
individuals to purchase items of fixed and circulating capital. This leads to higher levels of output and 
income, which facilitates greater levels of savings and investment, thereby continuing a self-generating 
process (Campbell and Skinner intro to Smith 1976 [1776]: 30; Campbell and Skinner 1982: 172-179). 
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notes that “…in all the modern states of Europe” this has been “entirely inverted” into 
an “unnatural and retrograde order” (Ibid, III.i.8-9). Despite the apparent influence of 
the Physiocrats here, Smith evidently does not share their commitment to laissez-faire 
policy, as authors such as Schumpeter (e.g., 1994 [1954]: 184-186) erroneously claim.  
 
Indeed, it is plainly hostility to legislation that confers unfair advantages rather than 
doctrinaire opposition to governmental intervention per se that characterises Smith’s 
views here. This theme of fairness is also evident in TMS, in which standards of virtue 
are defined in terms of natural justice.8 This balance between autonomy and justice is 
perhaps expressed most succinctly in the introduction to Book IV of WN, where Smith 
states that political economy is “…considered as a branch of the science of a 
statesman or legislator, to provide a plentiful revenue or subsistence for the people, or 
more properly to enable them to provide such a revenue or subsistence for 
themselves” (Ibid, IV.intro.1).9
In spite of the burgeoning heterodox literature to which Winch contributes, Smith 
continues to be associated with the classical liberal tradition associated with John 
Stuart Mill, in which it is suggested that: “[l]aisser-faire…should be the general 
practice…” (Mill 1909 [1871]: 950 [italics in original]). Arguably, Smith’s intricate 
observations regarding the role of government and the benefits of a system of natural 
 According to Donald Winch, despite the self-
determining features of such a view, this: 
 
…continues to disconcert historians of economic thought. It suggests a form of 
statecraft that seems to belie the very nature of the Wealth of Nations, whether 
seen, anachronistically, as a contribution to ‘positive’ economics, or as a 
critique of contemporary economic policies from a position that later became 
known as economic liberalism (Winch 1983b: 501). 
 
 
                                                 
8 See, for examples, Smith 1976 (1790), II.ii.2.1; III.i.2; III.vi.10. 
9 As Campbell and Skinner point out, this “…is very much a part of his [Smith’s] general model” 
(Campbell and Skinner, intro to Smith 1976 [1776]: 36; See also Kennedy 2005: 145). 
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liberty are understood more clearly in terms of self-determination and self-command, 
themes that are reflected throughout TMS. 
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1.1.2) The Theory of Moral Sentiments 
 
As in WN, Smith employs a historical methodology in TMS in order to inquire into the 
nature of social interaction. Here, this is related specifically to a discussion of the 
nature of virtue, which is made via his central concept, that of sympathy. As he 
explains in Part I of TMS, this involves “…changing places in fancy with the 
sufferer”. Smith is careful to distinguish this from mere pity or compassion (Smith 
1976 [1790], I.i.1.1-3), suggesting instead that we sympathise if we can “enter into” 
the motives of the agent, and thus are able to accurately “go along with” the 
resentment of the sufferer of an injustice or the gratitude of the recipient of good 
fortune.10
                                                 
10 As discussed in 2.1.3, Smith is therefore able to move beyond previous views such as those held by 
David Hume (e.g., 1896 [1739]), for whom sympathy is conceptualised as a “contagion” of sentiments 
(Ross 1995: 164). 
  
 
According to Smith, we naturally desire the sympathy and approbation of others.  It is 
for this reason, he suggests, that “…we make parade of our riches, and conceal our 
poverty” (Ibid, I.iii.2.1). He also observes, however, that, as wealth comes to be 
considered a principal object of admiration in the commercial stage of society, virtue 
is potentially deprived its value in acquiring this approbation. As such, he notes that 
the ability to sympathise with others’ motives may be similarly impaired. Smith 
solves this problem by developing the argument that we judge of others in the same 
way in which we judge ourselves, supposing ourselves the impartial spectators of our 
own behaviour:  
 
I divide myself into two persons…the first is the spectator, whose sentiments 
with regard to my own conduct I endeavour to enter into…The second is the 
agent, the person whom I properly call myself…The first is the judge; the  
second the person judged of (Ibid, I.iii.3.6).   
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Smith suggests that it is via one’s impartial spectator rather than state or sectional 
intervention through which individuals are able to judge the propriety of their own 
and others’ conduct, by way of: “…the tribunal of their own consciences…the man 
within the breast, the great judge and arbiter of their conduct” (Ibid, III.ii.32). This 
theme of self-determination recurs throughout TMS, such as in Part II, where Smith 
explains the natural jurisprudential foundations of individual and social sympathy. 
Rejecting accounts that suggest that justice is determined by considerations of utility, 
he argues instead that the ability to sympathise with others’ motives ensures that 
justice is served:  
 
All the members of human society stand in need of each others assistance, and 
are likewise exposed to mutual injuries…Society…cannot subsist among those 
who are at all times ready to hurt and injure one another…the prevalence of 
injustice must utterly destroy it (Ibid, II.ii.3.1; II.ii.3.3; See also Ibid, II.ii.2.1; 
III.ii.6; VII.ii.1.7). 
 
As he explains, recognition of this is facilitated by one’s relationship to one’s 
impartial spectator. As such, although Smith is clear that the moral sentiments are 
formed within society, he does not give an overly structural account of virtue. Indeed, 
he notes in Part II that virtuous motives that gain the sympathy of the “man within the 
breast” but that go unnoticed by others retain their just character. Smith explains that 
it is at these times that individuals are supported by their relationship with their 
“impartial and well-informed spectator” in their efforts to regard themselves “…not in 
the light in which he at present appears [to others], but in that in which he ought to 
appear, in which he would have appeared had his generous designs been crowned 
with success” (Ibid, II.iii.3.6). To be sure, against Bernard Mandeville (e.g., 1705), for 
whom outwardly virtuous behaviour can effectively conceal a selfish disposition, 
Smith explains in Book III that, in addition to their desire for praise from their 
fellows, individuals yearn for genuine praiseworthiness: 
 28 
The love and admiration which we naturally conceive for those whose 
character and conduct we approve of, necessarily dispose us to desire to 
become ourselves the objects of the like agreeable sentiments, and to be as 
amiable and as admirable as those whom we love and admire the most. 
Emulation, the anxious desire that we ourselves should excel, is originally 
founded in our admiration of the excellence of others. Neither can we be 
satisfied with being merely admired for what other people are admired. We 
must at least believe ourselves to be admirable for what they are admirable. 
But, in order to attain this satisfaction, we must become the impartial 
spectators of our own character and conduct. We must endeavour to view 
them with the eyes of other people, or as other people are likely to view them. 
…Their approbation necessarily confirms our own self–approbation (Ibid, 
III.ii.3). 
 
As Smith suggests in Part IV, each individual - including those whose virtue goes 
unrecognised beyond their own impartial spectator - contributes to the harmony and 
progress of society. This includes those whose efforts are directed primarily at gaining 
the approbation of others through social display. This is evident in his discussion of 
the “…poor man’s son, whom heaven in its anger has visited with ambition…” who 
seeks to emulate the happiness and contentment he imagines the rich enjoy: 
 
Through the whole of his life he pursues the idea of a certain artificial and 
elegant repose which he may never arrive at, for which he sacrifices a real 
tranquillity that is at all times in his power…It is then, in the last dregs of 
life… that he begins at last to find that wealth and greatness are mere trinkets 
of frivolous utility, no more adapted for procuring ease of body or tranquillity 
of mind than the tweezer-cases of the lover of toys (Ibid, IV.i.8). 
 
However, Smith does not disparage such individuals’ longing for social status. Rather, 
he suggests that: “…it is well that nature imposes upon us in this manner. It is this 
deception which rouses and keeps in continual motion the industry of mankind” (Ibid, 
IV.i.10). 
 
Smith again refers to this deception in WN, where he notes that the “…uniform, 
constant, and uninterrupted effort of every man to better his condition” subsequently 
creates new social bonds with those outside of one’s immediate circles via the 
 29 
increased commercial activity such an effort prompts (Smith 1976 [1776], II.iii.31). 
This process facilitates deeper imaginative reflection upon others’ motives, thereby 
increasing one’s sympathetic abilities, through which tranquillity - or real happiness - 
is found (Smith 1976 [1790], I.i.3.10).11
Sometimes what is called the constitution of the state, that is, the interest of 
the government; sometimes the interest of particular orders of men who 
tyrannize the government, warp the positive laws of the country from what 
natural justice would prescribe (Ibid, VII.iv.36).
 The role of the imagination is again referred 
to in Part V of TMS, where Smith discusses the relationship between contextually- 
and universally-observed standards of morality:    
 
The principles of the imagination, upon which our sense of beauty 
depends…may easily be altered by habit and education: but the sentiments of 
moral approbation and disapprobation, are founded on the strongest and most 
vigorous passions of human nature; and though they may be somewhat warpt, 
cannot be entirely perverted (Ibid, V.ii.1). 
 
Smith thus retains moral agency for the individual whilst avoiding a relativistic 
conceptualisation of morality. This is also evident in Part VI of TMS, where he relates 
sympathy to self-command, from which, he argues: “…all the other virtues seem to 
derive their principal lustre” (Ibid, VI.iii.11), and which promotes the harmony of 
society more effectively than positive systems of law, which he criticises in Part VII: 
 
12
This antipathy to such “warping” of the moral sentiments is also echoed in Smith’s 
opposition to “men of system” in Book VI, who he argues seek to impose their 
standards of right and wrong on the populace. As discussed in 2.3.1, Smith’s view is 
in contrast to civic humanist arguments that suggest positive interventions in order to 
  
 
                                                 
11 See Smith 1976 (1776), I.i.10; Smith 1976 (1790), II.ii.2.1-4; IV.i.9 Bonar 1922: 169; Campbell and 
Skinner 1982: 105; Fleischacker 2004: 115; Frantz 2000: 14; Morrow 1928: 173; Verburg 2000: 37  
12 As such, he argues: “The two useful parts of moral philosophy, therefore, are Ethics and 
Jurisprudence: casuistry ought to be rejected altogether” (Smith 1976 [1790], VII.iv.34). In this Part, 
Smith also discusses the systems of moral philosophy of the Peripatetics and Ancient Stoics (Ibid, 
VII.ii.1-2) and the views of Thomas Hobbes (Ibid, VII.iii.1-2), Francis Hutcheson (Ibid, VII.ii.3; 
VII.iii.3) and Mandeville (Ibid, VII.ii.4), whose explanations of virtue and approbation he rejects. 
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combat the alleged incommensurability of commerce and virtue, which reflects the 
opposition to institutional distortions of natural liberty that is a feature of WN. As 
such, a holistic approach to his oeuvre suggests that whenever Smith addresses a 
certain aspect of life, for example economic activity, he does so without isolating that 
particular sphere from its wider social context, or indeed from other elements of his 
thought. However, as Leonidas Montes notes:  
 
The widespread failure of most modern economists to appreciate this has 
led…to a biased conception of Adam Smith as the prophet of self-interest and 
the forebear of neoclassical economics (Montes 2004: 2). 
 
The development of such a view is discussed in the next Part of this chapter. 
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Part Two: Orthodox interpretations 
1.2.1) Smith, Schumpeter and Walras    
 
According to Jan Peil (1999: 7), the publication of the Glasgow Edition of Smith’s 
works and correspondence between 1976 and 1987 marked a new phase in Smithian 
scholarship, in which orthodox interpretations based on selective readings of his work 
began to be effectively challenged. However, the impact of these arguments upon 
mainstream characterisations of Smith’s views has been minimal. As noted, Smith’s 
popular reputation is that of a dogmatic advocate of self-interest and free trade. As 
Keith Tribe (1999: 609) explains: “[t]his long-established tradition of interpretation 
was reinforced during the 1980s, Adam Smith’s name being invoked on both sides of 
the Atlantic by neo-liberal policymakers”. More recently, Gordon Brown has echoed 
this view, despite claiming to have “rescued” Smith from the Hayekian Adam Smith 
Institute (Glaze 2008: 377). The continued dominance of this characterisation is 
arguably reflected by press coverage of the Bank of England’s March 2007 decision 
to place Smith on the British £20 note, in which he is mistakenly depicted as the 
founding father of capitalism, competition and libertarianism.13
                                                 
13 See, for example, BBC (online), 21/02/07 (“The economist is most famous for his book the Wealth of 
Nations, which many regard as almost inventing the concept of competition and market forces”.); The 
Daily Telegraph (online), 31/10/07 (“Who better for the £20 note than the patron saint of the free 
market, Adam Smith?”); The Daily Mirror (online) 31/10/2006 (“Adam Smith…helped to create the 
modern academic discipline of economics and argued for free trade, capitalism, and libertarianism”.)  
 However, this 
misinterpretation is not restricted to politicians and the mainstream media. Despite the 
conflation of economic and political liberalism occurring a number of years after 
Smith’s death, he is routinely referred to as an “economic liberal” in its contemporary 
sense in social science textbooks as well as in academic discourse more broadly 
(Tribe 1999: 609, footnote 3; Watson 2007: 30-36; Cohen 2008: 147). These 
erroneous characterisations are informed by orthodox economists’ selective approach 
to Smith’s work. As Montes (2004:13) argues:  
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Mainstream economists sometimes quote one or two sentences of Smith, 
usually out of context, in order to give their findings greater prestige…there is 
also a generalised view among economists that Smith is the forebear, if not the 
founder, of general economic equilibrium theory.  
 
As Knud Haakonnsen and Donald Winch (2006: 373) point out, this enables orthodox 
theorists to characterise Smith’s central intention as attempting to discover: 
 
“…under what market conditions does the ‘invisible hand’ generate the most 
efficient allocation of a society’s scarce resources on the basis of decisions 
made by individual economic agents…?” …From this perspective it is 
possible to regard Smith as foreshadowing one of the central problems of 
economics, while recognising that his intuitions left much to be repaired by 
more sophisticated generations. Joseph Schumpeter set the patronising tone 
when discussing Smith’s pioneering efforts in this field.14
Schumpeter ostensibly advocates a holistic approach to Smith’s oeuvre. However, 
despite stating that: “…both the Moral Sentiments and the Wealth of Nations are 
blocks cut out from a larger systematic whole”, he regards reading the first two books 
of WN as sufficient to understanding Smith’s contribution to economic analysis, in 
particular: “[t]he rudimentary equilibrium theory of [Book I] chapter 7, by far the best 
piece of economic theory turned out by Adam Smith…[which] points towards Say, 
and through the latter’s work to Walras” (Schumpeter 1994 [1954]: 141; 189).
 
 
15
Schumpeter also places Smith in the Pufendorfian natural law tradition in order to 
emphasise his alleged political liberalism. However, a truly holistic approach to 
Smith’s oeuvre undermines this connection, as Peil (1999: 41-52) suggests. Indeed, 
Smith explicitly distances himself from Pufendorf’s rationalistic and atomistic 
interpretation of individuals in TMS (See Smith 1976 [1790], VII.iii.1-4). Despite this, 
  
 
                                                 
14 According to Schumpeter, Smith’s “…limitations made for success. Had he been more brilliant, he 
would not have been taken so seriously. Had he dug more deeply, had he unearthed more recondite 
truth, had he used difficult and ingenious methods, he would not have been understood” (Schumpeter 
1994 [1954]: 185). 
15 As Winch (1997: 391) points out, this conflation is problematic, as, whereas for Léon Say, 
“…entrepreneurship has a separate function and reward, Smithian entrepreneurs are indistinguishable 
from those who receive interest and/or profit on their invested capital”. 
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Schumpeter’s interpretation is influential upon contemporary economists’ impressions 
of Smith’s thought, which is dependent upon the neoclassical assumption regarding 
the feasibility - and desirability - of the separation of economics and philosophy: 
 
I hold that the garb of philosophy is removable ... in the case of economics: 
economics has not been shaped at any time by the philosophical opinions that 
economists happened to have, though it has frequently been vitiated by their 
political attitudes (Ibid, 31-32).16
This view - which echoes the influence of marginalist economists Léon Walras (e.g., 
1874), William Stanley Jevons (e.g., 1871) and Carl Menger (e.g., 1871) - informs the 
common tendency to focus exclusively on the “scientific” WN at the expense of the 
“philosophical” TMS (see 4.1.1). This is reflected in Michael Fry’s (1992) Adam 
Smith’s Legacy: His Place in the Development of Modern Economics, an edited 
collection to which ten laureates of The Sveriges Riksbank [Bank of Sweden] Prize in 
Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel contribute essays.
  
 
17
This selective approach arguably reflects that of Walras, who, according to 
Schumpeter (1951: 95) is “…the greatest of all theorists”. Like Schumpeter, Walras 
praises Smith whilst “correcting” his views in his Elements of Pure Economics 
 As Athol 
Fitzgibbons (1995: 170-171) points out, the book contains indications from some of 
the authors that they are wholly unfamiliar with TMS. In addition, most of the 
references are drawn from the same sections of WN, where Smith’s commitment to 
free markets and advocacy of selfish behaviour is alleged to reside.  
 
                                                 
16 According to Daniel Hausman (1992: 272): “Neoclassical economics is the articulation, elaboration, 
and the application of equilibrium theory…Equilibrium theory consists of the theory of consumer 
choice, the theory of the firm, and the thesis that equilibrium obtains” (Hausman, D. M. [1992] The 
Inexact and Separate Science of Economics. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 
cited in Backhouse 1995: 114). It is important to note, however, that the term “neoclassical economics” 
is contentious. See, for examples, Colander (2000); Garnett (2005); Arnsperger and Varoufakis (2006). 
17 London: Routledge. The laureates are: Paul Samuelson, Laurence Klein, Maurice Allais, Richard 
Stone, Franco Modigliani, James Buchanan, James Tobin, Theodore W. Schultz, Wassily Leontief and 
Jan Tinbergen. 
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(1874). Walras’ main attack on Smith is arguably typical of orthodox accounts as it is 
concerned with the latter’s alleged theory of value, gleaned from comments in Book I, 
chapter v of WN, in which Smith states: “The real price of every thing, what every 
thing really costs to the man who wants to acquire it, is the toil and trouble of 
acquiring it” (Smith 1976 [1776], I.v.2). According to William Jaffé, Walras 
interprets this as conclusive proof that Smith’s view is that labour alone has value, 
and contrasts this to his notion of “rareté”, the analytical tool of marginal utility, 
which Walras argues is the ultimate standard of a correct theory of value (Jaffé 1977: 
24-26; Bernstein 2003: 15-16). As Jaffé explains, it is this that enables Walras to 
presume that he can successfully reject Smith’s commitment to a labour theory of 
value:  
 
…why is labour worth anything? Why is it exchangeable? That is the question 
before us. Adam Smith neither asked nor answered it. Surely, if labour has 
value and is exchangeable, it is because it is scarce. Value therefore comes 
from scarcity. If there are things other than labour which are scarce, they, like 
labour, will also have value and be exchangeable. So the theory which traces 
the origin of value to labour is a theory that is completely devoid of meaning 
(Walras 1977 [1894], cited in Jaffé 1977: 23). 
 
However, in order to reach this conclusion, it is necessary for Walras to focus upon a 
particular sentence in WN, such as that cited above, whilst ignoring comments made 
only two paragraphs later, in which Smith states:  
 
But though labour be the real measure of the exchangeable value of all 
commodities, it is not that by which their value is commonly estimated…it is 
not easy to find any accurate measure either of hardship or ingenuity. In 
exchanging indeed the different productions of different sorts of labour for one 
another, some allowance is commonly made for both. It is adjusted, however, 
not by any accurate measure, but by the higgling and bargaining of the market, 
according to that sort of rough equality which, though not exact, is sufficient 
for carrying on the business of common life (Smith 1976 [1776], I.v.4). 
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As such, Smith does not trace the origin of value to labour. Consequently, Walras 
merely succeeds in demolishing a caricature of Smith’s theory, as Jaffé points out.18
This is evident in Smith’s essay The Principles which lead and direct Philosophical 
Enquiries; illustrated by The History of Astronomy,
  
 
As Matthew Watson (2005: 170) explains, Walras’ attempt to derive a theory of pure 
economics also relies upon an understanding of exchange and competition as the 
effects of action and reaction by abstract, atomistic individuals, a view shared by 
other authors that engage in selective readings of Smith’s work. As noted in 1.1.2, 
however, Smith’s discourse on sympathy as explicated in TMS is based upon an 
understanding of real individuals’ conduct in ordinary life, a theme that is reflected in 
his treatment of economic behaviour in WN. It is therefore possible to argue from a 
holistic reading of Smith that it is unlikely that he would approve of the “scientific”, 
systematic explanations of human behaviour as presented by Walras and repeated by 
neoclassical economists that are not indicated by actual experience (Peil 1999: 117-
124).   
 
19 in which he explains that there 
is no essential difference between scientific research and learning through daily 
experience. Here, Smith again argues against “fixed” systems of thought (Smith 1980, 
HoA, II.2), a position that is reflected in his opposition to economic, religious and 
political dogma in TMS and in WN.20
                                                 
18 According to Jaffé: “…it is doubtful that Walras ever read The Wealth of Nations attentively…on the 
rare occasions that he cited Adam Smith…the quotations appear to be…drawn from references already 
made by others…[Walras was] an execrable historian” (Jaffé 1977: 23-24). 
19 Hereafter referred to as HoA. 
20 See Smith 1976 (1790), III.iii.43; V.ii.7; VI.ii.7; Smith 1976 (1776), V.iii.3.6; V.iii.3.25; V.iii.3.42; 
IV.ii.10; Weinstein 2006: 24-28; Griswold 1999: 296. 
 It is perhaps ironic, therefore, that Schumpeter 
(1994 [1954]: 182) argues that HoA is: 
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The pearl of the collection…Nobody, I venture to say can have an adequate 
idea of Smith’s intellectual stature who does not know these essays. I also 
venture to say that, were it not for the undeniable fact, nobody would credit 
the author of the Wealth of Nations with the power to write them. 
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1.2.2) Smith, Samuelson and Newton 
 
Despite this, Schumpeter’s selective use of WN remains influential on mainstream 
approaches towards Smith, a position that is at least matched by Paul Samuelson. Like 
Schumpeter, Samuelson (1977: 42-49; 1992: 3; 1952: 61) attempts to excuse the 
weaknesses in Smith’s alleged general equilibrium theorising, retains a selective 
approach to Smith, and is in agreement with Schumpeter’s view regarding Walras’s 
supposed superiority to Jevons and Menger.21 However, Samuelson rejects 
Schumpeter’s derisory opinion of Smith’s economic analysis, and instead attempts to 
show that it can be accommodated within a “canonical” model of neo-classical growth 
theory.22 As such, Samuelson accords Smith the title of “the prophet of laissez-faire”, 
a view now perhaps as ubiquitous within mainstream economics as his textbook 
[Economics] in which this description appears (Samuelson 1973 [1948]: 840).23
As Montes argues, Samuelson’s stance is based on an erroneous conflation of Smith 
with Walras, the architect of the “equilibrium system”, and Newton, the discoverer of 
the “world system”.
  
 
24
                                                 
21 Samuelson qualifies this last view, however. As he explains: “Jevons, Walras and Menger each 
independently arrived at the so-called ‘theory of subjective value’”. For Samuelson (1952: 61), 
however, Walras is the greatest of these theorists “…because of the key importance of the concept of 
general equilibrium itself”. 
22 Persky 1989: 197; Haakonnsen and Winch 2006: 373. According to Samuelson (1978: 1415): “Adam 
Smith, David Ricardo, Thomas Robert Malthus, and John Stuart Mill shared in common essentially one 
dynamic model of equilibrium, growth, and distribution”. 
23 Samuelson’s Economics: An Introductory Analysis is the most popular economics textbook of all 
time, having sold over four million copies through its eighteen editions (Gottesman, Ramrattan and 
Szenberg 2005). This has had a significant impact on the teaching of the subject. As Arjo Klamer, 
Dierdre McCloskey, and Stephen Ziliak (2007: 2) argue: “…most of today’s [economics] textbooks 
teach Samuelsonianism pure and simple, period”. 
24 Samuelson 1952: 61 cited in Montes 2003a: 723. This conflation may be indirectly influenced by 
Thomas Pownall, who considers WN to be a work of “moral Newtonianism” (see Governor Pownall’s 
letter to Smith, 25th September 1776, in Smith 1987, Appendix A, pp.337-376). 
 According to Montes, Samuelson is responsible for the widely 
held assumption that Smith’s methodology carries forward Newton’s “mechanical 
philosophy” and proclivity for mathematical modelling into modern mainstream 
economics. However, as he argues, it is impossible for Smith to emulate Newton’s 
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Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica (1687). This is because “…human 
behaviour cannot be reduced to a mathematical order in Smith’s system as he did not 
recognise society as atomistic”. Moreover, as Montes (2004:13) explains, even if 
Smith does carry Newton forward, neither thinker has “…an atomistic-mechanistic 
view of the world in the tradition of neoclassical and later mainstream modern 
economics”. Nevertheless, as Montes points out:  
 
Mainstream economists have ignored this situation, relying on too narrow a 
reading of Newton. As a consequence, Adam Smith’s rich, complex and 
broadly philosophical approach has been overshadowed by a biased and 
obsolete positivistic interpretation of the Newtonian method (Montes 2003a: 
723-725; 732-733).25
The view that Smith is influenced by Newton is also apparent in heterodox 
interpretations of his work. Indeed, Roy Campbell and Andrew Skinner (1982: 84) 
claim that Smith’s description of society as “an immense machine” in TMS follows 
his preference, stated in his lectures, for the Newtonian over the Aristotelian method 
of scientific discovery, and his admiration of Newton’s presentation of nature as a 
coherent system in HoA.
 
 
26
                                                 
25 According to Montes, it has become commonplace to label Smith a Newtonian whose methodology 
“…presupposed the view that society is a compound of independent individuals, i.e., an aggregate of 
Robinson Crusoes” (Freudenthal 1981: 135 cited in Montes 2003a: 733). 
26 “Elsewhere he [Smith] extended the analogy to the study of language, and to the plant and animal 
creation” (Campbell and Skinner 1982: 94). See Smith 1982 (1790), VII.iii.I.2; Smith 1980 HoA, 
IV.76; Smith 1985, ii.133–134. 
 Here, Smith applauds Newton’s “superior genius” in 
unifying Galileo’s laws of terrestrial motion with Kepler’s laws of celestial motion 
(Smith 1980 HoA, IV.67). According to Elias Khalil, however, the importance of 
these comments is overstated. Khalil points to the notes made by Smith’s literary 
executioners at the end of HoA in which they explain that they have chosen to exclude 
“some notes and Memorandums”. These notes explain that the essay: 
 
 
 
 
 39 
…must be viewed, not as a History or Account of Sir Isaac Newton’s 
Astronomy, but chiefly as an additional illustration of those Principles in the 
Human Mind which Mr. Smith has pointed out to be the universal motives of 
Philosophical Researches (‘Note By The Editors’ in Smith 1980 HoA, IV.67). 
 
Moreover, although his contemporaries considered the Newtonian system to be 
beyond criticism, Smith suggests that no abstract system can ever be considered as the 
ultimate true standard by which to measure or predict human behaviour. Indeed, as 
Smith states, although he initially had “insensibly been drawn in” to write as if 
Newton’s system was objectively true, “all philosophical systems” are “mere 
inventions of the imagination” (Smith 1980 HoA, IV.76). This commitment to the 
open-ended nature of philosophical, scientific, economic and moral development is a 
consistent theme in Smith’s oeuvre, as is discussed in 3.3.1-2. As Montes (2003a: 
743) claims: “[f]aith in reducing the complexities of economic behaviour to a 
mathematical model, inspired by mechanical philosophy, is simply inconsistent with 
Smith’s broader project”. Nevertheless, such a view continues to be reproduced in 
mainstream interpretations of Smith’s thought. As Donald Winch explains:   
 
…the underlying assumption is that the apparatus constructed upon the 
foundations laid by Walras and Pareto over the years provides the only 
language according to which Smith can be deemed to be speaking sense… 
   and is consequently essential to Smith’s standing as the pioneer spokesman  
for the superiority of any competitive market order over those in which many 
or most allocative decisions are made by the state (Winch 1997: 5-6). 
 
This approach also reflects the views of partial equilibrium theorists Milton Friedman 
and George Stigler. For Friedman (1978: 7-8): “Smith’s relevance to us is a function 
of the degree to which his arguments retain their validity, propositions advanced by 
Smith being directly applicable to, and testable against, modern issues”. Similarly, for 
Stigler: “[w]e increase our confidence in the interpretation of an author by increasing 
the number of his main theoretical conclusions which we can deduce from (our 
interpretation of) his analytical system” (Stigler 1965: 448). It is perhaps ironic 
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therefore that their claims to Smith’s supposedly central concerns rely upon a 
selective approach to his work. This appears to be even more contradictory when one 
considers that authors such as Friedman and Stigler also reflect Samuelson’s (1977) 
attempt to “rehabilitate” Smith within such a framework.27
As noted, this type of distortion of Smith’s views is not atypical within mainstream 
economics. Yet it is contradicted by what he actually states, both in relation to 
Newton and in terms of the conception of the self in society that he employs 
throughout his oeuvre. Nevertheless, Stigler et al’s perception that, as a pre-marginal 
utility author, Smith is somehow unscientific and therefore in need of clarification for 
current purposes is reflected by Stéphan Vincent-Lancrin (2003: 211), who also 
considers it appropriate to criticise and interpret Smith based upon contemporary 
interests and methods in economics: “Since Smith’s text at times lacks clarity, it 
sometimes requires some uncertain gap filling”.
 Like Samuelson, Stigler 
attributes Smith’s supposed mechanistic view of society and atomistic view of human 
agency to the influence of Newton:  
 
His [Smith’s] construct of the self-interest-seeking individual in a competitive 
environment is Newtonian in its universality. That we are today busily 
extending this construct into areas of economic and social behaviour to which 
Smith himself gave only unsystematic study is tribute to both the grandeur and 
the durability of his achievement (Stigler 1976: 1212). 
 
28 However, this is entirely at odds 
with Smith’s approach, as A. L. Macfie notes:  
 
His [Smith’s] aim was to present all the relevant facts critically. Modern 
writers start from a totally different angle...They aim at isolating one aspect of 
experience and breaking it down by analysis into its logical components. Thus 
the older type of writer is accused of ‘inconsistencies,’ and certainly these are 
to be found...To the modern method they represent failure. But to the 
philosopher they reflect the facts of our experience
                                                 
27 See also Friedman 1970 (1953): 3-43.  
28 See also Hollander 1973: 13; O’Donnell 1990: 171-193. 
 (Macfie 1955: 3). 
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This view is arguably echoed by Winch (1997: 393), who also disputes attempts made 
by orthodox theorists to “clarify” Smith’s thought. Winch criticizes Stigler for being 
“…disappointed to find a large number of instances in which Smith failed to follow 
through with rigorous Chicagoan logic when dealing with behaviour outside formal 
markets”,29 castigates Samuelson for attempting to “Ricardianise” Smith regarding 
diminishing returns, and dismisses Paretian notions of a “pure theory of the invisible 
hand”, in which an optimality of resource allocation is deemed possible within a 
society based purely on self-interest (e.g., Hahn 1982).30 Winch also points out that it 
is Smith’s view that wages would always tend towards subsistence levels as the 
population would increase due to greater prosperity, and that profit levels would 
decline in the long run, as an increase in stock would lead to an increase in the 
difficulty of profitably employing new capital, whereas rent would increase over 
time.31
Winch also challenges orthodox assumptions that Smith’s ontology presupposes an 
atomistic economic rationality. As he points out, in Book I of WN, Smith observes 
that: “In a decaying manufacture… many workmen, rather than quit their own trade, 
are contented with smaller wages” (Smith 1976 [1776], I.x.b.45). Thus, as Winch 
(1997: 390) argues, even when agents are less than perfectly informed, they do not act 
as utility-maximisers: “…nor does Smith treat these motives as aberrations from some 
rational norm… Rational economic man was a fiction invented by later economic 
thinkers…” In contrast to orthodox arguments that portray Smith as the “Creator of 
 As such, Smith clearly does not present the economy as a perfectly self-
regulating system.  
 
                                                 
29 See also Haakonnsen and Winch (2006: 373-374), who point to other public choice theorists such as 
Gary Becker and James Buchanan as prominent exponents of Smith’s supposed central focus on self-
interest as anticipating their approach. 
30 As Winch argues: “The pure theory provides a useful mental gymnasium for economists and a self-
consistent agenda for dealing with the inevitable impurities of the real world” (Winch 1997: 393-399).  
31 See Smith 1976 (1776), I.ix.2; I.ix.10; I.xi.d. 
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General Equilibrium Theory” (Arrow and Hahn 1971: 2), for Winch (1997: 388), 
therefore: 
 
Smith’s inadequacies as a general equilibrium theorist cannot be attributed to a 
lack of intellectual tools for the job…The much simpler answer is that Smith 
was not trying very hard to be a general equilibrium theorist. 
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1.2.3) The invisible hand, the butcher, the brewer and the baker 
 
Despite the convincing nature of arguments such as those put forward by Macfie and 
Winch, the popular conceptualisation of Smith remains that of the supposed advocate 
of unrestrained trade within a self-regulating market. A recent example of this is given 
by Gwydion Williams (2000: 8), who argues: “Adam Smith built a model of a modern 
economy in the belief that it could only work if all transactions were all perfectly 
amoral and selfish in nature”. Such a view is often supported by the citation of one or 
two passages from WN. Usually, this includes the “invisible hand” metaphor, in which 
Smith states:  
 
Every individual…generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the publick 
interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it…he intends only to his own 
gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to 
promote an end which was no part of his intention…By pursuing his own 
interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when 
he really intends to promote it (Smith 1976 [1776], IV.ii.9).  
 
As noted, for Samuelson (1973 [1948]: 840), the metaphor refers to the efficient 
organization of society’s production based on self-interest under conditions of perfect 
competition. As Elias Khalil points out, the invisible hand is interpreted by followers 
of Friedrich von Hayek’s spontaneous order concept to represent unintended 
consequences, “…such as the advancement of the public good via the pursuit of 
private gain”. For these theorists, such as John R. Hicks (e.g., 1932), “…the invisible 
hand signifies the first welfare theorem, i.e., competitive equilibrium guarantees 
(under some strict conditions) Pareto optimality”.32
                                                 
32 Khalil 2000: 49; See Hicks, J. R. 1932 ‘Marginal Productivity and the Principle of Variation’, 
Economica, 35: 79-88, in which he states: “It is one of the great advantages of the Lausanne analysis 
that in it the “individualistic” method, which has been described by Dr. Hayek as one of the greatest 
assets of neo-classical economics, is carried to its most complete fulfillment” (Hicks 1932: 84 cited in 
Aspromourgos 1986: 268). 
 Friedman and Friedman (1981: 5) 
conflate Smith’s invisible hand with his supposed dogmatic advocacy of free markets, 
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which, they argue, is his “flash of genius”.33
The dominance of these misinterpretations within mainstream economics is perhaps 
emphasised by the fact that, as with the authors in Adam Smith’s Legacy, Friedman, 
Hayek, Hicks, Samuelson and Stigler are economics Nobelists.
 Abraham Hirsch and Neil de Marchi 
(1990: 280) argue that: “…the major paradigm Friedman uses for political economy is 
a slightly modified form of Smith’s “invisible hand” hypothesis”. However, it is not a 
“slightly modified” but an extremely simplified version of the “invisible hand” that 
Friedman employs as representative of Smith’s oeuvre, which is conflated with his 
supposed advocacy of self-interest. This approach is reflected by Stigler (1982: 147), 
who ignores TMS, and conceives of self-interest as the “crown jewel” of WN. 
 
34
                                                 
33 As Roger Mason notes: “…Hicks, Samuelson, and Friedman had developed consumer theories 
which explicitly discounted or rejected social interpretations of consumer demand, and which lent 
themselves to purely mathematical and econometric analyses” (Mason 2002: 94). 
34 Friedman was awarded the Prize for Macroeconomics in 1976; Hayek (1974) shared the Prize for 
Interdisciplinary Research with Gunnar Myrdal; Hicks (1972, with Kenneth J. Arrow) and Samuelson 
(1970) won the Prize for General Equilibrium Theory; and Stigler (1982) was awarded the Prize for 
Microeconomics. 
 However, their 
views on Smith’s intended meaning behind the “invisible hand” are only plausible if 
one deliberately isolates the passage in which the metaphor appears from its 
immediate context. In addition, it is also necessary to discount large sections of WN in 
which Smith gives various accounts of the detrimental effects to society that 
unconstrained free trade and self-interest brings. For example, in Book II, Smith 
discusses the crisis in British banking stimulated by the irresponsible “projectors” 
(Smith 1976 [1776], II.ii); in Book V, he advocates that the Church pay its clergy less 
in order to remove their desire to better their own material condition (Ibid, V.i.g); and 
in the same passage as the “invisible hand” quote itself, Smith points to merchants’ 
false claims to trade “for the publick good” (Ibid, IV.ii.9). Rather than reflecting an 
ideological endorsement of laissez-faire, Smith’s “invisible hand” therefore forms 
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part of a practical observation aimed at greater integrity and transparency in trade so 
that such negative effects upon the public can be eliminated.  
 
This is readily apparent from a holistic approach. The first appearance of the phrase 
“the invisible hand” appears in HoA as the “invisible hand of Jupiter”, where Smith 
describes the tendency within “the lowest and most pusillanimous superstition” to 
attribute irregular natural phenomena to “the agency and power of their gods” (Smith 
1980 HoA, III.2; Macfie 1971: 595-99). Smith discusses this in terms of the 
evolutionary nature of knowledge, a view that is consistent with his discussion of the 
development of morality within society in TMS. Here, Smith introduces the “invisible 
hand” in his discussion of landowners’ consumption. As he explains, the landowner 
cannot consume all that is produced on his land. Moreover, the landowner pays those 
that work for him, and, through his consumption of clothes and luxury goods, those 
that produce these goods. In this way, Smith demonstrates that landowners: 
 
…are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution of the 
necessaries of life, which would have been made, had the earth been divided 
into equal portions among all its inhabitants, and thus without intending it, 
without knowing it, advance the interest of the society, and afford means to 
the multiplication of the species (Smith 1976 [1790], IV.i.10). 
 
The practical nature of this observation is arguably reflected in WN, where Smith 
employs the metaphor to demonstrate that individuals addressing themselves to their 
own interests are necessarily promoting those of others. According to Fleischacker, 
therefore, rather than representing proto-equilibrium theory, the invisible hand may be 
seen to represent a simpler point: that society grants individuals the opportunity to 
gain. As Fleischacker suggests:  
 
[i]f this seems disappointingly obvious, that is partly because we expect too 
much of the invisible hand passage. Smith himself does not write the passage 
as if it offered particularly striking news (Fleischacker 2004: 140). 
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To be sure, Smith suggests in Book I of WN that justice is served when two 
individuals make a “fair and deliberate exchange” (Smith 1976 [1776], I.ii.2; See Ibid, 
II.ii.3.2-3). This is reiterated in Part I of TMS, where he notes that such interaction 
requires the ability to sympathise with each others’ motives in a just, impartial manner 
(See Smith 1976 [1790], VI.ii.1.15; Ibid, I.i.4.7). Arguably, this is related to his 
agreement with Cicero’s distinction between instrumental and true friendship, or 
vulgares amicitiae and amicitia, in TMS: 
 
Among well-disposed people, the necessity or conveniency of mutual 
accommodation, very frequently produces a friendship not unlike that which 
takes place among those who are born to live in the same family…The 
Romans expressed this sort of attachment by the word necessitudo, which, 
from the etymology, seems to denote that it was imposed by the necessity of 
the situation (Smith 1976 [1790], VI.ii.1.15; Hill and McCarthy 2004: 8). 
 
 
As such, Smith’s use of the invisible hand in both books is not an appeal for the 
advantages of selfishness or of benevolence, but is a pragmatic and philosophically 
informed observation regarding the benefits of co-operation. This is echoed in VII.ii.4 
of TMS, as well as in Lectures on Jurisprudence,35
                                                 
35 Hereafter referred to as LJ [A] if relating to the notes from Smith’s lectures from 1762-1763, or LJ 
[B] if relating to the lecture notes from 1763-1764. 
 where Smith explicitly links 
trucking to “…the naturall inclination every one has to persuade…That is bartering, 
by which they address themselves to the self interest of the person and seldom fail 
immediately to gain their end”. Here, Smith highlights the human capacity to 
persuade via observation of the behaviour of animals:  
 
 
The brutes have no notion of this…They have no other way of gaining their 
end but by gaining ones favour by fawning and flattering. Men when 
necessitated do also, but generally apply to the stronger string of self-interest 
(Smith 1978 LJ [A], vi.56). 
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This argument is reiterated in WN, in the section in which Smith introduces his 
famous quote that: “[i]t is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the 
baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest” (Smith 
1976 [1776], I.ii.2). As Henry Clark notes: “[t]his text has often been seen as evidence 
that the agents in Smith’s social theory were primarily self-regarding if not selfish, 
that self-interest rather than virtue informed and motivated them” (Clark 1992: 186-
187). Arguing against such views, Fleischacker (1999: 170) suggests that, like the 
invisible hand metaphor, the passage is instead intended to demonstrate the necessity 
of both parties being able to address themselves to another’s interests. This view is 
granted support when one considers the discussion in which the sentence appears:  
 
…nobody ever saw one animal by its gestures and natural cries signify to 
another, this is mine, that yours; I am willing to give this for that … In almost 
every other race of animals each individual, when it is grown up to maturity, is 
intirely independent, and in its natural state has occasion for the assistance of 
no other living creature. But man has almost constant occasion for the help of 
his brethren, and it is in vain for him to expect it from their benevolence only. 
He will be more likely to prevail if he can interest their self–love in his favour, 
and shew them that it is for their own advantage to do for him what he requires 
of them. Whoever offers to another a bargain of any kind, proposes to do this. 
Give me that which I want, and you shall have this which you want, is the 
meaning of every such offer; and it is in this manner that we obtain from one 
another the far greater part of those good offices which we stand in need of. It 
is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we 
expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address 
ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self–love, and never talk to them 
of our own necessities but of their advantages. Nobody but a beggar chuses to 
depend chiefly upon the benevolence of his fellow–citizens. Even a beggar 
does not depend upon it entirely. The charity of well–disposed people, indeed, 
supplies him with the whole fund of his subsistence. But though this principle 
ultimately provides him with all the necessaries of life which he has occasion 
for, it neither does nor can provide him with them as he has occasion for them. 
The greater part of his occasional wants are supplied in the same manner as 
those of other people, by treaty, by barter, and by purchase…As it is by treaty, 
by barter, and by purchase, that we obtain from one another the greater part of 
those mutual good offices which we stand in need of, so it is this same 
trucking disposition which originally gives occasion to the division of labour 
(Smith 1976 [1776], I.ii.1-3).  
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This view is nevertheless rejected by Edwin Cannan (1924: 44; 1926: 131), who, 
whilst recognising that for Smith, the trucking disposition leads to co-operation, does 
not admit that it prompts the division of labour, as Smith clearly states. Rather, 
Cannan - who favours the Ricardian notion of comparative advantage as the original 
source of growth - arguably reads his own preoccupations into Smith’s thought when 
he suggests in his introduction to the 1904 edition of WN that the “butcher, brewer 
and baker” passage reflects Mandeville’s (1705) argument that selfish behaviour leads 
to public benefit (Cannan 1994 [1904]: liv-lv).36 As Tribe (2003: 228) points out, 
Cannan was “…perhaps the most influential teacher of economics in Britain up to his 
retirement as Professor of Political Economy at the LSE in 1926, [and] edited what 
was until the 1970s the standard edition of the Wealth of Nations…” To be sure, 
Cannan’s view is reflected in contemporary mainstream interpretations of Smith, such 
as that put forward by Eamonn Butler, Director of the Adam Smith Institute. For 
Butler:  
 
…Adam Smith’s moral system is as self-centred as his economic system… 
As author of The Wealth of Nations (1776), Adam Smith…championed the 
benefits of specialisation and free trade, creating the very idea of the modern 
market economy that dominates the free world today 
 
(Butler 2007a: 103).  
 
Indeed, in the press release to the 2007 Harriman House version of WN, which is 
based upon Cannan’s 1904 edition, Butler states: 
 
An enormously useful feature of this edition is the selection of famous quotes 
at the beginning. Smith’s insightful epigrams such as “It is not from the 
benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our 
dinner, but from their regard to their own interest” and his famous remarks on 
the “invisible hand” can be hard to find in the original, but here they all are, 
laid out easily and accessibly. There is also a brief guide which explains to the 
reader what Smith was trying to do in each section of the work, which makes 
reading it much easier (Butler 2007b [online]). 
                                                 
36 Cannan (1926: 123) argues that: “[v]ery little of Adam Smith’s scheme of economics has been left 
standing by subsequent inquirers”. 
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This approach reflects the selective method of Schumpeter, whose view of Smith as a 
proto-equilibrium theorist is also informed by his reading of Cannan’s edition of 
WN.37
                                                 
37 “To Professor Cannan we owe by far the best of the many editions of the Wealth of Nations (1904; 
republished many times, 6th ed. 1950) which contains a most valuable introduction…” (Schumpeter 
1994 [1954]: 183, footnote 15).  
 However, even a cursory reading of the section of the chapter in which the 
“butcher, brewer [and]…the baker” sentence appears - ‘Of The Principle Which Gives 
Occasion To The Division Of Labour’ - demonstrates that Smith is discussing 
humans’ unique ability to co-operate in making a “fair and deliberate exchange”. As 
he explains here, in: “civilized society…man has almost constant occasion for the 
help of his brethren, and it is in vain for him to expect it from their benevolence only” 
(Ibid, I.ii.2). Even when taking a brief reading of this small section of Book I, chapter 
ii, which as a whole is less than two and a half pages in length, it is clear that Smith’s 
point - that it is trade rather than charity that will more effectively provide an 
individual’s security - is less a normative stance advocating selfishness than a 
pragmatic observation of the reality of the social system in which he resides.   
 
Moreover, in this chapter, Smith argues for the social benefits of limited forms of 
governmental intervention. Indeed, he next refers to the butcher, brewer and baker in 
WN in terms of the division of labour being limited “by the extent of the market”: “In 
the lone houses and very small villages which are scattered about in so desert a 
country as the Highlands of Scotland, every farmer must be butcher, baker and brewer 
for his own family” (Ibid, I.iii.2). Against Stigler (1951: 185), who interprets this 
chapter to refer to “…the core of a theory of the functions of firm and industry, and a 
good deal more besides”, Smith is pointing out the inefficiency of this particular 
situation:  
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When the market is very small, no person can have any encouragement to 
dedicate himself entirely to one employment, for want of the power to 
exchange all that surplus part of the produce of his own labour, which is over 
and above his own consumption, for such parts of the produce of other men’s 
labour as he has occasion for (Smith 1976 [1776], I.iii.1). 
 
In this chapter, Smith also notes that, historically, those nations that were first 
civilised had access to “maritime commerce”.38 As such, he suggests, the efficient 
division of labour requires access to trade routes.39
However, Smith is cautious in this respect. As he argues: “[t]here is no art which one 
government sooner learns of another than that of draining money from the pockets of 
the people” (Ibid, V.ii.h.12). If taken from its context, this sentence could appear to be 
in accordance with dogmatic arguments for low taxation policies, as is argued by 
Butler (e.g., 2007: 71). However, when considered in terms of the rest of WN, it is 
 This relates to his discussion of 
public expenditure in Book V of WN. Although Smith advocates that internal trade 
routes ought to be paid for whenever possible by those that use them, he is also aware 
that: 
 
[t]he expence of maintaining good roads and communications is, no doubt, 
beneficial to the whole society, and may, therefore, without any injustice, be 
defrayed by the general contribution of the whole society (Smith 1976 [1776], 
V.i.1.4). 
 
The subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support of the 
government, as nearly as possible, in proportion to their respective abilities; 
that is, in proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy under the 
protection of the state (Ibid, V.ii.b.3; See also Ibid, V.i.i.6). 
 
 
                                                 
38 Smith notes that: “[i]t is remarkable that neither the antient Egyptians, nor the Indians, nor the 
Chinese, encouraged foreign commerce, but seem all to have derived their great opulence from this 
inland navigation”. However, Smith explains that they have a number of “navigable canals”, unlike 
Bavaria, Austria and Hungary, and “[a]ll the inland parts of Africa, and all that part of Asia which lies 
any considerable way north of the Euxine and Caspian seas, the antient Scythia, the modern Tartary 
and Siberia, seem in all ages of the world to have been in the same barbarous and uncivilized state in 
which we find them at present” (Smith 1976 [1776], I.iii.7-8). 
39 Smith also notes that this has the effect of ringing remote parts of the country into the economy, 
reducing monopoly and rent: “[g]ood roads, canals, and navigable rivers, by diminishing the expence 
of carriage, put the re–mote parts of the country more nearly upon a level with those in the 
neighbourhood of the town. They are upon that account the greatest of all improvements” (Smith 1976 
[1776], I.xi.b.5). 
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clear that, rather than reflecting an ideological dogma, Smith is instead indicating the 
practical role that government can play in increasing the size of the market - and thus 
the nation’s prosperity - via the efficient reallocation of public revenue. As noted, this 
is similar to TMS, where the theme of self-determination is tied to considerations of 
fairness and justice. Despite this, neoclassical views regarding the alleged 
incompatibility of WN and TMS endure. As is discussed in the next section, this view 
has its origins in the so-called Adam Smith Problem. 
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1.2.4) The Adam Smith Problem  
 
 
Once [one] embark[s] upon their self-imposed task of interpreting The Wealth 
of Nations in the light of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, [one] become[s] 
immersed in difficult problems of interpretation for which scarcely any two 
writers offer the same solution…The Germans…have coined a pretty term, 
Das Adam Smith Problem, to denote the failure to understand either which 
results from the attempt to use one in the interpretation of the other (Viner 
1928: 119-120). 
 
As Montes (2003a: 67-68) explains, the initial controversy regarding Smith’s work 
relates to the accusation levelled by German protectionists that his alleged advocacy 
of laissez-faire policies in WN supported British economic hegemony. This view, put 
forward by figures such as Johan Gottlieb Fichte (e.g., 1808 [1968]) and Friedrich 
List (e.g., 1841),40 was influential upon later authors such as Gustav Schmoller and 
Bruno Hildebrand, for whom: “…the problem of the Adam Smith School is that it 
tries to monopolise manufacturing for England” and wishes to “…transform political 
economy into a mere natural history of egoism”.41
The notion of an irreconcilable inconsistency between the supposedly egoistic WN 
and the altruistic TMS was popularised by Karl Knies’s “French connection” theory, 
in which Smith’s supposed shift from TMS to WN is attributed to his acquaintance 
with the French Physiocrats upon his visit to the continent in 1764 (Montes 2003b: 
71; 2004: 20). In The Political Economy From the Point of View of Historical Method 
(1853), Knies states:  “…it does not seem like an accident that between the 
publication of his Theory of Moral Sentiments and his economic Inquiry occurred his 
stay in France”.
  
 
42
                                                 
40 Fichte, J. G. (1808 [1968]) Addresses to the German Nation. New York, NY: Harper Torchbooks; 
List, F. (1841) The National System of Political Economy. London: Longmans, Green and Co. 
41 Hildebrand, B. (1848) Die Nationalokonomie der Gegenwart und Zukunft. Frankfurt am Main: 
Literarische Anstalt, p.275; 278 cited in Montes 2003b: 70.  
42 Knies, K. (1853) Die Politische Oekonomic vom Standpunkte der Geschictliche Methode. 
Braunschweig: C. A. Schwetschke und Sohn (M. Bruhn), p. 180, cited in Montes 2004: 28. 
 Lujo Brentano shares this view. As August Oncken points out, 
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Brentano argues in The Position of Labour under Modern Law (1887) that Smith’s 
opinions underwent a “revolution” during his time in France. As such, his focus upon 
sympathy in TMS is replaced by his conversion in WN to the “Gospel of 
Individualism” as advocated by Claude Adrien Helvétius, who, according to 
Brentano, views “…self-interest as the sole spring of human actions. The 
consequences of this dogma of self-love permeate every part of the work [WN]”.43
…the name of Helvétius does not occur in any edition, either of the Theory or 
of the Wealth of Nations…If the De L'Esprit of Helvétius had really made so 
great an impression upon him [Smith], he would not only have named but 
would also have discussed it in the revised edition of the Theory, and that in 
juxtaposition to his remarks on Mandeville…[However,] neither happened.
 As 
Oncken (1887: 448) notes, however:  
 
44
Under the influence of Hutcheson and Hume Smith was an Idealist, so long as 
he remained in England. After three years of contact with the Materialism that 
prevailed in France, he returned to England a Materialist. The contrast 
between Theory (1759) written before his visit to France and the Wealth of 
Nations (1776) written after his return can be quite simply explained in this 
way.
 
 
Despite this, Witold von Skarżyński echoes Knies and Brentano’s arguments in his 
Adam Smith as a Moral Philosopher and Creator of Political Economy (1878):  
 
45
In fact, Smith travelled in France and Switzerland between February 1764 and 
October 1766 in his capacity as tutor to Henry Scott, the third Duke of Buccleuch, 
spending eighteen months in Toulouse, over 400 miles and six days’ travel from the 
salons of Paris. As John Rae notes, Smith had visited the capital for ten days at the 
   
 
 
                                                 
43 Brentano, L. (1877) Das Arbeitsverhältniss gemäss dem heutigen Recht. Leipzig: Duncker und 
Humblot, p. 60, cited in Oncken 1887: 444 (italics in original). 
44 As Tribe (2008: 523) points out, James Bonar’s (1932 [1894]) A Catalogue of the Library of Adam 
Smith (London: Macmillan) demonstrates that Smith did not own any books by or about Helvétius. 
45 Skarżyński, W. (1878) Adam Smith als Moralphilosoph und Schoepfer der Nationaloekonomie: Ein 
Beitrag zur Geschichte der Nationaloekonomie. Berlin: Verlag und Theobald Grieben, p.183, cited in 
Tribe 2008: 521. Skarżyński is influenced by Buckle, who states in The History of Civilisation in 
England (1857-1861): “Adam Smith, in his Wealth of Nations, simplified the study of human nature, 
by curtailing it of all its sympathy…and by thus establishing two different lines of argument, he 
embraced the whole subject” (Buckle 1861 [1790], Volume 2, p.351, cited in Montes 2004: 31-32). 
The extent of Hutcheson’s and Hume’s influence upon Smith’s thought is discussed in 2.2.1-3.  
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start of his time in France, however did not meet with the Economistes during this 
short stay (Rae 1895: 12.XII.3).46 This is significant, as it is during the period 
between his arrival in Toulouse in March 1764 and July of that year that Smith began 
writing WN. This is evident in a letter to David Hume, dated 5th
[t]he Duke is acquainted with no Frenchman whatever. I cannot cultivate the 
acquaintance of the few with whom I am acquainted, as I cannot bring them to 
our house, and am not always at liberty to go to theirs…I have begun to write 
a book in order to pass away the time.
 July 1764, where 
Smith complains:  
 
47
Smith did spend a further ten months in Paris between December 1765 and October 
1766, where he met with figures such as Jean le Rond d’Alembert, Denis Diderot, 
Helvétius, André Morellet, François Quesnay, Victor de Riquetti, marquis de 
Mirabeau, Paul-Henri Thiry, baron d’Holbach, and Anne Robert Jacques Turgot 
during this period, as he mentions in a letter to Morellet dated 1
 
 
st May 1776.48
Published in 1896 by Cannan as Lectures on Justice, Police, Revenue and Arms, 
delivered in the University of Glasgow by Adam Smith (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press), this document demonstrates conclusive evidence of the continuity of Smith’s 
thought, insofar as the lectures closely resemble the content of WN. As Oncken (1897: 
445-446) suggests, Smith did not, therefore, undergo a radical change of mind 
 
However, that Smith had evidently formulated the economic ideas that appear in WN 
before this extended stay in Paris or indeed his trip to the continent is demonstrated by 
a manuscript copy of student notes taken during Smith’s final year of his 
Professorship of Moral Philosophy at the University of Glasgow in 1763.  
                                                 
46 As Rae explains, Smith: “…probably could not as yet speak French, for even to the last he could 
only speak it very imperfectly. Most of their time in Paris seems, therefore, to have been spent with 
Hume and Sir James Macdonald and Lord Beauchamp, who was Hume’s pupil and Sir James’s chief 
friend” (Ibid). Interestingly, it is during this period that Smith resigned his Chair of Moral Philosophy 
at Glasgow (see Letter from Adam Smith to Thomas Miller, 14th February 1764, in Smith 1987, letter 
81, pp.80-81). 
47 Letter from Adam Smith to David Hume, 5th July 1764, in Smith 1987, letter 82, p.81. 
48 Letter from Adam Smith to André Morellet, 1st May 1786, in Smith 1987, letter 259, p.295. 
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between his period of Professorship at Glasgow, where he wrote TMS, and his first 
visit to France, where he began writing WN. As Oncken also notes, Smith’s 
consistency is also apparent from the Advertisement in the preface to the sixth and 
final edition of TMS, where he states:  
 
“In the last paragraph of the first Edition of the present work, I said, that I 
should in another discourse endeavour to give an account of the general 
principles of law and government, and of the different revolutions which they 
had undergone in the different ages and periods of society; not only in what 
concerns justice, but in what concerns police, revenue, and arms, and whatever 
else is the object of law. In the Enquiry concerning the Nature and Causes of 
the Wealth of Nations, I have partly executed this promise; at least so far as 
concerns police, revenue, and arms”.  
 
…By the publication of the Lectures…which Edwin Cannan accomplished 
last year, the [alleged] gap [between TMS and WN] has, in some degree, been 
filled up. But this much is unquestionably evident from the passage above 
quoted, that the author himself firmly believed in the connection between his 
two works, the Theory and the Wealth of Nations. And yet in these latter days 
arise others who think they know better! (Smith 1976 [1790], Advertisement, 
cited in Oncken 1897: 449; See also Smith 1976 [1790], VII.iv.37) 
 
Indeed, although the lecture notes presented by Cannan may have demonstrated the 
paucity of the figures in the German Historical School’s assumptions regarding the 
irreconcilability of the two books, Cannan’s own suggestion that these notes present 
Smith as a consistently laissez-faire thinker arguably reverts back to the original 
reception granted to WN in Germany, where the Adam Smith Problem initially 
developed.  
 
To be sure, none of Smith’s British contemporaries detected an Adam Smith Problem. 
Indeed, the consistency or otherwise of his work is not commented upon between 
Dugald Stewart’s Account of the Life of Adam Smith, LL.D in 1793 and William 
Playfair’s eleventh edition of WN in 1803, in which Playfair states:   
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[i]t was during his Professorship [at Glasgow] that he [Smith] published the 
first edition of The Theory of Moral Sentiments…and it was then also that he 
probably collected most of the material, and laid the plan for the Inquiry into 
the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations.49
Playfair arguably continues Stewart’s politically conservative reconstruction of Smith, 
a portrayal extended by John Ramsay McCulloch (1850), editor of the Longman 
edition of WN. As Athol Fitzgibbons argues, McCulloch also echoes Playfair by 
including critical comments in the body of the text informing the reader of supposed 
errors in the book.
 
 
50 However, unlike Playfair, McCulloch explicitly reduces “Smith’s 
life work down to Book I of The Wealth of Nations”. According to Fitzgibbons (1995: 
149-150), McCulloch’s edition is extremely influential in the popularisation of the 
subsequent view in the nineteenth century of Smith as the advocate of “free trade, 
moral vacuity and self-love”.51
                                                 
49 Playfair 2000 (1804) introduction to Smith (1776), eleventh edition, cited in Montes 2004: 17; 20. 
Playfair’s edition is much criticised. As Emma Rothschild notes, Francis Horner wrote in the 
Edinburgh Review that: “[i]n the whole course of our literary inquisition, we have not met with an 
instance so discreditable to the English press” (Horner, F. 1806 ‘Playfair’s Edition of Wealth of 
Nations’. The Edinburgh Review, 7 [14]: 470-471, cited in Rothschild 1995: 727). 
50 McCulloch’s edition of WN attempts to “…make the reader aware of the fallacy of the principles 
which Dr. Smith has sometimes advocated” such as Smith’s supposedly “defective and unsound” 
notion of the labour theory of value: “[i]t is not…true, as is supposed throughout WN that the 
variations of the price or wages paid for labour have the same influence over the value or price of 
commodities as variations in the amount of such labour” (McCulloch intro to Smith 1850 [1776]: xlvii-
xlviii). McCulloch also argues that: “[t]he arrangement of the Wealth of Nations…[is] perplexed and 
illogical” (Ibid, xlix).  
51 Fitzgibbons 1995: 152. As Hollander explains, McCulloch was among the handful of influential 
thinkers, including James Mill and Francis Horner, who attended Dugald Stewart’s course on political 
economy (Hollander 1928: 35-36). 
 McCulloch arguably echoes Hildebrand’s (1848: 275) 
view that WN is about laissez-faire and “the deification of private egoism”. As 
Montes notes: 
 
[t]his early assessment of The Wealth of Nations reflects a view that was 
basically carried forward…for more than a hundred years. Not surprisingly, in 
this setting Smith became known as the founder of the materialistic 
“Manchester School” that preached the gospel of individual interest and free 
competition (Montes 2003a: 68). 
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Certainly, that such a view was still prevalent one hundred and twenty five years later 
is evinced by Stigler (1975: 237), who contends that: “The Wealth of Nations is a 
stupendous palace erected upon the granite of self-interest”. That this erroneous 
viewpoint is still highly influential is clear from Gordon Davis’s (2003: 291) 
argument that in WN Smith succeeds “…in banishing the language of moral 
evaluation from his economic analysis…hence the infamous ‘Adam Smith Problem’”. 
 
Contemporary heterodox authors that challenge such views argue that a move beyond 
the Problem requires that Smith’s thought be considered as a connected body of work. 
As noted, this stance is often associated with the publication of the Glasgow Editions 
of Smith’s works and correspondence between 1976 and 1983,52
However, according to Knud Haakonssen, editor of the Cambridge Edition of TMS 
(2002: xxiv), the Problem should not be dismissed so readily.
 in which his 
discussions on ethics, economics, moral philosophy, language and law are interpreted 
by its editors as being parts of a consistent and comprehensive history of man and 
society. These include D. D. Raphael and A. L. Macfie, editors of the Glasgow 
Edition of TMS, who dismiss the Problem as “…a pseudo-problem based on 
ignorance and misunderstanding” (Raphael and Macfie, intro to Smith 1976 [1790], 
p.20). Other notable scholars that arguably share this view include Winch (e.g., 1978; 
1997), Robert Heilbroner (e.g., 1982), and Jerry Evensky (e.g., 1987). 
  
53
                                                 
52 Horst Recktenwald provides a summary of the four main characteristics of subsequent heterodox 
interpretations, which include: a reappraisal of Smith’s economic analysis; a holistic reading of Smith; 
a particular interest in Smith’s social philosophy; and a new concern with the roles of socio-political 
institutions, including government, in Smith’s market economy (Recktenwald 1990 [1978]: 103-104; 
see also Otteson 2000: 54; Raphael and Macfie 1982: 20-25; Werhane 1991: 108; Wight 2002: 56-58). 
53 Haakonssen’s position has shifted from his earlier view that it is “…futile to take any more rides on 
that old hobby-horse ‘sympathy v. self-interest’ in Smith” (Haakonssen 1981: 197, footnote 19). 
 This argument 
perhaps reflects one of the most important developments in the recent debate within 
heterodox Smith scholarship, as it relates to Richard Teichgraeber’s (1981) and 
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Laurence Dickey’s (1986) rejection of Raphael and Macfie’s position,54 Otteson’s 
(2000: 53) rejection of Morrow (1928), Macfie (1967), Raphael and Macfie (1976), 
Raphael (1985), Teichgraeber (1981), and Haakonnsen (1981) in his argument that 
“…there is a real Adam Smith Problem”, and Leonidas Montes’s (2003a; 2004) 
related rejection of Raphael’s (1985) instrumental  “narrowing” of Smith’s concept of 
sympathy to that of moral judgement.55
 
 This demonstrates that, whilst broadly sharing 
the view that Smith considers TMS and WN as related parts of a comprehensive 
undertaking on man and society, the heterodox literature is not a homogenous body of 
thought. Indeed, this has always been the case.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
54 Teichgraeber (1981: 106; 110) considers Raphael and Macfie’s approach to the Adam Smith Problem 
to be “perfunctory” and “surprisingly extreme”. Dickey (1986: 582) refers to their reasoning as “an 
egregious scholarly error”. 
55 Montes 2003a: 63-87; see also Montes 2004: 15-56. 
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Part Three: Heterodox interpretations 
1.3.1) Strategist accounts 
 
An earlier theorist that claims Smith’s system to be consistent is Henry Bittermann, 
who asserts that Smith’s moral philosophy is as “scientific” as his economics.56
This view is arguably reflected in two opposing strands of the heterodox debate, 
exemplified by the positions held by Emma Rothschild (e.g., 2001) and Lisa Hill 
(e.g., 2001). Unlike Hill, Rothschild does not attribute hidden theological 
connotations to Smith’s “invisible hand” metaphor. In contrast, for Rothschild, 
Smith’s use of the “invisible hand” is ironic, a view that relates to his supposed 
concealment of his “radical” private opinions. Perhaps also extrapolating from Jacob 
Hollander’s (1927)
 More 
controversially perhaps, Bittermann (1940a: 709-710) also suggests that Smith may 
deliberately obscure his theological convictions: 
 
Smith wrote toward the end of a century of bitter controversy in theology; 
heterodox views, if expressed too forcefully, might still have been prosecuted 
under the blasphemy laws…It is, therefore, not surprising that he avoided 
theologic disputes in public and in private, especially since his views were 
probably not orthodox enough for his time and place…It is possible that there 
is an element of deliberate deception in Smith’s remarks about religion in the 
Moral Sentiments. Where freedom of expression is limited, some misleading 
of the unwary is almost inevitable. 
 
 
57
                                                 
56 Bittermann thus goes against Jacob Viner (1928) and John Rae (1834), who Bittermann (1940: 489) 
notes: “…objected to Smith’s method as unscientific and metaphysical”.  
57 Hollander 1928: 28-31. This article is originally titled ‘Adam Smith: 1776-1926’, and appears in The 
Journal of Political Economy (1927) 35 (2): 153-197. All page references to this article are however 
taken from the re-titled chapters ‘The Dawn Of A Science’, in Clark, J. M., Douglas, P. H. and 
Hollander, J. H. et al. (eds.), Adam Smith 1776-1926, Lectures to Commemorate the Sesquicentennial 
of the Publication of “The Wealth of Nations”, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928, pp.1-21; 
and ‘The Founder of a School’ (Ibid: 22-52). 
 more prosaic presentation of the reception afforded Dugald 
Stewart’s Account of the Life and Writings of Adam Smith (1793), Rothschild portrays 
this text as a deliberate and highly influential attempt to “protect” Smith’s reputation 
by advancing the image of him as a conservative public philosopher concerned only 
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with those: “…speculations…which have no tendency to unhinge established 
institutions, or to inflame the passions of the multitude”.58
Yet this is puzzling when one considers the early reception afforded Smith’s views. 
As James Buchan (2006: 6) notes, Thomas Malthus (1798) accuses Smith of 
conflating “the wealth of a state” with “the happiness of the lower classes of the 
people”.
 Rothschild thus arguably 
conflates Hollander’s suggestion - that Stewart modifies Smith’s views for his 
audience - with Bittermann’s view that Smith perhaps obscures his own opinions.  
 
As Hollander (1928: 29) notes, Stewart’s Account was first read to the Royal Society 
of Edinburgh between January and March 1793. Although Hollander explains that: 
“…the reaction from the French Revolution had put fetters upon intellectual freedom 
in Great Britain”, he presents the main consequence of this - in terms of Smith and 
Stewart - as the delay that it caused to Stewart’s presentation of his course of lectures 
in 1800 (Ibid, 28-31). In contrast, Rothschild (2001: 61) considers the “disjunction of 
economic and political freedom” in this period as “…the necessary condition, in the 
1790s, for the transformation in Smith’s own reputation” into a “cold-souled enemy 
of the poor”.  
 
59
                                                 
58 Stewart cited in Rothschild (2001: 57-58). Rothschild’s view is supported by Athol Fitzgibbons, who 
argues that Stewart proceeded to deliver the first academic course on political economy, separating it 
from ethics, jurisprudence and politics, in order to de-emphasise Smith’s moral philosophy, which was 
associated with French altruism in the period immediately after his death (Fitzgibbons 1995: 148). 
59 Malthus, T. R. (1798) An Essay on the Principle of Population, as it affects the Future Improvement 
of Society, with Remarks on the Speculations of Mr. Godwin, M. Condorcet, and other Writers, p.304, 
cited in Buchan (2006: 6).  
 Against Rothschild (2001: 66) this is arguably not based on Smith’s views 
being obscured by himself, nor by the “terror of the times”, but by Malthus’s opinions 
regarding overpopulation. Indeed, as Hollander notes, a good deal of Malthus’ 
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understanding of the economy is derived from Smith.60 A similar approach is perhaps 
found in the work of Adam Ferguson. As I discuss in 2.2.3, Ferguson defers to 
Smith’s views in WN, apart from those regarding the militia, as they contradict 
Ferguson’s advocacy of civic humanism within commercial society.61
As noted in 1.1.1, Smith also discusses poor workers’ right to humane treatment and 
attacks the poor laws and the restriction of movement for workers here (Ibid, I.viii.15; 
I.x.2). He also explicitly connects gains in trade to the increased revenue of all 
sections of society, and discusses the poor and education in Book IV
 These brief 
examples suggest that it is more likely that any “transformation” in Smith’s reputation 
is based more on others’ objections to specific matters in his work than by his own 
attempts to obscure them. Indeed, unlike contemporaries such as Malthus, Smith 
clearly demonstrates his concern for the poor in Book I of WN:  
 
No society can surely be flourishing and happy, of which the far greater part 
of the members are poor and miserable. It is but equity, besides, that those 
who feed, cloath, and lodge the whole body of the people, should have such a 
share of their own labour as to be themselves tolerably well-fed, cloathed and 
lodged (Smith 1976 [1776], I.viii.36). 
 
 (Ibid, 
IV.iii.II.3).62
                                                 
60 As Hollander states: “[a] chapter [xvi] of the Essay was devoted to the “…probable error of Doctor 
Adam Smith in representing every increase of the revenue or stock of a society as an increase in the 
funds for the maintenance of labour. But it was introduced with ‘diffidence’…and it rested on the very 
doubtful ground that only an increase of foodstuffs and not of manufactures could have ‘the same good 
effect upon the condition of the poor’. Beyond this there was deferential agreement” (Malthus 1803 
2nd edition, p.302, cited in Hollander 1928: 45-46). 
61 Letter from Adam Ferguson to Adam Smith, 18th April 1776, in Smith 1987, letter 154, pp.193-194. 
62 There are numerous other examples throughout Smith’s work that demonstrate his concern for the 
plight of the poor, including his extremely prescient comment in his discussion of the merits of 
education in LJ that “…it may be very justly said that the people who cloathe the whole world are in 
rags themselves” (Smith 1978 LJ [B], II.330).  
 As such, Malthus’s remarks are based on a clear understanding of 
Smith’s position on the poor. This goes against Rothschild’s view that he “…went to 
considerable lengths to obscure his opinions”, which, she argues, presents “…great 
difficulties [when]…trying to interpret Smith’s politics” (Rothschild 2001: 66). 
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According to Rothschild, this supposed obfuscation of his “real political sentiments” 
is responsible for the reduction of WN to a single “principle”, and Smith to a zealot of 
“Freedom of Trade” (Ibid, 67; Rothschild 1992: 75) in the period following his 
death.63 Rothschild correctly criticises portrayals of Smith as a laissez-faire 
economist, yet appears to conclude that it is possible to determine “what Smith 
means” by using similar sources to those authors that seek to claim him as an 
advocate of free trade. In contrast to Stewart, for whom “Smith’s real 
sentiments…were those of the prudent public man”, Rothschild (2001: 66) points to 
the Physiocrat Pierre Samuel Du Pont de Nemours, for whom the “real” Smith 
“…was to be found in the private man, or the unqualified friend of freedom. The 
public Smith was hiding his real sentiments from conservative public opinion”.64
As Rothschild argues, Du Pont (1809) criticises Smith’s advocacy of limited 
governmental intervention in Books IV and V of WN as an “error”, and instead 
interprets his argument here as “…a sacrifice which he thought he must make to the 
popular opinions of his country”.
  
 
65
                                                 
63 As Rothschild notes, Smith’s advocacy of free trade in corn as the best palliative for scarcity in Book 
IV, chapter v of WN has led to a reduction of his argument to “…a simple prescription that commerce 
is good and government bad” (Rothschild 2001: 72-75). 
 Yet Smith is clear in stating that intervention is 
appropriate in the correct circumstances. An unmistakeable example of this is in his 
discussion in Book V, chapter ii of WN of the appropriateness of a “publick bank”. 
Reflecting his general position, Smith’s attack here on the British government’s 
“slothful and negligent profusion” and “thoughtless extravagance” (Smith 1976 
[1776], V.ii.a.4) is not a dogmatic critique of intervention, but an assessment of a 
64 Dupont de Nemours, P. S. (1790) Observations sur les principes qui doivent déterminer le nombre 
des districts et celui des tribunaux dans les departments, cited in Rothschild 2001: 66. Interestingly, 
Hollander points out that Stewart includes Dupont’s La Physiocratie: ou constitution essentielle du 
gouvernement le plus advantageux au genre humaine (1767) along with others, including WN, in his 
list of recommended texts on the subject of “National Wealth” in his course on political economy 
(Hollander 1928: 35). 
65 Du Pont de Nemours, P. S. (1809) Observations sur les points dans lesquels Adam Smith est 
d’accord avec la theorie de M. Turgot, et sur ceux dans lesquels il s’en est ecarte, in Turgot, A. R. J. 
(1844) Oeuvres de Turgot, I, pp.67-71, cited in Rothschild 2001: 66-67. 
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particular state of affairs. As Nathan Rosenberg (1979: 26) explains, Smith’s position 
is therefore “…a pragmatic one, not one of principle”.  
 
As with later interpretations that claim Smith’s “true” intentions, Du Pont therefore 
falsely attributes to Smith a commitment to laissez-faire that is based more on 
interpretation than on meditation upon what he actually says. Interestingly, although 
Rothschild does not attribute such a position to Smith, she appears to make similar 
claims in terms of basing her division between the public (or “false”) and private 
(“real”) Smith on similar sources to those used by Du Pont:  
 
Dupont’s [sic] interpretation is supported by much of Smith’s correspondence, 
and by the revolutionary side or element of his published and unpublished 
work (Rothschild 2001: 67). 
 
 
In his letters and conversations, he [Smith] seems to have several more or less 
distinct personalities. It was this multiplicity which led to the tension, 
described by Dugald Stewart, between the qualified public Smith and the 
private Smith (Ibid, 66).66
Although Rothschild attempts to expose the orthodox manipulation of Smith’s ideas 
in this way, one might argue that her approach reiterates the mainstream tendency to 
posit two “Adam Smiths”, albeit from a different basis than is usually the case. 
Further, her contention that Smith intentionally obscures his “real” or “private” 
opinions is as speculative as her claim that Smith: “…was writing, in part, for a 
distant posterity, but he was prepared to confuse this posterity just as he confused his 
own public” (Rothschild 2002 [online]). This is far more difficult to sustain than her 
more plausible claim that others sought to obscure Smith’s intentions. However, these 
arguments are conflated in her subsequent assertion that the potentially subversive 
 
 
                                                 
66 Rothschild again refers to this alleged distinction between Smith’s public and private views in her 
Enlightenment Speech on Smith at the University of Edinburgh in 2002, where she notes: “[t]he 
difference between his [Smith’s] public and private self was commented on by his friends” (Rothschild 
2002 [online]). 
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elements of WN and TMS are not concerned with commercial policy, but with Smith’s 
views on education that he supposedly advocates in order to enable individuals to call 
into question the wisdom of established institutions, including organised religion 
(Rothschild 2001: 112-113; 67-68). 
 
Rothschild is correct in pointing out that Playfair’s opposing distinction between 
education (as formal schooling) and training (as apprenticeship) in his edition of WN 
is one that Smith does not make. As she argues, this is based on Playfair’s clear 
hostility to Smith’s alleged opposition to apprenticeship.67
This approach is also reflected in TMS in Smith’s opposition to “men of system” that 
seek to establish such precise laws.
 As such, this is a further 
case of a thinker interpreting his views with reference to their own particular political 
agenda. Indeed, Smith is not opposed to the principle of apprenticeship, but rather the 
absurdities of the present system, which he views as a “violation of this most sacred 
property” which “every man has in his own labour” (Smith 1976 [1776] I.x.c.12). As 
discussed, this forms part of Smith’s broader argument in WN against institutions, 
laws, and privilege that he considers to be an imposition on natural liberty. As such, it 
is a wider conception of justice that informs his opposition to contemporary 
apprenticeship laws that restrict individual freedom, rather than a commitment to the 
establishment of precise laws needed to remedy it as advocated by Playfair.  
68
                                                 
67 Rothschild cites Playfair’s Supplementary Chapter on education in his eleventh edition of WN: “To 
free youth from the shackles of apprenticeship, and subject infancy to the authority of the 
schoolmasters, is the present bent of political economists” (Playfair, W. [1803] ‘Supplementary 
Chapter’ in Smith 1803 [1776], ed. by Playfair, p.243, cited in Rothschild 2001: 96-97). 
68 “The man of system…is apt to be very wise in his own conceit; and is often so enamoured with the 
supposed beauty of his own ideal plan of government, that he cannot suffer the smallest deviation from 
any part of it” (Smith 1976 [1790], VI.ii.2.17). 
 Therefore, although Smith advocates that the 
public obliges “…every man to undergo an examination or probation in them before 
he can obtain the freedom in any corporation, or be allowed to set up any trade”, he 
does not specify what this “probation” should entail. Nor does he imply that such 
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training is different to “those most essential parts of education” - the basics in “the 
elementary parts of geometry and mechanicks” - that he argues should be taught by 
teachers in schools (Smith 1976 [1776], V.i.f.55-57). Indeed, Smith advocates similar 
“probation” for teachers as he does for tradesmen, whose standard of teaching will be 
assured through state regulation rather than state funding.69
Again, Smith’s view is clear. Whilst his support for such regulations goes against 
attempts to class him as a laissez-faire theorist, Rothschild’s view that Smith 
examines education in terms of its potentially subversive aspects is inaccurate. As I 
discuss in 2.3.1, Smith advocates basic education as it facilitates economic prosperity 
and moral development. Although this is at odds with contemporary views regarding 
the necessary influence of religion upon education, Smith does not make this the 
focus of his discussion. Indeed, his views on this subject are made clearly elsewhere, 
for example in Book V, chapter iii of WN, in which he points out his distaste for the 
contribution of organised religion to political faction and the clergy’s historical 
proclivity towards “…the gratification of their own private vanity and folly”.
 This also relates to the 
explicit connection that he makes between poor teaching standards in universities and 
his critique of the clergy: 
 
The parochial clergy are like those teachers whose reward depends partly upon 
their salary, and partly upon the fees or honoraries which they get from their 
pupils, and these must always depend more or less upon their industry and 
reputation (Ibid, V.i.g.2). 
 
70
                                                 
69 “…not by giving salaries to teachers in order to make them negligent and idle, but by instituting 
some sort of probation…to be undergone by every person before he was permitted to exercise any 
liberal profession… If the state imposed upon this order of men the necessity of learning, it would have 
no occasion to give itself any trouble about providing them with proper teachers” (Ibid, V.i.g.14). 
 
Indeed, such a clear critique prompted Adam Ferguson to write:  
70 Smith 1976 (1790), V.iii.3.6-42 Although he is clearly critical of such behaviour, Smith conflates the 
clergy’s desire for luxury with that of the feudal barons, and argues that this tendency led to the gradual 
reduction of their power over time. As he points out, the introduction of rents was driven by their desire 
to indulge in luxury, which in turn led to the gradual dissolution of “[t]he ties of interest, which bound 
the inferior ranks of people to the clergy”. Smith thus directly relates “[t]he gradual improvements of 
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You have provoked, it is true, the church, the universities, and the merchants, 
against all of whom I am willing to take your part; but you have likewise 
provoked the militia, and there I must be against you.71
To be sure, Smith’s “subversive” views were widely known. This goes against Iain 
McLean, who states that he agrees with “almost all” of Rothschild’s views, including 
her controversial position that Smith’s use of the invisible hand is “sarcastic”. 
According to McLean, Smith was “…always cautious about what he said in public. 
But we know that he was much less cautious in private”, and attributes this to Smith’s 
criticism of “Whining Christians” (McLean 2005: 24-28) in his letter to Alexander 
Wedderburn of 14
 
 
th August 1776.72 However, this view is consistent with Smith’s 
very public condemnation of the clergy and of “those whining and melancholy 
moralists” in TMS (Smith 1976 [1790], III.iii.8). Certainly, Morrow (1928: 165) notes 
that, in response to the perceived “blasphemous” notions present in TMS and 
supposed advocacy of selfishness in WN, eighteenth century moralist John Ruskin 
terms Smith “…the half-bred and half-witted Scotchman who taught the deliberate 
blasphemy: ‘Thou shalt hate the Lord, thy God, damn his law, and covet thy 
neighbour’s goods’”.73
Indeed, as Rothschild (2001: 68) states: “Smith’s subversive renown was founded, to 
a great extent, on his criticisms of established religion”. Furthermore, it is arguable 
that the climate of fervent opposition to unorthodox views such as Smith’s that 
  
 
                                                                                                                                            
arts, manufactures, and commerce” to the erosion of the clergy’s moral authority (Ibid, V.iii.3.25). The 
relationship that Smith draws between the progress of knowledge, prosperity and moral well being is 
discussed in 3.3.1, which relates to Smith’s rejection of civic humanist criticisms of commercial 
society, which is discussed in 2.3.1-4. 
71 Letter from Adam Ferguson to Adam Smith, 18th April 1776, in Smith (1987), letter 154, pp.193-
194. 
72 Letter from Adam Smith to Alexander Wedderburn, 14th August 1776, in Smith 1987, letter 163, 
p.203. 
73 It is perhaps interesting to consider that Ruskin is cited as an inspiration for ‘New Economics’ (see 
Boyle, Cordon and Potts 2006:10-15). Moreover, such perverse notions of the relevance of Smith’s 
nationality continued in the twentieth century, with Paul Douglas commenting on Smith’s “Scotch 
hard-headed way of accepting the status quo” and “thrifty Scotch manner” in his critique of Smith’s 
theory of value (Douglas 1928: 98; 80).  
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Rothschild points to inadvertently demonstrates the strength and clarity of his 
conviction more clearly. As such, it is difficult to argue, as she does, that Smith 
“writes in a sort of code” (Rothschild 2001: 67), on subjects such as poverty, the 
military, apprenticeships, education or religion. However, Rothschild’s discussion 
serves to highlight that a selective approach has often been taken towards Smith’s 
work. As Teichgraeber (1987: 340) notes: 
 
It is clear that Smith’s contemporaries were not interested in all that he had to 
say. Instead, they focussed almost entirely on his argument for free trade…  
because this was what they took to be the most interesting and useful aspect of 
the Wealth of Nations.74
                                                 
74 This view is perhaps echoed by Fitzgibbons (1995: 151): “[e]conomists did not want to intertwine 
the case for free trade with obscure metaphysical speculations that might be thought to subvert 
traditional morals…the free trade policy of Great Britain was too important to be jeopardized by a 
radical philosopher with a moral theory that was obscure but corrosive of both religion and the state”. 
 
 
Against Rothschild and McLean, it is therefore interpretation and selective use of 
Smith rather than deliberate obfuscation by himself that would appear to be the cause 
of any “transformation” in his reputation.  
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1.3.2) Theological accounts 
 
 
This criticism is also applicable to other contemporary heterodox interpretations of 
Smith. As noted, Lisa Hill (2001) puts forward an alternative argument to Rothschild. 
In her discussion of Smith’s “invisible hand” metaphor, Hill rejects “secularist” 
arguments that suggest that his use of theological language is employed merely as a 
“…stratagem…to obscure the unorthodoxy of his religious convictions”.75 Similarly, 
Hill attacks Rothschild’s (1994: 321) argument that Smith intends the invisible hand 
metaphor as an ironic joke.76
                                                 
75 Hill is here referring to Lindgren, J. R. (1973) The Social Philosophy of Adam Smith, The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff; Raphael, D. D. (1975) Adam Smith, Oxford: Oxford University Press; and Kristol, I. 
(1980) ‘Rationalism in economics’, The Public Interest, 61: 201–218 cited in Hill 2001: 2.  
76 Rothschild 1994: 321 cited in Hill 2001: 2. Rothschild argues that there is “…little evidence for the 
view that Smith took the invisible hand seriously”. Rothschild’s holistic reading of Smith prompts an 
analysis of the invisible hand in HoA as a joke that refutes Stoic fatalism. Yet Rothschild also suggests 
that the existence of an “all-wise Architect and Conductor” controlling Smith’s system of Nature points 
to the “serious and unironic use of the invisible hand: the efforts of individuals can… successfully 
promote the interests of the society, without being subject to the direction of sovereigns and 
legislators”. However, Smith’s supposed “deeper irony” is the outcome of a Stoic orderliness as the 
consequence of an unordered cosmos: “…the invisible hand is a thoroughly Smithian idea. It is an 
ironic joke, and it is also a joke on himself. It is a joke, in any case, on his immense posterity as well” 
(Rothschild 2001: 133-138). 
 Hill also rejects Glenn Morrow’s argument that 
“Smith’s moral world is a totally secular arrangement ‘not the order of a divine law-
giver’” (Morrow 1923: 71 cited in Hill 2001: 1). For Hill:  
 
Smith’s notion of a Providential invisible hand is, not only the centrepiece, but 
the unifying principle…of his entire oeuvre without which much of his 
thought makes little sense (Hill 2001: 22). 
 
This view perhaps reflects that held by Laurence Dickey (1986: 609) who argues that 
the language employed by Smith in the newly added Part VI in the sixth edition of 
TMS demonstrates his Christian convictions:  
 
…the concern with assimilationism, with differentiating the pursuit of 
perfectibility from that of perfection, with approximationism and with 
humility - is mainline Protestant theology shaped in the image of the theology 
of the divine economy.  
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Hill’s view is also reminiscent of Evensky’s (1998: 20) argument that, in the ideal 
society, for Smith: “…each individual will act in an ethical fashion - that is, in 
harmony with the deity’s design”. A recent contribution is made by Ann Firth (2007: 
72) who places similar emphasis to that of Hill and Dickey on the supposed 
importance of theology in Smith’s oeuvre:  
 
For Smith, the existence of God is the necessary condition which leads human 
beings to realize their true natures and God is the standard of perfection to 
which he wishes his readers to dedicate themselves…Smith’s answer to the 
preoccupation with wealth and social status was a form of self-cultivation 
designed to produce a particular ethical relationship first to oneself and then to 
others. It relied on the existence of an exemplar of moral perfection in the 
form of God.77
These views are influenced by Jacob Viner.
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77 See also Pack 1995; Schabas 2003; Singer 2004; Syed 1990. I challenge these views in 2.3.1-4. 
78 Indeed, Hill states that her “…intention here is to recover, defend and extend Jacob Viner’s contested 
claim that, owing to the secularization of the disciplines of economics and ethics, Smith’s system has 
been stripped of its ‘integral’ Providentialism” (Hill 2001: 1). 
 In his seminal article ‘Adam Smith and 
Laissez-Faire’ (1928), Viner rejects Cannan’s view of Smith as a dogmatic advocate 
of free trade, yet revives the two “Adam Smiths” myth by identifying “…a substantial 
measure of irreconcilable divergence between the Theory of Moral Sentiments and the 
Wealth of Nations” based on the “virtual disappearance” in WN of the “…doctrine of 
an order of nature designed and guided by a benevolent God…” that he alleges is in 
TMS (Viner 1928: 117). According to Viner, although Smith’s advocacy of natural 
liberty in trade is widely recognised:  
 
[w]hat is not so familiar…is the extent to which Smith acknowledged 
exceptions to the doctrine of a natural harmony in the economic order even 
when left to take its natural course. Smith, himself, never brought these 
together; but if this is done, they make a surprisingly comprehensive list and 
they demonstrate beyond dispute the existence of a wide divergence between 
the perfectly harmonious, completely beneficent natural order of the Theory of 
Moral Sentiments and the partial and limited harmony in the economic order 
of the Wealth of Nations (Ibid, 134). 
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Viner’s view is challenged by Macfie (1953: 211), who argues that the theme of 
natural liberty that runs through Smith’s oeuvre resolves any tension between the 
“prudent” man in TMS and the “economic” man in WN. As he explains: “…the almost 
theological view of the invisible hand” is “…exactly carried over from the Moral 
Sentiments into Wealth of Nations”.79
Seemingly echoing Viner, Morrow argues that: “[t]he real foundation for Adam 
Smith’s faith in the ultimate harmony of the conflicting interests of individuals is to 
be found in his theology”. However, unlike Viner, Morrow attributes a natural 
theological aspect to Smith’s account of natural liberty, arguing that, for Smith: 
“Nature, spelt with capital N, equals God” (Morrow 1928: 170-171). Morrow extends 
this argument to present Smith’s advocacy of “…pure and natural religion, free from 
every mixture of absurdity, imposture, or fanaticism” as providing evidence that 
“[t]he chief concern of natural theology [for Smith] was to furnish a foundation for 
morality independent of positive religion”.
 Despite this, Viner’s view that Smith advocates 
benevolence in TMS and self-interest in WN is influential on subsequent 
interpretations of Smith’s thought, as is his criticism of the former book, which, he 
suggests, is separable from, and inferior to, WN:  
 
…the Wealth of Nations was a better book because of its partial breach with 
the Theory of Moral Sentiments, and that it could not have remained, as it has, 
a living book were it not that in its methods of analysis, its basic assumptions, 
and its conclusions it abandoned the absolutism, the rigidity, the romanticism 
which characterize the earlier book (Ibid, 119-120).  
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79 Smith discusses this in terms of luxury spending in WN (Smith 1976 [1776], IV.ii.9) and emulation 
in TMS (Smith 1976 [1790], IV.i.10). 
80 Smith 1976 (1776), V.i.3 cited in Morrow 1928: 170. 
 This argument is a probable factor in 
Hill’s rejection of Morrow’s view that for Smith, the:   
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…order in which the moral standards arise is not a formal rational order, not 
an order independent of humanity in general, not the order of a divine 
lawgiver (primarily, at least), but an order immanent in human experience 
(Morrow 1923: 71). 
 
Against Hill’s interpretation, Morrow does not exclude the possibility of theological 
leanings in Smith’s notion of the constitution of the “moral world”. However, Morrow 
de-emphasises its significance by pointing out that Smith locates morality in everyday 
behaviour, and thus provides some understanding of his sophisticated consideration of 
moral agency and the development of changing standards across space:  
 
If the moral sentiments of the individual are the expression of the general 
sentiments of the society of which he is a member, it is to be expected that 
moral standards will vary according to the conditions of the different societies 
in which they arise (Morrow 1928: 174). 
 
As such, Morrow also reflects the non-prescriptive nature of Smith’s thought:  
 
…the whole theory of the nature of virtue is in the main incidental to the real 
inquiry which Smith has in mind. The more important, and by far the larger, 
portion of his work is given over to the development of a psychological theory 
of the origin of moral judgement. This portion of the Moral Sentiments is 
unique; it may be said to have anticipated, in some important respects, the 
results of later social philosophy and psychology with respect to the origin of 
the moral consciousness (Ibid).81
                                                 
81 This also reflects the holistic nature of Smith’s thought (see Bonar 1922: 149; Hutchison 1976: 511; 
Macfie 1967: 16). Smith’s influence on sociology and psychology is discussed in 3.1.1. 
 
 
Morrow’s view is arguably reflected in contemporary arguments that reject Hill, such 
as those proposed by Elias Khalil, who argues that Smith “fuses” his two uses of the 
term “nature”, which sometimes refers to God, and at other times to human nature. As 
such, Khalil rejects authors that follow Viner insofar as there is no necessary tension 
between Smith’s use of the terms in either WN or TMS. As he suggests, in both books: 
“Smith conceives religions as simply further articulations of rudimentary general 
rules” (Khalil 2000: 49-56). 
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Perhaps echoing John Maurice Clark’s (1928: 55) “Environmental Interpretation of 
Economics”,82 Peter Clarke (2000: 50-53) argues that a deeper understanding of 
Smith’s thought is achieved by placing his work in the context of the religious 
upheaval that occurred around the time in which it was written. In a manner similar to 
Rothschild, Clarke observes the influence held by the Catholic Church on the 
contemporary intellectual climate. Unlike Rothschild, however, Clarke also points to 
the concurrent re-emergence of interest in Stoicism.83 Similarly to Richard Sher 
(1985), Clarke thus interprets Smith’s views as reflecting the “Christian Stoicism” of 
Francis Hutcheson, and argues that Smith’s depiction of self-interest as gaining 
societal approval provides a critique of those that claim Smith as a neoclassical 
economist.84
This view is perhaps touched upon by Brendan Long (2006: 144), for whom: “[t]he 
final cause of God’s creative action is a desire to produce a society of virtuous and 
happy persons. The efficient causality is Nature, which is really human nature”. Long 
also argues that the depth of Smith’s theism extends only so far as his advocacy of the 
“Christian Golden Rule - that we are to love one another as we love ourselves”.
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82 Clark defines this as “…that type of economics which interprets things in the light of their origins, 
the influences which have made them what they are, and the processes by which they have achieved 
their present state” (Ibid, 53). 
83 Clarke notes the Catholic Church’s ban on Copernicus was repealed in 1757, two years before the 
first edition of The Theory of Moral Sentiments (Ibid). Macfie 1967, Teichgraeber 1981, Fitzgibbons 
1995, Raphael and Macfie 1982, and Vivenza 2001 also emphasise the influence of Stoicism on 
Smith’s work. 
84 “In neoclassical economics the rational individual maximizes individually determined utility. For 
Smith the maximization of self-love is a social product. Markets may produce the best possible 
outcome, but only if we behave with a clearly defined social awareness” (Clarke 2000: 68). 
85 Ibid, 145, footnote 1. A stronger rejection of the importance of theology to Smith’s system of 
thought is made by Peter Minowitz (1993: 132), who argues that Smith moves from deism in TMS to 
atheism in WN, thus perpetuating the two “Adam Smiths”. 
 
Long seemingly follows Fleischacker (2004: 44-45), who suggests that it is likely that 
Smith believes in God. However, he also argues that this is of limited importance: 
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The issue is not whether Smith believes in a God, nor even whether he 
believes in a Providential God…but whether he uses the existence of a 
providential God as a premise in his social science arguments…And the 
answer to that question must be a careful ‘no’.86
Similarly to Haakonssen (1981: 77), for whom “[n]othing hinges on teleological 
explanations in Smith”, Fleischacker thus argues that: “Smith never requires belief in 
God as a condition for his empirical explanations to work”.
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As I argue in 2.3.1 and 3.1.2, Smith’s advocacy of “pure and rational” religion (Smith 
1976 [1776], V.iii.3.8) appears to be one in which an individual’s relationship to their 
spiritual self need not be mediated by organised religion. This is consistent with 
Haakonssen’s (1981: 76) argument that, for Smith: “[r]eligion is more or less 
philosophical speculation which is superimposed upon men’s natural sentiments of 
morality…”
 This view is supported 
by Montes (2004: 37-38), who notes that, although there are numerous metaphors in 
TMS that may be viewed as referring to deistic or theological subjects, compared to 
none in WN: “…if one omits these references…the structure and content of the TMS 
remain unaltered”. However, Montes also appears to favour arguments - such as 
Rothschild’s and Clarke’s - that claim Smith deliberately clouds his non-religious 
views in deistic rhetoric due to the social context. More sensibly, Montes notes:  
 
[w]hether Smith merely drew on the widely used deistic language, or whether 
his use of this language was deeply felt, will probably remain a subject of 
controversy; just another “Smith Problem” (Montes 2004: 37-38). 
 
88
                                                 
86 According to Fleischacker (2004: 71), Smith “…belongs among the Enlightenment thinkers who 
looked forward to the coming universal religion”.  
87 This goes against arguments such as Young (1997), who, as Long explains, emphasises the 
theological aspects of Smith’s naturalism, and for whom: “[t]here is a strong sense of plan, purpose and 
teleology in Smith” (Young, J. T. 1997 Economics as a Moral Science: The Political Economy of 
Adam Smith, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp.15-16 cited in Long 2006: 129-130). 
88 Referring to Smith 1976 (1790), VI.ii.3.6 and Ibid, III.2.35, Haakonssen argues that, for Smith: 
“[r]eligious sentiments are at their most natural when they constitute the continuation of particular 
moral sentiments, but when they are made into a system they are a philosopher’s construction” 
(Haakonssen 1981: 76). 
 This is also a more modest argument than Morrow’s (1928: 170) view 
that Smith’s introduction of natural theology is an attempt to “…furnish a foundation 
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for morality independent of positive religion” which contradicts the non-prescriptive 
nature of Smith’s thought that Morrow appears to emphasise. Moreover, despite being 
more persuasive than those such as Rothschild and Viner that seek to argue that Smith 
obscures his opinions in both books, Morrow (1928: 166) argues that Smith’s:  
 
…economic liberalism, his doctrine of the division of labour; and…his view 
of the primary role of self-interest in the economic order…were taught by 
Smith before going to France. It is therefore impossible to suppose that he 
underwent a radical change of view between the period of professorship at 
Glasgow and the appearance of the Wealth of Nations. 
 
This is echoed by Viner (1928: 118), who argues, correctly, that: “[c]laims have been 
made for the Physiocrats, but the evidence indicates that Smith had already 
formulated his central doctrine before he came into contact with them or their 
writings”.89
                                                 
89 According to Richard Teichgraeber (1981), Viner is particularly influenced by Wilhelm Paszkowski, 
for whom TMS is a traditional, normative piece of moral theory, and WN a purely technical inquiry. In 
contrast, according to Teichgraeber, Morrow is influenced by Richard Zeyss, who argues that there is 
no contradiction in Smith’s moral and economic theories (Paszkowski, W. [1890] Adam Smith als 
Moralphilosoph; Zeyss, R. [1889] Adam Smith und der Eigennutz cited in Teichgraeber 1981: 105-108). 
Viner also possibly follows T. E. Cliffe Leslie (1870), who attributes a deism to Smith. However, 
according to Henry Bittermann, Viner goes against Leslie’s view that: “Adam Smith’s political 
economy and the rest of his philosophy were part of a single scheme” (Bittermann 1940a: 489). As 
Bittermann notes, Leslie: “…emphasized Smith’s natural theology and attributed the doctrine of laisser 
faire to it in large part” (Ibid; See also Montes 2004: 37).   
 However, whereas for Viner this does not indicate consistency in Smith’s 
thought, for Morrow, the continuity between TMS and WN that this demonstrates 
highlights Smith’s consistent advocacy of individualism: 
 
…the doctrine of sympathy is the necessary presupposition of the doctrine of 
the natural order expounded in the Wealth of Nations…Thus we arrive, by 
way of the Moral Sentiments, at a deeper understanding of that individualism 
which is presented in the economic liberalism and laissez-faire of the Wealth 
of Nations (Morrow 1928: 178). 
 
However, just as Smith does not advocate religious dogma, he also does not propose 
individualism, economic liberalism or laissez-faire. As Macfie argues:  
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…there is an implicit social theory which develops through his treatment of 
sympathy and the impartial spectator, and that this in fact is the theory which 
directs and dominates all Smith’s thought (Macfie 1953: 218-219 [italics in 
original]).  
 
 
This view arguably reflects Oncken’s argument that Smith’s thought is “…a system of 
Moral Philosophy, in which Political Economy forms but a part” (Oncken 1887: 449). 
Certainly, this is a more convincing account than Morrow’s argument that the 
consistency of Smith’s thought is due to his advocacy of individualism, and Viner’s 
suggestion that claims regarding its continuity are based on the deliberate distortion of 
his own thought. According to Viner (1928: 138):  
 
…[w]hen Smith revised his Theory of Moral Sentiments he was elderly and 
unwell…[yet] he had retained his capacity to overlook the absence of 
complete coordination and unity in that philosophy.  
 
Despite the evident weakness of such a claim, it arguably represents a meeting point 
between contemporary heterodox views that attribute Smith’s erroneous reputation as 
a laissez-faire economist to his deliberate distortion of his private opinions, and yet 
attempt to challenge this characterisation by emphasising different aspects of his 
thought. Viner’s redefinition of the Adam Smith Problem arguably connects these 
arguments to its original proponents’ views on Smith’s alleged theological leanings. 
Indeed, according to Schmoller (1907: 126), Smith was “an errand boy of Calvinism 
and of devout theists”.90
As noted, Hill, Evensky and Firth’s adherence to Viner’s stress upon Smith’s 
supposed theological convictions is challenged by Rothschild, Fleischacker and 
Montes’ reflection of Morrow’s decision to de-emphasise this aspect of Smith’s 
thought. The existence of such divisions between authors that utilise holistic readings 
  
 
                                                 
90 Schmoller, G. (1907) Adam Smith. Internationale Wochenschrift für Wissenschaft, Kunst und 
Technik: 327–36; 373–8, p.126 cited in O’Brien 1992: 129. 
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of Smith therefore indicates the diverse nature of the heterodox debate, as well as its 
connection to earlier arguments that continue to influence orthodox accounts. This 
additionally demonstrates that, despite ostensibly putting forward more sophisticated 
arguments regarding Smith’s meaning and motives than their orthodox counterparts, 
they are in similar danger of influencing subsequent debate with a complacent 
approach.  
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1.3.3) The clarity of Smith’s views 
 
As Montes (2004: 2) correctly notes: “[m]any current positions in economics not only 
adapt what Smith said, but are also rather quick and uncritical in attempting to make 
his words fit into a particular framework of modern economic ideas”. Despite their 
critique of such an approach, some heterodox authors replicate this tendency. This is 
arguably the case with Fleischacker (2004: 261-263), who notes that authors tend to 
adopt the parts of a writer’s work that they find useful, whilst ignoring those parts that 
may challenge their point of view.91 Despite this, Fleischacker argues that this is 
facilitated by Smith’s restraint from engaging in direct moral commentary in WN, 
which leaves him particularly open to misunderstanding: “…he [Smith] seems to have 
achieved this impartial tone too well, leading people, wrongly, to suppose that he left 
his moral beliefs behind when he came to write The Wealth of Nations”
Fleischacker’s (2004: 5) detection of an “ironic stance and tone” in both books also 
resembles Rothschild’s argument that Smith deliberately writes “…in such a way that 
his ideas could indeed mean different things to different people”, which, she argues, 
contributes to the “extraordinary multiplicity of understandings” of Smith’s work 
 (Fleischacker 
2004: xv). This echoes Bittermann’s comments about TMS:  
 
It is easy…to attribute to Smith some of the ideas of his predecessors and to 
supply the gaps in his own exposition from their theories, particularly since he 
did not always state his assumptions or how he differed from the writers 
whom he cites. His style itself, especially the florid rhetoric of the Moral 
Sentiments, is a fruitful source of confusion (Bittermann 1940a: 490). 
 
                                                 
91 Fleischacker 2004: 261-263. As Rothschild notes, an early example of this attitude towards Smith is 
found in the 1795 Parliamentary debate regarding the establishment of a minimum wage, in which 
William Pitt, who was in favour of removing labour regulations, invokes Smith’s free trading 
principles found in Book IV of WN, whereas Samuel Whitbread appeals to Smith’s support for higher 
wages for the workers as found in Book I (Rothschild 2001: 61-62). Fleischacker (2004: 263-264) also 
points to Smith being invoked on both sides of the debate regarding the establishment of the 
Combination Acts during 1799-1800, and in their repeal in 1924. According to Fleischacker, other 
figures that use Smith around this time in support of their political arguments include John Millar, 
Richard Price, Thomas Paine, Jeremy Bentham, Marie-Jean Condorcet, the Abbé Sièyes, and Mary 
Wollestonecroft; and also include Frederick Eden, Thomas Malthus, and Edmund Burke. 
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(Rothschild 2002 [online]). In contrast, Tribe (1999: 612; 619) attributes disputes over 
“what Smith meant” to the lack of primary sources left for posterity. As he explains: 
“Smith’s published corpus of writings was small, he was a poor correspondent, and 
shortly before his death most of his surviving papers were burnt at his instruction”.92
Indeed, Marcelo Dascal (2006: 79-80) points out that one of the essays that Smith did 
not request to be burned - Considerations Concerning the First Formation of 
Languages and the Different Genius of original and compounded Languages
 
However, it is arguable that taking such care to select for posterity which aspects of 
his carefully edited oeuvre he considers worthy of preservation clearly demonstrates 
that Smith neither intends to mislead his audience, nor is particularly open to 
misinterpretation.  
 
93
As Dascal (2006: 91) explains, Smith thus observes that languages develop via the 
increasing degree of sophistication of mental operations required over time. This is 
 - is 
typical of “…an extremely self-conscious writer, whose care for style and clarity of 
exposition was apparent in all his writings - a fact that was highly praised by his 
contemporaries and by present-day readers alike”. It is interesting therefore to briefly 
consider this part of Smith’s thought. As J. C. Bryce notes, Dugald Stewart (1793, 
II.24) considers Languages to be: “…an essay of great ingenuity, and on which the 
author himself set a high value…” In it, Smith remarks:  
 
[w]hat constitutes a species is merely a number of objects, bearing a certain 
degree of resemblance to one another, and on that account denominated by a 
single appellation, which may be applied to express any one of them (Smith 
1983, Languages, 2: 205). 
 
                                                 
92 As Tribe explains: “…there are no manuscripts, few letters, no third-party memoirs” (Ibid, 619). 
Tribe notes that there are “…only 179 surviving letters from Smith, plus 53 missing - for a man who 
lived to the (then) respectable age of 67 not even an average of four a year” (Mossner and Ross, intro to 
Smith 1987: viii, cited in Tribe 1999: 614). 
93 Hereafter referred to as Languages. 
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arguably linked to his discussions elsewhere in his oeuvre regarding the evolutionary 
nature of the development of knowledge and morality. This is emphasized by Dugald 
Stewart (1793), who identifies the main value of Languages as its provision of an 
early example of Smith’s “Theoretical or Conjectural History”, an approach Stewart 
identifies throughout Smith’s work. As Bryce points out, for Stewart:  
 
“The known principles of human nature”; “the natural succession of 
inventions and discoveries”; “the circumstances of society” - these are the 
foundations on which rests Smith’s thinking “whatever be the nature of his 
subject”; astronomy, politics, economics, literature, language (Stewart 1793, 
II.44-56, cited in Bryce, intro to Smith 1983: 24). 
 
Smith’s methodology is also reflected in the rhetorical style that he chooses to 
employ. As Dascal (2006: 105) explains: “…unlike the dominant tendency among the 
rhetoricians of his time, who focused on the ‘ornamental’ role of language, Smith 
viewed style as a comprehensive mirror of the mind”. Smith clarifies his rhetorical 
position in Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres:94
Smith also identifies two types of eloquence here: deliberative, or “Socratick” 
eloquence, and judicial, or “Aristotelian” eloquence, noting that the type employed 
 “[w]hen the sentiment of the 
speaker is expressed in a neat, clear, plain and clever manner…then and only then the 
expression has all the force and beauty that language can give it” (Smith 1983, 
Lecture 6, v.56). Smith also criticises Lord Shaftesbury’s “pompous and grand stile” 
(Smith 1983, Lecture 5, v.51), and is fulsome in his appreciation of Henry Viscount 
Bolingbroke’s and Jonathan Swift’s “plain” style (Ibid, Lecture 2, i.10). As he 
suggests: “…the most beautiful passages are generally the most simple” (Ibid, Lecture 
7, i.74-75).  
 
                                                 
94 Hereafter referred to as LRBL. 
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depends upon the orator’s judgement of their audience (Ibid, Lecture 24, i.135-136).95
The significance that Smith attached to the correct presentation of his views is also 
reflected in the assiduousness he displayed regarding his published work, as the six 
editions of TMS and five editions of WN published during his lifetime demonstrate.
 
As such, he is clearly aware that the context in which one speaks informs the 
rhetorical method one employs. Recognition of this helps to explain why “…the 
ethical overtones are damped down” in WN compared to TMS, as Macfie (1959: 211) 
points out, as Smith is simply choosing to emphasise certain aspects of his thought at 
different times depending upon his subject matter and potential audience.  
 
96
Indeed, as Walter Eltis argues: “Smith was remarkably forthright about some of the 
central political issues of the 1770s. Book IV [of WN contains]…scarcely the words 
 
As is well known, Smith drafted and re-drafted the opening chapter of WN numerous 
times over a period of thirteen years, changing only the presentation of his argument. 
This goes against Viner (1928: 137), for whom Smith “…displayed a fine tolerance 
for a generous measure of inconsistency”, and Rothschild (2001: 66), for whom Smith 
is: “…extraordinarily cautious and elusive when he writes about current policies in 
the Wealth of Nations”. However, as discussed, Smith clearly and consistently 
presents his critique of areas such as mercantilism, religion and apprenticeships in a 
succinct, yet rarely ambiguous, manner. 
 
                                                 
95 “The Deliberative was such as they used in their councils and assemblies on matters of Consequence 
to the State; and the Judicial was that used in proceedings before a court of Justice” (Ibid, Lecture 12, 
i.153). As Campbell and Skinner (1982: 77) point out, Smith advocates the former method when an 
audience needs persuading, and the latter when the audience merely requires confirmation. 
96 Montes 2004: 18. As Montes notes, Smith took five years to revise the sixth edition of TMS (Ibid). 
Indeed, in a letter to Thomas Cadell, Smith writes: “I have been labouring very hard in preparing the 
proposed new edition of the Theory of Moral Sentiments” (Letter from Adam Smith to Thomas Cadell, 
31st March 1789, in Smith 1987, letter 287, pp.319-320). Such thoroughness is also evident in a letter 
to his publisher in which Smith makes clear his eagerness that his ideas are presented correctly (Letter 
from Adam Smith to William Strahan, 4th April 1760, in Smith 1987, letter 50, pp.67-69). 
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of someone reluctant or even afraid to express his true political opinions” (Eltis 2004: 
152-156). Such a view appears to revert to the book’s original reception. As 
Fleischacker (2004: 20-21) notes, Edward Gibbon and Hugh Blair comment, 
respectively, that Smith uses “the most perspicuous language”,97and is “clear and 
distinct to the last degree”.98
                                                 
97 Letter from Edward Gibbon to Adam Ferguson, 1st April 1776, in Ferguson 1995, letter 86, p.138. 
98 Letter from Hugh Blair to Adam Smith, 3rd April 1776, in Smith 1987, letter 151, p.188. 
 To be sure, as Smith states in WN: “I am always willing 
to run some hazard of being tedious in order to be sure that I am perspicuous” (Smith 
1976 [1776] I.iv.18). Therefore, by returning to what Smith says rather than 
speculating upon what he means, we can see that heterodox claims to have overcome 
the supposedly exclusively orthodox tendency to find one’s “own innermost 
preoccupations mirrored” (Jaffé 1977: 25) in Smith’s work are overstated.  
 
Indeed, in attempting to reconcile his oeuvre whilst claiming that he deliberately 
attempts to deceive his audience, it would appear that heterodox authors such as 
Rothschild engage in the type of “gap filling” usually associated with orthodox 
economists. Rather than focussing upon erroneous orthodox arguments in which 
Smith’s books are deemed to be irreconcilable, which is an established heterodox 
criticism, and proceeding to attempt to “reclaim” his most famous metaphors and 
sentences, it is surely more fruitful to acknowledge the significance of Smith’s 
consistently careful choice of language when considering recurring themes in his 
work. 
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1b) Chapter One conclusion 
 
As discussed, despite the heterodox challenge, it is the neoclassical conceptualisation 
of Smith as a laissez-faire economist, based on a selective reading of his work, which 
continues to inform popular perceptions of his ideas. As I have also suggested, the 
holistic approach employed by certain heterodox authors in their attempts to challenge 
the ongoing dominance of these views fails to adequately confront this problem. In 
my view, this is because such critiques are often made on the terms set out by 
orthodox authors. This is particularly the case in their attempts to reclaim the 
“invisible hand”, a metaphor emphasised by these mainstream theorists rather than by 
Smith himself.99
As with most opinions on Smith, my suggested approach is not new. As I have 
suggested, I am influenced by Macfie (e.g., 1967) and Winch (e.g., 1997), who 
challenge orthodox interpretations through accurate evaluation of specific areas of 
Smith’s thought in relation to consistent themes in his work. As such, they are able to 
retain a critique based upon what Smith says rather than via interpretation of what he 
 Rather than focussing upon mainstream interpretations of this 
metaphor, I have suggested in this chapter that Smith’s evidently connected oeuvre is 
best understood in terms of the recurring themes in his work, an approach that is 
unavailable to orthodox interpretations. This approach facilitates commentary upon 
specific areas of his thought without separating them from the rest of his views, 
thereby avoiding the tendency to challenge orthodox accounts by making claims as to 
“what Smith means” in particular passages, and then extrapolating this opinion into 
bold assertions regarding the alleged overarching intentions that Smith has for his 
entire oeuvre. 
 
                                                 
99 As Rothschild notes, no mention is made of the “invisible hand” in the secondary literature on Smith 
until August Oncken’s Adam Smith in der Culturgeschichte in 1874 (Oncken 1874: 19 cited in 
Rothschild 2001: 289-290, footnote 9). 
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is assumed to mean by metaphors such as the invisible hand. This also enables them 
to avoid reiteration of the two “Adam Smiths” whilst successfully dismantling 
orthodox views. 
 
Arguably, this approach reflects that of J. Shield Nicholson, who rejects misguided 
interpretations of Smith in his editors’ introduction to the 1895 edition of WN. Unlike 
Cannan, Shield Nicholson does not seek to challenge the German Historical School 
by terming Smith a consistent, albeit laissez-faire, theorist. In addition, Shield 
Nicholson does not attempt to rectify the supposed two “Adam Smiths” by focussing 
upon the invisible hand metaphor. Instead, he utilises a holistic approach that enables 
him to maintain a critique of the orthodoxy without focussing on “reclaiming” parts of 
Smith’s argument that he himself does not emphasise. As such, Shield Nicholson 
demonstrates that it is more productive to concentrate on what Smith says rather than 
to argue about “what Smith means”. This approach enables him to argue 
authoritatively that: “[t]he ‘economic man’, the supposed incarnation of selfishness, is 
no creation of Adam Smith…Smith treats of actual societies, and considers the 
normal conduct of average individuals” (Shield Nicholson 1895: 13-14).  
 
Watson arguably echoes this approach. As he suggests: “[e]ven in WN, though his 
[Smith’s] main concern is with the economic side, he is concerned with real men in 
the markets, not the abstraction, economic man, of the later economists”. Alluding to 
the mirror metaphor in Book III of TMS, Watson claims that, for Smith, it is purposive 
exchange within society that grants agents their identity. Therefore, as long as 
economic activity occurs within society, the abstract self-interest of neoclassical 
theory cannot be the motivation for it (Watson 2005: 5-7). Similarly, Stuart Plattner 
(1989: 210-214) points out that whereas the hypothetical perfectly competitive 
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markets of neoclassical theory are based upon the assumption of impersonal 
transactions between atomized individuals, in the real world, personalized 
transactions occur between people within relationships that are embedded in networks 
of social relations that endure past the exchange itself, as Smith suggests. As Peil 
rightly argues, therefore: 
 
Smith’s sympathy based theory of man and society reminds us not to reduce 
the multidimensional jumble of all the different webs of exchanges that 
comprise a market economy to a mechanism driven by general and abstract 
price signals (Peil 1999: 145). 
 
The central importance of the concept of sympathy to Smith’s thought is only 
facilitated by a thoroughly holistic reading of his work. It is through such a reading 
we are able to see that Smith consistently provides an alternative to the self-interested 
“rational economic man” that orthodox economists attribute to him without 
reproducing the two “Adam Smiths” upon which their interpretation rests. As 
Amartya Sen (1987: 28) argues:  
 
[t]he professor of moral philosophy and the pioneer economist [Smith] did not, 
in fact, lead a life of spectacular schizophrenia. Indeed, it is precisely the 
narrowing of the broad Smithian view of human beings, in modern economics, 
that can be seen as one of the major deficiencies of contemporary economic 
theory.  
 
According to Fleischacker (2004: 15), this is caused by orthodox economists who 
engage in an active attempt “…to pull Smith into a framework that these scholars feel 
must fit him, whether in fact it does or does not”. As argued in 1.3.1-3, however, this 
“narrowing” does not derive exclusively from orthodox economists’ approaches. 
Nevertheless, it is this interpretation that continues to predominantly inform popular 
and academic characterisations of Smith’s work.  
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Despite this, it might appear that awareness of the connected nature of his thought is 
increasing. In a quantitative study of citations of Smith in academic journals between 
1970 and 1997 from various fields, Jonathan Wight identifies an increase in citations 
of TMS across the social sciences. However, as he also shows, this “stunning 
resurrection” of TMS is not reflected in economics journals. Rather, these citations 
occur in journals from fields such as law, sociology, psychology, and political 
science. Moreover, Wight also shows that, despite an increase across the sample of 
citations of TMS to WN from 0.08 in 1971-1972 to 0.21 in 1996-1997, economics 
journals still account for a higher percentage of Smith citations overall: 50.2% 
compared to 49.8% in other fields.100
Wight also notes a decline in citations of Smith in economics journals from the mid-
1970s onwards. It is tempting to reflect that this trend is due to the inability of 
orthodox economists to engage with the increasingly accepted view outside of their 
discipline as to the connected nature of TMS and WN. This is consistent with 
heterodox criticisms of the outmoded nature of neoclassical interpretations, and the 
alleged death of the Adam Smith Problem since the publication of the Glasgow 
editions of Smith’s works in the 1970s, as discussed in 1.2.4. Indeed, when 
economists do invoke Smith, it is still mainly in terms of citations from WN, as 
Wight’s article demonstrates. Conversely, whilst scholars in other fields have 
apparently welcomed a holistic interpretation of Smith, they consistently cite TMS in 
preference to WN. This suggests that not only is an instrumental approach towards 
Smith continuing across the social sciences, but that heterodox claims to have 
 
 
                                                 
100 Wight 2002: 70-74. These “other fields” also include journals in the areas of anthropology, natural 
science, general social science, history, philosophy, education, health, international studies and natural 
resources (Wight 2002: 73). 
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challenged orthodox views are overstated. As such, the two “Adam Smiths” arguably 
lives on. 
 
As discussed, however, Smith’s oeuvre contains consistent themes, and ought to be 
assessed as such. Despite broad agreement on this within the more sophisticated 
literature, there is an ongoing tendency to read one’s own preoccupations into Smith’s 
thought in heterodox and orthodox interpretations of his work. As I have shown, this 
adds complexity to the secondary debate, wherein various claims to Smith’s “real” 
meaning are made that are repeated uncritically by non-specialists drawn to certain 
aspects of his work. A related problem is that original sources of agreement and 
disagreement within and across these debates are often unclear. I have attempted to 
address this problem by demarcating points of departure within the debate via 
discussion of likely sources of influence on contemporary understandings of Smith’s 
work (see Fig.1). In a similar manner, the likely influences upon his thought are 
considered in the next chapter. 
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2a) Introduction 
 
In this chapter, I assess Smith’s influences. My approach here is not unusual - as Jack 
Barbalet (2005: 171-174) suggests, attempts to locate the sources of Smith’s ideas 
tend to focus upon their classical antecedents and the influence of Francis Hutcheson 
and David Hume. However, it is essential to consider these influences to which Smith 
implicitly or explicitly refers, rejects or builds upon in order to understand his thought 
more clearly. As in the previous chapter, I avoid speculation as to Smith’s intended 
meaning in order to focus upon his own views as expressed in his works and 
correspondence. In addition to tracing the connections between Smith, Hutcheson and 
Hume in this manner, I attempt to understand the nature and significance of the 
intellectual distance between Smith and his contemporaries in the Scottish 
Enlightenment in order to gain insight into a key area of Smith’s thought: his 
intersubjective notion of virtue.  
 
As Lisa Hill (2003: 1) points out: “…it is common to see the views of Scottish 
Enlightenment figures conflated as though they constituted a synthetic school of 
thought”. First used by W. R. Scott in 1900, the term the ‘Scottish Enlightenment’ is 
employed by authors such as Hugh Trevor-Roper (e.g., 2001 [1967]), John Pocock 
(e.g., 1983), and Nicholas Phillipson (e.g., 1983)101
                                                 
101 Robertson (1997 [online]); Withers 2000: 95. See Emerson 1990: 32-33.  
 to distinguish Scottish from 
European thought in the period 1740-1780 (Moore 1990: 37; Robertson 1997: 4). 
However, both share a discernible commitment to civic humanism. As Jeremy 
Jennings points out, this was the prevailing ideology in Europe during this period, as 
is reflected by Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s (1750) view that: “…luxury is diametrically 
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opposed to good morals”.102
As Istvan Hont and Michael Ignatieff (1983: 8) point out, Smith: “…dissented 
strongly from the civic moralist jeremiads on the impact of luxury upon the industry 
and the morals of the poor”.
 This raises two points. Firstly, it suggests that the 
majority of Scottish thought in this period is not as distinct from its European 
equivalent as some authors suppose. Secondly, and of more importance to my 
discussion, this also highlights Smith’s intellectual distance from his peers. 
 
103 This is in contrast to his Scottish contemporaries, 
whose advocacy of Christian education to remedy the allegedly pernicious effects of 
commerce upon morality reflects the ongoing influence of Scottish Protestantism 
(Chitnis 1976:14). As Robert Davis (2003: 568-571) explains, the programme of 
central planning of Scottish education as advocated by John Knox (1559) and Samuel 
Rutherford (1644) aimed to promote a national theology rooted in the patriotic 
rhetoric of the struggle for Scottish independence from England in the fourteenth and 
fifteenth centuries.104
 
 Despite a retreat from this appeal following the 1707 Act of 
Union with England, its patriotic, conservative, theocratic utopianism is retained in 
the views of the Scottish authors such as Reid and Ferguson during the eighteenth 
century. As Davis (2003: 574) points out, during this period: “[a]lmost without 
exception, Scottish intellectuals were prepared to acquiesce in the continuing 
institutional control of education by the Church”. 
 
                                                 
102 Rousseau, J-J. (1997 [1750]) The Discourses and other early political writings, translated by Victor 
Gourevitch, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.1-28, cited in Jennings 2007: 81-82; 
Rasmussen (2006: 309).  
103 Indeed, Smith’s critique of luxury is based on its inefficiency as a form of consumption rather than 
its potential for moral corruption, a point that he makes clearly in the “invisible hand” passage in TMS 
(Smith 1976 [1790], IV.i.6-10). See also Winch 1983a: 262.  
104 In Brief Exhortation to England (1559), Knox promotes the notion of the Scots as a chosen people. 
Utilising Old Testament discourse, Knox argues that education would increase awareness of this “fact” 
whilst enabling Scotland to achieve a perfect polity (Davis 2003: 568-571). 
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Smith provides an exception. Indeed, his opposition to state-sponsored religion, 
antipathy towards formal schooling based upon Christian teaching and preference for 
natural jurisprudence informs his intersubjective account of morality, which further 
confirms his distance from the theocratic universalism of his peers.105 In this, he is 
influenced by Hutcheson and Hume. As I discuss in 2.1.1-2.1.4, Smith develops 
Hutcheson’s Stoic notion of man’s sociability and Hume’s natural theory of justice, 
which allows Smith to make reference to morality independently from notions of 
God. This is typical of his approach, in which abstract philosophical concerns are 
often related to practical matters via implicit reference to a combination of immediate 
and classical influences. Indeed, as Campbell (1982: 10) points out, Smith’s ideas 
regarding the “natural progress of opulence” may be considered abstract, yet it 
demonstrates real-world impediments to such progress.106 One such constraint is the 
perceived impiety of gain, as expressed by Henry Thomas Buckle (1790), who 
advocates “complete resignation to the Divine will”, and for whom it is “…wrong for 
a man to wish to advance himself in life, or in any way better his condition”.107
As such, Schumpeter is incorrect to suggest that Smith’s work is: “…thoroughly in 
sympathy to the humours of his time”.
 
Smith’s pragmatic analysis regarding our natural propensity to desire to better our 
condition therefore affords room for improvement within a conservative society 
(Smith 1976 [1776], IV.ii.9; I.ii.1-2). 
 
108
                                                 
105 See Skinner 1982: 2-4; Winch 1983a: 268. 
106 See, for example, Book IV of WN. 
107 Buckle, H. T. (1970 [1861 (1790)]) On Scotland and the Scotch Intellect, edited by H. J. Hanham, 
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago, pp.223-224, cited in Campbell 1982: 13. 
108 Schumpeter 1953: 184-185 cited in Teichgraeber 1987: 338. 
 Indeed, as Thomas Sowell’s (1979: 3-19) 
study of contemporary parliamentary debates and reviews in journals demonstrates, 
this is not the case. Certainly, when one considers Winch’s point that no 
Enlightenment author “…executed a work remotely like Smith’s An Inquiry Into the 
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Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations” apart from James Steuart - whose 
mercantilist An Inquiry into the Principles of Political Oeconomy (1767) was 
dismissed by Smith - his relationship to the Scottish Enlightenment authors appears to 
be one of similar sources of intellectual inspiration resulting in dissimilar 
conclusions.109
Despite being referred to by figures such as Adam Ferguson, William Robertson and 
John Millar, Smith does not refer to them (Winch 1992: 98). As Raphael and Macfie 
point out, the influence of these and other Scottish Enlightenment figures on Smith’s 
thought is “remarkably small”.
  
 
110
This chapter concludes that, unlike many of his contemporaries, Smith does not posit 
an objective, immutable truth towards which society ought to be aimed and by which 
moral behaviour is to be evaluated. Instead, he considers the best practicable society 
 As noted, the exceptions are Hutcheson and Hume. 
In 2.1.1-4, I discern the extent of their influence upon Smith and the nature of his 
subsequent move beyond them. I also assess the likely classical influences upon 
Smith’s negative conceptualisation of justice. This relates to my argument in 2.2.1-4, 
where I suggest that Smith rejects his contemporaries’ fears for the moral degradation 
of society in its commercial stage. Discussion of these authors’ views serves to 
highlight Smith’s distance from such arguments, a theme that is developed in 2.3.1-4, 
where his view that morality is partially socially constructed yet also refers to certain 
observable general standards is discussed.  
 
                                                 
109 Winch 1983a: 253-270; Campbell 1982: 20; Dow, Dow, Hutton 1997: 374. In a letter to William 
Pulteney, Smith states: “I have the same opinion of Sir James Stewart’s [sic] book that you have. 
Without once mentioning it, I flatter myself, that every false principle in it, will meet with a clear and 
distinct confrontation in mine” (Letter from Adam Smith to William Pulteney, 3rd September 1772, in 
Smith 1987, letter 132, p.164).  
110 Raphael and Macfie, intro to Smith 1976 (1790), pp.10-13. Of his contemporaries in Scotland, 
Smith only mentions Hutcheson (e.g., Smith 1976 [1790], VII.ii.3.3-12), Kames (Ibid, II.ii.1.5) and 
Hume (Smith 1976 [1776], II.ii.96; II.iv.9). 
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that might be achieved via individuals’ conscientious reflection upon their own and 
others’ actions and motives. Arguably, the pronounced flexibility of Smith’s thought 
that is highlighted by comparison to his contemporaries additionally demonstrates its 
enduring relevance, as well as its connection to the thought of William James, which 
is discussed in Chapter Three of this thesis. 
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Part One: Smith’s influences    
 
2.1.1) Hutcheson 
 
In the seventeenth century, moderates in Scotland such as Robert Leighton advocated 
the importance of the working out of a godly life through relationships with others in 
society, urging a focus upon personal conduct and the avoidance of theological 
speculation. Such a spirit of self-determination within a social and religious 
framework can be said to have influenced the ideas of Francis Hutcheson, who is 
credited with laying the intellectual foundations for eighteenth century Scottish moral 
philosophy during his seventeen years as Professor of Moral Philosophy at Glasgow 
University from 1729. Of additional importance to Hutcheson’s moral philosophy are 
the broader intellectual shifts of the European Enlightenment upon Scottish thought 
during the eighteenth century, particularly Newton’s experimental method and 
Montesquieu’s legal ideas (Chitnis 1976: 58-59).111
Most notably, Hutcheson’s moral philosophy represents a challenge to 
epistemological scepticism. According to him, our ideas of beauty and virtue are real 
ideas perceived by internal senses, which are distinct from the sensations of the 
external senses (Haakonssen 1996: 73; Hope 1989: 48). For Hutcheson, therefore, our 
knowledge of objects is immediate, not mediate, as they are presented as an 
irresistible force to the mind. Hutcheson points to the five senses as evidence of the 
mind’s determination to receive ideas independently of our rational will. He also 
refers to our other “senses”: the external, internal, public, and moral senses, and the 
sense of honour. According to Hutcheson, these senses provide evidence of original 
desires for beauty and virtue, which may be highlighted by comparison to the 
   
 
                                                 
111 According to Montesquieu, man is “…formed to live in society” (Montesquieu 1914 [1752], I.1). As 
Gloria Vivenza (2001: 96) notes, of particular interest to Hutcheson is Montesquieu’s distinction 
between: “…law as reason and law as a creation of social circumstances”. 
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secondary desires they prompt, such as the desire for wealth, through the abilities of 
reflection and remembrance.  
 
The most significant of these senses to Hutcheson’s scheme is the moral sense, which, 
he argues, grants individuals irresistible recognition of virtue and vice. According to 
Hutcheson, this is a faculty of the mind that judges the moral quality of the actions or 
emotions of oneself and others, which represents an approval of virtue and 
disapproval of vice through feeling rather than via intellectual judgement (Broadie 
1990: 93-96; Dwyer 1982: 302).112 For Hutcheson, although the motivation for such 
judgements is subjective and emotive, the resulting moral judgement may still have 
independent truth-value insofar as the laws of nature have their origin in certain 
dispositions, such as our capacity for benevolent motivation. As Haakonssen (1996: 
74-78) points out, this reasoning enables Hutcheson to conclude that there is a divine 
benevolence behind this system, of which we are all aware via the moral sense.113
Despite referring to the simple ideas received by the moral sense as “approval” and 
“disapproval”, Hutcheson (1728: 216) is insistent that this does not mean that 
individuals are benevolent merely because they approve of benevolence, as: “…our 
approbation of moral conduct is very different from liking it merely as the occasion of 
pleasure to ourselves in gratifying these kind affections”.
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112 According to Hutcheson, once we have perceived an action by ordinary perception, our “moral 
sense” responds with feelings of approbation or disapprobation (Norton 1982: 132; Hope 1989: 39).  
113 According to Hutcheson, such superior moral motivation is therefore the basis for natural law. It is 
love or benevolence that “excites toward the Person in whom we observe it” an “Esteem, or Perception 
of moral Excellence” (Hutcheson, F. [1729] An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and 
Virtue In Two Treatises, third edition, pp.128-130 cited in Haakonssen 1996: 73). 
114 Hutcheson, F. (1728) An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections with 
Illustrations on the Moral Sense, p.216, cited in Campbell 1982: 172. Hutcheson: “…is adamant that 
there is a perception of virtue quite distinct from the pleasure of contemplating its effects” (Campbell 
1982: 172) yet does not seem to be able to advance on Shaftesbury’s tautological notion that we 
instinctively desire public good and are pleased by its pursuit and its result (Hope 1989: 13).  
 In order to support this, 
Hutcheson points to the dualism of human motivation. Despite acknowledging that 
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self-love is a stronger tendency than benevolence, he argues that calm reflection will 
recommend the latter tendency to us as we become aware that it is only benevolence 
that will make us truly happy. Therefore, in opposition to the early eighteenth century 
reformed Scholasticism of Calvinists such as Gershom Carmichael (e.g., 1724 
[2002]), who followed Augustinian theology’s concept of the innate sinfulness of 
Man, Hutcheson argues that our errors in moral and aesthetic judgements are not due 
to the “Fall” of mankind, nor are they representative of sceptical notions that reject 
notions of innate morality. Rather, Hutcheson suggests that we are misled by custom, 
by poor education, and by misleading associations of ideas.115
In this way, Hutcheson attempts to show that the restraint of our individual rights by 
considerations of the common good is morally well founded whilst highlighting that 
people are naturally inclined towards benevolent actions and approve of this virtue in 
others. However, Hutcheson is willing to see the principle of utility applied as a 
legislative principle, arguing that Government can and should attempt to obtain for 
individuals the benefits that come from organised social cooperation, due to the 
weakness of the average person’s moral reasoning.
  
 
116 In addition, in order to avoid 
criticisms that we cannot truly know that another person’s motivation does not spring 
merely from self-interest, Hutcheson also argues that we can calculate the action’s 
consequences in terms of the “greatest happiness” principle, then retrospectively 
reconstruct the motive by drawing on our experience.117
                                                 
115 Campbell 1982: 169; Moore 1990: 44-55; Herdt 1997: 28; Haakonssen 1990: 70-72. 
116 As Campbell (1982: 173-180) notes, Hutcheson is willing to trust the ordinary person where 
extensive reasoning is not required. However, his enthusiasm for governmental intervention and 
education may be seen to be conflated by the Common Sense theorists, whose ideas are discussed in 
2.2.1-4.   
117 In Treatise II of An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue In Two Treatises 
(1725), Hutcheson measures “right” and “wrong” by the greatest happiness of the greatest number: 
“…that Action is best, which procures the greatest Happiness for the greatest Numbers; and that, worst, 
which, in like manner, occasions Misery” (Hutcheson 1729, II.iii.8). 
 As Vincent Hope points out, 
therefore, after initially claiming that virtue depends on goodwill as its motive, 
 96 
Hutcheson increasingly refers to utility. However, as moral worth is characterised as a 
matter of useful public benevolence, his mathematical utilitarianism does not guide 
virtue, as he suggests, because the fact that an action makes more people happy does 
not necessarily mean that it is morally right.118
                                                 
118 Hope 1989: 23-31.This is of further interest when one considers the rights of minorities, a subject 
Smith appeals to in WN in his discussion of religious sects (See Smith 1976 [1776], V.iii.3). 
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2.1.2) Hutcheson and Hume   
 
As Alexander Broadie (1990: 95) explains, David Hume develops Hutcheson’s ideas 
regarding irresistibility and utilitarianism, albeit in ways to which he did not assent. 
For Hutcheson, the differences between his ideas and those of Hume are however  
“neither few nor insignificant”. Indeed, Hutcheson’s well-known opposition to 
Hume’s intention to be appointed Professor of Moral Philosophy at Edinburgh in 
1744 is based upon his rejection of Hume’s alleged scepticism (Moore 1994: 27). 
In the first sentence of A Treatise of Human Nature (1739) Hume proclaims that: 
“[a]ll the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds, 
which I shall call IMPRESSIONS and IDEAS”. Hume explains here that an 
impression is made by the apprehension of an object, whereupon reflection renders an 
idea of it in the mind. These simple ideas are re-presentations of preceding 
impressions, out of which a complex idea is formed. To Hume, this is readily evident, 
as: “[e]veryone of himself will readily perceive the difference betwixt feeling and 
thinking” (Hume 1896 [1739], I.i.1). The importance of this observation is manifest in 
his view that ideas philosophers claim to have are not ideas to which there is a 
corresponding impression. 
 
However, as Broadie points out, Hume does not deny the existence of an external 
world. Rather, he concludes that it is largely a product of our imagination and 
therefore does not correspond to a preceding unitary impression. In contrast to 
Hutcheson, Hume claims that individuals have an idea of necessary connection 
through expectations of familiar processes from experience that are then read as a 
feature of the world. As such, he argues that it is by the activity of the imagination 
that we see the self, a “bundle or collection of different perceptions” (Ibid, I.iv.6) as 
possessing a personal identity, which develops in society and develops knowledge of 
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itself through its relations with others. This additionally enables Hume to explain how 
beliefs arise, arguing that certain standards are chosen via connections established 
through associations between certain dispositions and actions, and their socially 
recognised painful or pleasurable outcomes (Broadie 1990: 95-103).119
As Moore (1994: 27-32) notes, Hume’s innovation here is that such conventions 
allow us to believe that others will be just in their behaviour, thereby enabling us to 
conceive of the idea of justice in a more vivid manner. Hume’s notions of contiguity 
and association therefore enable us to have an interest in respecting another’s 
property, as it is a general rule, while stating, in contrast to Hutcheson, that the source 
of this impression is artificial. To Hume, the virtues necessary to regulate impersonal 
relations do not arise from natural motives, but: “…artificially, tho’ necessarily from 
education, and human conventions” (Hume 1896 [1739], III.ii.1).
  
 
120
In this way, and in contrast to popular moral philosophy that invokes the 
internalisation of God’s will, Hume is able to suggest that we internalise a social will 
that prompts self-loathing at being morally deficient through the mechanisms of social 
approbation and non-approbation. Hume therefore attempts to advance from 
Hutcheson’s moral sense theory by developing a viewpoint of universal sympathy, the 
social need for a common measure: “[t]he intercourse of sentiments therefore in 
society and conversation makes us form some general unalterable standard by which 
we may approve and disapprove of characters and manners” (Hume 1896 [1739], 
III.iii.3; Haakonssen 1996: 104-109; Hope 1989: 55-60). According to Hume, the 
 
 
                                                 
119 Hume claims that: “…we cannot go beyond experience” (Hume 1896 [1739], intro). The notion of 
the self within society is of course also a theme of Hutcheson’s inquiry, and recognised as a key 
concern of Enlightenment thought. Adam Smith’s concept of the self is discussed in detail in 3.1.2.  
120 As he argues: “General rules create a species of probability, which sometimes influences the 
judgement, and always the imagination” (Hume 1896 [1739], III.ii.1 [italics in original]). See Mercer 
1972: 56; Haakonssen 1996: 108. 
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practice of praising or blaming by these criteria instils in us a desire to adhere to those 
rules. Indeed, whereas Hutcheson views conventions as bolstering our natural 
tendency to benevolence, for Hume, the inherent weakness and self-interestedness of 
individuals necessitates such conventions.121 Moreover, these traits are useful. Hume 
suggests that vanity in relation to what others think of us should “… be esteemed a 
social passion, and a bond of union among men”, as an agent’s subsequent awareness 
of the benefits of morality will produce a morally self-regulating agent (Hume 1896 
[1739], III.ii.2).122
Rather than represent a rejection of Hutcheson’s optimistic moral realist claims, 
Hume suggests that his view may be viewed as part of his “[t]ryal…to make the 
Moralist and Metaphysician agree a little better”. This view is expressed in Hume’s 
reply in 1740 to Hutcheson’s comments on a draft of Book III of A Treatise of Human 
Nature, ‘Of Morals’. As Moore points out, this letter reveals Hutcheson’s 
consideration that Hume’s moral philosophy lacks “Warmth in the Cause of Virtue”, 
to which Hume responds that, as a metaphysician engaging in abstract inquiry into the 
subject, was hardly surprising, yet that this does not exclude his findings from aiding 
a practical moralist such as Hutcheson.
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121 According to Hope, Hume concurs with Epicurus’s notion that knowledge of good and evil is based 
on pleasure and pain, and is discernible through reason (Hope 1989: 16). Hume is opposed to the 
“frivolous” Epicurean tradition, however. As Moore (1994: 27) explains, Hume may therefore be seen 
in the tradition of Epicurus, Lucretius and Horace, as revived by late seventeenth century French 
Pyrrhonians such as Bayle and Gassendi.  
122 This may be seen as a source of disagreement between Smith and Hume, as Smith condemns 
Mandeville’s use of vanity as a basis for propriety (See Smith 1976 [1790], VII.ii.4.7-8). 
123 Greig, J. Y. T. (1932) The Letters of David Hume. Oxford: Clarendon Press (hereafter referred to as 
HL): 32-40, cited in Moore 1994: 35-37. That Hume refers to Hutcheson’s experimental method in 
ethics at the beginning of A Treatise of Human Nature is widely recognised: the subtitle of the book is 
‘Being an attempt to introduce the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects’ (Hume 1896 
[1739]). 
 This opinion is shared by a number of 
authors, for whom Hume’s views are contingent with Hutcheson’s moral philosophy. 
Prominent among these is David Norton (e.g., 1982), who argues that Hutcheson’s 
moral realism is to be found in Hume’s concept of concomitant ideas that represents 
 100 
tacit acknowledgement of a knowable, external world. As Norton suggests, to Hume, 
as to Hutcheson, one can assume a basic uniformity in our underlying human nature, 
which is supported by custom, as we have an idea of necessary connection through 
expectations of familiar processes from experience that are then read as a feature of 
the world. As such, although Hume is a metaphysical sceptic, he may, like Hutcheson, 
be considered a common-sense moralist (Norton 1982: 7-10).124
Yet for Hutcheson, the differences between his ideas and Hume’s position are 
“neither few nor insignificant”.
  
 
125 As Moore suggests, this is perhaps exacerbated by 
misunderstandings by both authors of each other’s positions. As he notes, Hutcheson 
and Hume are both influenced by Cicero.126
                                                 
124 According to Norton, Hume’s moral epistemology posits that we are able to experience and isolate 
the common sentiments that enable us to distinguish virtue from vice, and right from wrong. These are 
natural sentiments shared by all, a point upon which Hutcheson would agree. For Norton, this is 
displayed in Hume’s metaphysical position, in which there are moral distinctions grounded in real 
existences that are independent of the observer’s mind, and his epistemology, in which Hume argues 
that these distinctions can be known (Ibid, 132; 120). See also Moore 1994: 24-25. 
125 Hutcheson’s well-known opposition to Hume’s intention to be appointed Professor of Moral 
Philosophy at Edinburgh in 1744 reflects this (Moore 1994: 27).  
126 For Moore, Hutcheson displays a preference for Cicero’s Stoic thoughts, Hume his Epicurean 
thoughts (Moore 1994: 26-37). Cicero’s eclecticism may also be seen to be an influence upon Smith, 
who arguably avoids an overt Epicurean or Stoic preference. A more detailed discussion of this subject 
is given in 2.3.4. See also Abramson 2002: 306-310, in which Cicero’s influence on Hume is 
acknowledged, as is the influence of Aristotle.  
 As such, Hume considers that Hutcheson 
must surely agree with Cicero’s notion in De finibus that virtue cannot be its own 
motive, yet Hutcheson’s aim is to prove the opposite. Similarly, Hutcheson considers 
Hume’s understanding of human nature to be based upon an inadequate understanding 
of what is natural. Hume’s response to this is that he purposely makes no attempt to 
explain why humanity has been created as this does not afford a philosophical 
response. More importantly, perhaps, Hume believes that Hutcheson must concur that 
one cannot know the sentiments of God, yet in all of his systems of moral philosophy, 
it is clear that he views as legitimate the claim that we may infer that God is 
benevolent.  
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Despite attempts to stress Hume’s connection to Hutcheson, this signals an important 
point of departure between the two thinkers. Indeed, according to Hume, Hutcheson’s 
exclusive focus upon benevolence in his Inquiry into beauty and virtue (1729) is an 
overtly narrow account of virtue.127 Consequently, Hume employs the principle of 
sympathy to appeal to the collective judgement of a society “…equipped to produce 
disinterested and intersubjective judgements of an objective moral reality” (Norton 
1975: 542). In contrast, there is no place for sympathy in Hutcheson’s system, which 
he terms  “an invention of the Cyreniacs and Epicureans”.128
Quality apprehended in Actions, which procures Approbation, and Love 
toward the Actor, from those who receive no Advantage by the Action.
 This is because universal 
justice cannot be conceived so narrowly as mere restraint from harming others; rather, 
for Hutcheson, it is a form of love or benevolence, understood as an active principle 
guided by rational judgement, prompted by the moral sense. According to Hutcheson, 
virtue is benevolence, and is perceived by others as the pleasantness of that 
benevolence. However, virtue is more than this, as moral good excites the love of the 
agent, which for Hutcheson explains why someone should want to be virtuous - to 
earn love:  
 
The word Moral Goodness, in this Treatise, denotes our Idea of some  
129
To Hutcheson, therefore, the feeling on which moral judgements are based is that of 
shared pleasure at the sight of natural benevolence. As such, sympathy is superfluous, 
as it “…could never account for that immediate ardour of love and goodwill which 
  
 
                                                 
127 HL: 34; 40 cited in Moore 1994: 35-37. 
128 Hutcheson 1755: 29-47 cited in Moore 1994: 35. Smith discusses Epicurus’s system in Smith 1976 
(1790), VII.ii.2. 
129 Hutcheson 1729: 69 cited in Hope 1989: 27. The passage continues: “Moral Evil, denotes our Idea 
of a contrary Quality, which excites Aversion, and Dislike toward the Actor, even from Persons 
unconcern’d in its natural Tendency” (Ibid). 
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breaks forth toward any character represented to us as eminent in moral 
excellence”.130
                                                 
130 Hutcheson 1755: 48 cited in Moore 1994: 35; Hope 1989: 21. 
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2.1.3) Hutcheson, Hume and Smith 
 
Despite his optimism, it is important to recognise that Hutcheson allows that: “…the 
Preservation of the System requires every one to be innocently sollicitous about 
himself” (Hutcheson 1729: 105 cited in Hope 1989: 28). This is echoed by Smith in 
WN, where he points out that: “[m]an …is sensible…that his own interest is 
connected with the prosperity of society, and that the happiness, perhaps the 
preservation of his existence, depends upon its preservation” (Smith 1976 [1790], 
II.ii.3.6).131
As he notes: “Dr. Hutcheson observed… that virtue must consist in pure and 
disinterested benevolence alone”. In contrast, for Smith, it is not benevolence but self-
deception that oils “the great machine” of society, inadvertently bringing social 
benefit (Ibid, VII.ii.3.6; I.iv.2). It is instructive to consider Smith’s identification of 
this unwitting deception in comparison to Mandeville’s “deliberate” deception.
 Yet Smith also notes that: “Dr. Hutcheson was so far from allowing self-
love to be in any case a motive of virtuous actions, that even a regard to the pleasure 
of self-approbation …diminished the merit of a benevolent action”. In contrast, Smith 
considers sympathetic self-love a viable motive to virtue (Ibid, VII.ii.3.13; See also 
Ibid, VII.ii.4.8; I.iii.2.1). 
 
132
                                                 
131 It is likely, however, that Smith was able to take from Epicurus without lapsing into utilitarian 
arguments, as he employs a more sophisticated notion of sympathy than Hume.  
132 “Dr. Mandeville considers whatever is done from a sense of propriety…as being done from a love 
of praise and commendation, or as he calls it from vanity…All public spirit, therefore, all preference of 
public to private interest, is, according to him, a mere cheat and imposition upon mankind; and that 
human virtue…is the mere offspring of flattery begot upon pride” (Smith 1976 [1790], VII.ii.4.7). 
 In 
his critique of Mandeville, Smith explains: “I shall only endeavour to show that the 
desire of doing what is honourable and noble, of rendering ourselves the proper 
objects of esteem and approbation, cannot with any propriety be called vanity” (Ibid, 
VII.ii.4.8). This criticism can also be directed at Hume, for whom, as noted, vanity 
enlivens individuals’ notions of justice. Hume’s suggestion that we internalise a social 
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will that results in self-loathing at being morally deficient appears to be an advance on 
Mandeville, as it is cognisant of the possibility of conscience guiding our actions. Yet 
Hume does not explain why we would respond to conscience, particularly as he 
argues that vanity is a stronger motivation than benevolence.  
 
For Hume: “[s]ympathy is the chief source of moral distinctions”. As Macfie notes, to 
Hume, sympathy is the idea of an emotion being converted into the emotion itself 
through the enlivening association with the impression of self: “I feel a sympathetic 
motion in my breast, conformable to whatever I imagine in his” (Hume 1896 [1739], 
III.iii.6 cited in Macfie 1967: 48). As such, Hume’s notion that another’s misery will 
invoke pity conflates cognition and emotion, as it locates sympathy in benevolence. In 
addition, his concept of sympathy is of limited practical consequence. Indeed, despite 
stating that: “[n]o quality of human nature is more remarkable…than the propensity 
we have to sympathise with others, and to receive by communication their 
inclinations and sentiments, however different from, or even contrary to our own”, he 
also notes that: “…any peculiar similarity in our manners, or characters, or country, or 
language…facilitates the sympathy” (Hume 1896 [1739], II.i.11). Hume’s concept of 
sympathy is therefore closely tied to associative mechanisms, and is consequently 
inadequate as a foundational motive for moral rules that operate beyond the realm of 
personal ties (Hampshire-Monk 1992: 132). 
 
Smith concurs with Hume about the importance of sympathy in ethics but disagrees 
about what it is and why it is important (Harman 2000: 189). In Book VII of TMS, 
Smith examines systems of moral philosophy that locate virtue in propriety, self-love, 
disinterested benevolence and prudence, and points out that in “[t]hat system which 
places virtue in utility”: 
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…virtue consists in not in any one affection, but in the proper degree of all the 
affections. The only difference between it and that which I have been 
endeavouring to establish is that it makes utility and not sympathy or the 
correspondent affection of the spectator the natural and original measure of 
this proper degree (Smith 1976 [1790], VII.ii.3). 
 
It is not the view of this utility or hurtfulness which is either the first or 
principal source of our approbation or disapprobation…the sentiment of 
approbation always involves in it a sense of propriety quite apart from the 
sense of utility (Ibid, IV.ii.3). 
 
This is the reverse of the utilitarian approach employed by Hutcheson and Hume, as 
“…the origin of approbation and disapprobation, so far as it derives them from a 
regard to the order of society, runs into the principle which gives beauty to utility” 
(Smith 1976 [1790], VII.iii.1.2). Therefore, justice does not come about through 
convention, but rather, comes prior to utility, as it is: “…the main pillar that upholds 
the whole edifice” (Ibid, II.ii.3.4).133
Smith may also be seen to develop Hume’s idea that there are some apparent 
similarities in the feelings of individuals, and that similar emotions may be observed 
to be aroused in others to those of the person with whom they are sympathising (Ross 
  
 
Smith may be seen to concur with Hutcheson’s notion that the principle of our 
approval of moral acts is not based on self-love, and that “…it could not arise from 
any operation of reason” (Ibid, VII.iii.3-4 cited in Ross 1995: 161). However, he 
views self-interest as a virtue, and rejects Hutcheson’s theory of the moral sense as 
the solution to the problem of the source of moral approbation and disapprobation. 
Smith concurs with Hutcheson’s view that a spectator approves of moral motives, but, 
like Hume, points out that approval can be explained by sympathy (Hope 1989: 83). 
                                                 
133 Smith’s negative concept of justice allows him to point out that benevolence cannot be enforced 
(See Ibid, II.ii.3.3). However, he does accept that “[t]he laws of all civilized nations oblige parents to 
maintain their children, and children to maintain their parents, and impose upon men many other duties 
of beneficence” (Ibid, V.ii.1.8). In this way, Smith is able to distinguish the legal enforcement of 
beneficence from the more general passion of benevolence, which is not enforceable by law. 
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1995: 161). This combination of Hutcheson’s idea of the internal character of a 
motive with Hume’s emphasis on the effects of motives enables Smith to reinstate 
conscience as the source of virtue (Hope 1989: 88). However, his notion of the 
impartial spectator goes beyond Hume’s concept of sympathy as shared feelings, as 
Smith’s concept posits that an individual is aware that they are sharing another’s 
feelings. Smith therefore points out that in approving of virtue we consciously 
sympathise with the agent. As Ian Ross (1995: 164) highlights, this extension allows 
Smith to account for various kinds of moral judgement; firstly, with regard to an 
action’s propriety, and secondly, the praise or blame that is to be attached to it.  
 
Smith thus moves beyond Hutcheson and Hume’s influence, locating individual and 
societal virtue in the approval of the impartial spectator. As Ross argues, this concept 
enables Smith to introduce “…new dimensions to the psychological mechanisms 
suggested by Hutcheson [and]…Hume, above all sympathy, imagination, and 
detached self-awareness, and evaluation…of our motives and actions” (Ibid). It 
additionally enables Smith to connect ethics to economic behaviour in society in a 
manner that is original yet is grounded within certain intellectual traditions. In this 
way, as Macfie (1967: 55) points out, Smith is able to build “…a steadily rising ladder 
for men from vanity to pride and from pride to magnanimity”. The influence of these 
traditions is discussed in the next section. 
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2.1.4) Natural jurisprudential and classical influences 
 
As Barbalet (2005: 183-184) notes, prior to the nineteenth century, most commodities 
in Europe were exchanged without a fixed price. Trust and bartering were achieved by 
interpreting the intentions or emotions of those with whom one transacted. This 
approach is reflected by Smith, who demonstrates that, in commercial society, greater 
interdependence is prompted by an increasing division of labour in ways “mutually 
beneficial to one another” as it is “…by treaty, by barter, and by purchase, that we 
obtain from one another the greater part of those mutual good offices which we stand 
in need of” (Smith 1978, LJ [A] VI.46-49; Smith 1976 [1776], I.ii.1-3). As discussed 
in 1.1.2, this theme is particularly evident in TMS, where Smith states that it is the role 
of the impartial spectator to perpetually monitor and correct the “strongest impulses of 
self-love”. Such self-command, “equality of temper” and other forms of interaction 
are produced by “conversation” in the “bustle and business of the world” (Smith 1976 
[1790], III.iii.4; III.iii.25; VI.ii.1.15-16). For Smith, therefore, market society 
generates amicable, not beneficent, friendships within large-scale societies of 
strangers.134
                                                 
134 Lisa Hill and Peter McCarthy (2004: 3-12) point out the similarity between Smith’s notion of a 
person that is capable of “sincere” friendship yet is disinclined to “ardent and passionate” familiarity 
and Cicero’s distinction between true and instrumental friendship, or amicitia and vulgares amicitiae 
(Smith 1976 [1790], VI.i.8-9; Cicero [1990] On Friendship and The Dream of Scipio, ed., trans. by J. 
G. F. Powell, Warminster: Aris & Phillips, cited in Hill and McCarthy 2004: 8). 
 Smith acknowledges that benevolence may contribute to human 
happiness, however is clear that in terms of social cohesion, justice, self-control and 
prudence, as recommended by the impartial spectator, are of more importance: 
 
It is not the soft power of humanity, it is not that feeble spark of benevolence 
which Nature has lighted up in the human heart, that is thus capable of 
counteracting the strongest impulses of self-love. It is a stronger power, a 
more forcible motive, which exerts itself upon such occasions. It is reason, 
principle, conscience, the inhabitant of the breast, the man within, the great 
judge and arbiter of our conduct (Smith 1976 (1790), III.iii.4; See also Ibid, 
VI.ii.1.19). 
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The restricted role that Smith grants benevolence does not, however, suggest that his 
concern for just socio-economic provision is limited. Indeed, as John Salter (1999: 
223) points out: “[t]hroughout the Wealth of Nations, Smith adopts the perspective of 
the poorest member of society”. Like Hume, Smith is in favour of a high-wage 
economy for the sake of the wage labourer, “…who supports the whole frame of 
society”.135
This is apparent in LJ, wherein Smith provides a historical account of the shift in the 
European legal structure towards judicial systems founded on this distinction. Here, 
he states: “[j]urisprudence is that science which enquires into the general principles 
which ought to be the foundation of the laws of all nations”.
 However, rather than reflect later political arguments that stress 
distributive justice, Smith’s concern for the needs of the poor reflects the natural 
jurisprudential distinction between perfect rights and imperfect obligations.  
 
136
                                                 
135 Smith 1978, LJ [A] vi.28; Hume, D. (1752) ‘Of Commerce,’ in David Hume, Philosophical Works 
(1874-1875) ed. by T. H. Green and T. H. Grose (London: Longmans, Green and Co.), iii, p.267, cited 
in Hont and Ignatieff 1983: 2; 5. 
136 Smith 1978, LJ [B], intro.1; Fleischacker 2004: 28; Ron 2008: 117-118. 
 This is reflected in his 
intention, stated at the end of TMS, to write “…an account of the general principles of 
law and government…” Smith’s theorizing on the evolution of laws may therefore be 
viewed as an implicit rejection of the claims of immutability of the early natural 
lawyers. Indeed, despite paying homage to Grotius for his handling of the primary 
elements of jurisprudence in this passage, Smith is critical of his overemphasis on 
casuistic law making. This reflects his consistent rejection of a priori accounts of 
morality, as the second part of the above sentence shows: “…and of the different 
revolutions they have undergone in the different ages and periods of society” (Smith 
1976 (1790), VII.iv.34-37). This would appear to show that Smith sees general 
principles of “natural reason” at the basis of positive-law systems, but that these 
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principles are not immutable and universal, due to their application to the changing 
realities of society (Hont and Ignatieff 1983: 88-93). 
 
Smith’s lectures thus reflect the Lockean tradition, in which an evolutionary notion of 
the problem of the origin and development of property is put forward, allied to a 
Montesquieuan connection between the development of laws and social 
circumstances (Vivenza 2001: 97; Winch 1983a: 261). In addition to these thinkers, 
the introduction of the study of the classics at Glasgow by Francis Hutcheson may be 
considered an important influence upon Smith’s thought. As Gloria Vivenza (2001: 1-
2) explains, the ideas and concepts of a classical origin were common in the learned 
circles of the eighteenth century. Specifically, Vivenza detects Platonic themes in 
Smith’s methodology, Aristotelian motifs in the psychological origins of his research, 
and Stoic self-control and Epicurean prudence in his economic thought.137
As Vivenza points out, there appears to be some similarity between Aristotle’s 
phronimos - man of practical wisdom - and Smith’s impartial spectator insofar as both 
figures have in common the ability to define the precise degree of virtue required 
without recourse to laws. For Aristotle, propriety lies in the “golden mean”, a point 
equidistant from the two extremes of human behaviour (Ibid, 46-47). Indeed, Smith’s 
notion of harmony being achieved through the “toning down” of one’s emotional 
response to the appropriate pitch might be compared to Aristotle and the Peripatetics’ 
allowance of emotion up to the point represented by the “golden mean” and Stoic self-
control that enables the individual to keep her passions down to the point of propriety. 
However, Smith indicates that, not only does such a point not exist, but also that it is 
  
 
                                                 
137 However it should be noted that Smith, in contrast to Epicurus, considers prudence to be a virtue 
that is desirable in itself (Vivenza 2001: 56). 
 110 
not necessary in order to achieve harmony or virtue.138 Indeed, whereas Aristotle 
regards philosophy’s end to be “the truth”, Smith argues that each explanation should 
merely satisfy the intellectual requirements of the time, and suggests that questions 
that occur to humanity can be resolved by the gradual progress of human 
understanding (Vivenza 2001: 40).139 Smith’s denial of the possibility of a priori 
knowledge therefore employs a modern, Montesquieuan notion of the relation 
between intellectual phenomena and the age that produced it in order to address issues 
of concern in classical theory.140
According to Macfie (1967: 60), Smith’s position is “almost conventional in the 
Enlightenment”, as it is one of eclecticism “…with a distinct bias towards the 
modified Stoicism typical of Cicero”.
   
  
141
                                                 
138 Ibid, 81. See Macfie 1967: 119; Bonar 1922: 163; 166. As Smith explains, although the sufferer 
“…longs for that relief which nothing can afford him but the entire concord of the affections of the 
spectators with his own,” there “… will never be unisons, [but] they may be concords, and this is all 
that is wanted or required” (Smith 1976 [1790], I.i.4.7). 
139 Smith’s commitment to the asymptotic nature of the process of knowledge production is discussed 
in 1.3.3 and 3.3.1-2. A discussion of Aristotelian and Roman Stoic influences on his thought is in 2.3.4.  
140 However, whereas Smith utilises Montesquieu’s ideas regarding the importance of context, Smith 
avoids Montesquieu’s overt relativism as evinced in The Spirit of the Laws, 1914 (1752). See, for 
examples, Book XIV: 5, 10, 15 and Book XIX: 10, 20. 
141 Macfie’s position is arguably reflected by Vivenza (2001: 2-4) See also Ross 1995: 165. 
 However, Smith’s rejection of the casuistry 
of mediaeval Christian theology that attempts to specify a set of rules to govern every 
aspect of human life is most unconventional in light of the commitment to religious 
instruction of the Common Sense theorists within the Scottish Enlightenment (Smith 
1976 [1790], VII.iv.34; Teichgraeber 1982: 259). According to P. H. Clarke (2000: 
50-64), the influence of Stoicism is most clearly discernible in TMS, particularly that 
of Marcus Aurelius. In particular, Smith’s impartial spectator concept may be seen to 
be influenced by Meditations, in which Aurelius refers to “that spirit that is within 
thee”, and where he states: “…we fear more what our neighbours will think of us than 
ourselves” (Aurelius, Meditations: 149-150, cited in Clarke 2000: 60). 
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However, although Smith’s “neighbour” as mentioned in Part III of TMS appears to 
echo Aurelius, Smith explicitly refers to Epictetus in this passage, rendering the latter 
a more likely source of inspiration in relation to the other-regarding, sympathetic 
impartial spectator concept.142 Perhaps of greater importance is the theme of detached 
observance to be found in both Roman Stoics’ concepts that Smith’s impartial 
spectator may be observed to reflect. Also important here are the four cardinal virtues 
- prudence, beneficence, justice, and self-command - that earn the approval of the 
impartial spectator. As Hope (1989: 106) points out, this list is similar to Cicero’s 
notion of decorum. However: “[t]his list is not Plato’s or Aristotle’s, nor that of 
Epicurus, Epictetus, Cicero or Marcus Aurelius. Nor is it from Shaftesbury, Butler, 
Hutcheson or Hume”. Rather, as Vivenza (2001: 83) argues, certain classical and 
modern authors help Smith to clarify areas of his thought, which he then “…made his 
own or rejected, according to the ideas he had formulated…in the course of this 
process”.143
                                                 
142 See Smith 1976 (1790), III.iii.11. As discussed, Aristotle’s phronimos has also been suggested as a 
likely template for Smith’s impartial spectator. Vivenza also adds Polybius’s “witness” to this list, but 
concludes that “at most” this is “a partial coincidence” (Vivenza 2001: 83). 
143 Phillipson (1983: 189) points out the superficial similarities between Joseph Addison’s “Mr. 
Spectator” and Smith’s impartial spectator. However: “Addison could be said to have done little more 
than admit that men find it surprisingly easy to internalise the values of the world in which they live”. 
Therefore, this does not bear comparison to Smith’s complex notion of the reflective “man within the 
breast” (see, for examples, Smith 1976 [1790], III.i.32-33; III.iii.25-29; III.iv). 
 In the next part of this chapter I consider the originality and wider 
implications of such conclusions in comparison to those of his contemporaries.  
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Part Two: Common Sense in the Scottish Enlightenment 
2.2.1) Kames and Turnbull  
 
As previous parts of this chapter have shown, moral philosophy in the Scottish 
Enlightenment developed out of the debate concerning the powers of moral 
discernment that individuals can claim to have. As noted, rather than reflect Christian 
arguments that God’s will is innately knowable, Smith’s historical understanding of 
morality reflects Grotius’ view that moral life is an evolutionary process of adaptation 
between individuals. A further influence is Henry Home, Lord Kames, whose 
historical treatment of law is reflected in Smith’s lectures.144
Smith refers to Kames as: “…an author of very great and original genius” in TMS 
(Smith 1976 [1790], II.ii.1.5). Whereas such platitudes were customary in eighteenth 
century academic circles, the tone of veneration in Smith’s reference may be due to 
his gratitude at Kames’ promotion of the Edinburgh lectures that led to his being 
appointed Chair of Moral Philosophy at Glasgow University in 1752.
  
 
145 As 
Haakonssen (1996: 5) explains, like Smith, Kames’s historical methodology is 
influenced by Montesquieu. This is in contrast to theorists such as Hutcheson, George 
Turnbull, Thomas Reid, and Dugald Stewart, for whom reflection upon history is not 
important, as they posit an atemporal utopia that is discernible from God’s will.146
                                                 
144 Meek 1971 24-25; Forbes 1982: 201; Winch 1983a: 260. In contrast to Kames, and indeed to 
Ferguson, Reid and the Common Sense authors however, Smith’s view of such development of society 
into its more complex forms shows that the capacity for prudence and wisdom increases rather than 
diminishes (Ibid). This discussion will be examined in more detail in a later section of this Part. 
145 Raphael and Macfie, intro to Smith 1976 (1790), p.16. Smith was appointed to the Chair of Logic at 
Glasgow in 1751 and moved to the Chair of Moral Philosophy in 1752 (Ibid, 8). 
146 Haakonssen (1996: 7) adds George Campbell, James Beattie and James Oswald to this list.  
 
From this perspective, and in addition to his pessimism regarding the perils of 
commercial society, Kames can be considered part of the mainstream Scottish 
Enlightenment. 
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In Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion, Kames echoes 
Shaftesbury’s and Hutcheson’s praise for Joseph Butler’s view that our moral 
faculties are authoritative. For Kames, a gradual examination of such “facts” will 
demonstrate a clearly discernible human nature “which manifests itself into a certain 
uniformity of character” constituted of specific “principles” that includes the moral 
sense faculty. In contrast to Hutcheson, however, for Kames the moral sense is not a 
motivating principle but an authoritative guide to action, similar to what Butler terms 
“conscience”, and which Kames refers to as “the voice of God within us”.147
Kames’ examination of George Berkeley’s philosophy leads to a description of such 
views as being capable of “annihilating the whole universe”, as this denial of “the 
reality of external objects” leads us into the “doubt of our own existence”.
 As 
Norton (1982: 176) points out, Kames: “…transforms the moral sense attack on moral 
scepticism into the common-sense attack on epistemological scepticism”, and “…lays 
out in systematic fashion the foundations of the Scottish Common Sense attack on the 
sceptical views of Berkeley and Hume”.  
 
148 
Similarly, Kames disagrees with Hume’s idea that belief is a matter of the force and 
vivacity of some perceptions. Echoing Hutcheson, Kames instead posits that we are so 
comprised by nature that our senses have an irresistible authority that commands 
belief in their reports. For Kames: “…our senses, external and internal, are the true 
sources from whence the knowledge of the Deity is derived to us”.149
It is in this way that Kames distinguishes between actions that are morally just and 
those that are morally correct: “…right actions are distinguished by the moral sense 
  
 
                                                 
147 Home, H. (1751) Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion, pp.26-45, cited in 
Norton 1982: 174-175.  
148 Home (1751) pp.207-210; 195; 146 cited in Norton 1982: 177-180.   
149 Home, H. (1751) 181-185; 189; 197 cited in Norton 1982: 178; 185-187. 
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into two kinds, what ought to be done and what may be done, or left undone”.150 
Kames relates such “duty to others and duty to ourselves”, which, David Lieberman 
suggests, is developed and articulated by Smith in TMS.  Certainly, in his discussion 
of the distinction between justice and beneficence in Part II of TMS, Smith refers to 
Kames’ “…remarkable distinction between justice and all the other social 
virtues…that we feel ourselves to be under a stricter obligation to act according to 
justice, than agreeably to friendship, charity, or generosity” (Smith 1976 [1790], 
II.ii.1.5).151
In spite of Kames’ overt naturalism, Smith concurs that the failure to observe the 
distinction between justice and other virtues such as benevolence had damaged all 
prior attempts to elaborate natural systems of jurisprudence, which had been reduced 
to casuistry (Ibid, VII.iv.7-15). Kames’ identification of the far-reaching 
consequences of such inflexible statutes may also be seen to influence Smith’s 
consistent preoccupation with the evolutionary nature of society. As Kames argues:  
“[l]aw…cannot long continue stationary; for in the social state…law ripens gradually 
with the human faculties”.
 
  
152
                                                 
150 Home, H. (1774) ‘Principles and Progress of Morality’, Sketches of the History of Man, first edition, 
pp.14-15, cited in Lieberman (1983: 211). The former case requires the individual to fulfil what ought 
to be done out of duty: “…the doing what we ought to do is termed just: the doing what we ought not 
to do, and omitting what we ought to do, are termed unjust” (Ibid [italics in original]).  
151 The section of Kames’ work to which Smith is referring is Essays on the Principles of Morality and 
Natural Religion (1751) Part I, essay ii (‘Of the Foundation and Principles of the Law of Nature’), 
chapters 3-4. Smith develops Kames’ insight eloquently, for example, in the same section, where he 
states: “[w]e may often fulfil all the rules of justice by sitting still and doing nothing” (Smith 1976 
[1790], II.ii.1.9). 
152 Home, H. (1767) Principles of Equity, second edition, pp.44-49, cited in Lieberman 1983: 229. 
Indeed, Ross cites Smith as stating: “…we must every one of us acknowledge Kames for our master” 
(Ross, 1972: 97). See also Keith Lehmann (1971: 175), who points out that Kames wrote the following 
- “[w]hile man pursues happiness for his chief aim, Thou bendest our self-love into the social 
direction” - in 1751, “…a quarter of a Century before Adam Smith wrote of the ‘unseen hand’”. 
 It is possible to argue, therefore, that Kames’ flexible 
account of justice is important to Smith’s development of the concept of self 
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determination as represented by the impartial spectator.153 This is rendered more 
plausible when one considers Kames’ vivid description of “that remorse of 
conscience, the most severe of all tortures”.154
Kames may also influence Smith’s argument that our principle conclusions “…are not 
from reason, but from an internal light which shows things in their relation of cause 
and effect”. He also states that sympathy “is the cement of human society”. However, 
he also argues that it “…is but one of the many principles that constitute us moral 
beings…To base an entire system of morality upon it alone would be hazardous” 
(Kames 1751: 349; 25; 112, cited in Lehmann: 1971: 169-170). Here, Smith does not 
concur. Smith also rejects Kames’ determinism. Indeed, despite the supposed 
influence of Newton upon eighteenth century Scottish thinkers,
 Indeed, in the chapter that follows 
Smith’s initial praise for Kames, Smith remarks upon “…the nature of that sentiment, 
which is properly called remorse; of all the sentiments which can enter the human 
breast the most dreadful” (Ibid, II.ii.3).  
 
155 Kames’ 
teleological approach looked for final behind efficient causes: “[a]ll things are by 
Thee pre-ordained, great Mover of all!…every living creature runs a destined course” 
(Kames 175: 379 cited in Lehmann 1971: 170).156
                                                 
153 Duncan Forbes argues that Kames’ Essays on Morality and Natural Religion: “…is a kind of 
staging post between Hume and Smith…It is full of anticipations of The Theory of Moral Sentiments” 
(Forbes 1982: 204, footnote 32).   
154 Home (1751) p. 64 cited in Smith 1976 (1790), Part II Endnotes, p.135. 
155 As Lehmann explains, Newtonianism was rejected at Oxford and Cambridge, and was taught by 
David Gregory at Edinburgh (Lehmann 1971: 156). 
156 This statement is in the prayer at the end of Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural 
Religion (1751), Appendix IV. Kames’ aim in writing these Essays was “…to promote the cause of 
virtue and natural religion” as a “duty to our Maker” (Home [1751], p.379 cited in Lehmann 1971: 
168). 
 Such fatalism is also reflected in 
Kames’ Historical Law Tracts (1758). Yet as Lehmann (1971:182-185) points out, 
Kames’ claims are not substantiated by a rigorous methodology. Rather, “…he gives 
us little more than…a few broad generalizations…[and] some historical examples not 
at all fitted into any developmental sequence”. 
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As such, whereas for Smith such development is open-ended, for Kames there is “a 
common standard”, a “common sense of mankind with respect to right and 
wrong…essential to social beings”157 that is the basis of the law of nature, and 
towards which society is developing. In this, Kames’ sociological and comparative 
approach is clearly influenced by Montesquieu. In his Sketches of the History of Man 
(1774), Kames states that promiscuity and polygamy are a “violation of nature” yet 
“voluptuousness in warm climates…instigates men of wealth to transgress every rule 
of temperance”.158
                                                 
157 Home, H. (1774) Sketches of the History of Man, IV.19f cited in Lehmann (1971): 206. As 
Haakonssen (1981: 185) points out: “Smith in various connections allows for pure chance as a factor in 
history”.  
158 Home, H. (1774) Sketches of the History of Man, p. 36, cited in Lehmann 1971: 251. See 
Montesquieu 1914 (1752) Book XIV, 2 13, 15 (on climate), and Book XIX, 12, 13, 14, 27 (on 
customs). 
 Such relativism is perhaps rendered more disconcerting when one 
considers that Kames holds the different races of man to be different species, 
originally differentiated in adaptation to different environments. Kames holds that 
there are different species of men “…just as there are different species of dogs: A 
mastiff differs from a spaniel not more than a white man from a Negro” (Kames 1774: 
20, cited in Lehmann 1971: 254).  
 
One must be careful not to denounce such views too strongly with hindsight, with 
knowledge unavailable to authors such as Montesquieu and Kames. However it is 
important to recognise that such universalism is inherent in Kames’ appeal to a 
“common standard of judgement” that is a supposed basic trait in human nature, and 
which “…enables men to arrive at essential truth without reasoning about abstract 
principles”. This is of particular importance when we consider that Kames’ Essays 
foreshadows Thomas Reid’s 1764 Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of 
Common Sense (Lehmann 1971: 164-165). 
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Reid’s teacher at Aberdeen, George Turnbull, also argues that general uniform and 
constant laws that are “observed to prevail” govern the world. In his Principles of 
Moral Philosophy (1740), Turnbull states his intention to “account for MORAL, as 
the great Newton has taught us to explain NATURAL appearances”,159 thus becoming 
one of the first theorists to open up liberal education to the study of the natural world 
as it had been explained by Newton. Turnbull’s teleological approach is evident 
insofar as any general law that produces a prevalence of “good, beauty, and perfection 
in the whole” is considered a good law.160 This is because we have a “natural 
furniture” and appetite for knowledge of God’s mind through experience of His 
works, which enables us to recognise that all the beautiful orderliness in the moral and 
physical world is God’s will. Turnbull therefore does not posit that there is innate 
knowledge, but rather, that our capacity for finding true wisdom is in the moral sense. 
We can infer God’s will, as we are well designed by a benevolent Deity: “…this 
reasoning is not above the reach of anyone; it is what every person who thinks at all, 
is naturally led to by the turn and disposition of the human mind”.161
Turnbull’s providential naturalism therefore echoes Hutcheson and Shaftesbury as he 
employs an inductive, introspective approach that places importance upon “ordinary” 
moral experience and language. As Norton highlights, however, Turnbull makes 
appeals to “common sense” as a kind of religious and moral truth far more often than 
these thinkers. Indeed, in his first theological piece, the Philosophical Enquiry 
Concerning the Connexion between the Doctrines and Miracles of Jesus Christ 
(1726), Turnbull explicitly links “common sense” to Christianity (Norton 1982: 163-
164). Importantly, therefore, and in a similar manner to Kames, Turnbull displays 
  
 
                                                 
159 Turnbull, G. (1740) Principles of Moral Philosophy, Epistle Dedicatory, cited in Norton 1982: 154.  
160 Turnbull, G. (2003 [1742]) Observations upon Liberal Education, pp.x-xv; Turnbull, G. (1740) 
Principles of Moral Philosophy, 1, pp.1-6, cited in Norton 1982: 154-155.  
161 Turnbull (1740) 1, pp.137-139, cited in Norton 1982: 169; Haakonssen 1996: 93. 
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universalistic tendencies that do not admit of other cultural standards or beliefs. This 
is particularly disquieting when one considers Turnbull’s role as an educational 
theorist that sought to establish practical “common sense” standards based on such a 
view.  
 
Turnbull believed that as concepts such as “good” and “evil” and “vice” and “virtue” 
appear in every language, they must have their source in concrete moral differences. 
To Turnbull, this “proves” that there is a common sense and common language, 
founded on two other features of moral creation - that there are certain faculties and 
dispositions of the mind that are common to all men, and that these have been 
furnished for us by a wise Providence: the “organizations” of men are so similar, “that 
they may be justly said to be specifically the same”.162 Turnbull is therefore able to 
posit the “reality” of virtue and vice and give a “full refutation” of those who claim 
these are arbitrary or conventional, as those who would “ascribe all that is social in 
our nature to art, custom, and super-added habit” clearly “shock all common 
sense”.163
                                                 
162 Turnbull (1740) 1, pp.33; 135-139, cited in Norton 1982: 165-166. 
163 Turnbull (1740), 2: 216; 1: 196-197; 430; 123 cited in Norton 1982: 161. 
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2.2.2) Reid 
 
Turnbull’s influence upon Thomas Reid may be discerned directly in his statement 
regarding the moral sense as being “…engraven on our hearts, innate, original, and 
universal”.164 This is echoed by Reid’s argument in Essays on the Active Powers of 
Man (1788) in which he states: “[t]hat conscience which is in every man’s breast, is 
the law of God written in his heart”.165
It is the Supreme Being who has given us the powers and faculties which He 
saw would be necessary for our survival and progress, and who has implanted 
in us principles that lead us to think and act in a way suited to the rest of His 
creation.
 Turnbull’s teleological and providential 
naturalism is also an influence on Reid’s vehement opposition to Hume. For Reid, 
“the natural faculties, by which we distinguish truth from error, are not fallacious”, 
and are given to us by God:  
 
166
Perhaps misunderstanding the importance of the normative aspect of Hume’s 
theory,
  
 
167
                                                 
164 Turnbull, G. (1763) A Discourse upon the Nature and Origin of Moral Laws, pp.251-2, cited in 
Norton 1982: 166. 
165 Reid, T. (1863 [1788]), Essays on the Active Powers of Man, in Hamilton, W. ed., The Works of 
Thomas Reid, Edinburgh: Maclachlan and Stewart, p.638b, cited in Haakonssen 1996: 200. It is 
interesting to consider the superficial similarity regarding conscience that may be seen in Reid and in 
Smith’s work. However, whereas to Reid it is God’s conscience that is “in every man’s breast”, for 
Smith it is the individual’s own impartial spectator. 
166 Reid (1863 [1788]) 2, p.591; 1, p.423, cited in Norton 1982: 173. 
167 Kuehn 1994: 129. Norton points to the negative reaction of Kames, Reid, and Beattie to the first 
edition of Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature that is influential in the overstated scepticism that is 
attributed to Hume (Norton 1982: 5). As has been discussed, Norton denies that Hume was a sceptical 
moralist. As G. H. Lewes points out, however, the “frivolous objections” of the Common Sense 
philosophers led to the perception of Hume as a radical sceptic (Lewes cited in Norton 1982: 5). 
Intriguingly, however, Stewart Sutherland (1982: 145) argues that: “Reid’s endorsement of common 
sense is based upon elements of scepticism”.  
 in that Hume’s aim is to explain how certain fundamental beliefs arise, Reid 
and his followers self-consciously attempt to show that human perception presupposes 
a certain a priori component (Kuehn 1994: 125). In opposition to his view of Hume’s 
Ideal Theory, Reid rejects the notion that an impression or idea is temporally or 
logically prior to our experience of objects. However, as Kuehn shows, Reid believes 
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it to be impossible to explain how the principles of Common Sense brought about the 
“real connexion” between our perceptions, but argues instead that we must be 
satisfied with describing those principles as they are required by knowledge and 
action (Ibid, 131-132).168
Keith Lehrer explains Reid’s claims against Ideal Theory. As he notes, according to 
Reid, conception is an operation of the mind that does not resolve itself into 
impressions and ideas. Any impression, be it faded or vivacious, is distinguishable 
from a conception of such an impression as well as from a conception from other 
things. Therefore, our conceptions must be a consequence of innate first principles of 
our mind that yields conceptual responses to an object from our sensations by a 
“natural kind of magic”.
 Similarly, Reid argues that as some beliefs arise from innate 
principles of the mind, for example original perceptual beliefs relating to the external 
world, they are justifiable without reasoning. That these “First Principles” of 
Common Sense may be observed, Reid argues, is sufficient to reject Hume’s 
“pointless” scepticism (Lehrer 1989: 108; Broadie 1990: 109; Haakonssen 1996: 
197). 
 
169  Echoing Turnbull, Reid also argues that our basic 
linguistic categories reflect our experience of the world: “I believe no instance will be 
found of a distinction made in all languages, which has not a just foundation in 
nature”.170
                                                 
168 Such an apparent tautology is highlighted by Joseph Priestley, who admonishes Reid for 
“…asserting that it is impossible to advance any farther in the investigation, for who can ever get 
beyond simple, original, and inexplicable acts of the mind” (Priestley cited in Kuehn 1994: 144, 
footnote 22 [italics in original]). 
169 Reid (1863 [1788]) cited in Lehrer 1989: 113; 119. “In all rational belief, the thing believed is either 
itself a first principle, or it is by just reasoning deduced from first principles” (Reid [1863 (1788)] 
p.637 cited in Haakonssen 1996: 186). 
170 Reid (1863 [1788]) p.1, cited in Broadie 1990: 106. Broadie contrasts Reid’s position to that of 
Gottlob Frege, whose linguistic categories inverts Kant’s theory categories, and for whom our basic 
linguistic categories structure our experience of the world (Broadie 1990: 106). 
 Reid argues that as our basic linguistic categories are enforced upon us by 
the nature of our immediate experience, we are able to read philosophy out of 
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language. As Broadie (1990: 106-108) points out, Reid utilises linguistic practice to 
argue that whereas his position is reflected in language, Hume’s position is not. 
 
Reid’s Common Sense may therefore be characterised as an attempt to refute Hume’s 
alleged scepticism, arguing in particular that there is an external world, and that there 
are causal relations between things. However, Reid’s argument is overstated. Indeed, 
as has been discussed, Hume does not necessarily deny the existence of the external 
world. Nor does he explicitly reject the existence of God. Indeed, in his discussion of 
the development of monotheistic religions in the Natural history of religion (1757), 
Hume refers to the gradual awareness of “that perfect Being, who bestowed order on 
the whole frame of nature” as evidence of the “natural progress of human thought”, 
the tendency of the mind to rise “gradually, from inferior to superior”.171
Reid also rejects Hume’s extension of Hutcheson’s notion of the utility of artificially 
engendered social conventions. For Reid, the foundation of morality is divine law. It 
is therefore his intention to utilise practical ethics to discern God’s will in order to 
define a system of morals that may in turn support our moral judgements. Although 
Reid writes of “[t]hat conscience which is in every man’s breast…which he cannot 
disobey without…being self-condemned”, which may appear to draw comparison 
with Smith’s impartial spectator, it is important to note that such duty to one’s 
conscience is actually duty to “the law of God”.
  
 
172
                                                 
171 Hume, D. (1757) The Natural History of Religion, p.311, in Hume, D. (1964 [1882-1886]) The 
Philosophical Works, second edition. Darmstadt: Scientia Verlag Aalen, cited in Wood 1994: 124. 
172 Reid, T. (2005 [1863]) Essays on the Active Powers of Man, in The Works of Thomas Reid. 
Yarmouth, Nova Scotia: Elibron Classics, p.638b, cited in Haakonssen 1996: 200. 
 Reid therefore does not appear to 
move beyond Kames’ and Turnbull’s reiteration of the Protestant tradition’s notion of 
our fulfilment of duties to God that we are naturally able to discern. This does not 
therefore bear comparison with the truly self-determining aspects of the impartial 
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spectator. Indeed, as Reid’s system of moral freedom is based specifically upon a 
Calvinist reading of moral duty, his understanding of an objective moral standard may 
therefore be seen to contain a relativism that limits its applicability.  
 
This is of particular importance when one considers Reid’s discussion of perfect and 
imperfect rights. As Haakonssen highlights, Reid rejects the notion that imperfect 
rights cannot be legally enforced. Instead, imperfect rights are “matched by positive 
duties to do some good”, which government should enforce.173 Reid’s institutional 
extension of the natural law notion of the common good is highlighted by his 
argument that the right to private property be abolished, and be replaced by common 
ownership. Echoing Kames’ fears over the potentially corrupting influence of 
commercial society,174
                                                 
173 Reid, T. (1990) Practical Ethics: Being Lectures and Papers on Natural Religion, Self-Government, 
Natural Jurisprudence, and the Law of Nations, ed. by Haakonssen, K. (1990), Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, p.197 cited in Haakonssen 1996: 204. As Haakonssen suggests: “Reid does 
not name his adversaries in this argument, but…these points collide head-on with the views of Hume 
and Smith” (Ibid, 205). 
174 “Now Riches, in all civilized Societies, seem to have all the advantages above all other 
Qualifications for gratifying this Desire” (Reid [1990] p. 285 cited in Haakonssen 1996: 217). 
 Reid advocates “the Utopian system” as suggested by Thomas 
More. In this system, the acquisition of property as an incentive to economic exertion 
is replaced by a system of public honours for moral exertion and merit (Haakonssen 
1996: 185, 197-199; 216-217). This may appear to be comparable to Smith’s notion 
of a moral society based upon self-approbation that ensures avoidance of “…the 
corruption of our moral sentiments, which is occasioned by this disposition to admire 
the rich and the great, and to despise or neglect persons of poor and mean condition”. 
However, whereas Smith stresses the usefulness of such a tendency, in that such a 
disposition acts as a stimulus to the economic, and consequently moral, improvement 
of individuals within society, Reid advocates its attenuation by a system of state-
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provided religious education: “The diseases of the Mind while it is pliable and 
docile…may, by Prudent means, be cured or alleviated”.175
The vast level of governmental involvement required by such a system further 
highlights the contrast between Reid and Smith. As Haakonssen explains, in Reid’s 
system, constant supervision of each individual’s contribution to the common good 
would be made “…by Officers appointed by the Publick, who shall at stated times 
make a Report to superior Officers of the Industry, Skill and moral behaviour of every 
Individual under their Charge”. This assessment would determine the “[d]istinctive 
ba[d]ges or habits, by which every Mans Rank & the Respect due to him may be 
known” or “the Marks…of Dishonour & Disgrace” given to the individual. Such 
categorization necessarily presupposes an objective standard of moral perfection 
towards which people may be compelled, or otherwise be branded as “being 
altogether unworthy and incapable of being Citizens of Utopia”.
  
 
176
[I]t must be the principle care of the state to make good citizens by proper 
education, and proper instruction and discipline…That men…will be good or 
bad members of society, according to the education and discipline by which 
they have been trained, experience may convince us. The present age has 
made great advances in the art of training men to military duty…and I know 
not why it should be thought impossible to train men to equal perfection in the 
other duties of good citizens.
 According to 
Reid, the attainment of the former and avoidance of the latter is dependent upon 
education:  
 
177
The contrast with Smith should therefore be clear. Reid advocates a state-run 
educational and “moral” programme based upon coercion, and from which deviation 
is punishable, in order to assuage the potentially morally debilitating effects of a 
 
 
                                                 
175 Smith 1976 (1790), I.iii.3 heading; Reid 1990: 289 cited in Haakonssen 1996: 217. 
176 Reid (1990) p.290; 292 cited in Haakonssen 1996: 218. 
177 Reid 1863 (1788): 577b-578a cited in Haakonssen 1996: 219-220. 
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commercial system based upon acquisitiveness. In contrast, Smith stresses the moral 
educability of the individual through self-examination of their impartial spectator, 
through which moral choices are arrived at by contemplation of the motives and 
consequences of their actions in relation to their contextual environment:  
 
He soon identifies himself with the ideal man within the breast, he soon 
becomes himself the impartial spectator of his own situation … The view of 
the impartial spectator becomes so perfectly habitual to him, that, without any 
effort, without any exertion, he never thinks of surveying his misfortune in any 
other view (Smith 1976 [1790], III.iii.29). 
 
In this way, Smith’s stress upon individual liberty does not deny social accountability 
yet reflects individuals’ moral advancement at their own pace. Indeed, whereas Reid 
may be seen to be advocating a specific set of rules based upon an objective “truth” 
aimed at a particular moral standard, Smith does not. Smith’s natural jurisprudential 
inclinations allow him to posit general observable traits in all forms of social 
organisations, yet he certainly does not advocate specific, supposedly atemporally 
applicable rules aimed at moral “perfection”. Rather, for Smith, agents’ actions are 
affected by the social environment in which they act, and therefore necessarily reflect 
diverse codes of behaviour at different times and in different places: “[e]ach 
individual, it is evident, can, in his local situation, judge much better than any 
statesman or lawgiver can do for him” (Smith 1976 [1776], IV.ii.10). 
 
Despite this, Reid’s Common Sense is highly influential. In 1764 Reid succeeded 
Smith as Professor of Moral Philosophy at Glasgow, and during the 1780s Reid’s 
philosophical system was institutionalised at four colleges, beginning at Edinburgh in 
1785. Like Kames, Reid’s philosophy was influential in the US during this period, 
and his work drew interest throughout Europe (Broadie 1990: 105; Emerson 1990: 34-
35). The institutional aspects of Reid’s system may have lent themselves particularly 
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well to such potential influence, however. As Haakonssen (1990: 84) points out, 
Reid’s replacement of the moral sense with Common Sense weakens the restraints on 
political power, which encourages the temptation of a “total politics of Utopia”:  
 
The constitutionalist element in [Reid’s]…thought is thus the natural result of 
his dread of a life governed by political chance, which Hume and Smith had 
accepted as the inevitable lot of humankind but which Reid felt it his moral 
and philosophical duty to oppose (Haakonssen 1996: 225). 
 
The tendency towards such a “man of system” approach is of course something that 
Smith warns against, yet in the case of Reid and his followers, the possibility is 
embraced. Reid’s utopian response to the supposed potential moral perils of 
commercial society is arguably reflected in the work of Adam Ferguson.  
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2.2.3) Ferguson 
 
Although not usually considered a member of the Common Sense “school”, Adam 
Ferguson utilises the scientific methods of Reid in his attempt to interpret the work of 
Smith and Hume. As Bruce Buchan (2005: 180-185) explains, in The History of 
England from the Invasion of Julius Caesar to the Revolution in 1688 (1754-1762), 
Hume discusses the creation of a “civilized” international order of independent, 
militarily powerful states, based on refined civil societies, shaped by a consciousness 
of the destructiveness of warfare and the necessity to avoid it. For Ferguson, however, 
the development of commercial society had intensified the capacity of the state to 
make war. At the same time, Ferguson, like Kames and Reid, laments the loss of the 
old martial virtues in modern armies that he considers to be caused by the increased 
division of labour that has brought about such a society’s development178: “A nation’s 
strength, first and foremost, rests in its men, and when citizens become corrupted in 
any way by lawlessness, luxury, or laziness, there is danger ahead”.179
 
  
According to Albert Hirschman (1977), Smith shares such concerns. Certainly, he 
notes that, within commercial society, specialisation achieved via the division of 
labour is “…acquired at the expence of his intellectual, social, and martial virtues” 
(Smith 1976 [1776], V.i.f.50; See also Smith 1978, LJ [B], II.331). For Hirschman: 
 
 
                                                 
178 Ferguson considers commercial society as the cause for the channelling of narrow aspirations into 
competition for money and recognition, which in turn generates servility and arrogance (Kettler 1977: 
438; 447). Smith is aware of this danger, yet, as discussed, he draws a different conclusion.  
179 Ferguson, A. (1767) An Essay on the History of Civil Society, Part VI, cited in Bryson 1945: 51. 
This is reminiscent of Kames, who argues: “[s]uccessful commerce is not more advantageous by the 
wealth and power it immediately bestows, than it is hurtful ultimately by introducing luxury and 
voluptuousness which eradicates patriotism” (Home, H. [1778] Sketches of the History of Man, second 
edition, cited in Lehmann 1971: 192). As Hill (2003: 13) points out, Ferguson’s ambivalence about 
progress is “…the keynote of his oeuvre”.  
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A full-blown expression of this point of view can be found in the work of his 
fellow Scot, Adam Ferguson, who retained ties with the “rude” society of 
Scotland and whose Essays on the History of Civil Society (1767) abounds 
with reservations about the “polished” society of expanding commerce 
exhibited by England (Hirschman 1977: 107). 
 
However, for Smith, an advantage of commercial society is its promise of the self-
regulation of conduct. As such, the development over time of the division of labour 
that leads to greater productivity facilitates “[o]rder and good government, and along 
with them, the liberty and security of individuals” (Smith 1976 [1776], III.iii.12).180 
Moreover, for Smith, the division of labour has made professional, standing armies 
necessary, as war has now become an “intricate science”, and, more importantly, 
because workers at war mean lost revenue from “…a great annual produce. The 
expence of 1761, for example, amounted to more than nineteen millions. No 
accumulation could have supported so great an annual profusion” (Smith 1976 [1776], 
IV.i.28). For Ferguson, by contrast, concerns over national defence lead him to argue 
for a social militia, which, he suggests, could be funded by the increased revenues 
afforded by the division of labour. Ferguson wrote to Smith to inform him of his 
opinion that Smith would “reign alone” on the subjects raised in WN, apart from his 
discussion of the militia, which Ferguson opposed.181
In An Essay on the History of Civil Society (1966 [1767]), Ferguson places emphasis 
on the need for political establishments to act against tendencies towards despotism 
 Indeed, as this was Ferguson’s 
major political cause it is difficult to agree with Hirschman’s connection of Smith and 
Ferguson on this issue in order to illustrate Smith’s supposed civic humanism.   
 
                                                 
180 See also Smith’s rejection of Quesnay (Ibid, IV.ix.28).  
181 Letter from Adam Ferguson to Adam Smith, 18th April 1776, in Smith 1987, letter 154, pp.193-194. 
This may be a minor point of contention, however this perhaps serves to highlight the intellectual debt 
Ferguson owes to Smith on other matters of greater importance. For example, Ferguson agrees with 
Smith’s idea that agents will govern themselves from the spectator’s point of view, although “…he 
reserves that mode of conduct to situations of little moral significance” (Kettler 1977: 443). 
 128 
and national decline (Kettler 1977: 449-454). Like Reid, Turnbull and Kames, such 
advocacy of political intervention necessarily pertains to notions of objective 
standards regarding the “nature of man”. For Ferguson: “[b]efore we can ascertain the 
rules of morality for mankind, the history of man’s nature, his dispositions …should 
be known”.182 Ferguson was Professor of Pneumatics and Moral Philosophy at the 
University of Edinburgh between 1764 and 1785, and, following Turnbull, attempts to 
utilise Newtonian methods in order to place moral philosophy on an empirical basis in 
the field of knowledge.183 Ferguson also echoes other Scottish Enlightenment figures 
by positing that “[m]an is by nature a member of society; his safety, and his 
enjoyment…consists in his being an excellent part of the system to which he 
belongs”.184 In particular, he remarks that: “[m]en conceive perfection, but are 
capable only of improvement”.185 Despite the possible Roman Stoic overtones in this 
statement regarding the potential for perpetual improvement, Ferguson suggests that 
the “fact” that humans are able to conceive perfection affords them “…a light to direct 
their progress, and it is the business of moral philosophy to determine the kinds of 
perfection toward which men should work”.186
Ferguson’s normative and theological commitments may therefore be deemed closer 
to the concerns of the Common Sense theorists rather than to those of Smith. Indeed, 
   
 
                                                 
182 As Bryson (1945: 32) explains, this is the eighteenth century version of psychology, the “theory of 
the mind”. 
183 According to Bryson (1945: 31) this is clearly the case in the first discussion in Ferguson’s Institutes 
of Moral Philosophy (1769).  
184 Ferguson, A. (1773) Institutes of Moral Philosophy, second edition, pp.108-109, cited in Bryson 
1945: 36.  
185 Ferguson, A. (1978 [1792]) Principles of Moral and Political Science, II, pp.107-113, cited in 
Bryson 1945: 37. According to Ferguson, our “…capacity for advancement is nowhere exhausted” 
(Ferguson, A. [1978 (1792)], I, pp.184-185 cited in Hill 1997: 701). As Hill points out, this “…is a 
typically Stoic idea, which Epictetus, for example, sets out in his Discourses” (see Ferguson [1978 
(1792)], I.iv.1-27, pp.27-35; Hill 1997: 701).  
186 Ferguson (1773) pp.130-33; 149; 152; Ferguson (1978 [1792]), I, pp.157-162, cited in Bryson 1945: 
37. 
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unlike Smith, Ferguson is ambivalent about progress.187 Ferguson’s pessimism is 
evident in his belief that Britain will meet the same fate as ancient Rome, despite this 
being a consequence of the progress that he seems to argue that God has ordained for 
humanity.188
According to Hill (1997: 691-692), this tension is resolved by Ferguson’s 
employment of the Christian and Ciceronian principle of free will that causes people 
to err unwittingly. Therefore, it is not evil but error that is the cause of societal 
retrogression. Hill argues that since error is always open to correction Ferguson can 
demonstrate “…the contingent nature of retrogression and even its constructive role in 
the divine master plan”. According to Hill, Ferguson thereby “…reformulates the 
entire problem of theodicy by replacing the idea of original sin with that of original 
ignorance”.
   
 
189
Indeed, Hill recognises that there is a “striking underlying tension” between free will 
and the transcendent order in Ferguson’s work (Ibid, 696). This uncertainty is clearly 
 However, this is unlikely, as it is a Stoic doctrine that vice is 
synonymous with ignorance and that our progress through the stages of history leads 
to a quest to shed this ignorance. In addition, Hill argues that Ferguson’s 
conceptualisation of progress is transcendentally teleological in that “…the Creator 
has fashioned people for progress through the free exercise of their faculties” however 
notes that the extent of our influence within the “teleological supertrajectory” is 
“impossible to discern” (Ibid, 694-695). 
  
                                                 
187 Ferguson (1966 [1767]) p.8; 123; 205-7 cited in Hill 1997: 679. 
188 According to Ferguson, “…those who have lived in an age of the ‘greatest improvements’ will 
perish ‘in the flames which they themselves had kindled’” (Ferguson 1966 [1767], p.110 cited in Hill 
1997: 681-682). 
189 Moreover, as Hill admits: “Ferguson was not alone among the moderns in resorting to this 
resolution strategy. Under the influence of Francis Hutcheson, moral cognitivism was commonplace 
among the moderate literati of the Scottish Enlightenment” (Hill 1997: 681-682). As such, Ferguson is 
arguably derivative rather than original on this matter. 
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apparent in Ferguson’s discussion of teleology. In Principles of Moral and Political 
Science (1978 [1792]), Ferguson appears to propose an asymptotic teleology, which is 
paradoxical: “[i]n its continual approach to the infinite perfection of what is eternal, it 
may be compared to that curve, described by geometers, as in continual approach to a 
straight line, which it can never reach”.190 Despite this apparent commitment to an 
evolutionary, open-ended conceptualisation of gradual development over time, 
Ferguson appears to posit a synchronic conceptualisation of change in his theory of 
spontaneous re-emergence from despotism: “[w]hen human nature appears in the 
utmost state of corruption, it has actually begun to reform”.191
Furthermore, as suggested, Ferguson appears to be opposed to the material progress 
that would lead to such a “moment”, as he echoes Montesquieu in arguing that the 
destruction of prosperity would lead to the destruction of its cause, tyranny,
 Further, as Hill (1997: 
705) points out: “Ferguson neglects to stipulate how, precisely, this process of 
reconstitution is supposed to came about…This portion of his writings lacks 
resolution and clarity”. 
 
192 whilst 
simultaneously placing faith in God’s benevolent plan. Additionally, Ferguson 
appears to reflect classic civic humanism in his desire to create institutional measures 
to counter moral decline in an age of prosperity (Hill 2003: 7). Ferguson attempts to 
utilise classical notions of “men of spirit” in order to counteract the “effeminacy” and 
slackening of civic spirit that industrialization brings,193
                                                 
190 Ferguson (1978 [1792]) I, pp.184-185, cited in Hill 1997: 701.  
191 Ferguson (1966 [1767]) pp.278-279, cited in Hill 1997: 705. 
192 Montesquieu (1914 [1752]) chapter XXI, p.128. Hill refers to Montesquieu as Ferguson’s “absent 
mentor” (Hill 1997: 704). That Ferguson is derivative of Montesquieu is highlighted in Ferguson’s 
tautology regarding temperate climates, in which Ferguson considers areas where development has 
been poor as areas that are poor for development (Brewer 1999: 246). In contrast, Smith blames the 
absence of water transport in central Asia rather than the climate as the contributing factor to poor 
levels of development (Smith 1976 [1776], I.iii.8). 
193 Ferguson (1966 [1767]) p.110 cited in Hill 1997: 681-682 See Justman (1993), who, 
unconvincingly, attempts to apply such concerns to the work of Adam Smith.  
 agreeing with Machiavelli 
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that war strengthens social bonds, in that a sense of common danger unites 
communities into becoming “faithful, disinterested, generous” (Ferguson 1966 
[1767]: 26-29 cited in Hill 2003: 9). Therefore, Ferguson disagrees that faction is 
destructive; rather, for him, faction and free government are causally linked. As Hill 
points out, Ferguson thereby rejects Smith’s and Hume’s practical idea of social 
harmony, arguing that the existence of “ferments” and factional disputes provide 
evidence of a progressive, free government (Ferguson 1966 [1767]: 170 cited in Hill 
2003: 10-11). 
 
This contradicts Hume’s notion that “[f]actions are…less inveterate, revolutions less 
tragical, authority less severe, and seditions less frequent” in a commercial society 
than in a “barbarous” stage of society.194 In opposition to Smith, Ferguson disagrees 
that commerce enables extensive sociability, preferring to maintain the civic humanist 
diagnostic tradition of tight-knit communities and beneficent friendship rather than 
Smith’s interdependent society of amicable strangers. As noted, for Smith, society can 
be held together by the division of labour, by justice, by individuals’ impartial 
spectators, and by sympathy. As Hill (2003: 17; 20) explains, however, in Ferguson’s 
opinion, Smith had “substituted ‘sympathy’ for genuine moral sentiments and the 
higher, social virtues for the lower ‘virtues’ of the market”, which would lead to the 
disintegration of communities and a decline in morality: “Mankind, when in their rude 
state, have a great uniformity of manners; but when civilized they are engaged in a 
variety of pursuits; they tread on a larger field and separate to a greater distance”.195
                                                 
194 Hume (1987 [1758]) ‘Of Parties in general’, Essays moral, political and literary, edited by E. F. 
Miller, Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Classics, 1987, p.55, cited in Hill 2003: 10. 
195 Ferguson (1966 [1767]) p.315 cited in Lehmann 1960a: 100. 
                                                                            
 
 132 
However, it is precisely such differentiation that Smith argues will lead to greater 
moral awareness, as other-directed behaviour will be necessary to form connections 
with those with whom we would otherwise have been unable to interact owing to their 
being considered as enemies. Ferguson’s support for faction, whether between 
individuals, groups or institutionalised within a permanent party political system, may 
also be seen to reflect Smith’s argument in WN that advocates a multitude of religious 
sects in order to avoid political alliances being formed with the dominant religious 
group (Smith 1976 [1776], V.iii.8). Further, Ferguson’s “three-stage” history of the 
society may be seen to be derivative of Kames’ and Smith’s four-stage theory of the 
development of human society through the stages of hunting, herding, farming, and 
commerce (Berry 2000: 315).196
Like Smith, Ferguson attributes these changes to an innate human desire to improve. 
Unlike Smith, however, he does not provide a mechanism such as approbation via the 
impartial spectator to explain how such a tendency occurs (Brewer 1999: 242). 
Indeed, Ferguson describes TMS as “a Heap of absolute Nonsense”.
  
 
197 This is 
particularly interesting when one considers that Ferguson’s argument is largely 
derivative of Smith’s ideas. Echoing Smith’s notion of “the uniform, constant, and 
uninterrupted effort of every man to better his condition” (Smith 1976 [1776], 
II.iii.31), Ferguson states that material self-interest is “…an consideration the most 
uniform and constant of any that possesses the mind”.198
                                                 
196 As Brewer (1968: 240) notes, Turgot developed the four stages theory in the 1750s, but his idea was 
not published. Lord Stair and Lord Kames published their ideas regarding the theory in 1757 and 1758 
respectively, which perhaps influenced the structure of Smith’s lectures in the 1760s. These concepts 
were developed prior to any of Ferguson’s lectures or publications. 
197 Ferguson, A. (1792) ‘Of the Principle of Moral Estimation’. Collection of Essays, 25, pp.208-212; 2, 
p.128, cited in Hill 2003: 15. 
198 Ferguson (1966 [1767]) p.144 cited in Brewer 1999: 242.  
 However, as Anthony 
Brewer (1999: 249-253) points out, Ferguson is “analytically imprecise”, and his 
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treatment of economic progress “…cannot be compared directly with Smith’s far 
more fully worked out and detailed treatment in The Wealth of Nations”.  
 
As Ronald Hamowy (1968: 249-255) notes, Smith and Ferguson were both members 
of the Grassmarket dining club in Edinburgh, where it is likely that discussion about 
patrons’ findings and theoretical commitments took place. Hamowy explains that 
between 1780 and Smith’s death in 1790, a dispute occurred between the two 
thinkers, in which Smith accused Ferguson of “borrowing” his ideas for the latter’s 
Essay on the History of Civil Society (1966 [1767]), which Ferguson refuted, adding 
that Smith had copied his analysis of pin manufacture in Book I of WN from a  
“French source”.199 According to Cannan, Smith is the injured party, as Ferguson had 
copied his ideas from Smith’s lecture notes, which formed the basis of WN, in 
1763.200
This is extremely interesting in itself, however it also serves to indicate the nature of 
the relationships between the Scottish thinkers in the eighteenth century. As ideas 
were discussed, themes of inquiry were developed, yet different authors reached 
diverse conclusions. The lack of referencing that was characteristic of eighteenth 
century authorship (Barbalet 2005: 174) also adds to the difficulty in understanding 
which ideas were original, and which were derivative. This is made more complicated 
when one recognises that the ideas themselves are formed out of interpretations of 
similar academic influences. For example, as Hamowy (1968: 251) argues, the 
division of labour idea was not unique to Smith: it can be seen in the ideas of David 
Hume, James Harris, Bernard Mandeville, and Sir William Petty. Indeed, Schumpeter 
  
 
                                                 
199 Hamowy explains that French source is likely to be the Encyclopedie, edited by Diderot and 
d’Alembert, rather than Montesquieu, as was first thought (Ibid, 256; Buchan 2006: 46-47).   
200 Cannan cited in Hamowy 1968: 250. The chronology of the authors’ published work perhaps 
demonstrates that Smith was correct in his alleged suspicions, as Ferguson first writes about pin 
factories in 1782, six years after the publication of the first edition of WN (Hamowy 1968: 257). 
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(1994 [1954]: 214) points out that this idea may be traced back to Plato. Yet Smith’s 
notion of a specific division of labour within a particular place of work is not 
comparable to Plato’s idea of a division of labour within a community. It is the latter 
idea to which Schumpeter points, which may be seen to have influenced the thought 
of Hume, Harris, Mandeville, and Petty. Smith may have been stimulated by Plato’s 
concept, yet, as Brewer (1999: 239) notes, he was the first to realize the possibilities 
of mass efficiency due to the aggregation of the division of labour within a nation’s 
workplaces: “Ferguson, like other writers of the time, had not quite made this leap of 
abstraction”.201
                                                 
201 Further, Smith is the only author to have explicitly connected the consequent increase in living 
standards to a heightened morality within society. Turgot anticipates Smith’s idea of continued growth 
driven by capital accumulation, but in less detail. Similarly, the same author had developed a notion of 
the development of society in four stages. Neither of these ideas had been published before Smith’s 
work appeared, however, which makes it less likely that they were a direct influence upon Smith, 
although this is difficult to establish (Brewer 1999: 241). 
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2.2.4) Millar and Stewart 
 
Among these “other writers” is perhaps John Millar, Crown Chair of Civil Law at 
Glasgow between 1761 and his death in 1801, during which time his lectures followed 
a system of classification as suggested by the Corpus Iuris of Roman Lawyers. As 
Lehmann explains, this enabled Millar’s students to view particular laws, or a whole 
system of law, and particular political institutions, in light of their historical 
development as their adaptation to changing contextual circumstances. For Millar, 
therefore, justice is historically conditioned, which echoes Hume’s and Smith’s views 
that circumstantial differences, not a priori motives, shape history (Lehmann 1960b: 
56-62; 1960a: 126). Indeed, Haakonssen (1996: 160) points out that Millar’s central 
theory of justice “…is in fact little more than a summary and conscious restatement of 
their [Hume’s and Smith’s] ideas”.202 An example of this is Millar’s rewording of 
Smith’s impartial spectator concept: “[t]he infringement of the rules of Justice…never 
fails to excite resentment in the breast of the person injured, and indignation in that of 
the spectators”.203
                                                 
202 Indeed, Ignatieff (1983: 320) points to Smith’s jurisprudence lectures as “the decisive event in 
Millar’s intellectual life”. Millar was a student at Glasgow from 1746 to 1751 (Lehmann 1960b: 56). 
203 Craig, J. (1804) ‘Account of the Life and Writings of John Millar, Esq.’ in Millar, J. (1804) The 
Origin of the Distinction of Ranks, fourth edition, Edinburgh, p.xxxii, cited in Haakonssen 1996: 161.   
 Millar also concurs with Smith and Hume that commercial society 
had made manners civilized, yet, like Smith, was aware that the broader availability of 
social and political enlightenment for the poor was limited without basic education 
and wider social mobility (Haakonssen 1996: 169-173). 
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In WN, Smith points out the tendency of the “labouring poor, that is, the great body of 
the people” to suffer a kind of “mental mutilation” from repetitive, mundane tasks, 
which leads into his discussion of education (Smith 1976 [1776], V.i.6.50; V.ii.60). 
Again echoing Smith, Millar is concerned with “the powerful tendency” of repetitive 
modes of work that the poor were made to undertake “to render them ignorant and 
stupid”, which prompts his advocacy of educational programmes for the poor through 
the institution of schools and seminaries.204 Despite being clearly influenced by 
Smith, and by Hume, on these and other matters, Millar may be seen to demonstrate a 
pessimism and conservatism that is similar to that of other Scottish Enlightenment 
thinkers.205 Indeed, whereas Millar agrees with Smith that individuals’ morals 
replicate the general standard of propriety of a particular time and place, Millar posits 
that sympathetic interaction within commercial society merely reflects a utilitarian 
attainment of reciprocal good offices, as: “[t]he pursuit of riches becomes a scramble 
in which the hand of every man is against the other”.206
This appears to echo Smith’s passage in TMS in which he discusses competitive 
individualism: “[i]n the race for wealth, and honours, and preferments, he may run as 
hard as he can, and strain every nerve and every muscle, in order to outstrip all his 
competitors”. However, whereas Millar insists upon the bitterness of the struggle for 
success, Smith is clear that this is not a necessary characteristic of commercial 
activity: “…if he should justle, or throw down any of them, the indulgence of the 
  
 
                                                 
204 Millar, J. (1803 [1787]) The Historical View of the English Government. London: Mawman, pp.141-
161, cited in Lehmann 1960a: 78. Smith is however wary of an educational system funded exclusively 
by the state, as this may lead to “man of system” tendencies (Smith 1976 [1776], V.i.6.55). This is 
discussed in more detail in 2.3.1.   
205 Millar also draws upon Smith’s distinction between the general “laws of justice” and the particular 
“laws of police” in order to arrive at the derivative contrast between fundamental rights and 
government (Haakonssen 1996: 165), and follows Smith and Hume in rejecting calls for the levelling 
of property (Ibid, 171). 
206 Millar, J. (1803 [1787]) pp.248-9, cited in Ignatieff 1983: 340; Lehmann 1960a: 386-387.   
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spectators is entirely at an end. It is a violation of fair play, which they cannot admit 
of” (Smith 1976 [1790], II.ii.2.1). Such “spectators” in the “race” are analogous to the 
impartial spectators that ensure societal and self-approbation at morally well-founded 
actions, as the just person “…feels himself to be the natural object of their love and 
gratitude, and, by sympathy with them, of the esteem and approbation of all 
mankind”. Conversely, selfish behaviour will ensure societal and self-condemnation, 
“…the dread and terror of punishment from the consciousness of the justly provoked 
resentment of all rational creatures” (Ibid, II.ii.2.3-4).  
 
In comparison to Smith, Millar therefore places little faith in the moral autonomy of 
the individuals’ “impartial and well–informed spectator…the man within the breast” 
(Ibid, III.ii.32), as he doubts that conscience could successfully withstand the 
supposedly pernicious temptation of the “commercial spirit” (Ignatieff 1983: 340). 
Millar’s pessimism regarding morality in commercial society is therefore comparable 
to that of Mandeville, Kames, Turnbull, Reid and Ferguson. However, according to 
Ignatieff, Millar’s comparative lack of influence is grounded in his “intellectual 
disarray”, as is evinced in “…the sweeping moral jeremiad of the final pages of the 
Historical View [of the English Government]” (Ibid, 345). Such a theological and 
negative interpretation of humanity’s ability to live harmoniously is also reflected in 
the work of Dugald Stewart, Smith’s first biographer. Reflecting the foundationalism 
of the mainstream of Scottish Enlightenment thought, Stewart rejects the subjectivism 
that he viewed as apparent in Smith and Hume’s moral philosophy, arguing that moral 
qualities exist independently of the perception of the human mind. 
 
Whereas for Smith, as for Hume, historical and cultural specifics are fundamental to 
the setting of the conditions of impartial, and therefore moral, standpoints, to Stewart 
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these are merely circumstantial and historical prejudices that obfuscate natural, 
immutable morality. Reflecting Reid, Stewart assumes that such “distortions” can be 
abandoned when minds are educated (Haakonssen 1996: 227-232).207 As Stewart 
considers moral excellence to be unequal between individuals, he advocates that 
moral education be employed, to develop an understanding of the relationship 
between private happiness, morally right behaviour and public happiness at an early 
stage. Stewart therefore echoes Reid’s normative Common Sense idea of a state-
provided elementary school system, in which the content of education is regulated by 
government as a religious aid to moral development (Ibid, 234-236).208
 
  
 
However, Stewart’s moral teaching, which would seek to inculcate a fundamental 
theological, objective standard of morality that refers to the teleological unfolding of 
God’s plan, does not seek to cultivate civic virtue for everyone. This is in contrast to 
Reid’s notion of moral education for all. Rather, Stewart’s aim was to make Reid’s 
Common Sense philosophy socially effective by instilling such moral attainment in an 
elite leadership that could direct society politically. Nevertheless, such an aim stresses 
Reid’s notion of the moral primacy of God’s design over that of the individual, which 
may be directly contrasted to Smith’s omitting to explain social order through 
reference to the design of the Deity. As Haakonssen points out, this serves to 
demonstrate “…how close Stewart is to the mainstream of Scottish moral thought in 
the Enlightenment and how distant he is from Hume and Smith” (Haakonssen 1996: 
260-264). 
                                                 
207 As Haakonssen (1996: 263) points out, Smith develops a complex socio-historical theory to address 
this, whereas Stewart places the full explanatory burden on the moral powers of the subject. This is 
possible, according to Stewart, because Reid’s foundationalism refutes Hume’s ‘Theory of Ideas’. 
208 Yet despite such obvious divergences from Smith’s ideas relating to his advocating of a limited role 
for government intervention, particularly within such an influential area as education, Stewart employs 
Smithian phrases and quotes Smith extensively, which: “suggest[s] a closer connection to Smith than 
there really is” (Haakonssen 1996: 240; 248-250). 
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Reid’s influence upon Stewart is therefore profound, which may be said to have 
indirectly affected the views of those who followed him. Indeed, Stewart’s adaptation 
of Reid’s ideas was highly influential. Haakonssen highlights that James Mill and 
James Mackintosh, creators of the Edinburgh Review that were also involved in the 
1832 Reform Act, follow Stewart’s notion of moral certainty and belief in the power 
of education “…to modify the mind…different from what it would otherwise have 
been”.209
                                                 
209 Burston, W. H. (1969) James Mill on Education, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.70, 
cited in Haakonssen 1996: 302-303. 
 Such beliefs reflect the moral certainty of the teleological arguments of the 
Protestant tradition that posit God’s will as knowable, immutable and innate. For 
Smith, in contrast, the moral world is genuinely open-ended (Haakonssen 1996: 307). 
 
Unlike the mainstream Scottish Enlightenment theorists, Smith seeks to consider how 
commercial society affects individuals’ behaviour rather than posit, as those within 
the mainstream do, how people ought to behave. Smith’s impartial spectator concept 
affords him a detailed framework within which to interpret such contextual 
influences, enabling him to avoid the “man of system” tendencies as displayed by the 
Scottish Enlightenment thinkers that seek to introduce their own, specific “supreme 
standard of right and wrong” into institutional mechanisms (Smith 1976 [1790], 
VI.ii.2.18). The comparative flexibility of Smith’s notion of propriety, as 
demonstrated by his impartial spectator concept, is discussed by way of comparison 
with such accounts in the next section. 
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Part Three: ‘Of the Influence of Custom and Fashion upon Moral Sentiments’ 
2.3.1) Moral education and men of system 
 
Whether Smith privileges the universal over the contextual is an ongoing source of 
tension within the heterodox debate.210
As discussed in 2.2.2, Smith observes in TMS that casuistic rules become reified over 
time into a legal formula for moral assessment. As he also points out, this “spirit of 
system” is damaging in formal modes of education. Indeed, as Smith argues: “…the 
richest and best endowed universities” are those that are “the most averse to permit 
any considerable change in the established plan of education” as advocated by the 
Church and the Common Sense thinkers (Smith 1976 [1790], I.iii.3; III.iii.43; 
VI.ii.2.15; V.iii.2.34). By contrast, Smith’s flexible notion of moral education 
involves sensitivity to a plurality of experiences and openness to new forms of 
knowledge that is consistent with the evolutionary approach he recommends 
 This relates to questions regarding whether he 
engages in moral relativity or posits immutable standards of right and wrong, and its 
effect upon his methodology. In this section I argue that Smith’s appeal to different 
cultural articulations of the human experience enables him to avoid these 
epistemological traps, as it involves a critical intersubjective understanding of 
morality that succinctly combines universal and contextual influences.  
 
                                                 
210 See, for examples, Haakonssen 1982: 206-207; 214-221; Haakonssen 1981: 74; Kettler 1979: 869; 
Levine 1998: 38; 57-58; Vivenza 2001: 88-89; Weinstein 2006: 27-28; Winch 1978. Haakonssen 
(1982: 214) characterises Smith’s idea of natural law as “…the combination of the universal and the 
particular in the figure of the Impartial Spectator”.  
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throughout his oeuvre. Therefore, Smith is clear that such knowledge is not solely 
derived from formal schooling. Rather, he observes that higher standards of propriety 
are arrived at via a process of interaction and reflection that occurs in everyday life: 
 
…the most vulgar education teaches us to act, upon all important occasions, 
with some sort of impartiality between ourselves and others, and even the 
ordinary commerce of the world is capable of adjusting our active principles to 
some degree of propriety (Ibid, III.iii.7).  
 
Smith also notes that this process of lifelong learning contributes to the alleviation of 
perceived differences. Indeed, despite observing that we sympathise most effectively 
with those whom we share, or perceive to share, common experiences, such a process 
facilitates more extensive sympathy. Smith observes that individuals sympathise 
firstly with themselves; next, with their family members; then, with their workmates; 
then, their neighbours; and lastly those within their “state or sovereignty” 
Smith points out in WN that children are “for the first six or eight years of their 
existence…very much alike”. It is therefore the division of labour “which appears to 
distinguish men of different professions, when grown up to maturity” (Smith 1976 
[1776], I.ii.4). As he explains in TMS, a child’s development of self-control through 
the impartial spectator is a matter of “constant practice”:  
(Ibid, 
VI.ii.2.1; VI.ii.1.2 See also Ibid, VI.ii.1.16). This hierarchy is arguably reflected in his 
discussion of children’s education in TMS. Here, Smith explains that children learn 
firstly from their parents, then from their siblings, and then from early friendships: 
“[w]hen it is old enough to go to school, or to mix with its equals”. Indeed, he is clear 
that a child’s development is preferably achieved within such a sequence: 
 
Surely no acquirement, which can possibly be derived from what is called a 
public education, can make any sort of compensation for what is almost 
certainly and necessarily lost by it. Domestic education is the institution of 
nature; public education, the contrivance of man. It is surely unnecessary to 
say, which is likely to be the wisest (Ibid, VI.ii.1.10; III.iii.22).  
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It thus enters into the great school of self–command, it studies to be more and 
more master of itself, and begins to exercise over its own feelings a discipline 
which the practice of the longest life is very seldom sufficient to bring to 
complete perfection (Smith 1976 [1790], III.iii.22; See also Ibid, I.v.4-6). 
 
With maturity, “[w]ith the eyes of this great inmate he has always been accustomed to 
regard whatever relates to himself. This habit has become perfectly familiar to him” 
(Ibid, III.iii.25).211
Smith concurs with Kames’ advocacy of parental input into the development of a 
child’s morality and capacity for independent thought before entering school. Yet 
Kames’ proposal for “a more perfect system of education” is through greater state 
involvement that seeks to instil religious values: “[a]mong the many branches of 
education, that which tends to make deep impressions of virtue, ought to be a 
fundamental measure in a well-regulated government”.
 As such, Smith’s flexible notion of education clearly differs from 
its formal incarnation as advocated by Kames and Reid. 
   
212 Reid, for whom it is the 
“principle care of the state to make good citizens by proper education”, reflects this 
view.213
                                                 
211 Over time, therefore: “[h]e does not merely affect the sentiments of the impartial spectator. He 
really adopts them” (Ibid). 
212 Home, H. (1761) The Art of Thinking, section VII, cited in Lehmann 1971: 244. Indeed, for Kames, 
“[e]ducation may well be deemed one of the capital arts of government” (Ibid, Preface, cited in 
Lehmann 1971: 238). 
213 Reid (1863 [1788]) pp.577b-578a cited in Haakonssen 1996: 219-220. 
 Smith also agrees with Kames’ advocacy of a school in every parish. 
However, this is a pragmatic endorsement based upon the recognition that instruction 
in the basics of “geometry and mechanicks” provides them with the skills necessary to 
find employment. As such he is able to retain his ambivalence regarding the tendency 
of state education to promote sectional interests whilst pragmatically pointing out that 
greater equality for the labouring poor will only come about through their familiarity 
with “the most essential parts of education…to read, write, and account” which “[f]or 
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a very small expence the publick can facilitate”.214
[n]othing tends so much to corrupt and enervate and debase the mind as 
dependency, and nothing gives such noble and generous notions of probity as 
freedom and independency. Commerce is one great preventive of this custom 
(Smith 1987 LJ [A], vi.6).
 It is thus considerations of public 
utility rather than mere benevolence that prompts Smith’s advocacy of basic 
education, which, he argues, prompts greater self-reliance. As he states in his lectures: 
 
215
In contrast, for Kames: “[k]nowledge is a dangerous acquisition for the labouring 
poor”.
 
 
216 This elitism, later expounded by Dugald Stewart, is also reflected in the 
views of David Hume. For Hume, education strengthens, rather than creates, our 
moral principles. As such, Smith may be seen to develop Hume’s instinctivist view of 
education.217 Yet for Hume, the consequence of education is the development of taste, 
of which, he argues, the “generality of men” do not possess the capability of 
understanding.218 That this reflects Kames’ notion that taste is unobtainable to those 
“who depend for food on bodily labour”219
Indeed, Smith’s suggestion that moral reflection independent from religiously inspired 
and state-delivered education is within the capabilities of ordinary agents may be 
viewed as wholly innovative. As Weinstein (2006: 9; 28) explains, such an insight is 
 perhaps demonstrates Smith’s 
transcendence of the type of elitism that other Scottish Enlightenment thinkers were 
unwilling or unable to overcome.  
 
                                                 
214 Smith advocates the establishment of “…in every parish or district a little school, where children 
may be taught for a reward so moderate, that even a common labourer may afford it; the master being 
partly, but not wholly paid by the publick” (Smith 1976 [1776], V.iii.2.53-54); Lehmann 1971: 238-
244; Griswold 1999: 254. 
215 Such dependency may plausibly be conceptualised as spiritual as well as material dependency, as 
Smith appears to advocate self-determination of morality as opposed to that suggested by organised 
religion. 
216 Home, H. (1774) Sketches of the History of Man, III, 90f, Edinburgh: Strahan and Cadell, cited in 
Lehmann 1971: 245. 
217 Davie 1973: 22-23; Davis 2003: 572. 
218 Hume, D. (1987 [1757]) ‘Of the Standard of Taste’ in Essays Moral Political and Literary, edited 
by Miller, E. F., Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, p.241, cited in Davis 2003: 572. 
219 Home, H. (1817 [1762]) Elements of Criticism, London: Blake, p.446, cited in Davis 2003: 572. 
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possible because Smith is able to combine general standards of morality with a 
context-dependent moral psychology. This enables him to effectively describe 
everyday experience without recourse to notions of either an immutable utopia that 
can readily be discerned through religion, or sceptical ideas that deny the possibility 
of shared human experiences. In this manner, Smith is also able to characterise 
societal development as an uneven, evolving process, without appealing to a fatalistic 
teleology akin to that subscribed to by the mainstream Scottish Enlightenment 
thinkers.220
                                                 
220 Weinstein 2006: 24-28; Griswold 1999: 296 As Haakonssen (1996: 131) argues, the object of the 
impartial spectator’s judgement is a socially formed self, “…but this does not mean that there are no 
universally constant features of humanity…the moral philosopher can trace certain patterns of moral 
reaction across different societies and cultures”.  
 
 
Indeed, although his ideal legislator reflects a few universal principles of practical 
reasoning, Smith’s use of the modern natural lawyers’ and Montesquieu’s notion that 
the understanding of them is not serves to demonstrate that the development of 
society is an open-ended process that arises from the unintended consequences of 
actors’ judgments, as well as to highlight the dangers of utopian schemes that seek to 
obstruct this natural course with the “madness of fanaticism” (Smith 1976 [1790], 
VI.ii.2.15; Haakonssen 1982: 205-213). Smith’s moral philosophy therefore contains 
implicit normative intentions whilst lacking overt substantive prescriptions. Indeed, it 
is precisely such prescriptions that he warns against in his discussion of the “man of 
system” in Part VI of TMS, from which it is instructive to quote at length: 
 
The man whose public spirit is prompted altogether by humanity and 
benevolence, will respect the established powers and privileges even of 
individuals, and still more those of the great orders and societies, into which 
the state is divided…When he cannot establish the right, he will not disdain to 
ameliorate the wrong; but like Solon, when he cannot establish the best system 
of laws, he will endeavour to establish the best that the people can bear. 
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The man of system, on the contrary, is apt to be very wise in his own conceit; 
and is often so enamoured with the supposed beauty of his own ideal plan of 
government, that he cannot suffer the smallest deviation from any part of 
it…He seems to imagine that he can arrange the different members of a great 
society with as much ease as the hand arranges the different pieces upon a 
chess–board. He does not consider that the pieces upon the chess–board have 
no other principle of motion besides that which the hand impresses upon them; 
but that, in the great chess–board of human society, every single piece has a 
principle of motion of its own, altogether different from that which the 
legislature might chuse to impress upon it.  
 
Some general, and even systematical, idea of the perfection of policy and law, 
may no doubt be necessary for directing the views of the statesman. But to 
insist upon establishing, and upon establishing all at once, and in spite of all 
opposition, every thing which that idea may seem to require, must often be the 
highest degree of arrogance. It is to erect his own judgment into the supreme 
standard of right and wrong. It is to fancy himself the only wise and worthy 
man in the commonwealth, and that his fellow–citizens should accommodate 
themselves to him and not he to them (Smith 1976 [1790], VI.ii.2.16-18). 
 
In warning against this approach, Smith may clearly be seen to be advising against the 
intrusive tendencies of government based on supposedly immutable “truths” that the 
Common Sense theorists subsequently advocate. Yet, as Macfie (1967: 70) argues, the 
chessboard analogy in the “man of system” passage shows that “…people are not 
mechanical or inanimate pieces, so neither can mechanical or logical thinking explain 
them”.221
As Charles Griswold (1999: 245) explains, whilst appearing to relate the progress of 
society to a divine plan, Smith is here actually reminding us not to mistake the 
 As such, Smith is able to reject teleological explanations whilst providing a 
warning about those that seek to utilize such explanations to justify their religious or 
political actions: 
 
When by natural principles we are led to advance those ends, which a refined 
and enlightened reason would recommend to us, we are very apt to impute to 
that reason, as to their efficient cause, the sentiments and actions by which we 
advance those ends, and to imagine that to be the wisdom of man, which in 
reality is the wisdom of God (Smith 1976 [1790], II.ii.3.5). 
 
                                                 
221 As Macfie (1967: 70) explains, Smith is able to develop an implicit social theory via his treatment 
of sympathy and the impartial spectator that is not offered as a theory of society, but is a reflection of 
his inductive observations and philosophical thought regarding everyday life. 
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efficient for the final cause, and therefore not to confuse apparent systemic coherence 
with moral justification. Indeed, Smith’s statement that: “[h]uman society, when we 
contemplate it in a certain abstract and philosophical light, appears like a great, an 
immense machine, whose regular and harmonious movements produce a thousand 
agreeable effects” supported by “the great Director of the universe” (Smith 1976 
[1790], VII.iii.1.2-4) does not reflect a teleological approach. Rather, Smith is 
highlighting the dangers in reading moral or theological “truths” from particular 
circumstances. As Haakonssen (1981: 74-75) explains, for Smith: “[m]en believe in 
God and an after-life because they are led to it by their moral convictions”. As such, 
religious belief is a continuation of individuals’ moral sentiments. This is a radical 
departure from Christian assertions of a Divine plan that so influenced the majority of 
Scottish Enlightenment thought.  
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2.3.2) Multiple impartial spectators 
 
According to Haakonssen (1996: 134-152), Smith’s refutation of orthodox 
philosophical arguments relating to God’s will is influenced by Samuel von Cocceji’s 
(1740) transformation of the natural law theory of sociality into one of recognition of 
mankind’s individual relationship with God, as: “[t]he covenant of God was replaced 
by the inner dialogue of the moral character, divine jurisprudence by the theory of 
moral sentiments”. As Haakonssen notes, despite Cocceji’s theocratic conservatism, 
his “inner dialogue” implies individual self-legislation, which Smith arguably 
develops into his concept of moral self-evaluation through one’s impartial 
spectator.222
As has been argued, Smith’s development of the role of moral imagination, sympathy, 
also relates to Hutcheson’s notion of spectatorial approval of moral motives. 
Arguably, Smith’s acknowledgement of differentiated levels of spectatorial concord 
among individuals reflects Hutcheson’s view that perfect virtue belongs to those that 
are as benevolent as they are able to be. Despite dismissing Hutcheson’s notion of a 
discernible objective morality, Smith employs his acknowledgement of diverse 
abilities in relation to personal reflection upon one’s conscience. As such, he is able to 
observe that agents are as in harmony with their own and others’ impartial spectator 
as they are capable of being.
 
 
223
 
  
                                                 
222 Raphael and Macfie, intro to Smith 1976 (1790), p.17. Reflection upon another agent’s impartial 
spectator is made possible by an understanding of and sympathy with the action taken by the actor in 
light of the motives that may have prompted their course of action. 
223 See Smith 1976 (1790), III.iii.21; I.iv.7. My argument here is in direct contrast to that made by 
Hope, who argues that: “[n]one of this means that the Impartial Spectator varies from person to person, 
or that each person has his own individual spectator…” (Hope 1989: 102). 
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Indeed, although Smith notes that the impartial spectator enables the agent to see their 
situation in a “candid and impartial light” (Smith 1976 [1790], I.i.4.8) this “reasonable 
man” is no Kantian universal “rational man” that pertains to an exclusive moral 
standpoint, as Griswold (1999: 139) points out. Instead, Smith’s post-religious 
concept of individual self-determination through the impartial spectator enables him 
to countenance individuals’ independent evaluation of the “propriety” of an action, as 
well as the “praise or blame” that may be attached to its motivation without recourse 
to any notion of an objective moral standard. As Griswold explains, Smith rejects the 
idea of such a rational morality as had been promoted by philosophers from the Stoics 
to Hutcheson: “[i]n defending the standpoint of ordinary life, Smith rejects moral 
theory that imposes demands we cannot meet and…guilt we ought not to bear”.224 
 
Smith’s recognition that a variety of spectatorial standards exists “from one person to 
the next” is also evinced in his statement that there are “different shades and 
gradations of weakness and self-command” within and among actors. 
                                                 
224 Griswold 1999: 141-142; Smith 1976 (1790), II.iii.3; Ross 1995: 164. 
Further, his 
point that “[t]he man who is himself at ease can best attend to the distress of others” 
also reflects a framework of differentiated capabilities that is analogous to the 
different levels of dexterity achieved by workers in a commercial society within the 
division of labour (Smith 1976 [1790], III.iii.21; III.iii.37; Haakonssen 1996: 152; 
132). Indeed, it may be argued that the pin factory example that Smith employs in WN 
in order to describe the commercial benefits of such a division of labour is analogous 
to the advance in moral dexterity that he suggests is possible within modern society as 
explicated within TMS.  
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Smith also places emphasis upon the influence of context in determining standards of 
beauty, which are analogous to standards of propriety. However, as he notes, this does 
not imply that a motive or its interpretation is entirely determined by the “principles 
of custom and fashion”:  
 
The principles of the imagination, upon which our sense of beauty depends, 
are of a very nice and delicate nature, and may easily be altered by habit and 
education: but the sentiments of moral approbation and disapprobation, are 
founded on the strongest and most vigorous passions of human nature; and 
though they may be somewhat warpt, cannot be entirely perverted. 
    
Smith is therefore able to appeal to basic moral judgements, yet remain sensitive to 
the influence of time and place upon perceived propriety:  
 
…though I cannot admit that custom is the sole principle of beauty, yet I can 
so far allow the truth of this ingenious system as to grant, that there is scarce 
any one external form so beautiful as to please, if quite contrary to custom and 
unlike whatever we have been used to in that particular species of things 
(Smith 1976 [1790], V.ii.1; V.i.9). 
 
As Salter (1999: 222) explains, Smith utilises this distinction in order to highlight 
that, although there are observable similarities among those passions that lead 
societies to punish the guilty and protect the innocent, the virtue of self-command is 
cultivated by our situation and our relationship to others. Smith therefore posits the 
everyday philosophical observance that there are a few common human traits that are 
reflected in the basis of general laws or rules across societies. Moreover, Smith points 
out that these are useful:  
 
Without this sacred regard to general rules, there is no man whose conduct can 
be much depended upon. It is this which constitutes the most essential 
difference between a man of principle and honour and a worthless fellow 
(Smith 1976 [1790], III.v.2).225
                                                 
225 Smith points out in the preceding passage: “[t]he coarse clay of which the bulk of mankind are 
formed, cannot be wrought up to… perfection. There is scarce any man, however, who by discipline, 
education, and example, may not be so impressed with a regard to general rules, as to act upon almost 
every occasion with tolerable decency, and through the whole of his life to avoid any considerable 
degree of blame” (Ibid, III.v.1). 
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Yet Smith is keenly aware of the multitude of differences that occur within this broad 
framework. Indeed, he appears to suggest throughout his work that, against those that 
seek to establish one “truth”, a plurality of perspectives is necessary to a harmonious 
society. This is arguably reflected in his advocacy of a multitude of religious sects in 
WN. Indeed, as with his critique of formal education, Smith advocates a natural 
religious awareness that is available via meditation upon one’s conscience rather than 
through mediation by organised religion (Ibid, III.v.13).226
Smith’s disdain for such perversions of the moral sentiments may similarly be viewed 
in his disparaging references to mercantilists, moralists and men of system in other 
parts of his work.
 
 
227 Smith may therefore appear to be acknowledging a “natural” 
objective course of events, from which such deviations are to be considered as 
perversions. Yet, as has been argued, he is at pains to point out the spontaneous nature 
of human development, and is also anxious to avoid the establishment of a set of rules 
that he recognises as context and time-specific. Indeed, if he were positing one ideal 
standard, Smith would have merely succeeded in replacing the religious notion of an 
immutable teleology with a socio-psychological one. In contrast, his broader point 
appears to be to warn against such a tendency towards aiming at an unattainable 
Utopia, whilst acknowledging humanity’s proclivity towards improvement as a 
distinctly non-linear process.228
                                                 
226 See also Ibid, III.ii.35; Smith 1976 (1776), V.iii.9 As Haakonssen (1981: 76) points out, Smith’s 
natural religion “…is very different from structured religious systems”.  
227 See Smith 1976 (1776), Book III; Book IV; Smith 1976 (1790), III.iii.9; VI.ii.2.16-18. 
228 “To expect, indeed, that the freedom of trade should ever be entirely restored in Great Britain, is as 
absurd as to expect that an Oceana or Utopia should ever be established in it” (Smith 1976 [1776], 
IV.ii.43). Smith’s evolutionary view of the nature of knowledge is discussed in 3.3.1-3. 
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To be sure, Smith conceptualises a framework within which different aptitudes co-
exist.229 Indeed, he points out that the disagreeable passions are as indispensable to 
society as the acceptable ones within and among persons. This necessarily involves a 
countenancing of different levels of ability regarding reflection upon one’s impartial 
spectator. As Smith notes: “[e]mulation, the anxious desire that we ourselves should 
excel, is originally founded in our admiration of the excellence of others” (Smith 1976 
[1790], III.ii.3). Therefore, just as we attempt to improve our material conditions by 
self-consciously emulating the happiness that we imagine the rich enjoy, we also 
strive to improve our reflexive abilities in relation to our impartial spectator through 
emulation of those actors that we perceive to be in concord with theirs. This ability is 
developed through the mutual sympathy mechanism for the selection of behaviour 
that is appropriate to the situation, which is founded upon individual and social 
spectatorial approval.  
 
Such a conceptualisation of the gradual elimination of inappropriate behaviour and 
the reinforcement of apposite conduct may appear to provide a teleological element to 
Smith’s work. Indeed, as Haakonssen argues, although Smith points out that man’s 
teleological inferences about the afterlife are speculative, he does not state that such 
speculation is invalid. Yet Smith points out, in contrast to the Common Sense 
theorists, that the real happiness, or tranquillity, that is usually associated with the 
afterlife, is attainable within society through social interaction initiated by commercial 
activity, and inspired by reflection upon one’s own impartial spectator. This enables 
reflection upon others’ motives, at which point propriety is established, without an 
appeal to a religiously or philosophically inspired objective standard.
                                                 
229 Indeed, Smith’s dividing of the passions of the imagination into the unsocial, social, and selfish 
arguably provides an analogy to a conceptualisation of different levels of individuals’ capability for 
achieving harmony with their impartial spectator (Smith 1976 [1790], I.ii.3-5). 
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As Haakonssen highlights, previous attempts at establishing a system of morals had 
failed because moral philosophers had attempted to evaluate individual behaviour by 
their perception of such standards. In contrast, Smith’s philosophy of unintended 
consequences acknowledges that agents act for individual purposes, which may only 
retrospectively be recognizable as some kind of order. His limited use of teleology 
may therefore be considered legitimate as it provides the efficient cause for socially 
appropriate behaviour, which countenances local knowledge as well as general 
principles. In highlighting unintended consequences, Smith is also able to explain 
changing standards of propriety, and is thus able to refrain from positing a fixed 
future point at which society should aim. 
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2.3.3) Principles of right and wrong 
 
That it is never Smith’s intention to seek to instruct people in what is right and what is 
wrong is evinced by the lack of any attempt on his part to establish a set of moral 
doctrines or rules by which people ought to live. Indeed, he attacks Hobbes’ notion 
that “[t]he laws of the civil magistrate…ought to be regarded as the sole ultimate 
standards of what was just and unjust, what was right and wrong” (Smith 1976 
[1790], VII.iii.2.1; Haakonssen 1981: 55-59; 71-81; 135). Yet this would appear to 
suggest that Smith agrees that there is a natural distinction between right and wrong. 
To be sure, in his discussion regarding the influence of custom and fashion on the 
moral sentiments in Part V of TMS, Smith acknowledges “the plainest principles of 
right and wrong” (Smith 1976 [1790], V.ii.14). However, he rejects Ralph 
Cudworth’s attempt to base such a distinction upon universal human reason, and, as 
discussed in 2.1.3, is critical of Hutcheson’s founding of approbation upon the “moral 
sense”.  
 
Smith accepts the traditional distinction between natural and acquired rights, in which 
some rights are so basic that they can be considered as universal (Ibid, VII.iii.2.5; 
VII.iii.3.11). This facilitates similar evaluations between different impartial 
spectators. Yet he does not posit that there is a universalistic standard by which to 
evaluate. Rather, he suggests a general framework within which punishment of 
spectatorial resentment is actualised differently in different societies.230
                                                 
230 As Haakonssen (1981: 148) points out: “…it would make little sense”, for instance, “ …for an 
impartial spectator to recognize trespass as injury in a society which had no idea of property in land; 
but clearly the principles upon which he recognizes theft of animals as injury amongst a society of 
nomads and those upon which he recognizes as trespass as an injury amongst a farming community are 
the same”.  
 In this way, 
Smith is able to observe that human nature has some defining characteristics, which 
are articulated culturally, rather than attempt to strongly advocate definite a priori 
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standards of right and wrong by which we should live. Indeed, although he points out 
that punishment of resentment regarding perfect rights is a universal theme, Smith is 
clear that the blame we attach to injustices must arise from individual cases, as 
reflection upon the unique motive in each case determines the degree to which the 
impartial spectator sympathises with the resentment of the sufferer. Such impartial 
self-legislation is reflected in Smith’s point that:  
 
[o]ne individual must never prefer himself so much even to any other 
individual, as to hurt or injure that other, in order to benefit himself… 
There is no commonly honest man who does not more dread the inward 
disgrace of such an action, the indelible stain which it would for ever stamp 
upon his own mind (Ibid, III.iii.6). 
 
When formal legal proceedings are required, Smith demonstrates a preference for case 
law over statute law,231 which reflects his preference for specific interpretations of 
general laws, rather than general applications of specific laws. In contrast to the 
legislative ambitions of the Common Sense theorists, therefore, Smith’s account 
allows for changes in standards over time, as well as for contemporaneous legal 
differences in different countries. These preferences reflect the tenets of natural 
justice, which, as Salter (1999: 215-218) points out, does not detract from the 
accuracy of law but indicates the most practical way that this accuracy can be 
achieved. Smith’s pragmatism and support for general over specific laws is 
demonstrated in his antipathy towards the poor laws,232
                                                 
231 In LRBL, Smith states: “Common Law…is found to be much more equitable than that which is 
founded on Statute only…as what is founded on practise and experience must be better adapted to 
particular cases than that which is derived from theory only” (Smith 1983, Lecture 28, p.175). 
232 Which were “peculiar to England” and, according to Smith, restricted labour mobility (Smith 1976 
[1776], I.x.2.45-56). 
 and tacit support for the 
English Corn Laws Act of 1772, which he considers to be “…the best which the 
interests, prejudices and temper of the times would admit of”. However Smith’s 
ability to incorporate change within his theory is also apparent in his statement that 
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the latter “may perhaps in due time prepare the way for a better” system (Smith 1976 
[1776], IV.v.50).233
This optimism is arguably a feature of Smith’s methodology. As Haakonssen (1982: 
215) points out, Smith goes to extensive lengths to “combine analysis of 
contemporary law and the history of its genesis”. Indeed, his analysis of moral 
relativity is facilitated by such historical investigation. Smith’s discussions of 
infanticide and slavery clearly demonstrate that social acceptability is not a sufficient 
condition of what is right (Smith 1976 [1790], V.ii.9; VII.i.28).
  
 
234
                                                 
233 This would allow: “…all nations to follow the liberal system of free exportation and free 
importation” that is “not only the best palliative of a dearth, but the most effectual preventative of a 
famine” (Smith 1976 [1776], IV.v.b.39).  
234 As Smith states: “…the characters and conduct of a Nero, or a Claudius, are what no custom will 
ever reconcile us to, what no fashion will ever render agreeable; …the one will always be the object of 
dread and hatred; the other of scorn and derision” (Smith 1976 [1790], V.ii.1). 
 Arguably, this was 
his point, as his discussion demonstrates that what is viewed as proper in one age, but 
is plainly wrong, becomes improper once its inhumanity is recognised (Hope 1989: 
86-87). Smith is thus able to combine his historical and empirical observations of 
different interpretations of morality with those of “…the plainest principles of right 
and wrong” (Smith 1976 [1790], V.ii.14) - and thus retain his critical faculty - without 
lapsing into moral relativity. Furthermore, he is confident that the potential 
educability of people will enable them to see what they were previously blind to.  
 
In this, Smith is not positing an objective morality. Rather, he is merely suggesting 
that our sense of merit and demerit can be improved through education: 
 
The person who is deliberately guilty of a disgraceful action, we may lay it 
down, I believe, as a general rule, can seldom have much sense of the 
disgrace; and the person who is habitually guilty of it, can scarce have any of 
it (Ibid, VI.iii.14). 
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Those who have been educated in what is really good company…who have 
been accustomed to see nothing in the persons whom they esteemed and lived 
with, but justice, modesty, humanity, and good order; are more shocked with 
whatever seems to be inconsistent with the rules which those virtues prescribe. 
Those, on the contrary, who have had the misfortune to be brought up amidst 
violence, licentiousness, falsehood, and injustice; lose, though not all sense of 
the impropriety of such conduct, yet all sense of its dreadful enormity, or of 
the vengeance and punishment due to it. They have been familiarized with it 
from their infancy, custom has rendered it habitual to them, and they are very 
apt to regard it as, what is called, the way of the world, something which either 
may, or must be practised, to hinder us from being the dupes of our own 
integrity (Ibid, V.ii.2).  
 
Smith is thus able to account for varying degrees of moral aptitude within and among 
societies throughout history without judging by or advocating any particular moral 
standpoint. However, Smith does not condone such an absence of virtue as he 
describes above: such patterns of emulation help explain but do not justify moral 
torpor. Yet he maintains that active reflection upon one’s impartial spectator, 
developed gradually under improving material conditions, will ensure the independent 
evaluation of one’s own actions within a general framework of societal propriety that 
will lead to moral progress.  
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2.3.4) Roman Stoicism 
 
Arguably, this view denotes the influence of Stoicism upon his thought. Like the 
Stoics, Smith insists that adherence to general rules does not obviate one’s 
responsibility to actively consider specific context and actions (Clarke 2000: 64). 
Similarly, Smith’s asymptotic notion of societal development may be traced to their 
influence upon his thought. Raphael and Macfie argue that despite the distinction 
between Smith’s sophisticated notion of sympathy and the relatively basic Stoic 
notion of sympatheia, “it is quite likely” that the impartial spectator and sympathy are 
“intimately related to the Stoic outlook”, as self-command “has come to permeate the 
whole of virtue”235
                                                 
235 Raphael and Macfie characterise sympatheia as the idea that there is an organic connection between 
everything within the physical universe. The sharpness of the distinction between Smith’s and the 
Stoics’ concept of sympathy is perhaps reduced when one considers this passage from Part III of TMS: 
“Man, according to the Stoics, ought to regard himself…as a citizen of the world, a member of the vast 
commonwealth of nature…We should view ourselves…in the light in which any other citizen of the 
world would view us” (Smith 1976 [1790], III.3.11, cited in Raphael and Macfie, intro to Smith 1976 
[1790], p.10).  
 (Raphael and Macfie, intro to Smith 1976 [1790], p.9). This is due 
to Smith’s notion that “[s]elf–command is not only itself a great virtue, but from it all 
the other virtues seem to derive their principal lustre”. Moreover, Smith’s 
endorsement of self-love as a virtuous motive may also be linked to Stoic ideas of 
self-preservation, as: “[e]very man, as the Stoics used to say, is first and principally 
recommended to his own care” (Smith 1976 [1790], VI.ii.1.1). 
 
Yet Smith is plainly at variance with the Stoics when he states: “[t]he plan and system 
which Nature has sketched out for our conduct seems altogether different from that of 
the Stoical Philosophy”. Despite appealing to Stoic notions of personal self-control 
within each individual, Smith is critical of Stoic apathy (see Ibid, VII.i.43; III.iii.14; 
Vivenza 2001: 59). This is mainly because such apathy would eliminate the “selfish 
affections” that are needed for progress:  
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By the perfect apathy which it prescribes to us, by endeavouring, not merely to 
moderate, but to eradicate all our private, partial, and selfish affections…it 
endeavours to render us altogether indifferent and unconcerned in the success 
or miscarriage of every thing which Nature has prescribed to us as the proper 
business and occupation of our lives (Smith 1976 [1790], VII.ii.1.46). 
 
Smith’s views coincide with the Stoic concept of the individual contributing to the 
good of the whole, yet he formulates his theory to incorporate the dynamic agency of 
the individual rather than a passive acceptance of one’s fate, as humans are “made for 
action” (Ibid, II.iii.3.3).236
Such flexibility is reflected in Smith’s point that discernment of  “the greater interest 
of the universe” via the rules of “strict justice” cannot generally be expected from “so 
imperfect a creature as man” (Smith 1976 [1790], VI.ii.3.3; VI.iii.1; VII.ii.3.18). 
Instead, as Wascek (1984: 594-596) points out, Smith insists that propriety and 
decency may be found among ordinary people, upon whose commonplace degree of 
understanding the concept of the impartial spectator is based.
 Indeed, Epictetus’ notion that self-interest is not 
necessarily harmful to society is clearly influential upon Smith’s thought (Griswold 
1999: 204-205). As Raphael and Macfie point out, in his survey of the history of 
moral philosophy in Part VII of TMS, Smith quotes Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius at 
length (Raphael and Macfie, intro to Smith 1976 [1790], p.8). It is likely therefore that 
Smith is referring to the Roman Stoics rather than the Ancient Stoics, when he states 
that:  
 
[t]he Stoics in general seem to have admitted that there might be a degree of 
proficiency in those who had not advanced to perfect virtue and happiness … 
The doctrine of those imperfect, but attainable virtues, seems to have 
constituted what we may call the practical morality of the Stoics (Smith 1976 
(1790), VII.i.42). 
 
237
                                                 
236 This view is similar to that held by William James, whose ideas are discussed in 3.1.2-3.3.5. 
237 Indeed, Wascek (1984: 595) highlights that questions such as “wherein does propriety consist?” 
relating to how everybody can achieve this, take up a large amount of space in TMS, whereas “…the 
account of perfect virtue is restricted to a few esoteric passages” therein. 
 Smith therefore 
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rejects Ancient Stoicism in favour of the more flexible and practical Roman Stoicism 
of Cicero, Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius, by arguing that in order to gain the 
sympathy of one’s impartial spectator, one does not need to possess the exceptional 
wisdom or self-command of Cato.238 Rather, enactment of a “mediocre” or “inferior 
prudence” that ensures respect for others’ rights, is sufficient (Smith 1976 [1790], 
I.ii.intro.2; VI.i.15; Wascek 1984: 596). Indeed, Smith refers disparagingly to Ancient 
Stoic notions of moral perfection,239
This relates to Smith’s discussion regarding the “golden mean” of beauty, nature and 
appropriate action throughout Part V of TMS. According to Vivenza (2001: 62-64), 
Smith’s ethical theory therefore retains Aristotelian elements insofar as the individual 
is fully responsible and acts autonomously. Like Smith’s notion that individuals 
become “the impartial spectator of his own situation”, Aristotle reflects that the 
“mean” of propriety is relative to ourselves as it relates to our superior knowledge of 
our own situation.
 and contrasts the “dialectical pedant” Chrysippus 
unfavourably to Cicero, Seneca, Brutus, and  “the mild, the humane, the benevolent 
Antoninus” [Marcus Aurelius] for whom propriety and fitness reside within 
“imperfect, but attainable virtues” (Smith 1976 [1790], VII.ii.1.35; VII.ii.1.42). Such 
advocacy of an achievable notion of virtue is an extension of Smith’s idea that 
“[v]irtue consists in propriety”, which is the appropriate “pitch” of the given emotion 
(Ibid, V.ii.intro.1).  
 
240
                                                 
238 This is also in contrast to Plato’s dismissal of such “demotic virtue” (Griswold 1999: 13. See Smith 
1976 [1790], VII.iii.1.3).  
239 “As all the actions of the wise man were perfect, and equally perfect; so all those of the man who 
had not arrived at this supreme wisdom were faulty, and, as some Stoics pretended, equally faulty…As 
in shooting at a mark, the man who missed it by an inch had equally missed it with him who had done 
so by a hundred yards” (Smith 1976 [1790], VII.ii.1.40; see also Ibid, VII.ii.1.21; I.ii.3.4). 
240 Smith 1976 (1790), III.iii.29. “Pro hemas” (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1107a1, cited in 
Griswold 1999: 182). 
 Yet, as discussed in 2.1.4, Smith’s practical wisdom differs from 
Aristotle’s phronesis in that Smithean prudence relates to self-approbation and not 
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self-perfection. Therefore, Smith’s notion of a “golden mean” of appropriate action 
that is evaluated by the impartial spectator is not strictly analogous to that sought by 
Aristotle’s spoudaios, or excellent person.241
 
  
 
Indeed, instead of characterising the “mean” as an objective point at which behaviour 
should aim, Smith is pointing out, pragmatically, that propriety differs depending on 
the type of passion at issue. Smith is therefore perhaps influenced more by Cicero’s 
notion of decorum, in which propriety is that what is suitable for a praiseworthy 
person to do within the circumstances. As such, he is able to observe that: “[i]n 
general, the style of manners which takes place in any nation, may commonly upon 
the whole be said to be that which is most suitable to its situation”, rather than 
advocate a set of normative moral standards towards which society should aim (Smith 
1976 [1790], V.ii.13; I.ii.intro.2; Griswold 1999: 182-183). Instead, Smith is able to 
conceptualise various standards of propriety that develop gradually and unevenly, and 
which are obtainable by all individuals in relation to general standards and their own 
cultural circumstances through reflection upon their own impartial spectator. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
241 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1113a25-b2, cited in Griswold 1999: 182. 
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2b) Chapter Two conclusion 
 
Despite Smith’s utilisation of certain aspects of Roman Stoicism that are pertinent to 
his enquiry, he avoids Stoic limitations to sympathy that prevents understanding of 
those that are dissimilar to us. As has been discussed, the notion of extensive 
sympathy is crucial to Smith’s theory. Therefore, against Vivienne Brown (1994: 85-
95), it is plausible to argue, as Griswold does, that Smith’s scheme does not 
“…operat[e] within a discursive space mapped out by Stoic moral philosophy” 
(Griswold 1999: 226, footnote 56). Rather, Smith calls Stoicism into question and 
modifies that which he regards as plausible within his own theoretical framework. 
Such adaptations are a common feature of Smith’s approach in relation to the other 
major influences upon his work, as has been examined.  
 
Interestingly, this process of modification is arguably analogous to his concept of 
sympathy itself. For Smith, this is an ongoing process of adjustment, a search for 
equilibrium that is similar to his conceptualisation of political and economic 
processes. This is reflected in his consistent restraint from positing objective moral 
standards. Although Smith does not explicitly discuss scepticism in his work,242
                                                 
242 Griswold (1999: 156) notes however that “…scepticism…was alive and well in his [Smith’s] time 
thanks in good part to Bayle, Montaigne, Shaftesbury, Berkeley, and above all Hume (whose work 
provoked Beattie, Kames, Oswald, and Reid, among others, to much discussion about the subject)”. 
 he is 
evidently influenced by Hume’s modified moral scepticism that attempts to avoid 
providing dogmatic theories of moral judgements that endeavour to reflect the 
supposed timeless quintessence of perfected “human nature”. As Griswold (1999: 
163-165) points out, the subsequent development of specific areas of Hume’s thought 
enables Smith to be characterised as “self-consciously nonfoundationalist” rather than 
“antifoundationalist”. This is an important distinction, as it reflects Smith’s ability to 
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inquire about the “appearances” of the world minus Hume’s digressions into 
epistemology. This facilitates Smith’s discounting of the limited philosophical debates 
about ultimate “realities”, and his focus upon philosophical reflections about everyday 
life (Ibid, 171-173). Yet, as has been discussed, Smith does make appeal to certain 
general human traits that are empirically observable. 
 
In Parts I, II and III of TMS, Smith observes, respectively, that our moral lives are 
constantly conducted under the three aspects of propriety, merit, and duty, which are 
ideas that necessarily pertain to mutually identifiable concepts. As Griswold notes, 
however, these are general, though not a priori, ideas that are learned by the 
individual through social interaction, emulation and reflection upon one’s impartial 
spectator (Ibid, 190-191). Smith’s utilisation of Roman Stoic notions of achievable 
virtue, as developed via Hutcheson’s and Hume’s notions of personal reflection in 
society, allied to a historical methodology, enables conceptualisation of 
intersubjectively constructed, evolving and dialectical modes of individual and 
societal moral growth that refer to existing standards of propriety, merit, and duty 
within and among societies. Smith is therefore able to reflect upon the continual 
adaptation of moral values within an extremely broad framework of ethical standards 
that are historically, contextually and temporally generated, without privileging 
agential or structural factors. 
 
However, there is a perceived central tension in Smith’s work relating to such 
factors.243
                                                 
243 See, for example, Fleischacker (2004); Kettler (1979); Vivenza (2001); Winch (1978, 1983a). See 
also Haakonssen (1981; 1982), who sees a reconciliation between natural justice and history in Smith’s 
impartial spectator.  
 This is demonstrated by Griswold’s description of the difficulties inherent 
in attempting to reconcile Smith’s asymptotic notion of evolving moral standards with 
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his view of the “natural rules of justice” that the ideal legislator recognises as “general 
principles which are always the same” (Smith 1976 [1790], VII.iv.37; Smith 1976 
[1776], IV.ii.39). According to Griswold (1999: 257-258) this tension between 
Smith’s jurisprudential inclinations and his seemingly contradictory commitment to a 
dialectical notion of individual and societal progress is of crucial importance: “[t]o 
pursue questions about first principles is to seek a standpoint external to the human 
spectacle, and he [Smith] thinks that that is unavailable”. Therefore:  
 
Smith could not fulfil his aspiration for a final and comprehensive 
philosophical system articulating the ‘general principles of law and 
government and of the different revolutions they have undergone in the 
different ages and periods of society’… [As such] Smith faced an aporia from 
which he could not free himself.244
Indeed, by suggesting that Smith implies a plurality of impartial spectators rather than 
one “Impartial Spectator”, I have attempted to stress the intricate nature of his balance 
 
 
I reject this argument. In this chapter I have attempted to evaluate the likely 
influences upon Smith and his development of them in order to assess his intellectual 
distance from his contemporaries. By contrasting his conclusions to those of the 
foundationalist thinkers, from the Stoics through to the Common Sense theorists, 
Smith’s non-foundationalism is rendered perceptible. Correspondingly, through 
evaluation of the areas of rationalist natural law theory and scepticism of authors such 
as Hobbes and Mandeville that Smith rejects, as well as the areas of Hume’s thought 
that Smith develops, we are able to see clearly that Smith does not subscribe to moral 
scepticism. In doing so, we are also able to reflect more fruitfully upon the supposed 
tension between Smith’s jurisprudential and non-foundational tendencies as focussed 
upon by Griswold.  
 
                                                 
244 Smith 1976 (1790), VII.iv.37 cited in Griswold 1999: 257-258 (italics in original). Indeed, Griswold 
goes so far as to speculate that Smith’s “failed” attempt to resolve this aporia may have been among 
the unpublished manuscripts burned at Smith’s request (Ibid). 
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between structural and agential factors. For Smith, a person cannot exist outside of 
society (Smith 1976 [1790], III.i.3), which necessarily indicates structural factors, yet 
an individual’s reflection upon such factors can result in a variety of standards of 
moral propriety. To be sure, when one considers Smith’s warnings about “men of 
system” (Ibid, VI.ii.2.16-18) it is likely that he considers such variety as necessary. In 
light of this, it is therefore plausible that Smith employs his concept of the “ideal 
legislator” as an abstract ideal to which the real-life, “insidious and crafty” politician 
ought to be compared, rather than to posit how an actual “ideal legislator” may 
represent an external standpoint (Smith 1976 [1776], IV.ii.39; IV.ii.44). 
 
Indeed, it is possible to argue that it is his appeal to a diversity of standards that 
ensures Smith’s enduring relevance. He is clear that it is an individual’s circumstance 
that creates the context within which their behaviour is shaped. Yet if Smith were to 
have located the genesis of moral standards within pure custom and fashion, his 
theory would only have been of contemporaneous insight, and therefore relativistic. 
However, by conceptualising the development of such standards as evolving unevenly 
within a framework of observable general standards, Smith is able to avoid positing 
specific normative judgements that are rooted in abstract epistemological concerns 
and yet are only of temporary relevance.  
 
To be sure, Smith’s flexible notion of human educability highlights his differences 
from the Common Sense theorists’ commitment to an immutable religious standard 
upon which formal educational standards ought to be based. Similarly, Smith’s 
opposition to casuistry indicates his antipathy towards utilitarian conceptualisations of 
specific rule-formation as considered by sceptics such as Hobbes. In contrast to such 
arguments, Smith’s broad notion of education reflects a non-formal, lifelong process 
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that is learned through emulation and is therefore sensitive to contextual factors. 
Smith’s privileging of informal education over that of formal schooling arguably 
demonstrates this (Smith 1976 [1790], VI.ii.1.10). As he suggests, familial structures 
enable the individual to identify the importance of context-specific conduct from an 
early age. The child therefore develops the practices of emulation and evaluation 
necessary for sympathetic social interaction prior to their formal instruction in the 
general vocational skills necessary for commercial activity. This highlights Smith’s 
ability to conceptualise universally observed human activities, in this case a parent 
caring for their child,245
For Smith, therefore, it is sympathetic ability added to basic education that will serve 
public utility. However, unlike the Common Sense theorists, for whom society will be 
served by religiously inspired moral education, Smith’s philosophical system is based 
upon an extensive notion of sympathy that involves self-determined individual 
reflection upon their own and others’ motivations. Proficiency in moral evaluation is 
therefore developed in the absence of state or sectional intervention in relation to 
education, as Smith describes in TMS. As discussed in 2.3.1, Smith envisages a 
similarly restricted role for government beyond that of its administrative duties in 
WN. By linking sympathetic interaction to commercial practices, he is therefore able 
to advocate economic improvement free from overt intervention, whilst avoiding 
jeremiadic warnings of the supposed dangers to moral standards that such 
independent interaction will bring. By implying that only the basics of education are 
required for such commercial activity to ease the poverty of the masses, which will in 
 whilst taking into account the contextual specificities in 
which the child, and later the adult, interacts. That this is necessitated by commercial 
society highlights Smith’s sophisticated combination of utility and pragmatism.  
 
                                                 
245 “The laws of all civilized nations oblige parents to maintain their children, and children to maintain 
their parents, and impose upon men many other duties of beneficence” (Smith 1976 [1790], V.ii.1.8). 
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turn enable deeper reflection upon moral matters through more intricate forms of 
mutual sympathy, Smith highlights his inclination towards commutative justice.  
 
As discussed, for Smith: we “…may often fulfil all the rules of justice by sitting still 
and doing nothing” (Ibid, II.ii.1.9). This does not, however, imply an “objective” level 
of “perfection” as posited by foundationalist authors such as Kames, Turnbull, Reid 
and Ferguson. Instead, Smith’s negative interpretation of justice reflects a flexible and 
realistic notion of individual moral attainment within society that is based upon 
respect for one another’s rights. As noted, Smith explicitly connects the material and 
the moral through the concept of emulation, which is based in the human desire for 
approbation (Ibid, I.iii.2.1).246
By interpreting Smith as a non-foundationalist yet pragmatic dialectical thinker, we 
are therefore able to see that he is able to countenance the “general principles which 
are always the same” (Smith 1976 [1776], IV.ii.39) that “ought to run through and be 
the foundation of the laws of all nations” (Smith 1976 [1790], VII.ii.9) without 
 As emulation necessarily implies differentiated levels 
of material attainment, it is conceivable that Smith’s framework also implies a 
plurality of spectatorial standards.  
 
As I have attempted to argue, Smith’s impartial spectator concept is one that 
facilitates the countenancing of the existence of many different levels of individual 
attainment of harmony with their own impartial spectator. This is based on the 
observation that Smith does not relate morality to an a priori, immutable standard.  
Rather, Smith’s notion of “fellow feeling” (Ibid, I.i.1.3) necessarily implies a variety 
of spectatorial standards through which differences may be mitigated via emulation.  
                                                 
246 As established in 1.1.1-2, Smith notes that such a desire regarding our material status is a necessary 
delusion, as it prompts the desire to “better our condition” (Smith 1976 [1776], II.iii.28) and thus 
become involved in commercial activity. 
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recourse to universalistic claims regarding an ultimate standard of morality that is 
characteristic of much Scottish Enlightenment thought.  
 
Indeed, as I have argued, Smith only ought to be considered as a “part of” the Scottish 
Enlightenment insofar as he shares similar intellectual influences. As has been 
discussed, his interpretation of such sources, and subsequent advances upon them, is 
unique. Unlike his contemporaries, Smith does not posit an objective, immutable 
standard by which moral behaviour ought to be evaluated and towards which society 
should aim. Instead, he attempts to conceptualise the best practicable society that can 
be achieved through individuals’ conscientious reflection upon their own impartial 
spectator. Such a pragmatic account is facilitated by Smith’s non-dogmatic, historical 
and psychological approach, which facilitates complex insights into contextual and 
agential factors upon the diverse and constantly developing processes that characterise 
individual and social moral life. As is discussed in the next chapter, this facilitates a 
lasting contribution to our ability to conceptualise the self in the social sciences. 
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CHAPTER THREE: TOWARDS A SMITH-JAMES 
FRAMEWORK OF THE SELF 
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3a) Introduction 
 
 
In his article ‘The self and its interests in classical political economy’, David Levine 
(1998: 41-57) identifies a lacuna in political economy:  
 
While political economy is about the economy understood as the system of 
pursuit of self-interest, it lacks an explicit and well-developed concept of the 
self whose interests are the driving force in this system.  
 
 
Whilst pointing out the “problematic” status of the self in classical political economy, 
Levine argues that neoclassical economics has no “…clearer concept of a self or 
subject than the one we find in the classical texts…” 
 
…indeed, there is more in Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments and in Marx’s 
early work to guide us in thinking about the subject of economic affairs than 
we will find in most writings that come later.  
 
 
The basis for Levine’s conflation of Smith’s and Marx’s concepts of the self is his 
view that for both thinkers, the conditions of commercial or capitalist society obviate 
individual self-determination.247
                                                 
247 “Both Smith and Marx explore the part that the subject or the self plays in economic affairs…each 
finds the system of wealth accumulation one that uses the subject to its end rather than facilitating the 
realisation of genuinely subjective ends” (Levine 1998: 57). 
 Levine relates this to Marx in terms of his well-
known concept of alienation, and to Smith with regard to his notion of emulation. 
Levine correctly identifies that for Smith, happiness does not lie in the “…restless 
striving to attain a higher station in life, but consists instead ‘in tranquillity and 
enjoyment’ within a ‘permanent situation’” (Smith 1976 [1790], III.iii.31, cited in 
Levine 1998: 40). Yet Levine argues that there is a tension between this aspiration 
and our propensity for emulation within commercial society that renders a source of 
tranquillity - self-determination - unachievable: “…for Smith, the pursuit of 
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admiration through wealth, rather than achieving the ends of the self, takes us further 
from the state in which the self achieves its true end” (Levine 1998: 41).248
However, as discussed in 1.1.2, Smith does not view emulation within commercial 
society as being an obstacle to tranquillity or self-determination. Rather, he points out 
that our proclivity for emulation is a necessary “…deception which rouses and keeps 
in continual motion the industry of mankind” (Smith 1976 [1790], IV.i.10), which 
prompts the division of labour and results in increased societal wealth and interaction 
via commercial activity.
  
 
249
                                                 
248 It is this misinterpretation of Smith’s notion of emulation that leads Levine to conflate Smith and 
Marx: “…the activity typical of the capitalist does not suggest real self-determination, but the external 
determination of the self in the eyes of others and the striving to attain an alien selfhood whose 
attainment is always just out of reach and would in any case only assure self-alienation” (Ibid). 
249 Indeed, Smith points out that it is within such “civilised nations” in which “[p]overty may easily be 
avoided” that “the mind is more at liberty to unbend itself” than in “rude and barbarous” ones (Smith 
1976 [1790], V.ii.8).  
 It is also through this process that individuals develop a 
deeper understanding, via mutual sympathy, of their own and others’ motives. As 
Smith notes:  
 
Emulation, the anxious desire that we ourselves should excel, is originally 
founded in our admiration of the excellence of others. Neither can we be 
satisfied with being merely admired for what other people are admired. We 
must at least believe ourselves to be admirable for what they are admirable. 
But, in order to attain this satisfaction, we must become the impartial 
spectators of our own character and conduct (Smith 1976 [1790], III.ii.3). 
 
Within this framework, emulation facilitates more sophisticated forms of imaginative 
sympathy and increases the potential for a deeper relationship with one’s impartial 
spectator. Such a process therefore grants the individual the potential to attain 
tranquillity whilst developing greater self-determination. Consequently, unlike Marx, 
for Smith the conditions of commercial society are conducive to self-realisation, not 
an obstruction to it.  
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Therefore, Levine’s (1998: 57) claim that: “…political economy in its classical 
version understands the system to confound individual subjective ends, subordinating 
them to the accumulation of wealth” does not apply to Smith’s framework. As 
suggested, in contrast to Marx, Smith preserves agency for the self in commercial 
society, as individuals do not merely replicate alienating socialisation processes but 
can consciously achieve self-determination within it.250
The need for a clearer understanding of Smith’s concept of the self is rendered more 
pressing when one considers his increasing influence across disciplines within the 
social sciences, particularly in regard to his influence on seminal figures in the 
establishment of the disciplines of psychology and sociology.
 Despite his false conflation of 
Smith and Marx, however, Levine has pointed to the potential salience of an 
important yet often overlooked aspect of Smith’s work: his concept of the self.   
 
251
                                                 
250 Smith does of course discuss “mental mutilation”, but this is a comment on the mental hazards of 
repetitive work rather than a suggestion that it contributes directly to alienation, as it does for Marx 
(e.g., 1946 [1867]). Indeed, for Smith, those whose: “…labour is both so constant and so severe, that it 
leaves them little leisure and less inclination to apply to, or even to think of any thing else” ought to be 
given basic education, which would contribute to individuals’ ability to critique rather than reify 
patterns of subordination: “[t]he more they are instructed, the less liable they are to the delusions of 
enthusiasm and superstition…They are more disposed to examine, and more capable of seeing through, 
the interested complaints of faction and sedition” (Smith 1976 [1776], V.i.f.50-61). 
251 See Wight 2002: 73; Fleischacker 2004: 270. 
 As Kurt Danziger 
(1997: 144-145) points out: “…The Theory of Moral Sentiments introduces certain 
conceptualisations regarding the self whose echoes are still detectable more than two 
centuries later”, as it is Smith’s conceptualization of the self: 
 
…that will come to dominate the emerging discourse of the social and 
psychological sciences in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. William 
James’s ‘social self’ (James, 1890) and Charles Horton Cooley’s ‘looking 
glass self’ (Cooley, 1902) could be regarded as variations on a theme 
composed by Adam Smith, and there are echoes of it in George Herbert 
Mead’s ‘taking the role of the other’ (Mead, 1934). 
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It is therefore interesting to consider that the lacuna in political economy that Levine 
identifies is also alluded to by Michael Lawlor in his discussion of William James. 
Lawlor argues:   
 
His [James’s] psychological pragmatism embodies a view of behaviour that is 
in sharp contrast to the then (and now) dominant psychology of neoclassical 
economics, in which behaviour is often reduced to a simplistic ‘economic 
man’ represented by an unchanging utility function optimising against its 
environment (Lawlor 2006: 325).  
 
 
This is noteworthy here since Lawlor draws a number of comparisons between James 
and Smith in terms of the scope, influence and philosophical emphasis in their most 
famous works:     
 
William James’s Principles of Psychology is one of the great classics of 
modern western thought. Like Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, it 
encapsulates in a pregnant form most of the questions, and many of the 
answers, that modern psychology has pondered since its publication in 1890. 
Also like Smith, James’s description of the basic outline of a scientific 
psychology is written in such a lucid and engaging style…that it stands even 
now among the best introductions to the subject. Also like Smith’s economics, 
James’s Psychology continuously reverts to philosophical issues (Ibid, 331). 
 
This may be no more than an interesting comparison between two seminal thinkers. 
Indeed, Robert Merton emphasises the hazards of “adumbrationism”, the process of:  
“…claiming to find a continuity of thought where it did not in fact exist or of failing 
to identify continuity when it did exist”. As such, one must be careful: 
 
…to distinguish between cases where there is a genuine connection to be made 
between ideas and their historical precursors, and those in which the 
specification of the precursor degenerates into what Merton refers to as 
‘antiquarianism’.252
                                                 
252 Merton, R. K. (1967) ‘On the history and systematics of sociological theory’. In On Theoretical 
Sociology: Five Essays, Old and New. New York, NY: The Free Press, pp.1-38 cited in Costelloe 1997: 
82. 
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Merton’s view appears similar to Quentin Skinner’s calls for caution when attempting 
to interpret historical sources. According to Skinner (1969: 53): “[t]o demand from 
the history of thought a solution to our own immediate problems is…to commit not 
merely a methodological fallacy, but something like a moral error”. This is a crucial 
point, as Levine and Lawlor propose, respectively, the insights of Smith and James 
relating to the self as sources of assistance in the filling of the lacuna in economics 
that they separately identify. As such, despite the possible similarities between their 
accounts of the self, any attempt to compare these thinkers must involve caution. That 
said, however, Skinner’s position arguably ignores the second part of Merton’s notion 
of adumbrationism: that of failing to identify continuity of thought where it may exist. 
In order to avoid this error, it is surely warranted to investigate whether a more 
significant connection between Smith and James exists, as both thinkers appear to 
represent alternative conceptualisations of the self to those currently prevalent within 
economics and in IPE.   
 
James certainly read Smith. In a letter to his brother Henry, dated October 14th 1888, 
William James writes: “[i]t does one good to read classic books. For a month past I’ve 
done nothing else, in behalf of my ethics class - Plato, Aristotle, Adam Smith, Butler, 
Paley, Spinoza etc etc”. As is noted by Ignas Skrupskelis and Elizabeth Berkeley, 
James owned a copy of the second edition of TMS.253 This is significant for two 
reasons. Firstly, it is arguable that, in addition to similarities drawn by Lawlor 
between Smith’s WN and James’s The Principles of Psychology,254
                                                 
253 Letter from William James to Henry James, 14/08/1890, in Skrupskelis and Berkeley 1993: 93. “The 
Theory of Moral Sentiments, 2d. ed. (1761), is the only work by Smith in WJ’s library” (Ibid: 94, 
footnote 6). 
254 Hereafter referred to as PP. 
 there are perhaps 
deeper connections between these thinkers than Lawlor’s stylistic comparison 
assumes. Secondly, as the date of the letter shows, James had read Smith around one 
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year prior to PP being published. This being the case, it is at least conceivable that 
Smith’s ideas influenced James’s discussions within that work, including, potentially, 
his seminal chapter on “The Consciousness of Self”.255
This appears more feasible when one considers Lawlor’s (2006: 334) argument that 
James’s active, selective view of mind is a more apposite concept of self than that 
informed by rational choice theory, “…a view which has in recent decades become 
fashionable across the social sciences”. As discussed in 1.2.1-3, there is considerable 
distance between Smith’s views and those that interpret his ideas as being precursors 
to neoclassical economics.
  
 
Richard Ashmore and Lee Jussim (1997: 3; 8-11) argue that this chapter “…marks the 
introduction of self as both a major determinant of human thought, feeling, and 
behaviour and as susceptible to understanding by empirical research procedures”. As 
they explain, in this chapter, James differentiates between the “I” and “me”, or self as 
knower and self as known, respectively. Through this framework it is possible to 
differentiate the self as subject, agent or process, from the self as object, content, or 
structure. Therefore, by utilising James’s concept of the self it is possible to 
understand the thoughts and behaviours of individuals in terms of intersubjective self-
determination that also acknowledges the differing impacts of prevailing cultural 
values and behavioural norms upon them. In this sense, James’s concept of the self 
appears compatible with Smith’s notion of self-determination via his impartial 
spectator concept.  
 
256
                                                 
255 This seems more plausible when one considers that James’s article “The Hidden Self” was also 
published in 1890, suggesting that James focussed on his concept of the self during the period prior to 
the publishing of PP in the same year.  
256 See Smith 1976 (1776), I.x.b.45; Smith 1976 (1790), I.i.1 for examples that demonstrate the 
distance between the purely self-interested economic agent that underpins neoclassical economics and 
Smith’s notion of the moral and economic motives that inform his framework of the self.  
 As Jan Peil (1999: 41-42) explains, in contrast to such 
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accounts: “Smith consistently attempts to understand the economy in the light of 
human and social value patterns”.257
This chapter thus aims to assess the potential compatibility of Smith’s and James’s 
thought in order to investigate the extent to which they can provide a philosophically 
consistent, alternative concept of the self to the dominant neoclassical “rational” self 
 As I have argued, a holistic interpretation of 
Smith’s thought therefore reveals an intersubjective notion of individuals’ identity and 
morality formation. Such a view consistently informs Smith’s oeuvre, as it does in 
James’s chapter on “The Consciousness of Self”. Such a link is intriguing, as it 
suggests a potentially deeper intellectual connection between the two thinkers than is 
usually assumed. Indeed, these preliminary links suggest that there are sufficient 
potential intellectual sympathies between Smith and James to validate an attempt to 
investigate the extent of the potential compatibility between their ideas in more depth. 
 
This is not, however, an attempt to investigate whether or not Smith influenced James. 
Indeed, such an effort could only result in the type of speculation that Merton and 
Skinner might warn against. Instead, this chapter attempts to identify the nature and 
extent of the connections between the two thinkers in a critical manner. To do this, in 
3.1.1-4 I discuss modern concepts of the self, and consider James’s seminal theory of 
the self in detail in order to examine any potential inconsistencies between it and 
Smith’s view. In 3.2.1-2 I undertake a holistic reading of James’s output in order to 
evaluate his concept of the self in terms of the rest of his work, and thus determine 
whether any critical inconsistencies or similarities exist between James’s and Smith’s 
philosophical positions. Such a discussion requires an investigation of James’s 
pragmatism and of Smith’s earlier work. This is undertaken in 3.3.1-5.  
 
                                                 
257  See also Macfie 1967: 121; Shield Nicholson 1895: 13-14. 
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that pervades contemporary social science, including IPE. Indeed, as I discuss in 
Chapter Four, critical IPE authors fail to challenge this orthodox conceptualisation of 
the self effectively. As Watson (2005: 52-53) argues, this is because they have:  
“…tended to import assumptions about fundamentally rational economic behaviour 
from the neoclassical tradition that they would otherwise align themselves against”. 
As Smith’s and James’s non-rationalist methodologies and non-foundationalist 
conclusions are consistent with the ostensible aims of critical IPE, it is apparent that 
their insights can aid problematisation of orthodox assumptions of instrumentally 
rational action by providing critical IPE with an alternative framework of the self. The 
focus of this chapter is to therefore assess the compatibility of Smith’s and James’s 
thought in order to test the viability of such a suggestion. The conclusion that I reach 
here is that sufficient similarities exist between the two thinkers’ views and concepts 
of the self to render it a practicable alternative to that currently employed in IPE.    
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Part One: The self and identity     
3.1.1) The modern self 
 
 
In Smith’s writing, the basic outline of the modern map of the self…is just 
about complete. The distancing of the self from its incarnations that had been 
implicit in Locke becomes explicit (Danziger 1997: 145). 
 
 
It is arguably possible to locate the origins of the modern concept of the self to John 
Locke’s chapter on “Of Identity and Diversity” in the second edition of his Essay 
Concerning the Human Understanding (1694). Here, as
As Kurt Danziger (1997: 141-144) points out, the implications of Locke’s conception 
of the self were developed throughout the eighteenth century. In 1714: “…the topic of 
personal identity made the pages of The Spectator, and in the years that followed 
virtually all of the major figures of eighteenth century British philosophy - Berkeley, 
Butler, Hume, Reid - had their say on the matter”.
 Jerrold Seigel (2005: 89-93) 
explains, Locke moves beyond Rene Descartes’ rationalist account by introducing the 
concept of a stable identity based not on the immortality of the soul, but on a 
continuity of consciousness of the self. Locke views individuals as being shaped by 
the world around them yet also as being capable of self-determination regarding their 
thoughts and actions, describing identity as containing an actively self-referential 
component:   
 
…as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or 
thought, so far reaches the identity of that person; it is the same self now it 
was then; and it is by the same self with this present one that now reflects on 
it, that that action was done (Locke 1694, II.XXVII.9). 
 
 It is arguable however that Adam 
Smith’s concept of the self reflects a more advanced understanding of identity than 
his contemporaries, as it explains how an individual’s relationship to self-knowledge 
is connected to their relationship to others via imaginative sympathy. As discussed in 
2.1.3, Smith develops this concept with regard to the ideas of David Hume.  
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Hume famously argues that: “…reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the 
passions” (Hume 1896 [1739], II.iii.3). Of these passions, he explains, sympathy is 
the most prominent in relation to self-formation as it enables individuals to understand 
the feelings of those around them. In this framework, sympathy is “nothing but a 
lively idea converted into an impression” through which we may “enter into” another 
person’s sentiments “…with so vivid a conception as to make it our own concern; and 
by that means be sensible of pains and pleasures” which are not our own (Ibid, II.ii.9). 
Hume is hereby able to improve on Locke’s notion that people judge others merely by 
outward appearances, as he argues that one can have limited access to another’s 
“inner” life via sympathy. However, as noted in 2.1.3, Hume’s understanding of 
sympathy as “contagion” is less sophisticated than Smith’s account.  
 
For Hume: “…a sympathy with public interest is the source of moral approbation, 
which attends that virtue” (Ibid, III.ii.2). In contrast, Smith places propriety rather 
than utility at the centre of moral distinctions: “[o]riginally…we approve of another 
man’s judgment, not as something useful, but as right, as accurate, as agreeable to 
truth and reality”. For Smith, therefore, justice does not come about through 
convention, but comes prior to utility (Smith 1976 [1790], II.ii.3.4; I.i.1.4). By 
attributing standards of propriety in part to individuals’ reflection upon their impartial 
spectator via extensive sympathy, rather than in customary societal approbation, 
Smith arguably moves beyond Hume’s accounts, among others. However, as Seigel 
(2005: 139) points out: 
 
Adam Smith seems never explicitly to have posed the question of what the self 
is, or in what it consists. All the same, Smith deserves a signal place in the 
history of modern self-reflection. He provided a theory of how selves are 
formed that went significantly beyond his predecessors. 
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This may appear counterintuitive unless one recognises that it is an observable feature 
of Smith’s non-dogmatic thought that a lack of the explicit advocating of a concept 
need not suggest a lacuna within his oeuvre. Indeed, despite the fact that there is no 
specific definition of the self in Smith’s work, its importance to his scheme is made 
clear when one considers that self-command is at the centre of his moral theory. 
Indeed, Smith’s moral philosophy implicitly shifts the discourse beyond debate about 
the nature of virtue towards an inquiry into how individuals achieve the capacity for 
virtuous behaviour via self-government. Smith certainly is explicit in stating that this 
is achieved via extensive sympathy:  
 
The man who feels the most for the joys and sorrows of others, is best fitted 
for acquiring the most complete control of his own joys and sorrows. The man 
of the most exquisite humanity, is naturally the most capable of acquiring the 
highest degree of self–command (Smith 1976 [1790], III.iii.36). 
 
As noted in 1.1.2 and 1.2.3, this is in contrast to Bernard Mandeville (1705), for 
whom public wealth and civic virtue are incompatible. For Mandeville, social rules - 
rather than individually self-determined standards of self-command that reflect and 
affect social norms - ensure outward displays of self-command. This leads to his 
famous argument that as seemingly virtuous actions are granted public approbation, it 
is in the vicious individual’s interest to appear outwardly virtuous. As Tribe (1999: 
621-622) points out, however, less attention is paid to a consequence of such a 
position, as Mandeville’s notion that only God can judge men’s true motives raises, in 
principle, the possibility of separating the self from social action. According to Tribe, 
it is this notion rather than Mandeville’s social control argument that relates to 
Smith’s concept of the impartial spectator, as such a part of the self ensures that 
despite our desire for social praise, tranquillity only derives from privately knowing 
that one is truly worthy of such praise. As Smith notes: “[w]e are pleased, not only 
with praise, but with having done what is praise-worthy” (Smith 1976 [1790], III.ii.5). 
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Therefore, unlike Mandeville and Hume, the criteria for self-evaluation in Smith’s 
framework is not exclusively derived from social standards of virtue, but from 
individuals’ relationships to their social environment and their impartial spectator.  
As Danziger (1997: 144) points out, Smith’s concept of the impartial spectator 
“…marks an important development in the conceptualisation of the Lockean 
‘punctual self’… [in which] [p]ersons no longer lived in their actions but adopted an 
observational, monitoring stance towards them”. Smith thus moves beyond Locke by 
detailing how such an observational stance informs, yet does not wholly constitute, an 
individual’s conceptualisation of moral propriety. This also reflects a deeper division 
from traditional connotations of sin and guilt as expressed by figures such as Thomas 
Reid in relation to the self.  
 
For Reid, one class of “the animal principles of action” is that of desires: “[t]he 
desires I have in view, are chiefly these three, the desire of power, the desire of 
esteem, and the desire of knowledge”. This notion of “self-esteem” may appear 
similar to Smith’s account of praiseworthiness, however it is not comparable to 
Smith’s intersubjective account, as Reid conflates the monitoring of one’s actions 
with regard to “one’s good on the whole” to theologically based social rules.258
                                                 
258 Reid 1969 (1788) Essays on the Active Powers of Man, p.128 cited in Spilka et al (1985), p.5 
footnote 2; Reid 1969 (1788) p.238 cited in Danziger 1997: 145. 
 In 
Reid’s scheme, deviance from such rules is considered a weakness in one’s self-
monitoring, and provides evidence of supposed “abnormality”. This is plainly at 
variance with Smith’s flexible notion of propriety in which “demotic” virtue is 
recognised as being acceptable in “so imperfect creature as man” (Smith 1976 [1790], 
VII.ii.3.18). In contrast to Smith, therefore, Reid discusses the self not only to 
describe how individuals act but also to prescribe how they ought to act. Reid’s focus 
on theologically generated rule-based “self-esteem” aimed at homogenising moral 
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standards does not therefore compare favourably with the self-determining 
implications of Smith’s concept of the self. 
 
In further contrast to Reid, Smith’s focus on self-worth via emulation does not lead to 
homogenised patterns of behaviour. Rather, as discussed in 1.1.2, for Smith, 
emulation leads to increased commercial activity, which facilitates increased social 
interaction and greater specialisation via the division of labour. This prompts material 
progress within society, which increases individuals’ abilities to reflect more 
extensively on their own and others’ motives and behaviour in the absence of 
simulated virtue or prescriptive religious values, as: “[t]he opinion which we entertain 
of our own character depends entirely on our judgments concerning our past conduct” 
(Ibid, III.iv.4). In this way, Smith’s self may be seen to deliver Locke’s account of the 
self-determined individual to the modern period. 
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3.1.2) Smith, James and the self 
 
Danziger (1997: 141) echoes Seigel in noting that Locke’s discussion of personal 
identity in secular terms had shaped English-language discussions of the self “…for at 
least two centuries. In 1890 William James still refers to the ‘uproar’ caused by 
Locke’s views”.259 Indeed, James could arguably lay claim to being as influential on 
subsequent discussions of the self as Locke and Smith had earlier. In 1890, James’s 
Principles of Psychology was published, and in 1892, its one-volume version, 
Psychology: Briefer Course, emerged, largely shaping the new academic discipline of 
psychology.260 In the chapter ‘The Consciousness of Self’ in PP, James separates the 
self into the “I” and the “Empirical Self or Me”, and divides the “me” into three 
constituent parts: “the material Self, the social Self, and the spiritual Self” (James 
1981 [1890]: 292).261
Unlike his contemporaries in neoclassical economics and experimental psychology, 
James’s discussion of the self in secular terms does not entail a rejection of “moral” or 
philosophical accounts. On the contrary, James consistently refers to these issues 
throughout his work. As such, he is aware that the “scientific” locating of selfhood in 
 Deborah Coon argues that it is in James’s depiction of the 
material and social selves that “…one of the more profound shifts in Western 
culture’s transformation of the religious soul into the secular self” occurs, as, unlike 
traditional accounts of the soul whose commitment was to God, “…the secularised 
self owed its allegiance to material possessions and other humans” (Coon 2000: 90). 
 
                                                 
259 The section to which Danziger is referring is James 1981 (1890): 349, in which James states: 
“Locke caused an uproar when he said that the unity of consciousness made a man the same person, 
whether supported by the same substance or no, and that God would not, in the great day, make a 
person answer for what he remembered nothing of” [italics in original]. 
260 Deborah Coon (2000: 88) notes that these books “…were the most influential psychology texts in 
the United States for the next few decades”.  
261 James’s division of the self into “I” and “me” is in direct contrast to traditional accounts of identity 
relating to an indivisible soul, and is therefore a development of the empiricist conceptualisation of the 
self as a divided entity (Danziger 1997: 147-148; See also Seigel 2005: 5). 
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remembered biography is a revival of the Lockean definition of the self in terms of 
the continuity of conscious memory. Indeed, in his summary of historical approaches 
to the self in PP, James states, Locke:  
 
…made his readers feel that the important unity of the Self was its verifiable 
and felt unity, and that a metaphysical or absolute unity would be 
insignificant, so long as a consciousness of diversity might be there (James 
1981 [1890]: 351 [italics in original]).262
Hence naturally flows the great variety of Opinions, concerning Moral Rules, 
which are to be found amongst Men, according to the different sorts of 
Happiness, they have a prospect of, or propose to themselves.
  
 
As Haakonssen (1996: 53) explains, despite locating the core of personality in self-
consciousness rather than in a soul-like substance, Locke posits the existence of “an 
eternal, most powerful, and most knowing Being”. Unlike James, Locke thus implies 
a traditional notion of God in his idea of the verifiable self. However, Locke does not 
derive a moral universalism from this, as he is aware that what constitutes “happiness 
or misery” is dependent upon locally accepted moral standards:  
 
263
                                                 
262 For Locke: “[s]elf is that conscious thinking thing, - whatever substance made up of, (whether 
spiritual or material, simple or compounded, it matters not) - which is sensible or conscious of pleasure 
and pain, capable of happiness or misery, and so is concerned for itself, as far as that consciousness 
extends” (Locke 1996 [1694], II.XXVII.17). 
263 Locke 1996 (1694), IV.XX.6; I.III.6 cited in Haakonssen 1996: 53. 
  
 
It is arguably this aspect of the Lockean Self that James retains when he notes that: 
“…minds inhabit environments which act on them and on which they in turn react” 
(James 1981 [1890]: 6). To be sure, James brings to the new discipline of psychology 
the empiricist understanding that individuals develop a variety of moral standards of 
self-evaluation from those with whom they interact on a daily basis. This approach 
was first developed by Adam Smith (Danziger 1997: 144).  
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As discussed in 2.1.3, Smith rejects Hutcheson’s notion of the moral sense, which 
Hutcheson employs as a denial of Locke’s relational concept of morality. As also 
noted, Hume develops Hutcheson’s concept of a moral sense, yet denies that it relates 
to God’s will. Rather, for Hume, individuals internalise a “social will” through which 
standards of morality are upheld via social approbation and non-approbation. As 
argued in 2.3.2, Smith’s impartial spectator concept surpasses both of these accounts, 
as it explains that propriety arises for the individual due to internal reflection upon the 
“authority of the judge within the breast” rather than through social convention or 
theological rules.264
Such a conceptualisation suggests a significant connection between James and Smith, 
as both thinkers expand the notion of religiosity beyond any specific theological 
boundaries, and place emphasis upon emulation, reflection and imagination in regard 
to the establishment of individuals’ moral standards. Moreover, by following Locke in 
refusing to draw relativist conclusions in relation to such standards, James presents an 
intersubjective notion of identity that is seemingly consistent with Smith’s view 
 
 
Like Smith, James’s “secularisation” of the self does not exclude the possibility of 
spiritual reflection, but employs a less orthodox interpretation of the individual’s 
relationship to God. As Deborah Coon (2000: 96) points out, for James:   
 
…what God boiled down to was a very human conception of “the highest 
possible judging companion”. God could be thought of as merely an abstract 
and most ideal “other” about whose opinion we cared. All humans had this 
notion of an ideal “other” to greater and lesser degrees. Our desire to please 
this ideal “other”, a desire that varied among individuals as much as other 
types of sociability varied, determined how religious we were. Our moral 
behaviour, in turn, was partly shaped by our desire to gain approval from our 
peers and partly shaped by our desire to gain approval from this ideal 
companion we held in our imaginations.  
 
                                                 
264 Haakonssen 1990: 70-72; Haakonssen 1996: 109; Smith 1976 (1790), VI.iii.19. 
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(Putnam 1997: 182; Baumeister 1997: 191). Further, by countenancing an “ideal 
companion”, and varied levels of individual communion with such an imagined 
entity, James’s framework is also seemingly compatible with Smith’s 
conceptualisation of a multiplicity of impartial spectators in which ordinary virtue is 
attainable in the absence of religious rules. 
 
In PP, James argues that: “…a man has as many social selves as there are individuals 
who recognize him and carry an image of him in their mind”(James 1981 [1890]: 
294).265
                                                 
265 As Danziger (1997: 147) points out, James’s view is reflected in contemporary discoveries on 
multiple personality.  
 This notion of “alternate selves” reflects a temporal and social understanding 
of identity insofar as individuals actively emphasise different aspects of their self 
according to which roles they choose to inhabit at different times. Importantly, as this 
process is an active one, James does not collapse the distinction between self and 
society, or between self as knower and self as known. This is arguably similar to 
Smith’s flexible notion of habitual sympathy with one’s impartial spectator, in which 
an individual’s private interpretation of the appropriateness of potential actions are 
affected by wider social norms, and are more or less salient at different times (Ibid, 
316; Smith 1976 [1790], VI.II.i.7-8). Like James, Smith thus preserves moral agency 
for individuals via active reflection upon and identification with the standpoint of 
their impartial spectator. As Griswold (2006: 41) points out, this maintains space for 
self-determination insofar as “one can direct one’s actions and shape one’s character”.  
Indeed, Smith states that if we are in accord with our impartial spectator: 
 
[w]e shall stand in need of no casuistic rules to direct our conduct. These it is 
often impossible to accommodate to all the different shades and gradations of 
circumstance, character, and situation, to differences and distinctions which, 
though not imperceptible, are, by their nicety and delicacy, often altogether 
undefinable (Smith 1976 [1790], VI.ii.1.22). 
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Like James, Smith therefore seemingly retains the distinction between object and 
subject whilst employing a Lockean notion of a multidimensional self that is 
intersubjectively formed but not reducible to such factors. As he points out, the 
mature individual: 
 
…does not merely affect the sentiments of the impartial spectator. He really 
adopts them. He almost identifies himself with, he almost becomes himself 
that impartial spectator, and scarce even feels but as that great arbiter of his 
conduct directs him to feel (Ibid, III.iii.25 [my emphasis]).  
 
As it is with the impartial spectator that the individual communes, the “man within the 
breast” is therefore conceived by Smith as a part of, and not wholly constitutive of, 
the self, as this process is actively selected and attained by the individual. As such, he 
does not equate the self with the impartial spectator. As Alexander Broadie (2006: 
180) points out: “[t]he impartial spectator cannot simply be a repository of social 
opinion, nor is it possible to reduce the judgment of the impartial spectator to the 
judgment of society”. This is consistent with Lawlor’s reading of James, for whom: 
“[i]ndividual lives…are complex mixes of self-interest, different habits and roles, all 
the while defined and constrained by the rules of the institutions they represent, but 
not completely determined by them…” (Lawlor 2006: 342). 
 
For Smith, self-interest is “that general principle which regulates the actions of every 
man…” However, as discussed, his self-interested individual is not analogous to the 
“rational man” of neoclassical economics (Smith 1978, LJ [B], 327; see Watson 2005: 
170). Smith’s notion that “[e]very man, as the Stoics used to say, is first and 
principally recommended to his own care” (Smith 1976 [1790], VI.ii.1.1) is thus 
understood more clearly when one considers that, in his framework, excessive self-
love will be restrained by each individual’s relationship to societal standards of 
propriety via their impartial spectator. Again, this is consistent with Lawlor’s reading 
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of James, for whom “rational man is not constantly computing his advantage” 
(Lawlor 2006: 342-343; Ashmore and Jussim 1997: 8). James therefore appears to be 
consistent with Smith by conceiving of identity as being influenced, but not wholly 
constituted by, a combination of habit and self-interest within the prevailing culturally 
accepted interpersonal processes that have developed over time.  
 
These connections are significant for three reasons. Firstly, as Ashmore and Jussim 
(1997: 11-12) note, the subject of the self is of growing interest within the social 
sciences, as scholars increasingly seek to make sense of the “…thoughts, feelings, and 
behaviours of individuals…and the study of group and intergroup processes and 
relations”. However, as Watson (2005: 52-53) points out, the pervasive view of the 
self within contemporary social science discourse is that of orthodox economics, 
despite its simplistic assumptions regarding human motivation and behaviour. As 
such, a more thorough conceptualization of the self is required. Secondly, James’s 
thought is a seminal influence upon, and is increasingly influential within, modern 
psychological, philosophical and sociological debates - a status shared by Smith. 
Moreover, both thinkers demonstrate sophisticated and compatible understandings of 
the self. Thirdly, it is plausible that a concept of the self that combines their insights 
can provide a philosophically consistent and sufficiently nuanced conceptualisation of 
the self that is arguably currently absent from orthodox and critical accounts in IPE. 
My inquiry as to whether such a concept of the self can be established will depend 
upon the extent to which connections exist between Smith and James beyond those 
already discussed. In order to do this, it is first necessary to discuss James’s concept 
of the self in greater detail. This is the subject of the next section. 
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3.1.3) James’s self 
 
…no single piece has had as much influence on the psychological study of the 
self as “The Consciousness of Self” (Suls and Marco 1990: 695).  
 
In this chapter in PP James divides “the constituents of the Self” into the “I” - “the 
bare principle of personal Unity” - and the “me”, which he separates into three parts: 
the material Self, the social Self and the spiritual Self (James 1981 [1890]: 292; 296 
[italics in original]). As he explains:  
 
[t]his me is an empirical aggregate of things objectively known. The I which 
knows them cannot itself be an aggregate, neither for psychological purposes 
need it be considered to be an unchanging metaphysical entity like the Soul, or 
a principle like the pure Ego, viewed as ‘out of time.’ It is a Thought, at each 
moment different from that of the last moment, but appropriative of the latter, 
together with all that the latter called its own (Ibid, 371 [italics in original]).  
 
For James, the “I” is therefore “a passing subjective Thought” that is conscious of the 
“me”, the “objective person, known by and recognized as continuing in time”. In this 
conceptualisation of the self, this “I” remembers and “cares” for certain experiences 
and intimately known objects and acquaintances that make up an individual’s 
empirical “me”. James locates the “nucleus” of this “me” in: 
 
…the bodily existence felt to be present at the time. Whatever remembered-
past-feelings resemble this present feeling are deemed to belong to the same 
me with it. Whatever other things are perceived to be associated with this 
feeling are deemed to form part of that me’s experience…(Ibid, 400-401 
[italics in original]). 
 
 
James lists these “other things” that form “the constituents of the me in a larger sense” 
as “…the clothes, the material possessions, the friends, the honours and esteem which 
the person receives or may receive”. James explains, therefore, that: “[n]ot only the 
people but the places and things I know enlarge my Self in a sort of metaphoric social 
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way”266
                                                 
266 James is prescient in observing that: “[t]he noteworthy thing about the desire to be “recognized” by 
others is that its strength has so little to do with the worth of the recognition computed in sensational or 
rational terms… there is a whole race of beings to-day whose passion is to keep their names in the 
newspapers, no matter under what heading…” (Ibid, 308). 
 (Ibid, 308 [italics in original]). He thus relates the “material Self” to the 
second part of the “me” - “the social Self”- which he defines as the recognition that 
each individual “gets from his mates”. Indeed, James notes the innate desire in 
humans to be noticed favourably, which involves another propensity - the desire to 
“improve”:  
 
We all have a blind impulse to watch over our body, to deck it with clothing of 
an ornamental sort, to cherish parents, wife and babes, and to find for 
ourselves a home of our own which we may live in and “improve”. 
 
No more fiendish punishment could be devised, were such a thing physically 
possible, than that one should be turned loose in society and remain absolutely 
unnoticed by all members thereof (Ibid, 293; 281). 
 
This is reflected in his Talks To Teachers on Psychology: 
 
Emulation is the very nerve of human society…We wish not to be lonely or 
eccentric, and we wish not to be cut off from our share in things which to our 
neighbours seem desirable possessions (James 1899: 325). 
  
Such connections between the material and social selves appear to bear a strong 
resemblance to Smith’s observations of human propensities in WN and TMS: 
 
…the principle which prompts to save, is the desire of bettering our condition, 
a desire which, though generally calm and dispassionate, comes with us from 
the womb, and never leaves us till we go into the grave (Smith 1976 [1776], 
II.iii.28). 
 
 
Nothing is so mortifying as to be obliged to expose our distress to the view of 
the public, and to feel, that though our situation is open to the eyes of all 
mankind, no mortal conceives for us the half of what we suffer (Smith 1976 
[1790], I.iii.2.1). 
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Emulation, the anxious desire that we ourselves should excel, is originally 
founded in our admiration of the excellence of others…in order to attain this 
satisfaction, we must become the impartial spectators of our own character and 
conduct (Ibid, III.ii.3). 
 
Moreover, James appears to be sympathetic to such a view of the interpersonal 
formation of moral standards, as he cites Adolf Horwicz: 
 
…having constantly to pass judgment on my associates, I come ere long to 
see, as Herr Horwicz says, my own lusts in the mirror of the lusts of others, 
and to think about them in a very different way from that in which I simply 
feel (James 1981 [1890]: 314 [italics in original]). 
 
This is reminiscent of Smith’s famous point that an individual “brought into” society 
is provided with a “mirror” that grants objectivity on “the propriety or demerit of his 
own sentiments and conduct” (Smith 1976 [1790], III.i.3). Again like Smith, James 
seemingly connects material and moral improvement whilst implicitly identifying the 
latter as the more likely source of obtaining happiness:  
 
We take a purer self-satisfaction when we think of our ability to argue and 
discriminate, of our moral sensibility and conscience, of our indomitable will, 
than when we survey any of our other possessions (James 1981 [1890]: 296). 
 
This is consistent with Smith’s notion of the wise man, whose: 
 
…self-approbation…stands in need of no confirmation from the approbation 
of other men…This self-approbation, if not the only, is at least the principal 
object, about which he can or ought to be anxious. The love of it, is the love of 
virtue (Smith 1976 [1790], III.ii.8). 
 
As discussed, Smith acknowledges the importance of social factors in identity 
formation, yet maintains agency for the individual. This is reflected in his “second” 
level of spectatorship, in which personal reflection upon one’s own impartial spectator 
occurs, as opposed to the more simplistic, prior stage of spectatorship, that of the 
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observation of others.267
Again like Smith, James relates active reflection on others’ motives to one’s own 
moral progress, as the deliberate reflection on a chosen action enables an individual to 
behave morally. Indeed, it is in his discussion of this active “spiritual self-seeking” 
that James makes his famous equation that “self-esteem = Success/Pretensions”, 
where he argues: “the seeker of his truest, strongest, deepest self” must “pick out” one 
 As Griswold (1999: 107) points out, in this way: “Smith’s 
account of sociality does not destroy any notion of the ‘inner life’”. Similarly, James’s 
social understanding of identity formation involves a conceptualisation of individuals 
as having an active inner life: “[t]he more active-feeling states of consciousness 
are…the more central portions of the spiritual Me” (James 1992 [1892]: 181 cited in 
Barresi 2002: 241). 
 
James therefore connects the “material Self” and “social Self” to the “spiritual Self”, 
yet identifies this latter aspect as the individual’s core, their “self of selves” which is 
“…the most enduring and intimate part of the self, that which we most verily seem to 
be” (James 1981 [1890]: 297). Both James and Smith thus appear to identify an 
analytically distinct part of the self with which the individual is involved in an active 
reflective process, yet conceptualise this part as being connected to the wider self and 
context in which such self-evaluation takes place. Like Smith’s “man within the 
breast” (Smith 1976 [1790], VI.ii.1.22), James’s notion of the self therefore moves 
beyond traditional notions of any spiritual part of the self as an indivisible, substantial 
“soul” whilst also avoiding an over-socialisation of any such “inner self”.  
 
                                                 
267 As Raphael and Macfie highlight: “[t]he judgment of the real spectator depends on the desire for 
actual praise, that of the imagined impartial spectator on the desire for praiseworthiness” (Raphael and 
Macfie, intro to Smith 1976 [1790], p.20). This relates directly to Smith’s point, new to the sixth 
edition of TMS, that: “…the jurisdictions of those two tribunals are founded upon principles which, 
though in some respects resembling and akin, are, however, in reality different and distinct” (Smith 
1976 [1790], III.ii.32). 
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of their possible empirical selves upon which to stake their “salvation”, as “…our 
self-feeling in this world depends entirely on what we back ourselves to be and do” 
(James 1981 [1890]: 309-310 [italics in original]; Coon 2000: 94). 
 
This is in contrast to the passive “Stoic receipt for contentment [which] was to 
dispossess yourself in advance of all that was out of your own power” (James 1981 
[1890]: 312). James’s view is arguably shared by Smith, who notes that Stoic 
philosophy’s “perfect apathy…endeavours to render us altogether indifferent and 
unconcerned in the success or miscarriage of every thing which Nature has prescribed 
to us as the proper business and occupation of our lives” (Smith 1976 [1790], 
VII.ii.1.46). Similarly, James notes the prevalence of “narrow and unsympathetic 
characters” that attempt, in the “Stoic fashion”, to protect the Self “by exclusion and 
denial”:  
 
All narrow people intrench their Me, they retract it, - from the region of what 
they cannot securely possess…Sympathetic people, on the contrary, proceed 
by the entirely opposite way of expansion and inclusion… (James 1981 
[1890]: 312 [italics in original]).268
James’s notion that an individual may choose to “back” one of their “different selves” 
therefore relates to his hierarchical scale of an individual’s self-regard that places “the 
bodily Self at the bottom, the spiritual Self at the top, and the extracorporeal material 
selves and the various social selves between” (Ibid [italics in original]). Interestingly, 
although Smith refrains from explicitly separating the self into these parts, James’s 
hierarchy appears similar to the subject matter and order in which they are discussed 
in the chapter ‘Of the Influence and Authority of Conscience’ in TMS, in which Smith 
considers the varied abilities that individuals may have in responding sympathetically 
 
 
                                                 
268 James notes that: “…we must care more for our honour, our friends, our human ties, than for a 
sound skin or wealth. And the spiritual self is so supremely precious that, rather than lose it, a man 
ought to be willing to give up friends and good fame, and property, and life itself…” (Ibid, 315). 
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to others’ bodily, social, and spiritual “misfortunes” (Smith 1976 [1790], III.iii.1-
19).269
                                                 
269 Smith distinguishes here between the “weak man”, the “man of a little more firmness” and “man of 
real constancy and firmness” (Ibid, III.iii.23-25). Smith also employs a tripartite scheme in LJ, where 
he notes: “[t]he end of justice is to secure from injury. A man may be injured in several respects: 1st as 
a man, 2nd as a member of a family, 3rd as a member of a state. As a man, he may be injured in his 
body, reputation, or estate…” (Smith 1978, LJ [B], 6).  
 
 
In this chapter, Smith notes that: “…the testimony of the supposed impartial spectator, 
of the great inmate of the breast, cannot always alone support him”. He therefore 
acknowledges that individuals can have “…very little fellow–feeling with any of the 
passions which take their origin from the body”. He also notes that: “[t]he mere want 
of fortune, mere poverty, excites little compassion. Its complaints are too apt to be the 
objects rather of contempt than of fellow–feeling…” (Ibid, III.iii.1; III.iii.17-18; see 
also Ibid, I.ii.I.5). This appears to bear comparison to James’s discussion of the 
material and social Selves, in which he states: “[w]ith another man’s bodily 
“hoggishness” hardly anyone has any sympathy; - almost as little with his cupidity, 
his social vanity and eagerness, his jealousy, his despotism, and his pride”. For James, 
such “narrow people” are “devoid of any inward looking glance” and thus identify 
more closely with their material and social Selves than their spiritual Self (James 
1981 [1890]: 314; 319). Again, this appears to reflect Smith’s observation that: “[t]he 
propriety of our moral sentiments is never so apt to be corrupted, as when the 
indulgent and partial spectator is at hand, while the indifferent and impartial one is at 
a great distance” (Smith 1976 [1790], III.iii.41). 
 
However, both thinkers consider extensive sympathy to be possible. Smith argues that 
the “authority” of the supposed impartial spectator:  
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…is, upon all occasions, very great; and it is only by consulting this judge 
within, that we can ever see what relates to ourselves in its proper shape and 
dimensions; or that we can ever make any proper comparison between our 
own interests and those of other people (Ibid, III.iii.1). 
 
Smith thus places primary emphasis on the authority of the individual’s “higher 
tribunal”, their “…supposed impartial and well–informed spectator…the man within 
the breast, the great judge and arbiter of their conduct” which, he argues, “…exists in 
the mind of every man” (Ibid, III.iii.32; IV.iii.25). This view is arguably echoed by 
James’s hierarchy, in which the spiritual Self is conceived of as: 
 
…the true, the intimate, the ultimate, the permanent Me which I seek… All 
progress in the social Self is the substitution of higher tribunals for lower; this 
ideal tribunal is the highest; and most men, either continually or occasionally, 
carry a reference to it in their breast (James 1981 [1890]: 316). 
 
Despite such hierarchies, there is no rationalistic separation of the “spiritual” from the 
“material” or “social” elements that inform an individual’s identity in either thinker’s 
conceptualisation of the self. For Smith: “…this demigod within the breast appears, 
like the demigods of the poets, though partly of immortal, yet partly too of mortal 
extraction” (Smith 1976 [1790], III.ii.32; see also Ibid, III.iii.38). James also blurs the 
boundaries between the material, spiritual and social Selves. As Coon (2000: 95) 
points out, for James the “potential social self” is “the most interesting” of the various 
selves one may choose due to “its connection with our moral and religious life”. This 
is because it is this “potential social self” that can attain the approval of “the ‘Great 
Companion’”.   
 
The ideal social self which I thus seek… may be represented as barely 
possible…Yet still the emotion that beckons me on is indubitably the pursuit 
of an ideal social self, of a self that is at least worthy of approving recognition 
by the highest possible judging companion, if such companion there be. This 
self is the true, the intimate, the ultimate, the permanent Me that I seek (James 
1981 [1890]: 315-316 [italics in original]). 
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James argues that such a notion of the ideal social self allows the individual to be 
“inwardly strengthened” and so pursue this potential self in the face of immediate 
familial and societal disapproval “…whose verdict goes against me now” (Ibid, 315). 
This is reminiscent of Smith’s observation that in order to attain the satisfaction of 
being truly admirable “…we must become the impartial spectators of our own 
character and conduct”, which is, he notes, a gradual process (Smith 1976 [1790], 
III.ii.3; VI.iii.25).270
A theme of self-determination therefore pervades both thinkers’ concepts of 
individuals’ moral lives. Indeed, James acknowledges that individuals are subject to 
“the moral education of the race” but notes that “this is not the only way in which we 
learn to subordinate our lower selves to our higher” (James 1981 [1890]: 314).
 It is therefore possible, as Griswold (1999: 107) points out, for 
Smith’s individual to become “morally governed in such a way as to be quite at odds 
with the community”:  
 
The man who is conscious to himself that he has exactly observed those 
measures of conduct which experience informs him are generally agreeable, 
reflects with satisfaction on the propriety of his own behaviour…and though 
mankind should never be acquainted with what he has done, he regards 
himself, not so much according to the light in which they actually regard him, 
as according to that in which they would regard him if they were better 
informed (Smith 1976 [1790], III.ii.5). 
 
271
                                                 
270 This also relates to Smith’s point that the virtuous individual is someone that is as morally rigorous 
as they are able to be (see Ibid, I.iv.7). 
271 Interestingly, this distinction between “lower” and “higher” selves is perhaps echoed in Jevons’ 
separation of “lower” and “higher” motives in society. Unlike James and Smith, however, for Jevons, 
such “higher” motives are unsuitable for “scientific” discussion (Jevons 1970 [1871] p.93; 78 cited in 
Watson 2005: 53-54).    
 This 
appears to challenge traditional notions that only God can know publicly 
unrecognized virtue, which echoes the opinion expressed in Smith’s discussion of 
education in Part VI of TMS, in which he states: “[w]e shall stand in need of no 
casuistic rules to direct our conduct” (Smith 1976 [1790], VI.ii.1.22; see also Ibid, 
VI.ii.1.10). For both James and Smith, therefore, self-determined moral improvement 
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may come about via self-reflection that is cognizant of, but not wholly constituted by, 
social factors. As such, they can account for varied levels of concord among 
individuals with their “ideal” selves. James notes that: “…it is probable that 
individuals differ a good deal in the degree in which they are haunted by this sense of 
an ideal spectator” (James 1981 [1890]: 316). This is consistent with Smith’s notion 
of a multiplicity of impartial spectators. As Broadie (2006: 182) points out: “…there 
are many impartial spectators because each person creates their own”.272
Active reflection upon one’s own “ideal self” is therefore a theme in both Smith’s and 
James’s work. As James notes: “[w]hen we think of ourselves as thinkers, all the other 
ingredients of Me seem relatively external possessions” (James 1992 [1892]: 181 
[italics in original]).
  
 
273 This relates to his agreement with Horwicz, who points out 
that our “possessions and performances” are dear to us due to their being vividly 
“felt”.274
                                                 
272 Smith 1976 (1790), III.iii.38; III.iii.21. See also 2.4.2. 
273 As Gale (1997: 65) points out: “…introspection is accorded pride of place in James’s existentially 
oriented philosophy”. 
274 James also concurs with Horwicz’s pointing out of the human tendency to feel “…how much more 
intelligent, soulful, better is everything about us than anyone else” (James 1981 [1890]: 326). This is 
not dissimilar to Smith’s observation that “[i]t is so disagreeable to think ill of ourselves, that we often 
purposely turn away our view from those circumstances which might render that judgment 
unfavourable” (Smith 1976 [1790], III.iv.4). 
 Horwicz also notes however that there is another “faculty of abstraction” 
within individuals - that of the “power of vividly representing the affairs of others”. 
According to Horwicz and James, it is therefore possible to intellectually assess things 
connected to the empirical self without bias. This is also feasible in relation to others: 
 
…there is no reason why a man should not pass judgment on himself quite as 
objectively and well as on anyone else…No matter how he feels about 
himself, unduly elated or unduly depressed, he may still truly know his own 
worth by measuring it by the outward standard he applies to other men (James 
1981 [1890]: 327-328). 
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For James, therefore, impartial self-reflection is obtainable via consideration of the 
interests of others. (Rogers 1997: 176) This is, again, similar to Smith’s notion of 
impartial spectatorship:  
 
In solitude, we are apt to feel too strongly whatever relates to ourselves…we 
are apt to be too much elated by our own good, and too much dejected by our 
own bad fortune…and it is always from that spectator, from whom we can 
expect the least sympathy and indulgence, that we are likely to learn the most 
complete lesson of self–command (Smith 1976 [1790], III.iii.38; see also Ibid, 
III.ii.2.1). 
 
However, James next states: 
 
This self-measuring process has nothing to do with the instinctive self-regard 
we have hitherto been dealing with. Being merely one application of 
intellectual comparison, it need no longer detain us here (James 1981 [1890]: 
328). 
 
This abrupt end to the discussion is a potential source of frustration for more detailed 
attempts concerned with comparing Smith and James’s concepts of the self. Yet 
despite James’s reluctance to continue his discussion of “self-measuring”, the 
influences on such a process appear to remain similar for both thinkers. This is 
demonstrated in the table that James employs to summarise the division of “The 
empirical life of Self”:275
                                                 
275 James 1981 (1890): 329. Table from http://psychclassics.asu.edu/James/Principles/prin10.htm 
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 Material. Social. Spiritual. 
Self-
Seeking. 
Bodily Appetites and 
Instincts 
Love of Adornment, 
Foppery, 
Acquisitiveness, 
Constructiveness 
Love of Home, etc.  
Desire to please, be 
noticed, admired, etc. 
Sociability, Emulation, 
Envy, 
Love, Pursuit of Honor, 
Ambition, etc.  
Intellectual, Moral and 
Religious 
Aspiration, 
Conscientiousness 
  
Self-
Estimation 
Personal Vanity, 
Modesty, etc. 
Pride of Wealth, Fear 
of Poverty  
Social and Family Pride, 
Vainglory, Snobbery, 
Humility, Shame, etc.  
  
Sense of Moral or 
Mental 
Superiority, Purity, 
etc. 
Sense of Inferiority or 
of Guilt 
 
 
The contents of the Material and Social Self-Seeking and Self-Estimation categories 
are strikingly similar to Smith’s explanations of self-love in TMS Part I, Section 
Three.276
It is therefore important to continue to engage in a comparison of their broader 
arguments to see if there are any inconsistencies in their seemingly compatible 
 In addition, the Spiritual Self-Seeking and Spiritual Self-Estimation 
categories may be seen to broadly echo Smith’s impartial spectator concept. It is 
perhaps important to note here however, that, despite investigating the potential 
similarities between Smith’s and James’s accounts of the self, it is not my intention to 
suggest that James merely reaffirms Smith’s thought. On the contrary, the specific 
focus of each thinker is of course different. However, my analysis of the potential 
compatibility between their concepts of the self is intended to establish whether their 
thought in this area is sufficiently complimentary to underpin a framework for the self 
that may be of use to critical IPE analysis.  
  
                                                 
276 Particularly in Chapter II: “Of the Origin of Ambition, and of the Distinction of Ranks”; and 
Chapter III: “Of the Corruption of Our Moral Sentiments, Which is Occasioned By This Disposition to 
Admire the Rich and Great, and to Despise or Neglect Persons of Poor and Mean Condition”, 
respectively. 
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concepts of the self. As has been noted, although it is possible to deduce Smith’s 
stance via a holistic interpretation of his oeuvre, his epistemology is not explicit. By 
contrast, James’s position is clearly evident in the next part of his discussion of the 
self. Having examined “What Self is Loved in ‘Self-Love’”, James focuses on the 
problem of personal identity, which he describes as: “…the most puzzling puzzle with 
which psychology has to deal”. Having discussed the three components of the 
empirical Me, James next considers substantialist, associationist, and transcendentalist 
attempts to explain how these facets might be unified (James 1981 [1890]: 330). 
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3.1.4) The problem of identity 
 
In contrast to the Common Sense theorists, James denies that the phenomena of 
personal consciousness requires a “real proprietor” in the form of a unified, 
substantial soul that somehow exists within each individual. He instead argues that 
personal consciousness is “…the real, present onlooking, remembering, ‘judging 
thought’ or identifying ‘section’ of the stream”. Unity is provided by these contiguous 
“pulse[s] of cognitive consciousness”, as: “[w]ho owns the last self owns the self 
before the last, for what possesses the possessor possesses the possessed” (Ibid, 337-
340). For James, therefore: “…the passing Thought itself is the only verifiable 
thinker, and its empirical connection with the brain-process is the ultimate known 
law”. Thus, he argues, the substantialist view of the soul that was developed from 
Plato and Aristotle, was formalised in the work of Hobbes through to Berkeley, 
“…and is defended by the entire modern dualistic or spiritualistic or common-sense 
school” is: “…needless for expressing the actual subjective phenomena of 
consciousness as they appear” (Ibid, 344-346 [italics in original]).277
Next, James discusses the Associationist Theory, the origins of which he locates in 
Locke’s notion “…of the same consciousness being supported by more than one 
substance”. James attributes the development of this theory to Hume, and cites his 
chapter on “Personal Identity” in A Treatise on Human Nature, in which Hume 
apparently denies the existence of a continuous self, as evidence of this.
  
 
278
                                                 
277 As discussed in 2.2.1-4 and 2.3.1, Smith’s position is also at odds with the Common Sense theory of 
authors such as Thomas Reid. A more detailed comparison of James and Reid is drawn in 3.3.5. 
278 Hume, D. (1739) A Treatise of Human Nature, Appendix to book I, cited in James 1981 (1890): 
351. 
 James 
argues that although Hume “…showed how great the consciousness of diversity 
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actually was”, his extreme position is no more helpful than that of the substantialist 
philosophers:    
 
[a]s they say the Self is nothing but Unity, unity abstract and absolute, so 
Hume says it is nothing but Diversity, diversity abstract and absolute; whereas 
in truth it is that mixture of unity and diversity which we ourselves have 
already found so easy to pick apart… (Ibid, 350-351). 
 
James next dismisses Immanuel Kant’s Transcendentalist Theory for neglecting to 
provide a vehicle for knowing: “[c]all the vehicle Ego, or call it Thought, Psychosis, 
Soul, Intelligence, Consciousness, Mind, Reason, Feeling, - what you like - it must 
know…” According to James, therefore, Kant’s concept of a transcendental Ego 
“…has no properties” and moreover “…has its meaning ambiguously mixed up with 
that of the substantial soul” (Ibid, 364 [italics in original]).279
In spite of this pragmatic conclusion, Jill Kress argues that James loads his notion of 
consciousness with spiritual connotations. Kress points to James’s abstraction of a 
 As discussed, James 
privileges the spiritual Self in his hierarchy within the empirical “me”. Yet, as he 
emphasises, the “I”, or “self of all the other selves”, does not contain purely spiritual 
connotations. Indeed, James notes that when he examines the process of introspection 
in detail: “…it is difficult for me to detect in the activity any purely spiritual element 
at all…” (Ibid, 298-300 [italics in original]). James concludes, therefore, that:  
 
…the part of the innermost Self which is most vividly felt turns out to consist 
for the most part of a collection of cephalic movements of ‘adjustments’ 
which, for want of attention and reflection, usually fail to be perceived and 
classed as what they are; that over and above these there is an obscurer feeling 
of something more; but whether it be of fainter physiological processes, or of 
nothing objective at all, but rather of subjectivity as such, of thought become 
‘its own object’ must at present remain an open question (Ibid, 305). 
 
                                                 
279 Smith once refers to the viewpoint of the impartial spectator as “reason”. As Griswold (1999: 139-
142) points out, however, such reasonableness is not analogous to Kantian philosophical rationality. 
Therefore, Smith’s notion of the impartial spectator does not refer to impartial reason and thus 
implicitly addresses “…what Kantian moral reason is meant to provide…without any of the 
problematic claims about the transcendental status of reason…”. Smith’s reference to the impartial 
spectator as “reason” is at Smith 1976 (1790), III.iii.5. 
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portion of the stream of consciousness into “…a sort of innermost centre within the 
circle” as evidence of this, and thus depicts his apparent attempt to replace ethereal 
explanations of consciousness with bodily processes as “…the most paradoxical 
aspect of James’s theories” (James 1981 [1890]: 284-285 cited in Kress 2000: 270-
271; 263). Interestingly, this is a similar criticism to that aimed by James at Hume. 
James argues against Hume’s “atomistic” view of experience: the notion that identity 
is composed of discrete and unconnected perceptions. In contrast, for James, 
consciousness flows. Therefore, as A. E. Pitson (2002: 75) notes, Hume’s metaphor of 
a chain or train to describe ordinary conscious experience is replaced by James’s 
metaphorical notion of consciousness as a stream or river. According to Kress, 
however, this flowing consciousness is duly broken by James’s identification of a 
“spiritual” core. As Milic Capek explains: 
 
…James is really waging battle on two fronts simultaneously in claiming that 
neither an empty and homogenous unity nor a sheer plurality of distinct states 
is an adequate description of the peculiar type of organisation that he calls the 
“stream of consciousness” (Capek 1953: 533). 
 
Capek thus highlights the extent of James’s dilemma. As he points out, by 
conceptualising the “perishing thought as the only thinker” James appears to be close 
to Hume’s supposed nominalism. However, by suggesting that the self transcends any 
particular conscious state, James may be seen to retreat towards a transcendental 
Kantian Ego. James therefore appears to vacillate between two theories that he rejects, 
as he fails to provide: “…any evidence of the Self which would be neither a more 
successive addition of particular impressions or sensory images nor a timeless and 
impersonal noumenal entity” (Ibid, 536-537).  
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The broader implications of such arguments to my inquiry are clear. If James fails to 
successfully replace the accounts he claims to surpass, the validity of his concept of 
the self must be questioned. Consequently, his concept’s apparent similarity to 
Smith’s notion of the self may be more problematic than is at first apparent, and so 
the potential for devising a framework of the self based on their accounts is 
challenged.  
 
James’s alleged failure to overcome the implications of his phenomenological 
reduction of the spiritual self to a collection of intracephalic sensations is 
compounded by John Dewey’s argument in “The Vanishing Subject in the 
Psychology of William James” (1940). As Kress notes, Dewey here proposes that 
there are “two incompatible strains” in Jamesian psychology: “…epistemological 
dualism, which argues for a definitive, psychical self, and naturalism which ‘purges’ 
psychology of the traditional notion of ‘subject’, describing mental phenomena in 
terms of the organism exclusively” (Dewey 1940 cited in Kress 1990: 264, footnote 
3). However, James does not display the naturalism that Dewey attributes to him. 
Indeed, as T. L. S. Sprigge (1993: 76) argues, James’s “…phenomenological 
materialism does not imply that the consciousness of these physical processes is itself 
a physical process in any ordinary sense”. As Capek explains, what James actually 
denies is that consciousness is “…a timeless, ghostly, and diaphanous entity, common 
to all individuals and consequently impersonal” (Capek 1953: 532-533). 
 
In A Pluralistic Universe,280
                                                 
280 Hereafter referred to as APU. 
 James states: “[t]he conscious self of the moment, the 
central self, is probably determined to this privileged position by its functional 
connexion with the body’s imminent or present acts. It is the present acting self…” 
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(James 1909: 344, footnote 8). Therefore, as Capek explains, the “perishing pulse of 
thought” is not the only thinker. Rather, it is “…only its present acting part, 
continuously accompanied or, more accurately, preceded, by nonsensory virtualities 
of the ‘full self’” (Capek 1953: 543 [italics in original]). James thus conceives of this 
central self as “…a sensory-motor termination of the full self”. As he notes:   
 
[m]y present field of consciousness is a centre surrounded by a fringe that 
shades insensibly into a subconscious more… What we conceptually identify 
ourselves with and say we are thinking of at any time is the centre; but our full 
self is the whole field, with all those indefinitely radiating subconscious 
possibilities of increase that we can only feel without conceiving, and can 
hardly begin to analyze (James 1977 [1909]: 130 [italics in original]). 
 
The “present acting self” is therefore the latest manifestation of the self that is 
“…continuous, to his own consciousness, at any rate, with a wider self from which 
saving experiences flow…” (James 1909: 139 cited in Lamberth 1997: 254). As 
Capek points out, James reached this conclusion after “a period of intense intellectual 
struggle”. Indeed, Capek explains that James had first discussed the possibility of the 
substantiation of a subliminal self in The Hidden Self, published in 1890. By 1909, the 
“I” of PP becomes the active part of “the full self”. Moreover, as this present acting 
self is “embedded in the larger cosmic self without being absorbed in it”, Kress’s 
argument regarding James’s supposed separation of the stream is rendered inaccurate, 
as the “break” between the spiritual self and the wider self does not occur. Rather, 
James’s “full self” is contingent with the “I” and as such is in a constant state of 
becoming (Capek 1953: 527-540).281
                                                 
281 This relates to Dan McAdams’s concept of “selfing”, which he defines as the appropriation of 
experience as one’s own. McAdams connects this to James’s “selective industry of the mind” in which 
the confederacy of selves is constellated around a unifying “character”, and Robert Jay Lifton’s 
concept of the “protean self” (McAdams 1997: 48-56). 
 This is similar to Smith’s asymptotic notion of 
the self. As Seigel (2005: 151) explains, Smith does not consider complete self-
governance to be possible, as this would isolate the individual from the sources from 
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which self-command flows. As such, his self is “always in the process of constructing 
itself”. 
 
A holistic interpretation of James’s ideas regarding the self therefore demonstrates 
that he does not merely replicate the “soul” or “Ego” in his concept of the “I”. 
Further, it is possible to see that there is no inconsistency in the development of 
James’s thought. Indeed, in PP, he states:   
 
[t]he identity which the I discovers, as it surveys this long procession, can only 
be a relative identity, that of a slow shifting in which there is always some 
common ingredient retained. The commonest element of all, the most uniform, 
is the possession of the same memories (James 1981 [1890]: 372 [italics in 
original]).282
It is therefore interesting to note James’s praise for Locke, along with Kant, for 
“…undermining the notion that we know anything about” the soul (James 1981 
[1890]: 374; See also Ibid, 349). Yet, whilst he subsequently attacks Kant, James 
merely points out that Locke’s notion “of the same substance having two successive 
consciousnesses” influenced Hume, who he subsequently criticises for seemingly 
  
 
This notion of the persistence of the psychological past in PP is thus consistent with 
the unified self of APU in which the present acting part of consciousness relates to the 
past thoughts and actions of the wider self. Indeed, Capek (1953: 540) argues that this 
was explicitly affirmed in 1910 in ‘A Suggestion about Mysticism’, one of James’ 
final articles. This is arguably reminiscent of Locke, for whom:  
 
…consciousness, as far as ever it can be extended - should it be to ages past - 
unites existences and actions very remote in time into the same person, as well 
as it does the existences and actions of the immediately preceding moment: so 
that whatever has the consciousness of present and past actions, is the same 
person to whom they both belong (Locke 1694, II.XXVII.16). 
 
 
                                                 
282 As Eric Knowles and Mark Sibicky (1990: 334) point out, for James: “[e]ach thought has the same 
directory of past identities, actions, and thoughts as its predecessor”. 
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rejecting the existence of the conscious self (Ibid, 350-351).283 Contrary to James’s 
view here, however, Hume’s notion of identity is arguably more complex. James’s 
interpretation is consistent with Hume’s view of the self as it appears in Book I of A 
Treatise on Human Nature (1739), in which he argues against substantialism by 
demonstrating the impossibility of finding an unchangeable substratum of the mind. 
However, as Seigel notes, in Book II, whose subject is “the passions”, Hume clarifies 
that it is only in the sense of Book I, which refers to “the understanding”, that the self 
appears as a mental representation to which no sense impression corresponds. When 
viewed in regard to “our passions and the concern we take in ourselves”, Hume points 
out that: “’Tis evident, that the idea, or rather impression of ourselves is always 
intimately present with us...” (Hume 1739, II.i.11, cited in Seigel 2005: 126-127).284
As Seigel (2005: 126- 127) argues, Hume thus explains that consciousness cannot be 
posited as the sole constituent of the self. Rather, self-awareness must begin in 
response to something concrete, and to which reflection attaches itself. Therefore, 
Hume: “…rose up not against the continuity and identity of the self but…against a 
one-dimensional reflective understanding of it”. This relates to David Norton’s 
argument, discussed in 2.1.2, that Hume’s concept of concomitant ideas represents 
tacit acknowledgement of a knowable, external world. As James perhaps fails to 
acknowledge, therefore, Hume does not conclusively deny the possibility of enduring 
selfhood. Furthermore, as Seigel points out, his view is not inconsistent with Locke, 
as Hume develops Locke’s notion of the potential diversity of consciousness into one 
 
 
                                                 
283 It is interesting to consider that, in APU, James appears to favour Hume over Kant: “…technique for 
technique, doesn’t David Hume’s technique set, after all, the kind of pattern most difficult to follow? 
Isn’t it the most admirable?…Think of the German literature of aesthetics, with the preposterousness of 
such an unaesthetic personage as Immanuel Kant enthroned in its centre!” (Ibid, 638) 
284 Indeed, as Hume notes in An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748), moral judgements 
would be impossible if this were the case:  “…with what pretence could we employ our criticism upon 
any polite poet or author, if we could not pronounce the conduct and sentiments of his actors, either 
natural or unnatural, to such characters, and in such circumstances?” (Hume 1748, VIII.i.18, cited in 
Seigel 2005: 128) 
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that can maintain unity. As such, like James, Hume does not reject the possibility of 
an ongoing self, as both thinkers conceive of an enduring yet changing self that has 
tacit reference to its past. Indeed, again like James, Hume argues that it is by the 
activity of the imagination that we are able to view the self as possessing personal 
identity, which develops in society and develops knowledge of itself through its 
relations with others (Ibid; Broadie 1990: 103-104). 
 
As discussed in 2.1.3, Smith provides a more detailed understanding than Hume of the 
role of the imagination in relation to identity formation. Whereas Hume restricts his 
notion of sympathy to that of “contagion”, and limits its role to maintaining the 
“social will” (Haakonssen 1996: 104), Smith develops his concept of the impartial 
spectator to provide an intersubjective account of identity formation. Unlike Hume 
and James, Smith avoids discussions on the nature of consciousness, yet, as with 
James’s agreement with Horwicz, it is via sympathy that Smith is able to present 
“…the subjectivity that makes the self able to objectify its own existence as 
intersubjectively formed” (Seigel 2005: 145).  
 
By neglecting to posit consciousness as the sole constituent of the self, and by 
locating the unity of an individual’s identity in memory and in self-objectivity via 
other-directed reflection, James broadly follows the empiricist tradition of Locke, 
Hume and Smith. However, of these thinkers, it is Smith’s intersubjectively formed 
self that appears closest to James’s view, as both thinkers recognize that standards of 
propriety are derived from reflection by the individual upon their “ideal self”, and that 
individuals may be more or less influenced by contextual interpretations of general, 
historically enduring, and universally observable standards of propriety that are more 
strictly or loosely adhered to at different times. Smith and James arguably move 
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beyond previous accounts, therefore, as in their views propriety is not a culturally 
informed manifestation of God’s will, as with Locke, or exclusively socially derived, 
as with Hume.  
 
In addition, for Smith and James, propriety is also not entirely decided upon by the 
individual, as the intersubjective concepts of morality formation that they suggest 
informs individuals’ identity demonstrates that individuals are capable of influencing, 
as well as being influenced by, the environment in which such behavioural standards 
are formed. As such, their notions of the self retain agency for the individual and are 
sophisticated frameworks through which we can arguably begin to adequately 
conceptualise the complex nature of individual motivations and actions. However, as 
discussed, Smith’s epistemological position is not explicitly stated. Like Hume, James 
does address this matter openly, and his position, whilst being closer to Hume’s than 
James himself believed, is arguably more sophisticated than Hume’s in relation to the 
self. Moreover, as James’s position does not appear dissimilar to Smith’s, it is 
arguable that a comparison between these thinkers can aid a clearer understanding of 
Smith’s philosophical stance. In order to do this, and to further determine the extent of 
the complementary nature of both thinkers’ frameworks of the self, it is necessary to 
undertake a more thoroughly holistic reading of their ideas.  
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Part Two: The social self 
3.2.1) James’s pragmatism 
 
 
Pragmatism represents a perfectly familiar attitude in philosophy, the 
empiricist attitude, but it represents it…both in a more radical and in a less 
objectionable form than it has ever yet assumed. A pragmatist… turns away 
from abstraction and insufficiency, from verbal solutions, from bad a priori 
reasons, from fixed principles, closed systems, and pretended absolutes and 
origins. 
 
No particular results, then…but only an attitude of orientation, is what the 
pragmatic method means. The attitude of looking away from first things, 
principles, ‘categories’, supposed necessities; and of looking towards last 
things, fruits, consequences, facts (James 1987 [1907]: 508-510 [italics in 
original]).  
 
As discussed, in PP, James challenges the notion of supposedly ideal standards of 
moral behaviour as found in Kantian and Christian moral philosophy. Similarly, in 
The Will to Believe (1896),285
As Trygrve Throntveit (2003: 23) notes, rather than rely upon a priori judgments 
about the coherence or plural nature of the universe, James was concerned with the 
conclusions one could draw from observed experience. Rather than formulate an 
overarching moral principle or advocate an epistemology based either on an external 
 James argues that: “…the words ‘good’, ‘bad’, and 
‘obligation’…mean no absolute natures. They are objects of feeling and desire which 
have no foothold or anchorage in Being apart from the existence of actually living 
minds” (James 1896: 197). James’s pragmatism demonstrates a continuation of this 
theme as he disputes the notion that philosophers can know what defines the “good”. 
As he explains in The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life (1897): “…there is no 
such thing possible as an ethical philosophy dogmatically made up in advance” 
(James 1897: 184). 
 
                                                 
285 Hereafter referred to as WB. 
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reality or on an internally conceived truth, James suggests that a working combination 
is necessary (Bird 1997: 277; Schellenberg 1990: 772, footnote 3). However, whilst 
he rejects certain forms of subjectivism as well as certain forms of objectivism, James 
leans towards a pluralistic interpretation due to his focus on psychological reality. As 
Lawlor explains, this leads to James’s emphasis on the variety of beliefs that could be 
held by individuals:  
 
[t]he truth of an idea is not a stagnant property inherent in it. Truth happens to 
an idea. It becomes true, is made true by events. Its verity is in fact an event, a 
process: the process namely of its verifying itself, its veri-fication. Its validity 
is the process of its valid-ation (James 1987 [1907]: 574 [italics in original] 
cited in Lawlor 2006: 328). 
 
As true beliefs must be verifiable, James does not reject the notion of an objective 
world, and his legitimisation of a plurality of worldviews thus does not collapse into a 
“pernicious subjectivism”. According to Ellen Suckiel (1982: 144-152), therefore: 
“James’s theory of truth is the pinnacle of his philosophical system”. Suckiel notes 
that in James’s ethical theory, the individual generates moral value. Yet it is from this 
that James develops his intersubjective notion of the self in terms of morality, as he 
recognises that a community of individuals have multiple demands rooted in their 
own conative stances towards the world. In doing so, he thus demonstrates that, to be 
meaningful, philosophical explanations of everyday life must recognise the 
psychological conditions under which individuals interpret their own and others’ 
situations and motivations. Therefore, as Suckiel argues, James’s pragmatism is:  
 
… a sophisticated and coherent system inspired by his commitment to treat 
philosophy as a serious enterprise, dealing with real problems…[according to 
James:]…a philosophy should provide us with mechanisms for interpreting 
our experience which are informative, useful, and conducive to the fulfilment 
of our highest possibilities. 
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This relates to his notion in “The Consciousness of Self” wherein an individual makes 
moral choices with reference to what kind of person they “shall now resolve to 
become” (James 1981 [1890]: 277) and to his chapters on “Attention”, “Will”, and 
“Instinct” in PP. 
James distinguishes between involuntary will, which is effectively that of the “ideo-
motor” will, and the more complex effort to temporarily fill consciousness with a 
chosen “object”, which becomes less difficult with practice.
As Susan Cross and Hazel Marcus (1990: 727-734) note, James 
points out that an individual’s will “power” over events, objects, and ideas begins 
when their internal representations of these factors are consistent with their 
representation of the self. This is because, for James: “…the faculty of voluntarily 
bringing back a wandering attention, over and over again is the very root of judgment, 
character, and will”, and it is this that prompts: “…the transition from merely 
considering an object as possible, to deciding and willing it to be real, the change 
from…the ‘don’t care’ state of mind to that in which ‘we mean business’” (James 
1981 [1890]: 401; 1173). 
 
286 Therefore, as the 
“ideal self” increasingly becomes a more salient aspect of the self, it becomes more 
easily held “fast before the mind”, which in turn gradually facilitates the individual’s 
ability to exercise their will more easily over time (Cross and Markus 1990: 727-734). 
It is through such “spiritual self-seeking” that the “narrow and unsympathetic” 
                                                 
286 This effort is the voluntary will: “The essential achievement of the will…when it is most ‘voluntary’, 
is to ATTEND to a difficult object and hold it fast before the mind. The so-doing is the fiat; and it is a 
mere physiological incident that when the object is thus attended to, immediate motor consequences 
should ensue” (Ibid, 1166 [italics in original]). 
individual that James describes in PP can come to identify more closely with their 
“truest, strongest, deepest self”- the “spiritual force” which James argues is the 
“substantive thing which we are” (James 1981 [1890]: 309-312; 1181 [italics in 
original]).  
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Such a theme of gradual moral self-determination arguably reflects Smith’s notion of 
impartial spectatorship, in which the individual comes to increasingly identify himself 
with the “great arbiter of his conduct”:   
 
[t]he view of the impartial spectator becomes so perfectly habitual to him, that, 
without any effort, without any exertion, he never thinks of surveying his 
misfortune in any other view (Smith 1976 [1790], III.iii.29; see also Ibid, 
III.iii.25). 
 
For Smith, the gradual development of extensive sympathy with one’s impartial 
spectator therefore facilitates self-command, which leads to a greater understanding of 
the motives and actions of oneself and of others. Yet this process of mutual 
accommodation does not equate to a homogenisation of behaviour. Rather, as Seigel 
points out: “…every individual will continue to feel the things that touch him or her 
directly with far greater intensity than those that merely concern others” (Seigel 2005: 
143; see Smith 1983, LRBL, Lecture 20, 63-64). This is arguably reminiscent of 
James’s pragmatic notion that an idea becomes real to the individual when it 
“…stings us in a certain way, makes as it were a certain electric connection with our 
Self” (James 1981 [1890]: 1172 [italics in original]). It is also arguable that the non-
prescriptive nature of Smith’s thought on the self - in which an individual 
intersubjectively develops an increasing identification with her impartial spectator 
over time - is echoed in James’s thought (Seigel 2005: 155). To be sure, both thinkers 
choose to emphasise gradual self-identification with one’s “ideal self” as important 
factors in their respective frameworks of the self.  
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3.2.2) The symbolic interactionist self  
 
 
This is of additional interest when one considers the apparent influence of both 
thinkers on the symbolic interactionists, for whom the self is primarily a social 
construction made via linguistic exchanges or symbolic interactions with others 
(Harter 1999: 38; Thoits and Virshup 1997: 108-111). James Schellenberg (1990: 
771-772) points out that although James’s psychology and philosophy, and in 
particular, his concept of the social Self, “laid the foundations” of symbolic 
interactionism, his thought does not share its focus on how social categories become 
internalised. This view is echoed by Ann Baumgardner (1990: 706-707), who notes 
the ironic nature of the symbolic interactionists’ focus on James’s social Self. As 
Baumgardner argues, James clearly regards the spiritual aspect to be the most 
important part of the “me”: 
 
Perhaps partly because James’s discussion of the social self is so 
succinct…much of American psychology and sociology immediately 
postdating James focussed on the motivations and processes of the social self, 
largely ignoring those of the spiritual as well as the material self. Within that 
work, surely the symbolic interactionists are those who come to mind 
especially Cooley (1902) and Mead (1934), who focussed almost exclusively 
on the social self and the influence of social relations on the maintenance and 
development of the social self. 
 
For Charles Horton Cooley, others’ opinions are pivotal in shaping an individual’s 
sense of self. Interestingly, Cooley additionally implies the existence of an 
internalisation process that enables this sense of self to persist in the absence of 
external feedback, which appears to bear some resemblance to Smith’s notion of the 
impartial spectator and to James’s “ideal self”. Unlike these accounts, however, 
Cooley fails to explain how identity remains stable in the event of negative or 
disparate views from significant others beyond “this very general shift” as Susan 
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Harter (1999: 41-42)  points out.287
[w]e appear as selves in our conduct insofar as we ourselves take the attitude 
that others take toward us. We take the role of what may be called the 
‘generalized’ other. And in doing this we appear as social objects, as selves 
(Mead 1934: 270 cited in Harter 1999: 41).
 This is perhaps more pertinent when one 
considers Cooley’s influential “looking-glass self” metaphor, which may appear 
similar to Smith’s famous analogy, and to James’s agreement with Horwicz, in which 
society provides the individual with a “mirror” through which self-appraisal is 
facilitated (Smith 1976 [1790], III.i.3; James 1981 [1890]: 314). However, unlike 
Smith’s and James’s sophisticated frameworks of the self in which a dynamic 
reflexivity is retained, Cooley’s “looking-glass self” does not define how this might 
come about.  
Cooley’s view is extended by George Herbert Mead, for whom: 
 
288
                                                 
287 Cooley argues that an adult with “balanced self-respect” is able to maintain a stable identity, as, 
unlike children, they have developed the faculty of being “not immediately dependent upon what others 
think” and therefore have “…stable ways of thinking about the image of self that cannot be upset by 
passing phases of praise or blame” (Cooley [1902], Human nature and the social order, pp.199-201, 
cited in Harter 1999: 41). By contrast, as discussed, Smith and James explain in detail that the mature 
individual can overcome disapprobation via reflection upon, respectively, their impartial spectator or 
their “ideal social self”.  
288 As with Cooley, James declines to offer many comments on Mead’s early work. As discussed in 
2.2.4, Smith also refrains from commenting favourably on the majority of his contemporaries’ work. 
 
 
In Mead’s account, the self originates in communicative activities as social interaction 
gradually becomes symbolic interaction. Mead thus considers James’s account of the 
formation of the self to have failed to recognise its fully social nature. However, it 
appears that Mead’s, Baldwin’s, and Cooley’s concepts of self-formation are 
ostensibly influenced by Smith, as they focus on childhood development and the 
impact of others’ views on their self-worth, subjects that Smith discusses at length in 
TMS. Of these thinkers, the connection between Smith and Mead is emphasised most 
strongly by Timothy Costelloe (1997).  
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Costelloe bases his conflation of Smith and Mead on Albion Small’s (1972) reading 
of Smith’s impartial spectator as an “individualistic and subjectivist psychology” 
through which Smith “unsuccessfully” attempts to express an “objective moral 
philosophy”. Small here appears to demonstrate a misunderstanding of the impartial 
spectator as he interprets it as merely meaning that “…approbation in others is made 
the cause of approbation in me, and approbation in me is the criterion of value of 
approbation of others”. To Small, therefore, there is: “…no admitted criterion of 
moral value in Smith’s system outside of the judgements of individuals” (Small 1972: 
50-52 cited in Costelloe 1997: 86). Following Small’s misinterpretation, Costelloe 
thus erroneously argues that Mead and Smith share “the same conception of selfhood, 
social interaction and social order” in which individuality is only intelligible via 
society: “I can see myself only insofar as I am involved in a set of social practices. 
The impartial spectator becomes an ideal spectator - Mead’s ‘generalized other’” 
(Costelloe 1997: 85-97). 
 
As noted, Mead also supposedly follows James. Like James, Mead divides the self 
into the “I” and the “me”. However, unlike James, this division, according to 
Costelloe: “…is central in forcing the implicit shift in his [Mead’s] focus from the 
realm of the individual to that of the social” (Ibid, 85-86). For Mead: “[t]he individual 
develops a self by first becoming an object to himself, and he does this by adopting 
the “attitudes” of the individual members of the group to which he belongs” (Mead 
1913: 374-380). As Ruth Leys (1993: 277) explains, Mead distinguishes between a 
“secondary self”, which is produced through one’s voice when an individual puts 
herself “in the place of others”, and a “first self”, of which one is immediately aware, 
“as when hearing one’s own voice one at the same time respond[s] to these social 
stimulations”. Mead states that: “…we do not naturally and primarily turn ourselves 
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upon how our voice sounds”, and so the “first self” is not ordinarily paid attention to 
by the individual. Instead, it is via the “secondary self”, or upon hearing how our own 
voice sounds, that the self is “created”, as when we “…put ourselves in the attitude of 
another, we direct our attention upon ourselves as a normal object”.289
Along with the rejection of instinct theory, an explanation of the symbolic 
interactionists’ focus on socially generated selves is perhaps a cause of this 
misunderstanding of Smith’s concept of sympathy. Indeed, Mead (1934: 299) 
describes “imitation” and “sympathy” as “the taking the attitude of the other when 
one is assisting the other”. Like Cooley, and unlike James, Mead therefore fails to 
  
 
However, as Leys (1993: 295; 298) argues, this is a “bizarre theory” that: “…makes 
the second self wholly a matter of the process of reflection that allows the primary 
self to be brought into a kind of consciousness”. Mead’s “peculiar and self-defeating” 
account therefore: “…threatens to collapse the distinction between the second, 
manifestly socially constituted self and the presocial, ‘background’ self”. This is 
clearly at variance with James’s and Smith’s accounts, in which such a collapse 
between self and society does not occur. However, in spite of their considerable 
distance from Mead, Leys points out that the latter’s ideas are representative of a 
broader trend in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century American social thought:  
 
…his [Mead’s] generation’s attempt to construct a theory of imitation is 
indebted to William James’s account of the social nature of the self. Its origins 
also go back to Adam Smith’s theory of sympathy, which in the 1890s 
underwent a considerable revival in the United States…Sympathy, described 
by Smith as the ability to imaginatively identify with the sufferings of the 
other person, became the principle by which a generation of sociologists 
sought to explain the relations between the individual and others (Ibid, 277-
294). 
 
                                                 
289 Mead, G. H. (1914) ‘Class Lectures in Social Psychology’ in Miller, D. L. (ed.) The Individual and 
the Social Self: Unpublished work of George Herbert Mead. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 
pp.71-2 cited in Leys 1993: 298. 
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adopt the more complex stage of Smith’s account of reflexive impartial spectatorship, 
as his individual embodies “social attitudes rather than roles of separate individuals” 
(Mead 1934: 179). By contrast, Smith’s sophisticated notion of sympathy and 
recognition of a multiplicity of impartial spectators clearly does not collapse the 
individual and society, as one is able to determine propriety via reflection upon one’s 
impartial spectator. As Smith writes in a letter to Sir Gilbert Elliot: “…real 
magnanimity and conscious virtue…can support itselfe under the disapprobation of 
mankind”.290
As such, one’s actions are not mere replications of supposedly objective social 
criteria. Indeed, as discussed, Smith acknowledges that an individual may disagree 
with others in their community, yet, via sympathy, can learn to respect others’ points 
of view (Smith 1982 [1790], I.iii.2). James arguably echoes this view in his discussion 
of the “potential social self”, in which self-determined agency is retained by the 
individual who can go against societal disapproval whilst pursuing their “ideal social 
self”. This is in contrast to Mead, who argues that: “[i]n the crowd there is an 
organisation of individuals without the emergence of any self”.
  
 
291
                                                 
290 Letter from Adam Smith to Sir Gilbert Elliot, 10th October 1759, in Smith 1987, letter 40, p.49. 
291 James 1981 (1890): 315; Mead 1927: 149 cited in Leys 1993: 299. 
 Mead’s failure to 
retain space for individual agency therefore renders his explanation less useful than 
Smith’s and James’s concepts of the self, which can better explain how attitudes 
gradually change amongst individuals in societies and how respect for difference in 
individual attitudes becomes more prevalent. To account for this requires a more 
nuanced understanding of James’s social Self, and recognition of the more 
sophisticated “second” level of impartial spectatorship in Smith than that 
demonstrated by Mead. Despite claims made by authors such as Costelloe, it is clear 
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that Smith’s flexible and non-prescriptive theory is closer to James’s pragmatism than 
it is to Mead’s one-dimensional universalism.292
 
  
 
In spite of their paucity, these accounts therefore serve to demonstrate that a more 
accurate interpretation of Smith’s concept of sympathy and James’s I/Me distinction 
reveals deeper connections between their conceptualisations of the self. As such, it is 
possible to consider a framework of the self that incorporates their insights through 
which one can begin to countenance a sophisticated notion of individual identity that 
does not contain universalistic assumptions. Such universalistic understandings of the 
self include orthodox economists’ characterisation of the utility maximising “rational 
economic man”, which, as discussed in 4.1.1, pervades social science discourse 
(Watson 2005: 52-53). As is discussed in the next Part, James’s distance from such 
accounts points to further connections between his and Smith’s philosophical 
approaches. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
292 Cross and Marcus (1990: 728) point out the contemporary rejection of Mead’s account in favour of 
a more sophisticated notion of the self: “Psychologists and sociologists alike now concur that the self-
concept is probably best framed as a multifaceted phenomenon…Despite James’s claims that the self 
was a composite of material, social, and spiritual selves, until quite recently many approaches to the 
self-concept formulated it as a fairly monolithic or global entity (see Mead, 1934)”.  
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Part Three: A Pluralistic Universe 
3.3.1) Connecting principles   
 
As the previous section has shown, a holistic approach to James’s work demonstrates 
consistency in his thought. As prior chapters have also illustrated, such an approach 
towards Smith facilitates similar insight into the continuity in his thought. In this 
section, I show that a thoroughly holistic interpretation additionally demonstrates 
connections between the two thinkers’ underlying epistemologies. As noted, and in 
contrast to James, Smith does not explicitly state his epistemological position in TMS 
and WN. However, in LJ, LRBL, and, in particular, the essays that comprise his Essays 
on Philosophical Subjects, Smith’s view of the provisional nature of knowledge and 
thus his attitude towards philosophy is arguably rendered less opaque. Moreover, as 
there is no discernible attempt by him to subsequently alter his position from that 
taken in his lectures and essays in his later works, the consistent nature of Smith’s 
thought is again emphasised.293
In HoA, Smith discusses the three “sentiments” of surprise, wonder, and admiration 
that, he argues, follow sequentially in the establishment of philosophical knowledge. 
He observes that humans appear to have a psychological need to place the “…events 
which appear solitary and incoherent” in nature into a philosophical scheme, as they 
“…disturb the easy movement of the imagination”.  This: “…prompts mankind to the 
study of Philosophy, of that science which pretends to lay open the concealed 
connections that unite the various appearances of nature” (Smith 1980, HoA, II.12; 
III.3). Smith illustrates this by giving the example of the astronomical system, which 
connects the “grandest and most seemingly disjointed appearances in the heavens” 
   
 
                                                 
293 As Herbert Thomson (1965: 231) points out: “…the general concept of science presented in his 
early writings remain substantially unchanged” in Smith’s books. 
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into a contemporarily plausible explanation of observed phenomena (Ibid, IV.4).294
…imitation and painting render objects more agreeable….Variety of objects 
also renders them agreeable...These qualities, which are the ground of 
preference and which give occasion to pleasure and pain, are the cause of 
many insignificant demands which we by no means stand in need of. The 
whole industry of human life is employed not in procuring the supply of our 
three humble necessities, food, cloaths, and lodging, but in procuring the 
conveniences of it according to the nicety and [and] delicacey of our taste. To 
improve and multiply the materials which are the principal objects of our 
necessities, gives occasion to all the variety of the arts (Ibid, II.209).
 
According to Smith, such an explanation increases the admiration of such phenomena, 
as it temporarily alleviates the psychological discomfort prompted by surprise and 
wonder. This emphasis on the intellectual or aesthetic sentiments of surprise, wonder, 
and admiration is also demonstrated in LJ: 
 
Man is the only animal who is possessed of such a nicety that the very colour 
of an object hurts him. Among different objects a different division or 
arrangement of them pleases… Easy connection also renders objects 
agreeable; when we see no reason for the contiguity of the parts, when they 
are without any natural connection, when they have neither a proper 
resemblance nor contrast, they never fail of being disagreeable (Smith [1978], 
LJ [B], II.208). 
 
This point directly precedes his discussion of the importance of aesthetics to the 
material well being of society:  
 
295
As Griswold points out, aesthetic pleasure is a pervasive theme in TMS. Here, 
sympathy is typified as a “correspondence” of sentiments, propriety is defined in 
terms of “proportion” and  its moral beauty is determined by its “harmony” with our 
sentiments, and “the harmony of society” is facilitated via individuals’ “harmony and 
 
 
                                                 
294 As Buchan (2006: 25) notes, Smith’s intention here is thus “…not to provide a history of 
astronomy…His interest is psychological”.  
295 These arts include “Agriculture” and “Commerce and navigation.” As Smith notes, “[b]y these 
again other subsidiary arts are occasioned”. These include: “Writing,” “geometry,” and “Law and 
government”: “Wisdom and virtue too derive their lustre from supplying these necessities…In an 
uncivilized nation, and where labour is undivided, every thing is provided for that the natural wants of 
mankind require; yet when the nation is cultivated and labour divided a more liberal provision is 
allotted them; and it is on this account that a common day labourer in Brittain has more luxury in his 
way of living than an Indian sovereign” (Ibid, II.210-211). 
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concord” with others and their impartial spectator.296 Wightman and Bryce point to 
similar themes in Smith’s reference in WN to the aesthetic pleasure deduced from a 
“…systematical arrangement of different observations connected by a few common 
principles” (Smith 1976 [1776], V.i.3.2.25); in his observation in Of the Nature of 
That Imitation Which Takes Place in What are Called the Imitative Arts,297 in which 
the pleasure derived from contemplation of such systems of thought is compared to 
that gained from listening to a “well composed concerto of Instrumental Music” 
(Smith 1980 Imitative Arts, II.30); and in LRBL in which Smith states: “[i]t gives us a 
pleasure to see the phaenomena which we reckoned the most unaccountable, all 
deduced from some principle (commonly a well known one) and all united in one 
chain”. Here, Smith admits his admiration for Newton’s emphasis on the exposition of 
a system based on “…certain principles, known or proved, in the beginning, from 
whence we account for the several phaenomena, connecting all together by the same 
chain” (Smith 1983, II.133-134 [Lecture 24]). For Smith, therefore, as for Newton: 
“Philosophy is the science of the connecting principles of human nature” (Smith 
1980, HoA, II.12).298
However, in emphasizing the rhetorical appeal of Newton’s system, Smith is 
reminding us, as he does more clearly in HoA, that such systems are actually “mere 
inventions of the imagination” (Ibid, IV.76).
  
 
299
                                                 
296 Smith 1976 (1790), I.i.2.2; I.i.3.5; I.i.4.5; I.i.4.7 cited in Griswold 1999: 330. See also Smith 1976 
(1790), VII.iv.28. See Labio (2006) for a review of recent literature on the significance of aesthetics in 
Smith’s thought.  
297 Hereafter referred to as Imitative Arts. 
298 However, Smith credits Galileo rather than Newton with the notion that the establishment of a 
system must derive from “from reason and experience” (Ibid, IV.44). 
299 See Loasby 2002: 1231-1232. The extent of Smith’s admiration for Newton is discussed in 1.2.2. 
 Whilst it is clear that Smith shows an 
appreciation of such frameworks, he is here intimating the dangers of the tendency to 
claim existing knowledge as universal “truth”. This is explicated more forcefully in 
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Smith’s warnings against “men of system” in TMS, which, as argued in 2.4.1, inform 
the restrained nature of his policy proposals in WN.  
 
These examples suggest a consistently cautious attitude in Smith’s thought towards 
fixed philosophical or scientific schemas that lay claim to supposedly objective truth. 
Moreover, Smith’s recurring suspicion of dogmatic systems of explanation is 
arguably comparable to the similarly consistent attitude reflected in James’s oeuvre. 
In The Hidden Self (1890), James argues that:  
 
[t]he ideal of every science is that of a closed and completed system of truth… 
and, so far from free is most men’s fancy, that when a consistent and 
organised scheme of this sort has once been comprehended and assimilated, a 
different scheme is unimaginable (James 1890: 361). 
 
This is reflected in PP, where he suggests: “[f]rom one year to another we see things 
in new lights” (James 1981 [1890]: 227), and in WB, where he states: “[n]o concrete 
test of what is really true has ever been agreed upon” (James 1979 [1896]: 22). 
Consequently, he argues in APU that: “…no philosophy can ever be anything but a 
summary sketch, a picture of the world in abridgment, a foreshortened bird’s-eye 
view of the perspective of events” (James 1987 [1909]: 633). This view is also 
reiterated in The Meaning of Truth:  
 
Experience, as we know, has ways of boiling over, and making us correct our 
present formulas…The present sheds a backward light on the world’s previous 
processes. They may have been truth-processes for the actors in them. They 
are not so for one who knows the later revelations of the story (James 1911: xi 
[italics in original]).  
 
As Leary explains, this commitment to the fundamental reality of alternative 
perspectives permeates James’s system of thought from his earliest definition of 
philosophy as “the possession of mental perspective” in Essays in Philosophy (James 
1876: 4 cited in Leary 1992: 158). Certainly, James argues in PP (1890) that the 
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individual selects such a perspective: “My experience is what I agree to attend to” 
(James 1981 [1890]: 380 [italics in original]).300
This is similar to Smith’s view in HoA and Imitative Arts, in which he argues that 
individuals are motivated to attempt to “soothe the imagination” (Smith 1980, HoA, 
II.12) and obtain, via scientific or philosophical explanations, a “state of...tranquillity, 
and composure” (Smith 1980, Imitative Arts, II.20).
 This view is reflected in his 
argument in WB, in which James states: 
 
[t]he individual has a stock of old opinions already, but he meets a new 
experience that puts them to strain…The result is an inward trouble to which 
his mind till then had been a stranger, and from which he seeks to escape by 
modifying his previous mass of opinions...until at last some new idea comes 
up which he can graft upon the ancient stock with a minimum of disturbance 
of the latter, some idea that mediates between the stock and the new 
experience and runs them into one another most felicitously and expediently 
(James 1907: 35). 
 
301
When the first mathematical, logical, and natural uniformities, the first 
 As Brian Loasby argues, such 
a process of inventing and imposing connecting principles in order to maintain 
psychological comfort generates speciation, which in turn accelerates the growth of 
scientific knowledge (Loasby 2002: 1229-1232). As with Smith, James views this 
process to be additionally useful insofar as it facilitates wider awareness of the 
limitations of belief in objective, fixed reality:   
 
laws
                                                 
300 As James points out: “[t]he altogether unique kind of interest which each human feels in those parts 
of creation which it can call me or mine may be a moral riddle, but it is a fundamental psychological 
fact” (Ibid: 278). As Leary (1992: 157) notes, therefore: “[t]he concept of interest is thus fundamental 
to James’s psychology and philosophy, and in particular to his view of human understanding”.  
301 Smith refers to the terms “science” and “philosophy” interchangeably, which suggests that he 
considers them to be the same thing. As Richard Olson points out, Smith certainly does not load the 
term “science” with objective connotations, but “sets up a human rather than an absolute or natural 
standard for science, and it leaves all science essentially hypothetical” (Olson, R. [1975] Scottish 
Philosophy and British Physics, 1750-1880, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p.123, cited in 
Wightman and Bryce, intro to Smith 1980: 12). 
, 
were discovered, men were so carried away by the clearness, beauty and 
simplification that resulted, that they believed themselves to have deciphered 
authentically the eternal thoughts of the Almighty…[However]…as the 
sciences have developed farther, the notion has gained ground that most, 
perhaps all, of our laws are only approximations. The laws themselves, 
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moreover, have grown so numerous that there is no counting them; and so 
many rival formulations are proposed in all the branches of science that 
investigators have become accustomed to the notion that no theory is 
absolutely a transcript of reality, but that any one of them may from some 
point of view be useful (James 1987 [1907]: 511 [italics in original]). 
 
Like Smith, James thus views such laws as temporary aids to human understanding 
rather than final explanations of reality. It is arguable, however, that such an 
understanding has not been imported into orthodox economists’ assumptions 
regarding the supposed universal rationality of individuals, which, as has been argued, 
informs notions of the self in contemporary IPE. By contrast, as Herbert Thomson 
(1965: 231) argues, Smith “…was not willing to restrict his speculations to economic 
statics or to the purely mechanical relationships of economic phenomena”. 
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3.3.2) The practical imagination  
 
 
It is therefore interesting to consider Smith’s discussion in HoA of Aristotle’s view of 
the Pythagoreans, who first studied arithmetic and then explained “all things by the 
properties of numbers” (Smith 1980, HoA, II.12). Smith discusses this in relation to 
the process of a kind of cross-fertilisation among separate areas of inquiry, wherein an 
analogy is adapted in a related field, to serve, in some cases, as the “great hinge upon 
which every thing turned” in it.302
                                                 
302 “In the same manner also, others have written parallels of painting and poetry, of poetry and music, 
of music and architecture, of beauty and virtue, of all the fine arts; systems which have universally 
owed their origin to the lucubrations of those who were acquainted with the one art, but ignorant of the 
other” (Smith 1980, HoA, II.12). Such a flexible approach to the insights of thinkers from different 
fields and previous times arguably reflects Smith’s own methodology. As I discuss in 2.3.4, Smith 
develops his own concepts via the retention and rejection of the insights of a variety of thinkers (see 
Vivenza 2001; Hope 1989; see also Smith 1987, letter to Lord Shelburne 29th October 1759, letter 42, 
pp. 58-60, in which Smith lists the books that are “suitable for educating” his tutee, the Duke of 
Baccleuch). 
 Such a process thus leads to new discoveries within 
different branches of inquiry. As Thomson notes, in HoA, Smith gives the examples 
of the systems devised by Ptolemy, Copernicus, Descartes, Kepler, and Newton, who 
sought analogies that could be used as “…organising principles to impart greater 
simplicity and accuracy to another science” (Thomson 1965: 223-224). According to 
Thomson, Smith also extends Aristotle’s theoretical distinction between final and 
efficient causes. As Thomson explains, Smith develops his own distinction between 
the purpose of nature in history, and the unintended outcomes of individual agency: 
“[t]his Aristotelian distinction is expanded by Smith into a deception, or illusion 
theory” (Ibid, 227-232). In WN, this deception famously takes the form of the 
invisible hand. As Raphael and Macfie (intro to Smith 1976 [1790], p.14) argue:  
 
[i]n itself the idea of deception by an invisible hand is unconvincing. It gains 
its plausibility from the preceding account of aesthetic pleasure afforded by 
power and riches, a pleasure that is reinforced by the admiration of spectators. 
Smith himself clearly set most store by the psychological explanation. But the 
invisible hand, through its reappearance in WN, has captured the attention, 
especially of economists. 
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Unlike subsequent orthodox economists’ use of his most famous metaphor, Smith 
clearly provides a psychological rather than a rationalistic account of behaviour in his 
adaptation of the Aristotelian distinction to explain unintended outcomes of 
individuals’ behaviour. This is arguably reflected in TMS. Here, as Watson (2005: 
220) notes, Smith demonstrates that “…it is ‘passions’ rather than ‘reason’ that 
provide the guide for action, and which condition our response to the social 
circumstances in which we find ourselves”. As Smith explains: 
 
Nature has directed us to the greater part of these by original and immediate 
instincts. Hunger, thirst, the passion which unites the two sexes, the love of 
pleasure, and the dread of pain, prompt us to apply those means for their own 
sakes, and without any consideration of their tendency to those beneficent 
ends which the great Director of nature intended to produce by them (Smith 
1976 [1790], II.iii.3.10). 
 
As Thomson (1965: 228) points out: “[t]his analogy, taken from the most 
commonplace observations in biology…is used to justify or explain…that a 
progressive force exists in nature, apart from any conscious human planning”. Such 
analogies thus contribute to tranquillity, which, according to Smith, is the point of 
philosophy.  
 
As discussed, this psychological view of the nature of the development of knowledge 
is also reflected in HoA, where Smith first introduces his analogy of the invisible 
hand. As James Buchan notes: “[e]xposed to alarming and inexplicable natural 
phenomena, the savage mind sees the actions of ‘…the invisible hand of Jupiter’” 
(Smith 1980, HoA, III.2 cited in Buchan 2006: 38). Smith thus demonstrates via this 
analogy that the needs of the imagination are temporarily satisfied until a process of 
modification is necessary to overcome newly emergent complexities associated with 
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the answers the current explanation provides.303 As such, “philosophical systems” are 
based upon ongoing psychological needs, for which more complex understandings 
and explanations will be developed in the future. Smith’s emphasis on the 
evolutionary nature of this process thus demonstrates his connecting of the intellectual 
and moral progress of individuals to that of contemporary scientific progress whilst 
implying the absurdity of claims to absolute, objective knowledge made by 
philosophical, scientific and theological systems.304
However, as he also notes here, imagination can hinder as well as stimulate new 
knowledge. Smith points out that the “natural prejudices of the imagination” partly 
explain the original resistance to the notion of a moving earth before the temporary 
acceptance of the ideas of Copernicus (Ibid, IV.52).
 As he points out in HoA: 
“[p]hilosophy, therefore, may be regarded as one of those arts which address 
themselves to the imagination” (Smith 1980, HoA, II.12). 
 
305
                                                 
303 As Wightman and Bryce explain, this in turn renders the previously sufficient explanation 
unacceptable to the imagination, which prompts an alternative thought-system “designed to explain the 
same problems as the first, at least in its most complex form” (Wightman and Bryce, intro to Smith 
1980, p.7 [italics in original]). Smith notes that, by the sixteenth century: “[t]his system [of Astronomy] 
had now become as intricate and complex as those appearances themselves, which it had been invented 
to render uniform and coherent. The imagination, therefore, found itself but little relieved from that 
embarrassment, into which those appearances had thrown it, by so perplexed an account of things” 
(Smith 1980, HoA, IV.7; see also Fiori 2001: 438-443). 
304 As Loasby argues: “[a]s our foundation model of the growth of knowledge as an evolutionary 
process, we cannot do better than Adam Smith’s psychological theory of the emergence and 
development of science, which he illustrated by the history of astronomy” (Loasby 2002: 1231). 
305 In TMS, Smith points out: “[t]he vortices of Des Cartes were regarded by a very ingenious nation, 
for near a century together, as a most satisfactory account of the revolutions of the heavenly bodies. 
Yet it has been demonstrated, to the conviction of all mankind, that these pretended causes of those 
wonderful effects, not only do not actually exist, but are utterly impossible, and if they did exist, could 
produce no such effects as are ascribed to them” (Smith 1976 [1790], VII.iv.4.14). 
 As Brian Loasby argues, Smith 
thus points out that such resistance “…appealed to principles of motion that 
conformed to prevailing conceptions of good order”. Similarly “…most economists 
accept the notion of ‘rational expectations’ because it fits their idea of a good theory” 
(Loasby 2002: 1231). It is interesting therefore that Smith refers to resistance in his 
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discussion in TMS of “the abstruser sciences” such as mathematics, which are “not 
always very easily comprehended”: 
 
It was not…their utility which first recommended them to the public 
admiration. This quality was but little insisted upon, till it became necessary to 
make some reply to the reproaches of those, who, having themselves no taste 
for such sublime discoveries, endeavoured to depreciate them as useless 
(Smith 1976 [1790], IV.ii.7).  
 
This is consistent with his point in LRBL: 
 
The People, to which they are ordinarily directed, have no pleasure in these 
abstruse deductions; their interest, and the practicability and honourableness of 
the thing recommended is what alone will sway with them and is seldom to be 
shewn in a long deduction of arguments (Smith 1983, LRBL, ii.135 [Lecture 
24]). 
 
Smith is here demonstrating the connected nature of self-interest, utility and virtue 
whilst pointing out that philosophical explanations must accord with everyday 
experience. As Fleischacker (2004: 24) points out: “Smith wants economics to make 
ready sense to us; he wants to show how its fundamental principles are but 
extrapolations of what we ordinarily believe…”306 This relates to Smith’s argument in 
WN in which he states: “…every individual, it is evident, can, in his local situation, 
judge much better than any statesman or lawgiver can do for him” in deciding 
“[w]hat…species of domestick industry…his capital can employ, and of which the 
produce is likely to be of the greatest value” (Smith 1976 [1776], IV.ii.10).307
                                                 
306 As Peil explains, according to Smith, there is no essential difference between learning in daily life 
and scientific research (Peil 1999: 124). 
307 This appears similar to James’s approach. As Lawlor (2006: 327) notes, James “…wrote 
impressionistically to get his ideas across. In addition, recall that he aimed for a wider audience than 
professional philosophers”. Similarly, for Cotkin (1990: 88), James was a public philosopher who 
“…attempted to capture the nature of the cultural crisis of his era and to present solutions to it in 
accessible philosophical formulation”. 
 It is 
worthy of note, therefore, that it is this discussion - regarding merchants preferring to 
invest in domestic rather than foreign industry - that is the point at which Smith 
introduces his “invisible hand” analogy to demonstrate the beneficial, if unintended, 
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effects of such behaviour upon the accumulated stock of the national economy (Smith 
1976 [1776), IV.ii.9 cited in Watson 2005: 175).  
 
Smith’s use of such an analogy to facilitate understanding thus demonstrates the 
emphasis he places on the practical role of the imagination in comprehending and 
creating social phenomena. This is also stressed in his discussion of emulation in 
TMS. As with the invisible hand analogy in WN, Smith again grants a role to 
“deception” in material progress. As he points out, individuals imagine the supposed 
happiness enjoyed by the wealthy, and seek to emulate them: “[i]t is this deception 
which rouses and keeps in continual motion the industry of mankind” (Smith 1976 
[1790], IV.i.10). As discussed in 1.1.2, this facilitates moral progress via extensive 
sympathy, Smith’s central concept. The adaptation of Aristotle’s distinction is 
therefore important to Smith’s account, and provides further evidence of his 
commitment to the intersubjective, evolutionary nature of “truth”, whilst further 
undermining the supposed aporia in his work as noted by Griswold.308
[t]he great significance of Smith’s doctrine is that since it measures the value 
of philosophical systems solely in relation to their satisfaction of the human 
craving for order, it sets up a human rather than an absolute or natural standard 
for science, and it leaves all science essentially hypothetical.
 As Richard 
Olson argues:  
 
309
                                                 
308 See 2b and 3b for a rejection of this argument. 
309 Olson, R. (1975) Scottish Philosophy and British Physics, 1750-1880. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, p.123 cited in Wightman and Bryce, intro to Smith 1980, p.12. 
 
 
James appears to share this position. In The Meaning of Truth, he contends that:  
 
[p]urely objective truth, truth in whose establishment the function of giving 
human satisfaction in marrying previous parts of experience with newer parts 
play no role whatever, is nowhere to be found (James 1911: 37).  
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As truth for James relies upon the interests of the individual, the development of 
knowledge thus relates not just to philosophical systems, but also to the processes 
undertaken by individuals in terms of gaining clearer knowledge of themselves and 
others via experience. As discussed in 3.1.3, for James this process involves 
imaginative reflection by individuals upon their “ideal selves” and upon others in 
society. James therefore places emphasis upon the role of the practical imagination 
and social experience on identity, and relates the intellectual and moral progress of 
society to that of the individual. It is interesting therefore to consider the view of 
Haakonssen (2006: 10), who argues that Smith’s emphasis on the role of the practical 
imagination is key to his notion of identity:  
 
It is through the practical imagination that we ascribe actions to persons and 
see persons, including ourselves, as coherent or identical over time. In other 
words, the practical imagination creates the moral world. This form of 
imagination Smith calls “sympathy”. 
 
Sympathy is of course discussed most thoroughly in TMS.310
                                                 
310 See Smith 1976 (1790), VII.ii-iv; see also Ibid, III.v.5. 
 Here, Smith also relates 
his awareness of the contested nature of truth to the evolution of scientific knowledge 
in his critique of rationalism. As he notes: “[t]hat virtue consists in conformity to 
reason” was “…more easily received at a time when the abstract science of human 
nature was but in its infancy, and before the distinct offices and powers of the 
different faculties of the human mind had been carefully examined and distinguished 
from one another” (Smith 1976 [1790], VII.iii.2.5-6). However, Smith’s rejection of 
rationalism does not result in his advocating relativism. Rather, he accounts for 
enduring, yet culturally interpreted, moral practices via empirical observations. As 
Haakonssen (2006: 4-6) argues, using this method enables Smith to demonstrate that, 
despite some practices being universally observable, “…it is impossible to formulate a 
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universal idea of the highest good or the good life”.311
Again, this view is similar to that expressed by James. In WB, he argues that: 
“…deadness and liveness in an hypothesis are not intrinsic properties, but relations to 
the individual thinker”. For James, such hypotheses relate to moral preferences, as: 
“…our non-intellectual nature does influence our convictions. There are passional 
tendencies and volitions which run before and others which come after belief…” As a 
consequence, “[t]here are, then, cases where a fact cannot come at all unless a 
preliminary faith exists in its coming”.
 Smith’s account of virtue is 
thus consistent with his evolutionary approach to scientific understanding. As 
Thomson (1965: 232) explains: “Smith’s view, which is expressed in his earliest 
writings, is that a science must explain causal relationships that are exceedingly 
complex, and where more than one explanation may be offered that is consistent with 
the observed facts”. 
 
312
                                                 
311 As Haakonssen explains, for Smith: “[b]ecause moral personality derives from the mutual 
judgements of people and because such judgements depend on the social experience and imagination, 
the idea of personhood…must vary with time and place” (Ibid). Haakonssen relates this to Smith’s 
theorisation of the four stages of society: “[e]ach extension of the concept of what can be considered a 
person entails a change in the interests people have and, hence, what sort of injuries they are subject to 
and what rights they meaningfully can claim recognition for” (Ibid, 18). 
312 James 1979 (1896): 14; 19-20; 29. This is consistent with Smith’s argument in HoA that “…no 
system, how well soever in other respects supported, has ever been able to gain any general credit on 
the world, whose connecting principles were not such as were familiar to all mankind” (Smith 1980, 
HoA, II.12). As Loasby (2002: 1232) argues, these “…connecting principles… are widely diffused 
because of our readiness…to look for guidance …and because of our desire to act…in ways that merit 
the approval of others. These powerful emotions, together with the underlying similarity in human 
mental, emotional and aesthetic processes which underpins them, are foundational principles of 
Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments”.  
 This relates to James’s argument against 
rationalist systems of philosophy in Pragmatism, which, he states, are: 
 
…far less an account of this actual world than a clear addition built upon it, a 
classic sanctuary in which the rationalist fancy may take refuge from the 
intolerably confused and gothic character which mere facts present. It is no 
explanation of our concrete universe; it is another thing altogether, a substitute 
for it, a remedy, a way of escape (James 1987 [1907]: 495-496 [italics in 
original]). 
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James therefore shares with Smith a cautious approach towards fixed systems based 
on claims to supposedly immutable knowledge whilst retaining the possibility of an 
ontological commitment to an external world. However, this does not equate to 
objectivism. As James argues: “[t]he essential contrast is that for rationalism reality is 
ready-made and complete from all eternity, while for pragmatism it is still in the 
making” (Ibid, 115). According to James, therefore, the pragmatist can find a middle 
ground between empiricism and rationalism. As he suggests, pragmatism can 
“…remain religious like the rationalisms, but at the same time, like the empiricisms, it 
can preserve the richest intimacy with the facts” (Ibid, 500-1).313 Similarly, as 
Thomson explains, although “Smith speaks of himself occasionally as an empiricist”, 
he avoids explicitly aligning himself with the purely inductive empiricism of Bacon, 
Hobbes, and Locke. According to Thomson, Smith agrees with Berkeley’s blurring of 
the empiricists’ distinction between the primary and secondary qualities of colour, 
sound, taste, and smell. Smith therefore rejects the early empiricists’ isolation of 
“primary qualities” of things, and, like James, thus avoids their emphasis on the 
supposedly objective, measurable truth.314
                                                 
313 Whilst attempting to occupy this middle ground, James appears to favour the latter approach. In the 
Appendix to Some Problems of Philosophy: A Beginning of an Introduction to Philosophy (1910), he 
notes that: “[e]mpiricism, believing in possibilities, is willing to formulate its universe in hypothetical 
propositions. Rationalism, believing only in impossibilities and necessities, insists on the contrary on 
their being categorical” (James 1992 [1910], Appendix: 1099). 
314 It is interesting, therefore, to consider James’s pragmatic characterisation of Berkeley. Pace Locke’s 
passive “belief in a substantial soul behind our consciousness” and Hume’s denial of the soul, James 
points out that: “[a]s I said of Berkeley’s matter, the soul is good or ‘true’ for just so much, but no 
more” (James 1987 [1907]: 525-526 [italics in original]; See also Myers 1986: 97). 
 Instead, as noted, Smith consistently 
relates standards of judgment to aesthetic rather than rational criteria throughout his 
work. As Thomson points out, therefore, for Smith:  
 
…two or more alternate theories may provide equally satisfactory 
explanations of a given body of phenomena, and may be equally true; the one 
explanation would be preferred to another on account of its simplicity and 
elegance (Thomson 1965: 219-221; see Smith 1980, HoA, II.12).  
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Whilst I am not attempting to class Smith as a pragmatist, the connection between his 
thought and that of James here is emphasized further by Wightman and Bryce’s 
argument that Smith’s approach to philosophical systems is of contemporary 
relevance:  
 
…today we should be more ready than Adam Smith to think that the 
replacement of the currently favoured theory of physics or astronomy is not 
just possible but probable…The new theory may be preferred because it is 
simpler or because it can be connected more directly with the theory of a 
related branch of science…Is it then proper to claim that the preferred theory 
is more true than its rival? (Wightman and Bryce, intro to Smith 1980: 
21[italics in original]) 
 
This view is arguably reflected in James’s WB, in which he observes: “[f]or what a 
contradictory array of opinions have objective evidence and absolute certitude been 
claimed!” (James 1979 [1896]: 98) This relates to Pragmatism, wherein he again 
connects the evolutionary nature of truth claims to individual perspectives: “A new 
opinion counts as ‘true’ just in proportion as it gratifies the individual’s desire to 
assimilate the novel in his experience to his beliefs in stock” (James 1907: 512-513). 
As Wightman and Bryce note, the pluralistic nature of “truth” has been demonstrated 
through the development of scientific knowledge: 
 
In these days of relativity theory, physics itself seems to cast doubt on any 
idea of strictly objective truths in nature independent of observers at different 
points of space and time. Adam Smith’s view of science appears more 
perceptive today than it will have done in the eighteenth century (Wightman 
and Bryce, intro to Smith 1980: 21).315
                                                 
315 Thomson connects Smith’s though to that of Albert Einstein, for whom: “[s]cience is not just a 
collection of laws, a catalogue of unrelated facts. It is a creation of the human mind, with its freely 
invented ideas and concepts” (Einstein, A. and Infield, L. [1938] The Evolution of Physics, New York, 
NY: Simon and Schuster, p.310, cited in Thomson 1965: 223. See also Khalil [1989]). Wightman and 
Bryce (intro to Smith 1980: 15) also draw close comparisons between Smith’s view here and T. S. 
Kuhn’s work on scientific revolutions.  
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As Loasby (2002: 1235) points out, Smith’s view of human intelligence as reliant 
upon connecting principles rather than formal logic is supported by a wide range of 
psychologists’ findings.
3.3.3) Habit and the practical imagination 
 
It is therefore interesting to consider Smith’s salience to another area of scientific 
enquiry: that of psychology. In HoA, Smith notes that the creation of new knowledge 
depends upon the assimilation of information into new categories:  
 
When two objects, however unlike, have often been observed to follow each 
other, and have constantly presented themselves to the senses in that order, 
they come to be so connected together in the fancy, that the idea of the one 
seems, of its own accord, to call up and introduce that of the other…(Smith 
1980, HoA, II.7; see also Smith 1978, LJ [B], II.208). 
 
316
                                                 
316 These include Winkeilman and Berridge, who note that a “…common source of subrational 
influences on liking was examined in our research on the affective consequences of manipulating the 
ease, or fluency of information processing…A similar observation was made by Adam Smith in his 
‘Lectures on Jurisprudence’, in which he wrote that: ‘easy connection…renders objects agreeable’” 
(Smith 1978, LJ [B], II.208 cited in Winkeilman and Berridge 2003: 670 [italics in original]). As 
discussed in earlier sections of this chapter, Smith is an acknowledged influential figure across a 
variety of disciplines, including that of psychology. See Baumeister (1997); McAdams (1997). 
 As has been suggested, Smith bases his account of 
philosophical and scientific knowledge formation on a psychological explanation, 
which, as Loasby (2002: 1236) explains, enables Smith to recognise “…the obstacles 
to absorption among those for whom no such assimilation is possible - or in other 
words, who lack the relevant absorptive capacity”. Smith thus acknowledges that a 
variety of standards of ability regarding imaginative reflection exist among 
individuals, which relates to his conceptualisation of a multiplicity of impartial 
spectators. As such, it is interesting to note James’s argument in WB that “similar 
instances” are “the necessary first step” in any type of human understanding, whether 
scientific or non-scientific (James 1896: 987 cited in Leary 1992: 153). 
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This view is reflected in his discussion of “the Law of Contiguity” in Talks to 
Teachers on Psychology and to Students on Some of Life’s Ideals (1899):  
Any object not interesting in itself may become interesting through becoming 
associated with an object in which an interest already exists. The two 
associated objects grow, as it were, together; the interesting portion sheds its 
quality over the whole; and thus things not interesting in their own right 
borrow an interest which becomes as real and as strong as that of any natively 
interesting thing (James 2006 [1899]: 74).317
Although this may appear to be an elitist argument, James is actually pointing out the 
social utility of such habit formation, which, he explains, is due to education, custom, 
and the individual’s will. This remark is consistent with his argument in WB in which 
he notes that the ideal self prompts the morally strenuous life (James 1992 [1879]: 
585). As James argues here, and in the chapters on “Habit” and “Will” in PP, it is via 
habit that individuals become more adept at reflecting upon their ideal self. As this 
process becomes habitual, individuals are increasingly aware of the socially beneficial 
consequences of behaving morally. This is perhaps similar to Smith’s distinction in 
  
 
This is more intriguing when one considers that, like Smith’s acknowledgement of 
varied levels of concord between individuals and their impartial spectator, James 
conceives of different levels of imaginative ability among individuals relating to their 
“ideal self” in PP. Here, he notes that: “…some people are far more sensitive to 
resemblances, and far more ready to point out wherein they consist, than others are”. 
James relates this observation to habit:  
 
Habit is thus the enormous fly-wheel of society, its most precious conservative 
agent. It alone is what keeps us all within the bounds of ordinance, and saves 
the children of fortune from the envious uprisings of the poor. It alone 
prevents the hardest and most repulsive walks of life from being deserted by 
those brought up to tread therein…(James 1981 [1890]: 500; 121). 
 
                                                 
317 As James notes: “[t]he entire routine of our memorized acquisitions is a consequence of nothing but 
the Law of Contiguity” (Ibid, 67). 
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WN between “a philosopher and a common street porter” which, he points out, 
“…seems to arise not so much from nature, as from habit, custom, and education” 
(Smith 1981 [1776], I.ii.4). Here, Smith, again like James, is not advocating elitism 
but is explaining that such differences are socially useful as they perpetuate the 
division of labour:  
 
Among men…the most dissimilar geniuses are of use to one another; the 
different produces of their respective talents, by the general disposition to 
truck, barter, and exchange, being brought, as it were, into a common stock, 
where every man may purchase whatever part of the produce of other men’s 
talents he has occasion for (Ibid, I.ii.5).318
Smith thus demonstrates that each individual adds to society by contributing to the 
overall stock of knowledge. In addition, he points out the material benefits of such 
interaction: 
 
 
As Smith explains in his lectures at Glasgow, the division of labour “…flows from a 
direct propensity in human nature for one man to barter with another”. However:  
 
[t]his disposition to barter is by no means founded upon different genius and 
talents…Genius is more the effect of the division of labour than the latter is of 
it. The difference between a porter and a philosopher in the first four or five 
years of their life is properly speaking none at all. When they come to be 
employed in different occupations, their views widen and differ by degrees 
(Smith 1978, LJ [B], II.219). 
 
The social utility of the habitual taking of roles is also reflected here: 
  
A miln wright perhaps found out the way of turning the spindle with the hand. 
But he who contrived that the outer wheel should go by water was a 
philosopher, whose business it is to do nothing, but observe every thing…fire 
machines, wind and water–milns, were the invention of philosophers, whose 
dexterity too is encreased by a division of labour. They all divide themselves, 
according to the different branches, into the mechanical, moral, political, 
chymical philosophers (Smith 1978, LJ [B], II.218). 
 
                                                 
318 As Smith notes: “…without the disposition to truck, barter, and exchange, every man must have 
procured to himself every necessary and conveniency of life which he wanted. All must have had the 
same duties to perform, and the same work to do, and there could have been no such difference of 
employment as could alone give occasion to any great difference of talents” (Ibid, I.ii.4). 
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The philosopher and the porter are both of advantage to each other. The porter 
is of use in carrying burthens for the philosopher, and in his turn he burns his 
coals cheaper by the philosopher’s invention of the fire machine (Ibid, II.220-
221).319
As he notes, philosophers “…must have extensive views of things…[and] bring in the 
assistance of new powers not formerly applied” (Smith 1978, LJ [A], II.218).
 
 
320
This relates to the emphasis Smith places upon the role of the practical imagination 
and the cross-fertilisation of ideas in HoA, in which he explains that philosophical 
effort can only take place: “…when law has established order and security, and 
subsistence ceases to be precarious” (Smith 1980, HoA, III.iii).
 This 
is reflected in Book I, chapter i of WN. Immediately after discussing the division of 
labour in relation to the pin factory example, Smith notes:  
 
All the improvements in machinery…have by no means been the inventions of 
those who had occasion to use the machines. Many improvements have been 
made by the ingenuity of the makers of the machines, when to make them 
became the business of a peculiar trade; and some by that of those who are 
called philosophers or men of speculation, whose trade it is, not to do any 
thing, but to observe every thing; and who, upon that account, are often 
capable of combining together the powers of the most distant and dissimilar 
objects (Smith 1976 [1776], I.i.9). 
 
321 He relates this 
process to moral progress via sympathy most clearly in TMS.322
                                                 
319 As Campbell and Skinner note, according to W. R. Scott, Smith was probably referring here to 
James Watt, the inventor of the “fire machine” [steam engine] (Scott cited in Campbell and Skinner, in 
Smith 1976 [1776], p.21, footnote 22). See ‘Early Draft of Part of the Wealth of Nations’ 19; 30; ‘First 
Fragment on the Division of Labour’ 1, in Smith 1978, LJ, Appendix.  
320 As Haakonssen (2006: 11) notes, the practical imagination is therefore key to Smith’s central 
concept: “[w]e spontaneously see people as purposeful, and this is the central act of the practical 
imagination. Smith calls this sympathy…” 
321 As Thomson (1965: 218) points out: “[t]he advance of knowledge thus becomes cumulative; each 
advance should provide more leisure and security for affluent individuals to devote more time to its 
advancement”. 
322 See, for example Smith 1976 (1790), V.II.8; Ibid, III.iii.29; Ibid, III.iii.25. As Thomson notes: “[i]n 
The Theory of Moral Sentiments, sympathy serves as the regulating force which sustains the divergent 
motions of individuals and directs their courses within the harmonious pattern established by nature…” 
(Thomson 1965: 226 [italics in original]). 
 However, he also 
observes the increasing personal and social awareness of the connection between 
conscionable and optimal behaviour in exchange that is realized through the practical 
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imagination and experience in WN.323 As Thomson (1965: 230-231) argues, therefore: 
“[t]he apparently normative aspects of WN reflect Smith’s efforts to account for the 
trend of historical development and to do justice to the fundamental principles of 
psychology, as well as to present a coherent system”.324
Smith thus consistently emphasises the role of imagination and habit upon individuals 
in the establishment of sympathetic commercial activity and relates the cumulative 
nature of such specialisation to philosophical, technological, material and moral 
advances within society. Therefore, Smith’s emphasis on “dissimilar geniuses” among 
individuals in his lectures and in WN is consistent with HoA, in which he notes that 
the person “…who has spent his whole life in the study of the connecting principles of 
nature, will often feel an interval betwixt two objects, which, to more careless 
observers, seem very strictly conjoined” (Smith 1980, HoA, II.11).
 
 
325
                                                 
323 See, for example Smith 1976 (1776), I.x.b.25; I.ii.2. This echoes Smith’s argument in TMS that 
justice is served when “mercenary exchange of good offices according to an agreed valuation” is made 
(Smith 1976 [1790], II.ii.3.2). This relates to perhaps Smith’s most famous quote: “[i]t is not from the 
benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to 
their own interest” (Smith 1976 [1776], I.ii.2), which is also referred to in his lectures (Smith 1978, LJ 
[A], vi.45-46; LJ [B], II.219-222). 
324 Therefore, as Thomson explains: “[i]n both The Theory of Moral Sentiments and The Wealth of 
Nations, the structure of the system is constituted by an equilibrium between the individual and 
society” (Ibid). 
325 As Loasby (2002: 1232) argues: “…it is in this scientific context that the effects of division of 
labour first appear” in Smith’s work. 
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3.3.4) Philosophy and the self 
 
 
Smith’s notion that imagination, habit, custom, and education can make certain 
individuals more perceptive than others thus relates to his connection between 
material, moral, and intellectual growth, as well as to his rejection of rationalism. This 
is reflected by Smith in the section ‘Of the Sense of SEEING’ in ‘Of The External 
Senses’.326
                                                 
326 Hereafter referred to as External Senses. 
 Echoing Berkeley, Smith here notes that: “…no man ever saw the same 
visible object twice” (Smith 1982a, External Senses, 59). However, Smith also points 
out that, although all individuals have the ability to master “certain rules of 
Perspective”, in some cases this ability can be impaired or lost. Smith illustrates this 
point with reference to a blind patient, who, after being treated for cataracts, learns to 
use the “language” of sight in order to develop his innate ability to discern differences 
between objects’ size in relation to his distance from them, and the difference between 
paintings and the objects they are meant to represent. Smith explains that, had the 
patient’s cataracts not been treated until a later date: “[i]n him this instinctive power, 
not having been exerted at the proper season, may, from disuse, have gone gradually 
to decay” (Ibid, 50; 57-69). Smith notes that it is: 
 
…not very easy to say how it is that we learn” this skill “whether by some 
particular instinct, or by some application of either reason or experience, 
which has become so perfectly habitual to us, that we are scarcely sensible 
when we make use of it (Ibid, 50).  
 
However, he appears to appears to favour the former explanation: 
 
…though it may have been altogether by the slow paces of observation and 
experience that this young gentleman acquired the knowledge of the 
connection between visible and tangible objects; we cannot from thence with 
certainty infer, that young children have not some instinctive perception of the 
same kind (Ibid, 69). 
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This example demonstrates that, for Smith, each individual has the ability to discern 
connections between representations of the external world, and this ability may be 
more developed in certain individuals via education or habitual exposure to a 
particular skill. Therefore, as Thomson argues:   
 
[i]n preference to either a consistent rationalism or a strictly inductive process 
of reasoning, Smith favoured the intuitive judgment of the expert, who 
through extensive experience and erudition with a particular field of study had 
acquired a skill or taste with respect to his field of specialization. From such a 
perspective, the beauty, order, and harmony of a system of thought became 
parts of its verification (Thomson 1965: 220 [italics in original]).327
This highlights a contrast between Smith and Hume. As discussed in 2.2.3, both 
thinkers are influenced by Cicero. As James Moore (1994: 26-27) argues, whereas 
Hume demonstrates a proclivity for Cicero’s Epicurean thoughts, Smith avoids an 
overt Epicurean preference.
  
 
This arguably demonstrates again that, as with Smith’s concept of the self, despite the 
absence of an explicit discussion, it is possible to infer his philosophical commitments 
via a holistic interpretation of his thought. As Wightman and Bryce point out, 
although he ostensibly had “little to say about man’s external situation”, Smith:  
 
…assumes that all men are endowed with certain faculties and propensities 
such as reason, reflection, and imagination, and that they are motivated by a 
desire to acquire the sources of pleasure and avoid those of pain. In this 
context pleasure relates to a state of the imagination: the “state of...tranquillity, 
and composure” (Smith 1980, Imitative Arts, II.20 cited in Wightman and 
Bryce, intro to Smith 1980: 3 [italics in original]). 
 
328
                                                 
327 According to Loasby, Smith’s position is thus consistent with Hume’s view of reason, which “alone 
can never produce any action” (Hume, D. [1978 (1739)] A Treatise of Human Nature, edited by L. A. 
Selby-Bigge, Oxford: Clarendon Press, p.414, cited in Loasby 2002: 1231; see also Fleischacker 2004: 
26; Wightman and Bryce, intro to Smith 1980: 16). 
328 As Moore points out, unlike Hutcheson, Smith also avoids an overt preference of the Stoic elements 
of Cicero’s thought (Ibid; see 2.2.3). 
 According to Moore, Hume’s Epicurean reading of 
human nature suggests that our inherent weakness and instability need to be remedied 
by convention. This relates to his understanding of sympathy, which, as Norton 
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(1982: 542) suggests, facilitates Hume’s appeal to the collective judgement of a 
society “…equipped to produce disinterested and intersubjective judgements of an 
objective moral reality”. Although Norton perhaps stresses this point in order to 
underscore his argument that Hume is not a metaphysical sceptic, it is clear that Smith 
stresses the role of the individual’s will as opposed to accounting for sympathy, like 
Hume, in terms of natural causation and the principles of the association of 
impressions and ideas (Broadie 2006: 171). 
 
As Griswold explains, in Smith’s interpretation, Epicurus considers virtue to be 
“defined relative to its utility to the agent’s desire for tranquility and thus pleasure”. 
However, Smith avoids this conflation of sympathy and selfishness. Via his attack on 
Mandeville, Smith shows that what satisfies the spectator is not the pleasure of self-
love, “but the mutuality of the concord of sympathy” (Griswold 1999: 126 [italics in 
original]).329 Thus, unlike Hume, Smith can explain that sympathy is not always 
pleasurable, but is an activity that requires effort. Therefore, an individual’s 
conceptualization of what is pleasurable or painful is related to their level of moral 
development, which informs their ability to generate concord. As such, different 
levels of proximity to one’s spectator are observable among individuals. Thus, those 
that are in closer harmony with their spectator are able to sympathise with those that 
are not in accord with their own, and can sympathise with a view with which they do 
not agree or a set of circumstances which do not reflect their own.330
                                                 
329 See Smith 1976 (1790), VII.ii.2.14-16 in which Smith criticises Epicurus for referring “…all the 
primary objects of natural desire and aversion to the pleasures and pains of the body”. 
330 As Broadie (2006: 172) suggests, it is through the process of sympathetic interaction that an 
individual can thus reflect upon disagreeable aspects of their own nature, which can prompt deeper 
evaluation of their own beliefs.  
 Indeed, one 
could argue that Smith considers this aspect of sympathy to be fundamental to the 
moral progress of society, and, by extension, that a multiplicity of moral standards 
and impartial spectators are observed not only to exist but to be necessary. To be sure, 
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for Smith, sympathy is an active imaginative process that both informs and is 
informed by each individual’s identity and experiences.331
James (1981 [1890]: 288) broadly reflects this view. As discussed, for him, the 
individual chooses to identify with a particular aspect of their “Me”: their material, 
social, or spiritual Self. The “real” for each individual is thus what excites her: “Our 
requirements in the way of reality terminate in our own acts and emotions, our own 
pleasures and pains. These are the ultimate fixities from which…the whole chain of 
our beliefs depends” (James 1889: 345).
  
 
332
[a]s individual members of a pluralistic universe, we must recognize that, even 
though we do our best, the other factors also will have a voice in the 
result…We must ‘Trust them; and at any rate do our best, in spite of the if;’ 
 Truth is therefore a personal and practical 
matter, which relates to James’s evolutionary, asymptotic view of knowledge, which 
he connects to individuals’ progress. As he notes in WB: “[t]he spirit and principles of 
science are mere affairs of method…The only form of thing that we directly 
encounter, the only experience that we concretely have is our own personal life” 
(James 1979 [1896]: 327). This is alluded to in Some Problems of Philosophy: A 
Beginning of an Introduction to Philosophy: 
 
The melioristic universe is conceived after a social analogy, as a pluralism of 
independent powers…Its destiny thus hangs on an if, or on a lot of ifs – which 
amounts to saying…that, the world being as yet unfinished, its total character 
can be expressed only by hypothetical and not by categorical propositions… 
(James 1981 [1910], Appendix: 1099 [italics in original]). 
 
This is a reiteration of James’s preference for empiricist over rationalist methodology, 
which demonstrates his countenancing of unintended consequences:  
 
                                                 
331 See Hume 1896 (1739), III.ii.1. Smith may be seen to challenge Hume directly in Part I of TMS 
(e.g., Smith 1976 [1790], I.i.1.1). 
332 As Strube (1990: 701) argues: “[t]hus, to the extent that self-knowledge allows better contact with 
the pleasures and pains of self-seeking, the truer is that self-knowledge”. 
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…‘If we do our best, and the other powers do their best, the world will be 
perfected” (Ibid, 1100 [italics in original]). 
 
As James is aware, however, these “other powers” are interfered with via prescriptive 
interventions, a view consistent with Smith’s opposition to “men of system”.333
                                                 
333 See Smith 1976 (1790), VI.ii.2.16-18; Smith 1976 (1776), Book IV. 
 
Moreover, like Smith, James clearly does not posit a perfectible universe, and nor 
does he specify how such an outcome ought to be achieved. As noted, for James, 
pragmatism “…does not stand for any special results” (James 1987 [1907]: 509). 
According to Wesley Cooper (2003: 412-413), this demonstrates James’s modest 
consequentialism in which morality is simply “about making things go better”. This is 
again comparable to Smith’s position, a point that is made more clearly by 
consideration of James’s rejection of Thomas Reid. 
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3.3.5) Pragmatism and Common Sense 
 
According to Ronald Beanblossom (2000: 488-489):  
 
[w]hereas Reid finds theoretical solutions to metaphysical questions, James 
finds only practical solutions based upon the demands of subjective 
satisfaction, that is, meliorism. Whereas Reid claims truth is objective, James 
claims it is subjective…334
As such, it is James’s pragmatic meliorism that enables him to overcome moral 
subjectivism.
  
 
335
[n]o concrete test of what is really true has ever been agreed upon. Some make 
the criterion external to the moment of perception…Others make the 
perceptive moment its own test – Descartes, for instance, with his clear and 
distinct ideas guaranteed by the veracity of God; Reid with his “common 
sense”; and Kant with his forms of synthetic judgment a priori…[yet]…The 
much lauded evidence is never triumphantly there; it is mere aspiration or 
Grenzbegriff, marking the infinitely remote ideal of our thinking life…
 As Beanblossom notes, James is thus able to mediate between 
empiricism and rationalism, as his meliorism allows him to justify, on practical 
grounds, a notion of moral objectivity alongside his commitment to pluralism. As 
Beanblossom argues, for James: “[i]f we make the truth in ethics, then subjective 
satisfaction can justify the belief that there is objectivity in morals” (Beanblossom 
2000: 480-483 [italics in original]). This relates to James’s intersubjective notion of 
knowledge formation as discussed in Pragmatism, in which: “[t]he world stands really 
malleable…Man engenders truth upon it” (James 1987 [1907]: 599 [italics in 
original]). Similarly, in WB, James argues that:  
 
336
                                                 
334 As Beanblossom (2000: 489) notes: “[f]or Reid, common sense beliefs are not a fund of basic 
beliefs which are altered over time as practical needs may require…” 
335 In The Dilemma of Determinism from his Essays in Pragmatism, James cites Alexander Carlyle’s 
admonition of such  “…a vast, gloomy, solitary Golgotha and mill of death” to describe subjectivism 
(James 1948: 57). 
336 James 1979 (1896): 22-23 (italics in original). As Lee Oser notes, James denies Descartes’ mind-
body dualism by anchoring the self as a moral agent in the physical conditions of our animal life. 
Moreover, this view “stands in profound contrast to post-Kantian aesthetic theory, which suspends the 
physical presence of the body in favor of the world-constructing faculties of mind” (Oser 2004: 286; 
See James 1992 [1892], Psychology: Briefer Course, p. 356).   
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In Pragmatism, James discusses the tension between “common sense” perception and 
the “invisible” makeup of the world that science investigates:  
 
As common sense interpolates her constant ‘things’ between our intermittent 
sensations, so science extrapolates her world of ‘primary’ qualities, her atoms, 
her ether, her magnetic fields, and the like, beyond the common sense world. 
Science and critical philosophy thus burst the bounds of common sense… 
 
 
With critical philosophy, havoc is made of everything. The common-sense 
categories one and all cease to represent anything in the way of being; they are 
all but sublime tricks of human thought, our ways of escaping bewilderment in 
the midst of sensation’s irremediable flow (James 1987 (1907): 566-567 
[italics in original]). 
 
James’s characterisation of common sense here appears similar to Smith’s first stage 
of philosophical knowledge, that of wonder, as elucidated in HoA. As discussed, here, 
as elsewhere, Smith implicitly rejects rationalism yet by no means discards the 
possibility of a knowable, external world. However, rather than discuss these issues at 
any length, Smith focuses on the practical contribution to and consequences of 
philosophical inquiry relating to material, intellectual, and moral progress. This theme 
is, again, reflected in the work of James, who arrives at such a stance via a more 
detailed explanation of the practical value of philosophy. As he argues in Pragmatism, 
in contrast to “the scientific tendency in critical thought”, which “…has opened an 
entirely unexpected range of practical utilities to our astonished view”: 
 
The philosophic stage of criticism…so far gives us no new range of practical 
power. Locke, Hume, Berkeley, Kant, Hegel, have all been utterly sterile, as 
far as shedding any light on the details of nature goes…The satisfaction they 
yield to their disciples are intellectual, not practical; and even then we have to 
confess that there is a large minus-side to the account (Ibid, 567-568).  
 
This relates to his criticisms of “the Scotch school” in PP: 
 
Locke and Kant, whilst still believing in the soul, began the work of 
undermining the notion that we know anything about it. Most modern writers 
of the mitigated, spiritualistic, or dualistic philosophy - the Scotch school, as it 
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is often called among us - are forward to proclaim this ignorance, and to attend 
exclusively to the verifiable phenomena of self-consciousness, as we have laid 
them down. Dr. Wayland, for example, begins his Elements of Intellectual 
Philosophy with the phrase “Of the essence of Mind we know nothing,” … 
This analogy of our two ignorances is a favorite remark in the Scotch school 
(James 1981 [1890]: 347-348). 
 
The Dr. Wayland to whom James refers is the US clergyman and educator Francis 
Wayland, whose The Elements of Intellectual Philosophy (1854), Elements of 
Political Economy (1841), and Elements of Moral Science (1835) are heavily 
influenced by Thomas Reid (Madden 1962: 348). As Donald Frey notes, Wayland 
attempts to render Protestant morality compatible with laissez-faire economics, 
interpreting the invisible hand as the Divine hand of God (Frey 2002: 229; Tribe 
2003: 233). As is evident in 1.3.1, this is a misinterpretation of Smith’s view. As is 
also discussed in 2.2.2, Smith is opposed to Reid’s position. Arguably, James’s 
antipathy towards Reid affords a clearer understanding of Smith’s epistemology.  
 
Although Smith does not refer to Reid, the latter refers to him. In a letter to Lord 
Kames, Reid states: “I have always thought Dr. Smith’s System of Sympathy wrong. 
It is indeed only a Refinement of the selfish System”.337
In contrast to Reid, Smith holds, as Broadie (2006: 187) notes, “…that a person can 
operate with a set of moral categories, such as propriety…duty, and moral rules, 
without having those categories in a synthetic unity with categories of a religious or 
 However, Smith explains 
that, during sympathetic interaction: 
 
I not only change circumstances with you, but I change persons and 
characters. My grief, therefore, is entirely upon your account, and not in the 
least upon my own. It is not, therefore, in the least selfish (Smith 1976 [1790], 
VII.iii.1.4; see also Ibid, I.i.1.2). 
 
                                                 
337 Letter from Thomas Reid to Henry Home, Lord Kames in Ross, I. S. (1965) Unpublished Letters of 
Thomas Reid to Lord Kames, 1762-1782. Texas Studies in Literature & Language, 7 (1): 17-65. 
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theological sort”. This is, again, similar to James’s position. In The Varieties of 
Religious Experience,338
Religion, therefore, as I now ask you arbitrarily to take it, shall mean for us the 
feelings, acts and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as 
they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider 
the divine (Ibid, 36 [italics in original]).
 James contrasts “institutional” to “personal” religion, and 
concludes that the latter is “…more fundamental than either theology or 
ecclesiasticism” (James 1987 [1902]: 33-35). In this “pragmatic religion”, belief in 
God is justified if it useful for the individual to hold that belief:  
 
339
In the concluding lecture of VRE James asks “…is the existence of so many religious 
types and sects and creeds regrettable?” His answer is, emphatically, “No” (James 
1987 [1902]: 436). Indeed, James points out in Essays in Radical Empiricism that: 
“[r]eligious institutions are prone to becoming interested chiefly in their own dogma 
and corporate ambitions” (James 1912: 268-9). This arguably relates to his general 
opposition to “bigness and greatness in all their forms”,
 
  
340
                                                 
338 Hereafter referred to as VRE. 
339 As James notes in ‘Conclusions’: “God is real since he produces real effects” (Ibid, 461). As Suckiel 
(2003: 33) notes: “[o]n some occasions, notably Lectures XIV and XV of Varieties, The Will to 
Believe, Is Life Worth Living? and Lecture III of Pragmatism, James argues for the justifiability of 
holding religious beliefs, based on the consequences in the life of the believer that those beliefs 
engender”. 
340 As Coon highlights, in a letter from June 1899 expressing his anger over the Spanish-American 
War, James states: “[t]he bigger the unit you deal with, the hollower, the more brutal, the more 
mendacious is the life displayed.  So I am against all big organizations as such…and in favor of the 
eternal forces of truth which always work in the individual and immediately unsuccessful way, under-
dogs always, till history comes after they are long dead, and puts them on top” (William James, letter to 
Sarah Jane Whitman, in H. James (1920) (ed.) The Letters of William James, Boston, II, 90, cited in 
Coon 1996: 80). 
 which reflects his 
pluralistic notion of truth. As he notes in Talks to Students on Some of Life’s Ideals 
(1899):  
 
[h]ands off: neither the whole of truth nor the whole of good, is revealed to 
any single observer, although each observer gains a partial superiority of 
insight from the peculiar position in which he stands…It is enough to ask each 
of us that he should be faithful to his own opportunities and make the most of 
his own blessings, without presuming to regulate the rest of the vast field 
(James 1992 [1899]: 860). 
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Again, this is comparable to Smith’s antipathy towards “men of system”.341
However, this “pure and rational” religion, when considered in the context of Smith’s 
general suspicion of dogma and emphasis on self-determination via the impartial 
spectator, would appear to be one in which the individual’s relationship to their 
spirituality need not be mediated by organised religion. As Broadie (2006: 187) notes, 
it is possible to see TMS as “…an attempt to introduce the experimental method of 
 In WN, he 
argues against “[t]he interested and active zeal of religious teachers [which] can be 
dangerous and troublesome only where there is, either but one sect tolerated in the 
society, or where the whole of a large society is divided into two or three great 
sects…” (Smith 1976 [1776], V.i.g.8). This reflects Smith’s consistent advocacy of 
freedom of choice and suspicion of political interference:   
 
…if politicks had never called in the aid of religion, had the conquering party 
never adopted the tenets of one sect more than those of another, when it had 
gained the victory, it would probably have dealt equally and impartially with 
all the different sects, and have allowed every man to chuse his own priest and 
his own religion as he thought proper. There would in this case, no doubt, 
have been a great multitude of religious sects (Ibid). 
 
It may appear paradoxical however, that, whilst demonstrating the social utility of 
eradicating religious faction via society being “…divided into two or three hundred, 
or perhaps into as many thousand small sects”, Smith appears to advocate one “true” 
religion:   
 
…the concessions which they would mutually find it both convenient and 
agreeable to make to one another, might in time probably reduce the doctrine 
of the greater part of them to that pure and rational religion, free from every 
mixture of absurdity, imposture, or fanaticism, such as wise men have in all 
ages of the world wished to see established (Ibid, V.iii.3.8; See also Ibid, 
V.iii.3.6). 
 
                                                 
341 See Smith 1976 (1776), I.viii.36; IV.ii.9; V.i.e.18; Smith 1976 (1790), V.ii.9; VI.iii.28; Rosenberg 
1979: 29; Rosenberg 1960: 562; Salter 1999: 223; De Marchi and Greene 2005: 451-452; see also 
1.1.1-2 for a discussion of Smith’s concern for the poor.  
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reasoning into moral subjects”.342 Yet Smith avoids conflating morality with 
rationality. As Griswold argues, Smith once refers to the viewpoint of the impartial 
spectator as “reason”. However, such “reasonableness” is not analogous to Kantian 
rationality. Therefore, Smith’s notion of the impartial spectator does not refer to 
impartial reason yet implicitly addresses “…what Kantian moral reason is meant to 
provide…without any of the problematic claims about the transcendental status of 
reason” (Griswold 1999: 139-142).343
As argued, Smith’s intersubjective understanding of moral reasoning is shared by 
James. In Pragmatism, he contends: “[t]o treat abstract principles as finalities, before 
which our intellects may come to rest in a state of admiring contemplation, is the great 
rationalist failing” (James 1987 [1907]: 527).
  
 
344
This reflects my argument in 2.3.2 regarding Smith’s conceptualisation of a 
multiplicity of impartial spectators. Smith is aware that no one, including himself, has 
 A holistic reading of Smith’s and 
James’s work thus reveals that, for them, moral identity does not derive from 
universalistic assumptions based on theological or rationalist claims to truth. As 
Haakonssen (2006: 9) argues: 
 
[w]hile a scientist of human nature, such as Smith, may…be able to discern 
the basic features of the human mind and personal interaction which are 
involved in social adaptation, he does not have access to a universal morality 
nor is an underlying logos any part of his concern. 
 
                                                 
342 This is, of course, the subtitle of Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature (1739). As Gavin Kennedy 
(2005: 18-19) explains, it is this text that was confiscated by Smith’s tutors at Balliol College, who 
reprimanded him for owning a book they considered unsuitable reading for a candidate for ordination. 
It would appear that Smith’s antipathy towards organised religion continued throughout his career in 
academia. As Buchan notes: “John Ramsay of Ochertyre reported that Smith asked to be excused from 
opening his [moral philosophy] class [at Glasgow] with a prayer, but was refused” (Ramsay, J. [1888], 
Scotland and Scotsmen in the Eighteenth Century, Edinburgh: William Blackwood, Vol. 1, p.463 cited 
in Buchan 2006: 42). See also Smith 1976 (1790), III.v.13; Ibid, III.ii.35. 
343 Smith’s reference to the impartial spectator as “reason” is in Smith 1976 (1790), III.iii.5. 
344 This is arguably reflected in VRE: “Both our personal ideals and our religious and mystical 
experiences must be interpreted congruously with the kind of scenery which our thinking mind 
inhabits. The philosophic climate of our time inevitably forces its own clothing on us” (James 1987 
[1902]: 388-389). 
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sufficient information to make infallible judgements. Indeed, as Broadie (2006: 183) 
points out: “…we can never say that the impartial spectator’s judgment is true, and in 
that sense every such judgement is no more than a holding operation”.345
Such choices imply an open-ended future, actively affected by the individual.
 This again 
relates to James’s pragmatic rejection of supposedly objective truth and his 
commitment to the asymptotic and provisional nature of knowledge. As discussed, 
James argues in ‘The Consciousness of Self’ in PP that one’s “ideal social self” 
prompts an individual’s addressing their moral aspirations. The philosophical 
relevance of such a position is evident in his rejection of Schopenhauer in the 
previous chapter in PP, ‘The Stream of Consciousness’, in which James discusses 
why “ethical energy” is “the decisive issue of a man’s career”: 
 
When he debates, Shall I commit this crime? choose that profession? accept 
that office, or marry this fortune? - his choice really lies between one of 
several equally possible future Characters. What he shall become is fixed by 
the conduct of the moment…. The problem with the man is less what act he 
shall now resolve to do than what being he shall now choose to become 
(James 1981 [1890]: 172 [italics in original]). 
 
346
                                                 
345 As Broadie (2006: 184) notes: “[i]n the light of the foregoing comments we have to recognise that 
despite Smith’s reference to ‘the judgment of the ideal man within the breast’ (Smith 1976 [1790], 
III.3.26), the doctrine of the impartial spectator is not a contribution to, even less a version of, the ‘ideal 
observer theory’ that has been on the agenda at least since Roderick Firth’s work”. 
346 This is in contrast to dogmatic theological and philosophical systems that claim access to an 
objective viewpoint from which universal moral standards are derived and towards which individuals 
are to be compelled. Moreover, as discussed, James does not suggest that identity is purely socially 
constructed. Rather, as Oser (2004: 290-291) points out, James’s rejection of Schopenhauer entails that 
the “Jamesian self is able to be socialized…but its “constituents”, “mutations” and “multiplications” 
are basic to our experience, the healthy attunement of which forms a large part of moral education” 
(See James 1992 [1892]: 174–209).  
 This 
is reflected in the self-determining aspects of Smith’s impartial spectator concept. As 
noted, rather than posit an ideal standard towards which all individuals must aspire, 
Smith’s: “…concern is to explain how people make moral assessments of the merit of 
their own and other people’s motives and behaviour, and he suggests that this happens 
by an implicit invocation of their notion of ideal propriety”, as Haakonssen (2006: 12-
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14) points out. This is because, for Smith, as for James: “…as moral agents, we are 
acts of creative imagination”.347
[t]he impartial spectator is simply not ideal, but instead the best, for all its 
many faults, that we can manage. That best is constrained by limited 
information admixed with error and by an affective nature that can yield to 
pressure from outside forces and, in yielding, distort the agent’s moral 
judgments.
 Therefore, as Broadie (2006: 184) argues:  
 
348
                                                 
347 As Haakonssen rightly argues: “[i]f he (Smith) had meant this to be a criterion of right action, as 
opposed to an analysis of the structure of people’s judgement of right action, then it would clearly have 
been circular and quite vacuous…” (Ibid). 
348 As Broadie (2006: 185) notes: “[t]he real spectator sets the agenda for the impartial and, but for the 
prompting, the latter might have stayed asleep and the agent would not have reacted appropriately to 
his situation”.  
 
 
Like James, Smith thus appears to posit a pluralistic moral universe, albeit one that is 
underpinned by observable similarities. As such, neither thinker presents their 
conceptualization of the self as being an atomized, perfectly informed agent that is 
free from external constraints. This is in direct contrast to neoclassical economists’ 
assumptions about “rational economic man”.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 252 
3b) Chapter Three conclusion 
 
This chapter has demonstrated the compatibility between Smith’s and James’s notions 
of the self via a comparison of their intersubjective explanations of the nature of 
identity and knowledge formation. This serves to reiterate that neoclassical authors’ 
reductionist views of Smith’s work fail to adequately reflect his psychological 
account of identity and behaviour and the connections that he demonstrates exist 
between material, moral and scientific progress. This predisciplinary approach is also 
reflected in James’s work. As Ashmore and Jussim (1997: v) point out: 
“[p]sychological and sociological analyses of self have a common parent in William 
James”. However, although James’s views regarding the self are accurately 
represented within contemporary psychology, his ideas are imported into sociology 
via figures such as Mead. An example of this is given by Roy Bhaskar (2002: 70), 
who states: “[p]erhaps the best known attempt in the 20th
This is also reflected in more sophisticated attempts to engage with Smith in 
sociology, as is evident in the “ethical naturalism” of Andrew Sayer (2003). In 
 century…of the self is the 
contrast between the ‘I’ and ‘me’, initially formulated by Meade [sic]”.  
 
It is interesting therefore to consider that, like mainstream economists, sociologists 
are similarly obstructed from engaging effectively with Smith. One explanation of this 
is Mead’s misinterpretation of Smith’s concept of sympathy, which, in turn, 
contributes to a reiteration of the supposed two “Adam Smiths” across the social 
sciences. This is supported by Costelloe’s admittance that Mead never cites or 
mentions TMS (Costelloe 1997: 83). Along with severely undermining Costelloe’s 
claim that Smith’s notion of sympathy facilitates Mead’s supposedly identical 
conceptualisation of the self, this also shows Mead’s reading of Smith to be as 
selective as that of orthodox economists, albeit with a different emphasis.  
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contrast to Mead, Sayer refers exclusively to TMS in his attempt to reconcile 
structural and agential factors in moral philosophy via Smith. Sayer is also informed 
by Griswold’s argument regarding the alleged aporia between Smith’s “historical” 
and “conventionalist” account of morality. As discussed in 2b, for Griswold, Smith 
does not explain how general, unchanging principles of justice might be derived from 
moral notions. As such, Griswold (1999: 257) asks: “[i]s not the process either 
circular or inherently impossible?” As I have argued, Smith avoids this aporia by 
implying a multiplicity of impartial spectators and an intersubjective account of the 
development of moral standards.  
 
As I have suggested, this account is echoed by James. Indeed, both authors stress the 
evolutionary nature of and the close connection between knowledge and morality 
formation. With this, and both authors’ antipathy towards prescription, in mind, we 
can more fruitfully interpret Smith’s comments regarding “…the science of a 
legislator, whose deliberations ought to be governed by general principles which are 
always the same” (Smith 1976 [1776], IV.ii.39). This quote appears in “Of Restraints 
Upon The Importation As Can Be Produced At Home from foreign Countries of such 
Goods” in Book IV of WN. Here, Smith argues against restrictions on imports of 
items such as corn, salt, and cattle; points out the “folly” of taxes placed upon 
necessities; and discusses the negative impacts of retaliatory tariffs. Indeed, it is in 
this section that he introduces the invisible hand metaphor (Ibid, IV.ii.9), which, as 
noted, relates to the evolutionary character of material, moral and scientific progress.  
Therefore, this quote, used by Griswold to demonstrate Smith’s supposed deduction 
of moral standards from an unchanging, objective source, actually appears in a section 
in which he is arguing against the prescriptive interference of individuals that may lay 
claim to such standards. As such, we can see that his notion of “general principles 
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which are always the same” does not relate to a priori moral standards, but to his 
observation that retaliatory actions are reactions to previous interventions that restrict 
progress. This enables Smith to advocate the virtues of the “scientific” legislator, a 
disinterested figure, similar perhaps to that of each individual’s impartial spectator, 
who can see the long-run benefits of freer trade, as opposed to those figures that are 
more suited to dealing with such short-term policies: “…that insidious and crafty 
animal, vulgarly called a statesman or politician, whose councils are directed by the 
momentary fluctuations of affairs” (Ibid). By introducing such a temporal aspect, 
Smith is clearly demonstrating that there are no fixed rules for dealing with every 
eventuality, a theme that is consistent with his rejection of casuistry and “men of 
system” (Smith 1976 [1790], VI.ii.1.22).  
 
As suggested, and as Haakonssen and Winch (2006: 386) point out: “[t]here is an 
exact parallel between his [Smith’s] concept of morals and his view of the physical 
sciences”. By highlighting Smith’s view of the evolutionary and open-ended nature of 
knowledge formation through a comparison with James, one is able to see more 
clearly that a pluralistic view of the nature of morality pervades Smith’s thought. As 
such, it is plain that his attempt to articulate the “general principles of law and 
government” is an undertaking based on observation rather than a normative process.  
This goes against Griswold’s stance, which informs Sayer’s view that: “Smith appears 
to waver between realist and conventionalist views” (Sayer 2003: 6-7). To support 
this, Sayer quotes from TMS:   
 
“Originally, however, we approve of another man’s judgement, not as 
something useful, but as right, as accurate, as agreeable to truth and reality.” 
However, this realist point is immediately compromised when he [Smith] 
continues “and it is evident that he attributes those qualities to it for no other 
reason but because we find that it agrees with our own.” - implying a 
subjective or conventionalist view of truth (Smith 1976 [1790], I.i.4.4 cited in 
Sayer 2003: 7). 
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Sayer (2003: 12) argues that “…we need to relate ethical dispositions or moral 
sentiments both to the kinds of beings we are - social, embodied beings located in 
various societies or communities - and to what it is that makes people not merely 
respond to conditions but discriminate among them”. Smith would no doubt concur. 
However, although Sayer attempts to account for the effects of social processes, he 
does not explain how such discrimination might occur, nor how moral dispositions are 
formed, beyond that of these social processes that he argues are overly focused upon 
in social constructivist accounts. As such, in attempting to avoid relativism, Sayer 
arguably veers towards Bhaskar’s Meadian collapse of the individual and society.  
 
As I have argued, a holistic reading of Smith reveals that, while he never rejects 
epistemological realism, he does not commit himself to this position. This is evinced 
by his rejection of Hutcheson’s moral sense concept and of rationalist and common 
sense arguments throughout his oeuvre. Furthermore, as is clear from his rejection of 
Mandeville and his development of Hume’s notion of sympathy, Smith does not 
imply a conventionalist version of truth. Indeed, his discussions in TMS regarding 
slavery and infanticide clearly demonstrate this (Smith 1976 [1790], VII.i.2.28; 
V.ii.15). As Haakonssen and Winch (2006: 386) argue, Smith:  
 
…certainly subscribed to the relativity of morals in the sense that he saw 
moral phenomena as objects of causable explanation (i.e. as understandable in 
relation to their generation and effect). However, that is different from the 
metaphysical doctrine that values inherently or necessarily vary with their 
circumstances so that universal values are impossible, a doctrine Smith would 
have as little truck as with any other piece of metaphysics. 
 
As such, Sayer’s argument for a “qualified ethical naturalism” fails to provide any 
move beyond that which Smith already recognises, but is unwilling to emphasise.349
                                                 
349 As Haakonssen (1996: 131) argues, the object of the impartial spectator’s judgement is a socially 
formed self: “…but this does not mean that there are no universally constant features of humanity 
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However, a rejection of Sayer’s argument highlights that, rather than “wavering”, 
Smith’s asymptotic view of the nature of knowledge and morality formation 
consistently informs his work. As Olson explains: “Smith implied that unceasing 
change rather than permanence must be the characteristic of philosophy”.350 As 
Haakonssen and Winch (2006: 382-384) suggest, this does not imply “…that Smith 
had no concepts of moral obligation, rightness, and goodness; it is simply to maintain 
that once we have an account of the origin and function of these moral concepts - their 
causes and effects - there is nothing more to say about them in philosophical or 
‘scientific’ terms”. As they argue: “If we want guidance on how to live the good life, 
we should look elsewhere…” (Ibid, 382-385)351
This relates to my argument in 2.3.2 that Smith conceives of a multiplicity of 
impartial spectators, as well as to contemporary pragmatist notions that: “…the 
question of how the world ‘really’ is independently of our goals and descriptions is 
simply not relevant” (Kivinen and Piiroinen 2004: 239; 338). This reflects James’s 
view. As discussed, for James, moral truth is what it is useful, personally and socially, 
for the individual to believe. As this relates to his notion of the ideal social self as the 
motivating factor, as it is in Smith’s account of the impartial spectator, this is unlike 
Mandeville’s social “deception” and Hume’s convention-based social utility 
argument. As with Smith, this is also at odds with Hutcheson’s moral sense argument, 
the rationalism of Kant, the common sense of Reid, and theological accounts that 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
…the moral philosopher can trace certain patterns of moral reaction across different societies and 
cultures”.  
350 Olson, J. (1975), Scottish Philosophy and British Physics, 1750-1870. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, p. 123 cited in Wightman and Bryce, intro to Smith 1980: 12. 
351 Haakonssen and Winch (2006: 386-387) suggest that for Smith: “…there were in fact three features 
of the moral life that seemed to have a high degree of stability across time and place - a conclusion 
reached by his empirical, especially historical, study of the species…the negative virtue of justice…the 
positive virtues that regulate people’s love of each other… [and] the procedural virtue of impartiality”. 
As they argue: “[t]his reading of Smith’s moral theory is confirmed by the fact that all his moral, legal, 
and political criticism is, as it were, internal to an historically given situation…” (Ibid, 337-338). 
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claim moral standards derive from God and are knowable through an accountable, 
indivisible soul’s relationship to Him via their doctrines. Instead, for James, “…minds 
inhabit environments which act on them and on which they in turn react” (James 1981 
[1890]: 294). As noted, this is similar to Smith’s account.  
 
Arguably, it is via such a comparison that it is possible to see more clearly that for 
Smith, as for James, moral identity is formed by an individual in relation to their ideal 
self and their contextual environment, which they affect and are affected by.352
                                                 
352 See James 1880: 442; Smith 1976 (1790), III.i.2-3. 
 This 
relates to both thinkers’ asymptotic notions of truth and retention of an analytically 
distinct part of the self with which the individual communes. Indeed, it is evident in 
both accounts that it is via conscious effort that individuals can change their moral 
perspectives over time. It is thus as absurd to argue that Smith places emphasis upon a 
fixed ontological reality as it is to claim that either thinker proposes a conventionalist 
account of moral standards. As Haakonssen and Winch (2006: 338) point out, Smith: 
“…has virtually nothing to say about what to expect of the future; and his 
prescriptions”, such as they are, “…are all ‘internalist,’ piecemeal, and hedged with 
qualifying doubt on all sides”. Therefore, like James, in suggesting that a plurality of 
moral standards exists, Smith does not “…pour out the child with the bath” (James 
1981 [1890]: 352). Rather, as this chapter has demonstrated, both authors retain 
agency for the individual via a psychological explanation of knowledge and morality 
formation. As such, their compatible views can provide a framework for a viable 
alternative to the concept of the self that is currently employed in IPE. The appeal of 
such a framework is explored in the next chapter. 
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4a) Introduction 
 
Economists’, sociologists’ and psychologists’ ongoing engagement with Adam Smith 
is reflected by IPE theorists such as Andrew Gamble (1995), Richard Higgott (e.g., 
2000; 2006), Craig Murphy and Roger Tooze (1991), Susan Strange (e.g., 1984) and 
Matthew Watson (e.g., 2005; 2007a; 2009; 2010), who invoke Smith’s ideas in order 
to re-engage the subject field of IPE with its pre-disciplinary origins. For these 
authors, Smith’s polymathic approach to political economy is the “central stream” 
from which IPE springs, a point that reminds us of its ability to host a variety of 
philosophical concerns and methodological approaches (Gills 2001: 236-240).  
 
Often, however, this is overlooked. As Higgott (2006: 2; 19) suggests, there has been 
an undesirable bifurcation of the subject field in recent years along methodological 
lines, in which deductive, rationalist, International Relations-based North American 
IPE is set against its inductive, reflexive, critical British counterpart (Denemark and 
O’Brien 1997; Murphy and Nelson 2001; Tooze 1985; Cameron and Palan 2009). 
Benjamin Cohen (2007; 2008) has noted an antagonistic relationship between these 
research communities that he identifies as a set of “entirely different ‘cultures’ of 
IPE” that, he claims, can only engage in a “dialogue of the deaf”(Cohen 2008: 175). 
As Higgott and Watson (2008: 2-3; 11) argue, however, this separation of IPE into 
two hostile camps is a “…crude methodological caricature” that “…looks capable of 
reinvigorating something akin to the terms of the Methodenstreit, only this time as 
applied to IPE”. 
 
As Gamble (1995: 518-520) explains, the Austro-German Methodenstreit (battle of 
methods) occurred between Carl Menger and Gustav Schmoller during the late 1880s 
and early 1890s over the use of deductivist or inductivist methodology in explaining 
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economic phenomena. According to Gamble, Menger’s victory prompted an enduring 
“disciplinary chasm” that resulted in politics and economics subsequently being 
interpreted as “…separate spheres, which needed to be analysed in quite separate 
ways”.353
This fragmentation of political economy into separate disciplines (Higgott 2006: 187) 
is also reflected in the selective approaches to Smith’s thought on both “sides” of this 
deductive-inductive divide in the social sciences. As discussed in 1.2.1-4, the standard 
view of Smith is that put forward by Austrian and neoclassical economists who 
portray him as an advocate of selfishness and methodological individualism (e.g., Von 
Mises 1969; Stigler 1975), a view associated with Menger’s methodology. It is 
perhaps important to note that Menger did not attribute this view to Smith. Indeed, he 
states that: “…there is not a single instance in A. Smith’s work in which he represents 
the interest of the rich and powerful as opposed to the poor and weak” (Menger 1950 
(1891): 223 cited in Rothschild 2001: 65). As noted, this view rests instead upon the 
analytical separation of the economic “Smith” of WN from the moral “Smith” of TMS, 
and deliberate concentration upon selected passages from the former book. As 
discussed in 1.3.1-3, this focus upon the WN “Smith” is challenged - albeit to a 
limited extent - by sociologists and economic historians from the other “side” of the 
post-Methodenstreit divide that attempt to rehabilitate the altruistic “Smith” of TMS 
through arguments regarding his purported susceptibility to misunderstanding and 
proclivity for obfuscation of his “real” meaning.  
 The Methodenstreit thus stimulated the creation of the disciplines of 
economics, sociology and psychology and their self-consciously distinct research 
agendas and methodological commitments that were disseminated by newly 
established syllabuses, journals and academic associations. 
 
                                                 
353 Gamble 1995: 518-520. See Blyth and Varghese 1999: 361; De Soto 1998: 89-92; Swedberg 1987a: 
18; Tribe 1995: 74; Bernstein 2003: 42. 
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As argued in 1b, these accounts are as inaccurate as those they seek to challenge, as 
they also reiterate the Adam Smith Problem whilst claiming, wrongly, that Smith 
deliberately invites misinterpretation. A different viewpoint is given by William Tabb 
(1999: 31), who argues that: “[t]he reason Adam Smith and other canonical writers 
are open to multiple and conflicting readings is that the interpretation of these texts is 
a struggle over the construction of the discipline”. Although I do not intend to explore 
the merits of Tabb’s argument here, it raises an important point. This is that 
contemporary authors’ appeals to a particular “Smith” are implicitly informed by the 
“side” of the post-Methodenstreit divide that their disciplines’ founders opted to join. 
Significantly, however, the originators of these “sides” - Menger and Schmoller - both 
viewed Smith as an advocate of individualism, self-interest and laissez-faire.  
 
As “undisputable leader” of the Younger German Historical School and of the Verein 
für Sozialpolitik (Association for Social Policy), a group of economists dedicated to 
opposing laissez-faire policy, Schmoller was influential in shaping the notion of 
Smith as a dogmatic advocate of selfishness and free markets that gained popularity 
during the nineteenth century. Moreover, despite an apparent commitment to a socio-
political methodology, Schmoller’s agreement with older German Historical School 
members as to the supposed credibility of the Adam Smith Problem also reflects the 
tendency to separate the “economic” from the “ethical” aspects of human behaviour 
that is ordinarily identified with marginalist accounts as provided by Menger.354
                                                 
354 Schmoller, G. (1907) Adam Smith. Internationale Wochenschrift für Wissenschaft, Kunst und 
Technik, pp.327-336, 373-378 cited in O’Brien 1992: 131; Montes 2004: 27, footnote 20; Haller 2004: 
7; Tribe 2002: 28. 
  
This tendency is compounded by other figures in the Younger German Historical 
School such as Max Weber.  
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As is well known, Weber’s is a seminal contribution to sociology. Less remarked 
upon is that he studied under Karl Knies - originator of the faulty “French connection” 
theory on Smith - whom Weber replaced as Professor of Political Economy at 
Heidelberg University in 1896 (Yagi 2005: 325-327). Arguably, Weber’s (1978 
[1922]) distinction between “formal rationality” and “substantive rationality” reflects 
Knies’s and Schmoller’s separation of the two “Smiths”. To be sure, it helped 
compound the burgeoning division between the new disciplines of economics and 
sociology. As Hodgson (2001: 118-120) points out, following Menger, economists 
would: “…consider the rational behaviour of the individual, with given ends and 
circumstances”. Following Weber, sociologists: “…would consider the manner in 
which culture may mould these ends”. Certainly, it was during this period that: 
“…sociology backed off from the area of economics”, as Richard Swedberg (1987a: 
18) notes. 
 
This divide was not immediately apparent in the US, however, where for a number of 
years its leading economists advocated the German Historical School’s socio-political 
approach. Richard T. Ely, founder of the American Economic Association, was 
among a number of prominent US economists that advocated this method upon their 
return from German universities in the 1880s.355 Indeed, Ely’s advocacy of 
progressive activism and opposition to laissez-faire economics was central to the 
discipline in this period; as Tabb (1999: 117) notes, Ely’s Outline of Economics 
(1893)356
                                                 
355 As Mason (1982: 391) notes, a number of prominent US economists of the period such as Simon N. 
Patten, Edmund J. James and Joseph F. Johnson returned from Germany  “imbued…with a common 
doctrine”. Sociologist Mead also visited Germany in the following decade, taking Schmoller’s course 
on ‘General or Theoretical Political Economy’ during his stay at the University of Berlin between 1889 
and 1891 (Hodgson 2001: 116). 
356 New York, NY: Macmillan. 
 was the most widely used textbook in US universities’ economics 
departments for the next forty years. In the long term, however, Simon Newcomb - 
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Ely’s opponent in the US version of the Methodenstreit - was arguably more 
influential.357 Sharing Menger’s opposition to interventionism, Newcomb additionally 
promoted the use of mathematics in order to rid economics of its socio-political 
overtones (Tabb 1999: 117). This ongoing separation of economics from politics 
marks an alignment of European and American approaches that was aided by Lionel 
Robbins’ (e.g., 1935) adoption of the Austrian method for British economics, and 
which in turn influenced the emerging neoclassical orthodoxy in the US (Tabb 1999: 
117; Hodgson 2008: 83; Hodgson 2001: 207-208). As Hodgson (2001: 209) states: 
“[w]hen Paul Samuelson (1947, 1948) re-laid the foundations of postwar neoclassical 
economics and published his best-selling textbook,358
                                                 
357 The US version of the Methodenstreit occurred between 1884 and 1886 (Tribe 2003: 239-241). 
358 Samuelson, P. A. (1947) Economics: An Introductory Analysis. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press; Samuelson, P. A. (1948) Economics: An Introductory Analysis. New York, NY: 
MacGraw-Hill. 
 Robbins’ definition of 
economics was adopted”.  
 
As discussed in 1.2.2, Samuelson’s canonical account continues to dominate 
economics and also mainstream interpretations of Smith’s work. The continued 
influence of this view, based upon Viner’s (1928) assumption that the WN “Smith” is 
separable from and superior to the TMS “Smith”, reflects the ongoing ascendancy of 
post-Methodenstreit assumptions regarding the separable nature of economic from 
other forms of behaviour. Indeed, it is arguable that the reductionist lens through 
which Samuelson and other neoclassical authors such as Friedman (e.g., 1970 
[1953]), Schumpeter (e.g., 1994 [1954]) and Stigler (e.g., 1975) present Smith owes 
as much to Schmoller et al’s separation of the two “Smiths” in the Adam Smith 
Problem as it does the catallactic separation of economics from politics that 
marginalists such as Menger (e.g., 1850 [1951]) advocate. 
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To be sure, orthodox IPE theorists’ conceptual separation of economics and politics 
and preference for the former discipline’s methodology continues to reflect this 
approach (Murphy and Tooze 1996: 682). Yet, as Watson (2005: 5-6) suggests, 
critical IPE theorists have also: “…tended to import assumptions about fundamentally 
rational economic behaviour from the neoclassical tradition that they would otherwise 
align themselves against”. This, he argues, is demonstrated by non-reflexive 
reiterations of the dominant “states and markets” approach by critical IPE theorists 
that implicitly reproduces neoclassical assumptions of rationality. In order to 
problematise this, Watson and Higgott suggest that it is necessary to consider IPE not 
in terms of opposing methodological factions based upon location, as Cohen does, but 
in terms of a classical political economy approach that pre-dates the “deductive-
inductive divide” that has pervaded the social sciences since the Methodenstreit 
(Watson 2005: 27; Higgott 2006: 9; Higgott 2007: 162).  
 
Writing around one hundred years before this period ensures Smith’s transcendence 
of this divide. However, his ability to do so is based less upon chronology but on the 
consistently holistic method with which he approaches the study of social phenomena, 
a point discussed in 3.3.2. Indeed, as Hodgson (2001: 5) notes: “[w]hile Adam Smith 
attempted judiciously to blend induction with deduction, at the same time he sought 
general principles and laws”. Yet, as established, Smith does not do so in order to 
posit a universalist teleology, but to inquire into the possible existence of these 
principles and laws in terms of the ongoing development of systems of morality, 
economics, justice, science, aesthetics and language, without ever isolating these areas 
of life.  
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As also noted, Smith’s approach therefore bears comparison to William James’ 
philosophical psychology, a seminal contribution made during the period in which the 
Methodenstreit occurred.359 As Michael Lawlor (2006: 324) suggests: “James moved 
easily between disciplines and subjects, and refused to respect traditional academic 
boundaries”. Certainly, psychologists, sociologists and political theorists are 
increasingly recognising the relevance of James’ contribution.360 As I suggested in the 
previous chapter, James’s ideas are also of vital significance to IPE. Indeed, James’s 
and Smith’s pre-disciplinary approaches avoid the post-Methodenstreit propensity to 
conceptualise each social science discipline as, in Susan Strange’s memorable phrase: 
“…a closed shop, a self-perpetuating secret society of the initiated”.361
                                                 
359 See Swedberg 1987a: 12; Twomey 1998: 433; Goodman 2002: 30; Haakonssen and Winch 2006: 
372. As Hodgson (2001: 99-108) explains, there was a British Methodendiskurs between Alfred 
Marshall and historicists William Cunningham and Herbert Foxwell, which was “a pale imitation” of 
the Austro-German Methodenstreit, owing to Marshall’s failure to reject historical specificity in 
economics. Despite this, Marshall’s theoretical approach became the dominant mode of economic 
thought in Britain prior to Robbins’ tenure at the London School of Economics owing in part to his 
successful rejection of the historical school’s naïve empiricism. 
360 See Danziger 1997; Barbalet 2008; Rorty 1982. As discussed in 3.1.3, James’s seminal influence 
upon contemporary psychology is well noted in the field (see Suckiel 2003; Danziger 1997). 
361 Strange 1984: ix; Strange 1994: 20; Strange 1991: 33; Gamble 1995: 517; Underhill 2000: 805-806. 
 This is in 
contrast to Cohen (2008: 177), who argues that IPE theorists: “…should temper the 
temptation to address the totality of human experience”.  
 
In my view, this impasse demonstrates that intellectual space exists within IPE for a 
Smith-James understanding of the individual in society. As I argue in the Conclusion 
to this thesis, a clearer understanding of these thinkers enables IPE theorists to reflect 
upon their subject field’s interdisciplinary character minus the subjectivism and 
rationalism of marginalist and neoclassical economics that informs orthodox IPE and 
the overly normative approaches typically associated with critical IPE.  
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In order to prepare the ground for this argument, in 4.1.1-3, I discuss the ongoing 
legacy of the Methodenstreit in terms of the continued dominance of rationalist 
approaches in the social sciences, which, I suggest, influences behavioural economists 
as well as orthodox and critical IPE theorists. In 4.2.1-2, I discuss other attempts to 
bridge the perceived methodological gap in the social sciences made by new 
institutionalist economists and their “old” institutionalist counterparts who endeavour 
to utilise particularistic interpretations of Smith and James via the thought of Menger 
and Thorstein Veblen. In 4.3.1-3, I discuss constructivist efforts to overcome the 
divide, including those of critical realist, poststructuralist, social constructivist and 
neopragmatist theorists. This demonstrates the influence of figures such as Mead and 
Charles S. Peirce - whose views are also incorrectly conflated with those of Smith and 
James - on these flawed attempts to overcome the assumed divide. As such, I provide 
an explanation for and an alternative to these theorists’ inability to transcend the 
disciplinary divide and to provide a satisfactory account of agency. As I suggest, this 
failure owes much to an implicit adherence to the post-Methodenstreit separation of 
politics and economics and its subsequent institutionalization behind disciplinary 
boundaries, and the related tendency to implicitly identify oneself within such 
theoretical traditions via one’s methodological approach. In my view, that these 
attempts often utilise mistaken conceptualizations of Smith or James demonstrates the 
pressing need for clearer understanding of their thought. In addition, this 
understanding facilitates the contextualisation of IPE within the social sciences and 
highlights its unique ability to provide a non-reductive account of agency that 
transcends post-disciplinary methodological barriers. 
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Part One: Rationalist approaches   
4.1.1) Rational choice and the two “IPEs” 
 
Cohen’s division of IPE into rationalist and cognitive “factions” along geographical 
lines is based upon claims to the subject field’s alleged intellectual origins:  
 
The American school…takes its inspiration from the norms of conventional 
social science as developed since the late nineteenth century…The British 
school’s roots, by contrast, go back…to the classical political economy of the 
eighteenth century and its links to the study of moral philosophy (Cohen 2008: 
165; 174-176). 
 
 
Cohen’s (2007: 197) view that IPE has existed “for less than half a century” - allied to 
his view that the subject field: “…is about the complex linkages between economic 
and political activity at the level of international affairs” - intimates a preference for 
the “American school” that he perceives. Of more importance to my argument is that 
his identification of two distinct research communities in IPE, each with their own 
“boundaries, rewards, and careers”, arguably reflects the broader propensity within 
the social sciences to bifurcate its disciplines into opposing groups. This tendency was 
introduced by the Austro-German Methodenstreit, a debate over appropriate 
methodological approaches in the social sciences primarily associated with the 
arguments of Gustav Schmoller and Carl Menger, leading figures in the Younger 
German Historical School and the newly emergent Austrian school of economics. As 
Keith Tribe (1995: 74) explains, whereas Schmoller advocated a historical, 
comparative approach in order to discern the general laws of economic development, 
Menger sought to “…clarify the theoretical basis of economics by reducing 
propositions to their most abstract, ideal-typical form”.  
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These methodological preferences are respectively associated with later sociologists’ 
and economists’ approaches, and may also be identified in orthodox and critical 
approaches to IPE. As with the erroneous separation of the two “Adam Smiths”, the 
ongoing reiteration of this division in disciplinary journals, key texts and syllabuses 
maintains the impression that there is an irrevocable tension between those on either 
side of the alleged methodological divide. As a more accurate appraisal of Smith’s 
work demonstrates, however, this need not be the case. Indeed, Smith demonstrates 
that it is not necessary to separate aspects of social phenomena in order to assess them 
effectively. In contrast, Menger’s catallactic separation of economic behaviour from 
other forms of conduct is repeated by authors such as Max Weber (e.g., 1978 [1922]), 
whose seminal contribution to sociology helped shape the methodological 
commitments of subsequent contributors to this subject field. As such, the post-
Methodenstreit rationalist separation of economics and politics that is usually 
associated with mainstream economics is as deeply embedded within sociology, 
despite the latter discipline’s emblematic commitment to socio-political methodology.  
 
Arguably, the status of rational choice theory as “the universal grammar of social 
science” supports this view.362 Rational choice theory developed out of public choice 
theory, collective action theory and game theory, and its conceptualisation of 
individual agency as “rational economic man” is derived from John Stuart Mill’s 
(1992 [1844]) notion of the autonomous economic individual (Blyth 2002: 299; Blyth 
and Varghese 1999: 351-353; Tabb 1999: 114).363
                                                 
362 Boulding, K. E. (1969) ‘Technology and the Changing Social Order’. In Popenoe, D. (ed.) The 
Urban Industrial Frontier: Essays on Social Trends and Institutional Goals in Modern Communities. 
New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, p.131 cited in Swedberg 1987b: 121. See also Blyth 
2002: 299; Coleman 1994: 171; Higgott 2006: 23; Higgott 2007: 162.  
363 As Donald Green and Ian Shapiro (1994: 13) explain, there is no single rational choice theory, 
however assumptions associated with rational choice approaches include: “…utility maximisation, the 
structure of preferences, decision making under conditions of uncertainty, and…the centrality of 
individuals in the explanation of collective outcomes”. 
 In addition to its employment by 
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economists, this conceptualisation of agency is increasingly utilised by sociologists as 
an explanation for forms of activity other than that categorised by them and others as 
“economising” behaviour (Hodgson 1998: 189). Interestingly, Milan Zavirowski 
(2000: 448) notes, rational choice sociologists Raymond Boudon (1998) and Karl-
Dieter Opp (1989) refer to Smith as “the spiritual father of rational choice 
theory…”364 This is incorrect, as highlighted in 1.2.2. It is significant, however, that, 
whilst Smith might reject economics Nobelist Gary Becker’s365 argument that: “…the 
economic approach is a comprehensive one that is applicable to all human behaviour” 
it is a view that is accepted by many sociologists whose methodological commitments 
might ordinarily be associated with opposition to such ontological reductionism.366
                                                 
364 Boudon, R. (1996) ‘The “Cognitivist Model.”’ Rationality and Society, 8 (2): 123-151; Opp, K-D 
(1989) The Rationality of Political Protest. A Comparative Analysis of Rational Choice Theory. 
Boulder, CO:  Westview Press, cited in Zavirowski 2000: 464. 
365 Becker was awarded the Sveriges Riksbank (Bank of Sweden) Prize in 1992 “…for having extended 
the domain of microeconomic analysis to a wide range of human behavior and interaction, including 
nonmarket behaviour” (http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1992). 
366 Becker 1976: 8. For Becker: “[t]he combined assumptions of maximizing behaviour, market 
equilibrium, and stable preferences, used relentlessly and unflinchingly, form the heart of the economic 
approach as I see it” (Ibid, 5; see also Eichengreen 1998: 993; Hodgson 1998: 189). Becker (e.g., 1992; 
1996) has attempted to account for endogenous preferences in terms of social groups and habit. 
However, this effort is hindered by his ongoing definition of agency as rational utility maximization.  
 
 
This demonstrates an implicit acceptance of orthodox economists’ rationalist 
separation of politics from economics within sociology, despite claims to a more 
sophisticated explanation of social phenomena than that held by their economist 
counterparts. As James Coleman (1994: 167-172) argues, sociological rational choice 
theorists attempt to provide such explanations by combining theoretical principles 
from sociology and economics. However, despite replacing suppositions about perfect 
markets with a sociological view of institutions, neoclassical assumptions regarding 
methodological individualism and rational utility maximisation are retained. 
Arguably, rational choice sociologists’ attempt to re-engage economics and sociology 
on the former discipline’s terms is also reflected in IPE. As Higgott and Watson note: 
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[w]henever the suggestion of unifying a subject field arises within the social 
sciences, the debate quickly becomes one of the extent to which others should 
open themselves up to the methods of economics by incorporating rational 
choice theory as the primary engine of enquiry. This is the source of the 
‘objective’, ‘conventional’ modes of analysis that Cohen attributes to 
American IPE (Higgott and Watson 2008: 7-8). 
 
According to Higgott and Watson, Cohen’s preference for rational choice theory 
echoes International Relations theorist Robert Keohane’s reduction of IPE to “the 
handmaid of the intellectual preferences of economics” (Ibid, 9-10). Certainly, 
Keohane (1999 [1982]: 151) employs rational choice theory in order to attempt: “…to 
develop models that help to explain trends or tendencies towards which patterns of 
behaviour tend to converge”. As Higgott and Watson point out, Keohane’s insistence 
upon avoiding “diversionary philosophical construction” in IPE reflects Schumpeter’s 
“…avowedly post-Methodenstreit perspective celebrating the cleansing of the core of 
economics of everything but deductive-rationalist method”.367
In contrast, critical IPE theorists ostensibly oppose their orthodox counterparts’ 
preference for rational choice owing to its “ontological irrealism”.
 As discussed in 1.2.1, 
Schumpeter’s separation of the WN “Smith” from the TMS “Smith” - and selective 
focus upon particular sections of the former book - is influential upon mainstream 
interpretations of his thought that erroneously present Smith as an early advocate of 
“rational economic man” (e.g., Stigler 1978). 
 
368
                                                 
367 Keohane 1988: 382 cited in Higgott and Watson 2008: 9-10. 
368 Hay 2006b: 90. See also Berry 2007: 7; Hodgson 1998: 189; Lewin 1996: 1319; 1293. 
 Indeed, such is 
the apparent hostility towards the theory among these authors that, according to 
Watson (2005: 17; 27), any notion of its potential incursion into the subject field: 
“…evokes fears of the colonization of all social scientific enquiry by the crudest 
variant of neoclassical economics” among them. As Watson (2008: 54) also explains, 
critical IPE (e.g., Denemark and O’Brien 1997; Murphy and Nelson 2001) is often 
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presented in terms of a self-consciously “oppositional logic”. However, despite their 
rejection of rationalist ontology, critical IPE theorists appear as amenable to the 
conceptual separation of “economic” from other forms of behaviour as their orthodox 
counterparts, as is evinced by the ongoing use of the “states and markets” framework 
in their analyses.369
                                                 
369 As Watson points out, this is characteristic of Marxist, feminist, mercantilist, ecologist, neo-
Gramscian and poststructuralist IPE as well as liberal accounts. See e.g., Levine 1998; Kuiper 2006; 
Tame 1978; Frierson 2006; Cox 1987; Brown 1997; Walter 1996; Watson 2007: 1. 
 As Watson suggests: 
 
[e]ven though the British school may reject rational choice theory as a formal 
methodology, the theoretical perspectives that dominate work in this tradition 
still conceptualise individual conduct on the basis of assumptions about 
rational behaviour. Despite the identification of two schools…they come 
together in underlying assumptions about rationality (Watson 2005: 27).  
 
 
As a consequence, alternative theories of action that are an integral feature of 
political economy debates tend to be overlooked in IPE, in favour of the 
neoclassical conception of rational action (Ibid, 6). 
 
The recurrent absence within critical IPE of the elucidation of an alternative model of 
agency to that of the mainstream accounts they criticise is therefore better explained. 
As such, the need for this model to be replaced by a political economy approach that 
pre-dates the ongoing, albeit implicit, influence of rationalist assumptions set down 
during the Methodenstreit is also readily apparent.   
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4.1.2) Rationalist separations of economics and psychology 
 
Efforts to develop a sophisticated model of agency are made by behavioural 
economists, who attempt to combine cognitive psychology and economics via a 
rational choice framework. As James Coleman (1994: 167) explains, behavioural 
economists examine: “…psychological anomalies that cause individuals to deviate 
from rational action”. This avowedly rationalist approach develops John Watson’s 
(1913) behaviourist psychology in which it is claimed that social conditioning is a 
more important factor upon behaviour than instinct. As Hodgson (2003a: 551) points 
out, behaviourism gained credibility in the period following the Methodenstreit owing 
to its positivist methodology. This approach reflects experimental psychology’s 
origins in the mid-nineteenth century that began with the psychophysical experiments 
of Gustav Theodor Fechner and the timing of nervous transmission by Hermann von 
Helmholtz. Fechner argued that mental phenomena could be measured by finding 
quantitative relationships between material stimuli and mental sensations, an approach 
continued by Wilhelm Wundt, Helmholtz’s student, whose establishment of the first 
psychology laboratory at the University of Leipzig in 1879 signalled the 
institutionalisation of the newly emergent discipline (Danziger 2000: 331). As 
Luigino Bruni and Robert Sugden (2007: 151) explain:  
 
Fechner’s work was based on a regularity found by the physiologist Ernst 
Heinrich Weber: the change in magnitude of a given stimulus that produces a 
just noticeable change in sensation is proportional to the total stimulus 
…Fechner used this regularity as a method of measuring the magnitude of 
sensations: according to the Fechner-Weber law, if stimulus increases 
geometrically, sensation increases arithmetically (Bruni and Sugden 2007: 
151). 
 
 
 
 273 
Fechner’s 
However, these disciplinary boundaries took some time to become established. 
Indeed, Fechner’s 
methodological commitment to the quantifiable nature of perception, 
sensation and thought reflects the growth of supposedly “value-free” knowledge 
across the newly emergent social sciences during this period (Coon 2000: 85-86; 
Leary 1980: 301-302; Mirowski 1989: 354). As Hodgson (2003: 140) notes, once 
these “scientific” norms were put in place in the newly emergent discipline of 
economics, “self-reinforcing standards for subsequent research” arose, as: “[s]cholars 
seeking publication or promotion had a better chance of success if they conformed to 
these norms”. 
 
views are reflected in the marginalist economics of Francis 
Edgeworth and William Stanley Jevons (Lewin 1996: 1297). As Bruni and Sugden 
(2007: 150-151) explain, for Edgeworth and Jevons: “…the psychology of sensation 
was an essential part of economics”, as they viewed the law of diminishing marginal 
utility - one of the fundamental principles of neoclassical economics - as a “special 
case of this more general law of psychology”. This is perhaps unsurprising, owing to 
Fechner’s development of Daniel Bernoulli’s (1738) separation of objective price 
from the subjective utility gained by the individual.370 Certainly, Fechner’s 
formulation of the hypothesis of diminishing sensitivity is invoked by Edgeworth in 
his thesis that: “[t]he rate of increase of pleasure decreases as its means increase”.371
                                                 
370 Bernoulli, D. (1954 [1738]) ‘Exposition of a New Theory on the Measurement of Risk’. 
Econometrica, 22 (1): 23-36, cited in Heukelom 2008: 3-5. 
371 Edgeworth, F. Y. (1967 [1881]) Mathematical Psychics. New York, NY: Kelley, pp.59-62, cited in 
Bruni and Sugden 2007: 152.  
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Similarly, as Ross Robertson points out, Jevons’s work on the utility theory of value 
is influenced by the statistical psychophysiology of Richard Jennings, whose Natural 
Elements of Political Economy (1855) made: “…a first important statement of some 
of the relationships between economics and psychology”.372
…any particular person must be regarded as governed by various 
considerations of which wealth is only one. But then there are principles 
governing the accumulation of wealth. These principles are totally different 
from the principles of morals.
 As Harro Maas (2005: 
621) notes, this approach enables Jevons to advocate that: “…the political economist 
could attain measurement and precision by making use of the inductive methods of 
statistics and experiments of ordinary use in the natural sciences”. This also facilitates 
Jevons’ analytical distinction between an individual’s “economic” self and their 
“moral” self:  
 
373
As such, as Watson notes: “[i]n contrast to his classical forebears…Jevons believed it 
to be improper for economic analysis to be concerned with the ‘higher motives’ of life 
within society: [for Jevons] ‘[i]t is the lowest rank of feelings which we here 
treat’”.
  
 
 
374 As is more widely known, for Jevons, economic behaviour is understood in 
terms of the Benthamite focus on the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain 
(Bruni and Sugden 2007: 150-154). Jevons connects consumption to production via 
this understanding of pleasures and pains as the governing motives of individuals’ 
economic actions.375
                                                 
372 As Robertson (1951: 234) argues, the influence of Jennings upon Jevons’s work was at least equal 
to that of Jeremy Bentham. 
373 Jevons, W. S. (1875-6) ‘Lecture 1: Definitions of Political Economy’, in Black, R. D. C. (ed.) 
Jevons 1972-81: Papers and Correspondence of William Stanley Jevons. London: Macmillan, Volume 
IV, pp.3-8, cited in Sigot 2002: 266. 
374 Jevons 1970 (1871): 93 cited in Watson 2005: 54. 
375 As Maas explains, according to Jevons, each worker automatically decides whether or not to supply 
labour based upon a consideration of the merits of a marginal increment in the “irksomeness” of work 
in order to receive a parallel increase in the pleasure of consumption (Maas 2005: 639). 
 Indeed, for Jevons, the laws of supply and demand are founded 
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on the “laws of human enjoyment”, wherein “[a] balance of utility on both sides will 
lead to an exchange” (Jevons 1862 [1866]: 284; Sigot 2002: 275).  
 
In contrast, William James attached “much greater significance to…unlearned acts 
and reflexes as keys to psychological explanation”, as Zenas Clark Dickinson (1919: 
395) points out.376  Indeed, James’ preference for psychopathology over 
psychophysiology can be discerned in the chapters on “The Consciousness of Self” 
and on “Hypnotism” in PP, and in James’s 1896 Lowell Lectures, wherein he 
discusses the analysis of dreams, hypnotism, automatisms, hysteria, and multiple 
personality (Wozniak 1994: vii).377
As noted, however, orthodox economists, sociologists and critical IPE theorists 
continue to utilise rationalist notions in their accounts of agency. Arguably, this is 
aided by the deliberate separation of psychology from economics made by authors 
from the latter discipline since the beginning of the twentieth century. As Shira Lewin 
points out, in their varied approaches, John Watson (1913), Roy Hicks and John Allen 
 More famously, this is also evident in his chapter 
on “Will” in PP, in the section entitled “Pleasure and Pain as Springs of Action”. In 
opposition to psychological hedonists such as Alexander Bain, yet also to Jevons’s 
experiments on the exertion of muscular force, published in 1870, which closely relate 
to his theory of labour (Maas 2005: 621), James argues that it is unrealistic to assume 
that behaviour is always oriented towards the hedonic optimum:  
 
[i]mportant as is the influence of pleasures and pains upon our movements, 
they are far from being our only stimuli…and those persons obey a curiously 
narrow teleological superstition who think themselves bound to interpret them 
in every instance as effects of the secret solicitancy of pleasure and 
repugnancy of pain (James 1981 [1890]: 550-551 cited in Lewin 1996: 1299). 
 
 
                                                 
376 Dickinson, Z. C. (1919) ‘The Relations of Recent Psychological Developments to Economic 
Theory’. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 33 (3): 377-421 cited in Lewin 1996: 1299. See also 
Haakonssen and Winch 2006: 372; Twomey 1998: 433.  
377 As Danziger (1997: 147) notes, James’s discussion of multiple selves in PP is reflected in 
contemporary psychopathological discoveries on multiple personality. 
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(1934), Paul Samuelson (1938) and Milton Friedman (1953) are prominent among 
those that accomplished this intellectual marginalisation so successfully that it is now 
customary to view economics independently of psychological assumptions, despite its 
notion of agency being deduced from Fechner’s views on human wants (Bruni and 
Sugden 2007: 150; Hogarth and Reder 1987: 1).378
As suggested, this is an approach that James rejects.
  
 
379
                                                 
378 Lewin also includes Vilfredo Pareto (Pareto, V. [1953 (1901)] ‘On the Economic Principle: A Reply 
to Benedetto Croce’. International Economic Papers, 5: 58-102); Eugene Slutsky (Slutsky, E. [1972 
(1915)] ‘On the Theory of the Budget of the Consumer.’ In Ekelund, R. B., Furubotn, E. G., Gramm, 
W. P. [eds.], The evolution of modern demand theory.  Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, pp.189-218); 
and Ian Little (Little, I. M. D. [1949] A Reformulation of the Theory of Consumer’s Behaviour. Oxford 
Economic Papers, 1 [1]: 90-99) in this list.  
379 James’ admiration for Fechner is reserved for his spiritual account of consciousness rather than for 
his psychophysical experiments (See James 1987 [1909], Lecture IV, ‘Concerning Fechner,’ pp.690-
710). 
 Indeed, according to Michael 
Lawlor (2006: 342), James’s refusal to consider individuals as figures that constantly 
select rationally optimal behaviour “forcefully demonstrates” that rational choice 
theory:  
 
…can at best be only part of the inquiry into human social behaviour…After 
decades of growing influence across the social sciences, we can now see that 
the insight to be gained from neoclassical choice theory itself exhibits 
diminishing returns (Lawlor 2006: 335, footnote 1).  
 
Despite this, rationalist approaches to behaviour continue to dominate the social 
sciences. 
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Behavioural economists Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman (e.g., 1979; 1982) 
attempt to challenge the neoclassical descriptions of rationality upon which rational 
choice theory is based by reintegrating psychology and economics via a subjective 
account of utility.
4.1.3) Rationalist reconnections of economics and psychology 
 
 
380 In contrast to earlier behavioural psychologist Ward Edwards 
(e.g., 1954; 1961),381
To my mind, Thaler and Sunstein’s notion of policymakers as “choice architects” 
demonstrates the pertinence of Colin Hay’s (2005: 104) sardonic question which asks: 
“…what sense does it make to speak of a rational actor’s choice in a context which is 
assumed to provide only one rational option?” To be sure, as with the neoclassical 
assumptions of agency that behavioural economists claim to challenge, this approach 
 who claims that individuals make rational decisions consistent 
with the predictions of normative theory, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) argue that 
individuals’ abilities to make such decisions are impaired by the “heuristics and 
biases” that they employ when processing new information. However, Tversky and 
Kahneman retain neoclassical economists’ implicit use of Fechnerian psychophysics. 
As Floris Heukelom (2006: 18) points out, this is demonstrated in their distinction 
between normative and descriptive theory, an approach that is extended by 
prescriptive behavioural economists such as Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein, who 
advocate effective “framing” of issues by policymakers in order to encourage 
individuals to behave in a socially optimal manner. According to them: “[f]raming 
works because people tend to be somewhat mindless, passive decision-makers” 
(Thaler and Sunstein 2008: 37).  
 
                                                 
380 Kahneman was awarded the Sveriges Riksbank (Bank of Sweden) Prize in Economic Sciences in 
Memory of Alfred Nobel for 2002 for: “…for having integrated insights from psychological research 
into economic science, especially concerning human judgment and decision-making under uncertainty” 
(http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2002/). 
381 Edwards, W. (1954) ‘The theory of decision making’. Psychological Bulletin, 41: 380-417; 
Edwards, W. (1961) ‘Behavioral decision theory’. Annual Review of Psychology, 12: 473-498. 
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is in contrast to James’s and Smith’s accounts of self-determined individuals. Indeed, 
Thaler and Sunstein’s “libertarian paternalism” arguably reflects more closely the 
insidious “man of system” and moral interventionism of the Common Sense school 
that Smith warns against (e.g., Smith 1976 [1790], VI.ii.2.17), as well as a fixed 
teleology that James (e.g., 1920: 409) consistently rejects. Certainly, behavioural 
economists’ use of psychophysics and mathematical modelling of behaviour ensures 
its proximity to the tenets of mainstream economic theory. Indeed, as Kahneman 
(2003: 1469) states: “[t]heories in behavioral economics have generally retained the 
basic architecture of the rational model, adding assumptions about cognitive 
limitations designed to account for specific anomalies”.382
This is perhaps less radical than Herbert Simon’s (e.g., 1996) attempted rejection of 
orthodox assumptions regarding the optimally informed “rational economic man” in 
favour of: “…a creature of bounded rationality using heuristic search to find 
satisficing - ‘good enough’ - courses of action”.
  
 
383
As Gerry Kerr (2007: 261) explains, three factors guide individuals’ activities in 
Simon’s behavioural economics approach: limited alternatives, the misalignment of 
 Simon (1992) adds to this notion 
his concept of “docility” in order to challenge mainstream economists’ inability to 
account for altruistic activity: 
 
Docile people learn readily in a social setting, and tend to acquire socially 
approved cognitive behaviours and beliefs in matters of fact and value… 
docility implies belief legitimated by social processes… rather than belief 
based on self-evaluated empirical evidence (Simon 1992: 75). 
 
                                                 
382 Kahneman, D. (2003) ‘Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics’. 
American Economic Review 93 (5): 1449-1475 cited in Sent 2004: 749, footnote 21. 
383 Simon, H. A. (1996) Models of My Life. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, p.364 cited in Oakley 
2002: 170. Simon was awarded the Sveriges Riksbank (Bank of Sweden) Prize in Economic Sciences 
in Memory of Alfred Nobel for 1978: “…for his pioneering research into the decision-making process 
within economic organizations” (http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1978/).  
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individual and organisational goals, and the limits on knowledge. According to Kerr, 
these factors: “…are essentially the applied tenets of William James’s psychology”.  
James (1981 [1890]: 136) does note in PP that individuals utilise habit in order to 
simplify activities and to partake in a more efficient use of energy. As he explains: 
“[h]abit diminishes the conscious attention with which our acts are performed”. 
However, as with his notion of the “present acting self” in APU,384
…the mind is at every stage a theatre of simultaneous possibilities. 
Consciousness consists in the comparison of these with each other, the 
selection of some, and the suppression of the rest by the reinforcing and 
inhibiting agency of attention… The mind, in short, works on the data it 
receives very much as a sculptor works on his block of stone (James (1981 
[1890]: 288).
 James clearly 
demonstrates his view that whereas one’s receipt of sense data is involuntary, one’s 
organization of it is not: 
 
385
In contrast to Kerr’s argument, therefore, James’ view is very different from Simon’s 
passive account of agency, in which individuals’ “…thinking capacities are not 
anywhere near a match for the complexities of the situations they have to cope 
with”.
  
 
386 As discussed in 3.2.2, James echoes Smith’s successful retention of agency 
whilst avoiding any collapse of the individual and society that Simon’s account 
appears to involve.387
This is significant since John Odell, former editor of International Organization, the 
journal most closely associated with orthodox IPE (Murphy and Nelson 2001: 394), 
views Simon’s bounded rationality concept as a variant of rational choice theory that 
  
 
                                                 
384 James 1977 (1909): 344, footnote 8 [italics in original]. 
385 Ibid, 1166. As Richard Gale (1997: 59) points out: “James assumes that it is causally determined 
both which ideas enter consciousness and whether an effort is made to attend to one of them to the 
exclusion of its competitors”. 
386 Simon, H. A. (1986) ‘The failure of armchair economics’. Challenge, 29: 18-25, p.23 cited in 
Oakley 2002: 168. 
387 See James 1981 (1890): 550-551; Barbalet 2008: 808; Bruni and Sugden 2007: 150-154; Horwitz 
2003: 267-268; Jevons 1866 (1862): 284; Lewin 1996: 1296; Maas 2005: 639; Smith 1980, HoA, II.12. 
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ought to be utilised in IPE in order to understand how economic policy decisions are 
made and can be improved. In addition, Odell (2002: 182) suggests that: “[t]he 
bounded rationality premise could be the foundation for generating a new, more 
unified and more valid body of IPE knowledge bridging gaps between today’s classic 
rationalists, idea analysts, and constructivists”. Deborah Elms also aims to incorporate 
behavioural economics into IPE. As she points out, IPE theorists: 
 
…discount psychological insights about human behavior for reasons of 
methodology. We favor parsimony over chaos… [However,] continuing 
evidence drawn from psychology suggests that individuals rarely, if ever, 
actually behave like our models suggest (Elms 2008: 240). 
 
 
For Elms, individuals repeatedly reject Pareto-improving outcomes due to notions of 
fairness, and points to Matthew Rabin’s (1993) attempt to incorporate this in formal 
economic models as a way forward for a more sophisticated account of agency in IPE 
(Ibid, 256). However, Rabin’s notion of “reciprocal altruism” arguably confuses 
social interaction with altruism as he offers an overly social account of agency in 
which individuals’: “…willingness to help seems highly contingent upon the 
behaviour of others…” (Rabin 1993: 1283-1284). In addition, Rabin (1998, 12–13) 
argues: “[m]ainstream economics employs a powerful combination of methods…I 
believe these methods are tremendously useful, and…we should strive to understand 
psychological findings in light of these methods”. Rabin therefore echoes Kahneman, 
Knetsch and Thaler’s (1986: S285) attempt to enhance mainstream economics with 
“more realistic behavioral assumptions” rather than challenge its flawed ontology 
more fundamentally. Indeed, as Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler admit: “…adding 
complexity to the model of the agent generally makes it more difficult to derive 
unequivocal predictions of behavior from a specification of the environment …there 
is a threat of a slippery slope” (Ibid, S299).  
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The deeply limited nature of the challenge to neoclassical accounts of rationality that 
authors such as Simon, Rabin, Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler provide arguably 
reflects the continued dominance of rationalist assumptions in the social sciences. To 
be sure, as with rational choice sociologists’ attempts to combine the methodology of 
sociology with a notion of agency derived from orthodox economics, these 
behavioural economists’ attempts to utilise psychological explanations in order to 
model how decisions are made is informed by the similar assumptions about 
rationality as those accounts that they purport to challenge. Moreover, that this 
extremely limited alternative to “rational economic man” is seen as a way for IPE to 
incorporate more sophisticated accounts of agency by authors such as Elms and Odell 
demonstrates the intellectual space that exists for a pre-disciplinary account of agency 
within the subject field that a Smith-James framework of the self can provide. 
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Part Two: Institutionalist approaches 
 
4.2.1) New institutionalist economics 
 
 
As Tabb (1999: 123) points out, new institutionalist economists attempt to develop a 
more sophisticated account of agency than that outlined above by characterising the 
development of social institutions as “…the intended or unintended consequences of 
rational individual behaviour”.388
[o]nce convenient regularities become prominent, a circular process of 
institutional self-reinforcement takes place…this important core theme of an 
action-information loop is clearly evident, for example, in North’s (1981) 
theory of the development of capitalism [and] Williamson’s (1975) transaction 
cost analysis of the firm…(Hodgson 1998: 176).
 For new institutionalist economists such as 
Douglass North and Oliver Williamson, an example of this is given by Menger (1892) 
in his explanation of the emergence of money, in which, they suggest, he 
demonstrates the unintended development of social institutions from the self-
interested actions of individual agents. As Hodgson notes, for Menger:  
 
389
North (1986: 233) defines institutions as: “…the humanly devised constraints that 
structure political, economic, and social interactions”.
 
 
 
390
                                                 
388 As James Coleman (1994: 167) explains, new institutionalist economics occupies a niche within 
sociological rational choice theory. 
389 North, D. C. (1981) Structure and change in economic history. New York City, NY: Norton; 
Williamson, O. E. (1975) Markets and hierarchies, analysis and anti-trust implications: A study in the 
economics of international organization. New York City, NY: Free Press, cited in Hodgson 1998: 176.  
390 North was awarded the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 
in 1993: “…for having renewed research in economic history by applying economic theory and 
quantitative methods in order to explain economic and institutional change” 
(http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1993/press.html). For North (1990: 3): 
“…institutional change shapes the way societies evolve through time and hence is the key to 
understanding social change”. 
 As Nixon Kariithi (2001: 
375) notes, for North, institutional structures arise in order to simplify the interaction 
process, thus limiting the negative effects of individuals’ limited abilities to process 
information. As Kariithi also suggests, this view invokes Simon’s bounded rationality 
theory in which “…people impose constraints on interaction in order to structure 
exchange” (Ibid).  
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Williamson (1994: 81) also concurs with Simon’s notion of bounded rationality, but 
rejects his benign view of individuals’ “frailties of motive and reason” in favour of the 
selfish, opportunistic individual, which, Hodgson points out, provides the basis of his 
account (Hodgson 1994: 70). As Victor Nee (2003: 52-55) explains, Williamson 
develops Ronald Coase’s notion of transaction costs, the central concept of new 
institutionalist economics, which, Coase argues, cannot be accounted for by 
neoclassical economists.391
Adam Smith pointed out the hindrances to commerce that would arise in an 
economic system in which there was a division of labour but in which all 
exchange had to take the form of barter. No-one would be able to buy 
anything unless he possessed something that the producer wanted. This 
difficulty, he explained, could be overcome by the use of money.
 Indeed, in his Prize Lecture to the memory of Alfred 
Nobel in December 1991, Coase depicts Smith as the only theorist to invoke 
transaction costs in relation to the evolution of the institution of money:  
 
392
The butcher seldom carries his beef or his mutton to the baker, or the brewer, 
in order to exchange them for bread or for beer, but he carries them to the 
market, where he exchanges them for money, and afterwards exchanges that 
money for bread and for beer. The quantity of money which he gets for them 
regulates too the quantity of bread and beer which he can afterwards purchase. 
It is more natural and obvious to him, therefore, to estimate their value by the 
quantity of money, the commodity for which he immediately exchanges them, 
than by that of bread and beer, the commodities for which he can exchange 
them only by the intervention of another commodity; and rather to say that his 
butcher’s meat is worth threepence or fourpence a pound, than that it is worth 
three or four pounds of bread, or three or four quarts of small beer. Hence it 
comes to pass, that the exchangeable value of every commodity is more 
frequently estimated by the quantity of money, than by the quantity either of 
  
 
 
It is accurate to suggest that Smith observes problems that arise when a universal unit 
of exchange is unavailable:  
 
                                                 
391 “These operations are often extremely costly, sufficiently costly at any rate to prevent many 
transactions that would be carried out in a world in which the pricing system worked without cost” 
(Coase, R. H. [1960] ‘The Problem of Social Cost’. Journal of Law and Economics 3: 1-44, p.15 cited 
in Nee 2003: 52; Coase 1988: 15). 
392 Coase 1991 (online). Coase was awarded the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in 
Memory of Alfred Nobel in 1991: “…for his discovery and clarification of the significance of 
transaction costs and property rights for the institutional structure and functioning of the economy” 
(http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1991/). 
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labour or of any other commodity which can be had in exchange for it (Smith 
1976 [1776], I.v.6). 
 
 
However, Smith does not advocate the use of money in order to avoid such 
transaction costs. Nor does he suggest that its advent was due to the unintended 
consequences of self-interested behaviour, as orthodox accounts of the “butcher, 
brewer and the baker” passage from WN erroneously suggest, as noted in 1.2.3. 
Rather, in keeping with the absence of dogmatism that is characteristic of the rest of 
his oeuvre, Smith is simply observing that the institution of coined money developed 
over time and across cultures out of deliberate attempts to engender a non-perishable 
unit of exchange.393
Menger suggests these individual efforts are motivated by self-interest: “…nothing 
may have been so favourable to the genesis of a medium of exchange as the 
acceptance, on the part of the most discerning and capable economic subjects, for 
their own economic gain…” (Ibid, 249) According to Horwitz (2001: 85) this: “…is 
 Certainly, Smith does not belong in the spontaneous-order liberal 
tradition of Menger and Hayek in which Austrian economist Steven Horwitz (2001: 
83-85) places him, in which institutions such as the market are deemed entirely: 
“…the results of human action but not of human design”.  
 
According to Horwitz, Menger’s “…theory of the origin of money serves as a 
paradigmatic spontaneous-order explanation”. For Menger (1892: 250):  
 
…we can only come fully to understand the origin of money by learning to 
view the establishment of the social procedure, with which we are dealing, as 
the spontaneous outcome, the unpremeditated resultant, of particular, 
individual efforts of the members of a society, who have little by little worked 
their way to a discrimination of the different degrees of saleableness in 
commodities. 
 
                                                 
393 Smith gives as examples the use of salt, shells, dried cod, tobacco, sugar, hides or dressed leather, 
cattle, and nails used as mediums of exchange (Smith 1976 [1790], I.iv.3). 
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but a somewhat amplified statement of the Scots’ invisible hand idea”, a view echoed 
by Markus Haller (2000: 530), who argues that:  
 
Menger’s model for the explanation of social institutions can be considered as 
an intellectual inheritance of 18th
In addition, Coase rejects the Adam Smith Problem. However, whilst he is correct to 
suggest that there is no dichotomy between Smith’s books, Coase’s view that WN and 
TMS are consistent is based on his notion that Smith frequently invokes the negative 
-century Scottish social philosophy… 
According to David Hume, Adam Smith and Adam Ferguson, many social 
interactions are the result of people’s actions, but not the result of their 
intentions or plans.  
 
 
However, as discussed in 1.2.3, Smith’s notion of the “invisible hand” does not refer 
to the unintended consequences of selfish behaviour. Rather, it demonstrates Smith’s 
call for integrity and transparency in trade so that efficiency can be increased whilst 
the detrimental effects of unconstrained self-interest upon society might be 
eliminated. Furthermore, as I argue in 2.1.1-2.2.4, Smith’s work is not synonymous 
with Scottish Enlightenment theorists such as Hume and Ferguson. This is significant, 
as new institutionalist and Austrian economists attempt to utilise a more sophisticated 
approach to Smith than their neoclassical counterparts in order to claim a move 
beyond reductionist accounts of agency. As Horwitz argues:  
 
In The Theory of Moral Sentiments ([1759] 1976), the foundation of Smith’s 
conception of human morality is the faculty of sympathy. Mengerian man is 
[similarly] understood to be moulded by the institutional environment in 
which he moves. Certainly Hayek [e.g., 1948] does not view human beings 
as…unconnected, narrowly self-interested maximizers… (Horwitz 2001: 91). 
 
 
Coase (1976: 541) also contends that:  
 
 
[i]t is wrong to believe, as is commonly done, that Adam Smith had as his 
view of man an abstraction, an “economic man,” rationally pursuing his self-
interest in a single-minded way. Adam Smith would not have thought it 
sensible to treat man as a rational utility-maximiser (Coase 1976: 541). 
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aspects of human nature. According to Coase (1976: 535) Smith regularly suggests 
that man is “…dominated by self-love, lives in a world of self-delusion, is conceited, 
envious, malicious, quarrelsome, and resentful”.394 As discussed in 1.1.2, 2.1.1 and 
2.3.3, Smith accounts for a broad range of dispositions, however his is a thoroughly 
optimistic view of human nature that does not require a rational, selfish individual as 
its theoretical base unit.395 Indeed, Smith does not privilege “…the less agreeable 
qualities of human beings as being productive of good”, as Coase (1976: 545) 
contends, but rather individuals’ abilities to co-operate, sympathise, and retain self-
command.396
Despite Coase’s claims regarding the Adam Smith Problem and rational economic 
man, his view of the “invisible hand” demonstrates similarities with canonical 
accounts of Smith’s views that are erroneously postulated as providing intellectual 
justification for individualism and doctrinaire free market policies. As such, this also 
highlights the broader failure of new institutionalist economists to move beyond their 
neoclassical counterparts’ accounts of agency. Indeed, as Coase (1984: 230) admits: 
 Coase’s view is more reminiscent of Mandeville’s utilitarian notion of 
the “natural” selfishness of individuals that leads to public utility that Smith (1976 
[1790], VII.ii.4.6-7) rejects, a view arguably repeated in Menger’s account of money 
and Williamson’s notion of the opportunistic individual. Further, Coase (1991 
[online]) reiterates the Austrian notion of the invisible hand:  
 
A principal theme of The Wealth of Nations was that government regulation or 
centralised planning were not necessary to make an economic system function 
in an orderly way. The economy could be co-ordinated by a system of prices 
(the “invisible hand”) and, furthermore, with beneficial results. 
 
                                                 
394 Specifically, this argument is intended to counter Viner’s (1928) erroneous detection of a “harmony 
of interests” in TMS that he interprets as referring to Smith’s advocacy of divine guidance. As 
discussed in 1.3.2, Viner is also mistaken. 
395 As discussed in 3.3.5, this modest meliorism is also a feature of William James’s pragmatism. 
396 However, as Dennis Rasmussen (2006: 312) points out: “Smith’s touchstone is the happiness of the 
individuals who make up a society, not some vague notion of ‘public happiness’”. Smith’s implicit 
rejection of Hutcheson’s mathematical utilitarianism, as discussed in 2.2.1, arguably confirms this. 
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“…new institutional economists build on a modified version of the maximizing 
assumption of neoclassical economics”.397
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
397 Coase, R. H. (1984) ‘The New Institutional Economics’. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical 
Economics, 140: 229-231, p.230, cited in Nee 2003: 51. 
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4.2.2) “Old” institutionalist economics 
 
 
In contrast to new institutionalist economists, “old” institutionalist economists such as 
Thorstein Veblen (e.g., 1919 [1898]) view “the market” as a socio-cultural 
mechanism. Interestingly, whilst new institutionalist economists attempt to utilise 
Smith, contemporary institutionalist economists such as Geoffrey Hodgson and Paul 
Twomey point to James’s influence on Veblen. As Twomey argues, in contrast to the 
“rather crude psychological framework” of the individual that underpins neoclassical 
accounts of economic agency, Veblen’s institutionalist conception of the self is 
informed by the conceptualization of the mind associated with the pragmatism of 
James and Charles S. Peirce (Twomey 1998: 437-444; 2003b: 164).  
 
As is well known, James dedicated WB to Peirce. However, it is a mistake to conflate 
these theorists’ views. As Barbalet (2004: 338) explains, Peirce introduced the term 
pragmatism in ‘The Fixation of Belief’ (1877) and ‘How to Make our Ideas Clear’ 
(1878) as “…a logical method for going beyond formalism and abstraction”. James 
refers to these discussions in ‘Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results’ (1920 
[1898]), yet it was not until 1904, with his publication of ‘The Pragmatic Method’, 
that wider interest in pragmatism began to be established. According to Barbalet, this 
irritated Peirce, who wanted pragmatism: “…to be understood as a purely logical 
method unlike the psychological approach he saw in James’s work” (Barbalet 2004: 
338). To be sure, Peirce renamed his version of pragmatism in 1905, calling it 
“pragmaticism”. As Robert Lane (2007: 252) points out, this represents a “modal 
shift” in Peirce’s thought towards a realist explanation of truth that he argues is 
obtainable only via empirical, scientific investigation.398
                                                 
398 Peirce, C. S. (1905) ‘Issues of Pragmaticism’. The Monist, 15 (4): 481-499 cited in Lane 2007: 552. 
 As Michael Lawlor (2006: 
331; 325) notes, Peirce (1958: 133) suggests that: “…there exists a fixed and ultimate 
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point toward which a community of inquirers could and would, if pursued long 
enough, push the collective activity of science to the ‘one true conclusion’” (Peirce 
1958: 133 cited in Lawlor 2006: 325; Hookway 1997: 159).  
 
Like Peirce, James does not reject the notion of an objective world: 
 
Ideas are so much flat psychological surface unless some mirrored matter 
gives them cognitive luster. This is why as a pragmatist I have so carefully 
postulated ‘reality’ ab intitio, and why, throughout my whole discussion, I 
remain an epistemological realist (James 1987 [1911]: 925; See also James 
1981 [1890]: 1172). 
 
As Gerald Myers (1986: 294) notes, James recognises Peirce’s contribution in 
approaching the question “what is truth?” However, for James: “[r]ealities are not 
true, they are; and beliefs are true of them” (James 1987 [1911]: 925 [italics in 
original]). As such, truth must resonate with the individual: “[t]he ultimate test for us 
of what a truth means is indeed the conduct it dictates or inspires” (James 1920: 412). 
This is in contrast to Peirce’s teleological explanation, which James clearly opposes: 
“The Truth: what a perfect idol of the rationalistic mind!” (James 1907: 115 [italics in 
original])   
 
As Alan Dyer (1993: 348) notes, Veblen attended Peirce’s tutorials on logic of 
scientific inquiry at Johns Hopkins University during the autumn of 1881, which had 
a discernible impact upon his evolutionary notion of socio-economic systems. As 
Robert Griffin explains, Veblen (1954: 176) agreed with Peirce’s advocacy of the 
development of an inductive methodology aimed at the achievement of an objective 
standard of knowledge. According to Peirce, this scientific process was the latest 
stage in the development of Western thought, succeeding the stages of “primitive 
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tenacity”, “authority”, and “reason, intuition and appeal to the natural order”.399 
However, owing to Peirce’s limited application of pragmaticism to science and 
mathematics, and associated rejection of socio-political factors (e.g., Peirce 1935 
[1873]: 109), Veblen adapted James’s notion of habit (e.g., James 1979 [1896]: 116-
126) to fit his institutionalist critique of capitalism (Griffin 1998: 742-754).400
However, this passage does not support Twomey’s comparison of James and Veblen, 
as James is merely suggesting that a habit, once adopted, can aid efficient use of 
energy. As he notes in PP: “…habit simplifies the movements required to achieve a 
given result, makes them more accurate and diminishes fatigue” (James 1981 [1890]: 
112). As such, the above passage merely indicates the useful nature of habit to these 
individuals and the society to which they contribute. As discussed in 3.3.3, this is 
consistent with Smith’s notion of the social utility of the division of labour (Smith 
1978, LJ [B], II.218). This is also consistent with James’s argument in WB in which 
  
 
According to Twomey: “James was not only aware of the personal significance of 
habits but also of their social implications. The stability of habits is a major 
contribution to the stability of society”. In order to support this view, Twomey cites 
PP, where James states that habit is: 
 
…the enormous flywheel of society, its most precious conservative agent...It 
alone prevents the hardest and most repulsive walks of life from being 
deserted by those brought up to tread therein. It keeps the fisherman and the 
deck-hand at sea through the winter; it holds the miner in his darkness, and 
nails the countryman to his log-cabin and his lonely farm through all the 
months of snow (James 1981 [1890]: 121 cited in Twomey 1998: 438).  
 
 
                                                 
399 Interestingly, Peirce (1986: 252) illustrates this third stage of logic with a conflation of Hobbes and 
Smith, who, Peirce argues, put forward: “…the doctrine that man only acts selfishly…This rests on no 
fact in the world, but it has had a wide acceptance as being the only reasonable theory”. However, 
Smith does not suggest such a negative conception of human motivations, or hold a teleological notion 
of knowledge. 
400 Peirce, C. S. (1935 [1873]) Collected Papers. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of the Harvard 
University Press; Veblen, T. B. (1954) Essays in Our Changing Order, edited by L. Ardzrooni, New 
York, NY: The Viking Press, cited in Griffin 1998: 742-754. 
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he notes that the person who has “pluck and will” can avoid “a sensualism without 
bounds” (James 1992 [1879]: 585) and thus develop greater moral strength.  
 
This is not, however, similar to Veblen’s institutionalist explanation of the 
development of cultural conceptions, in which “…labour acquires a character of 
irksomeness by virtue of the indignity imputed to it” (Veblen 1934 [1899]: 17) owing 
to socialisation processes that govern the “…settled habits of thought common to the 
generality of men” (Veblen [1919 (1909)]: 239). This is significant since the notion of 
habit is a key element in Veblen’s institutionalist account of economic behaviour, as it 
is the mechanism through which, Hodgson suggests: “…the framing, shifting and 
constraining capacities of social institutions give rise to new perceptions and 
dispositions within individuals” (Hodgson 2007: 331). 
  
This lack of agency perhaps prompts Schumpeter (1991: 292) to claim that: 
“[i]nstitutionalism is nothing but the methodological errors of German historians”.401
                                                 
401 Schumpeter, J. A. (1991) The Economics and Sociology of Capitalism, edited by R. Swedberg. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p.292 cited in Hultén 2005: 170. 
 
This is perhaps disingenuous, as Veblen (1901: 73) is critical of Schmoller’s denial of 
“the feasibility of a scientific treatment of economic matters” and his “…aim at 
confining economics to narrative, statistics and description”. However, as Steffan 
Hultén (2005: 170) notes, Veblen retains the German Historical School’s view that 
“…economics should deal more with the evolution of societies and less with pricing 
and allocation”. This is a central theme of “old” institutionalist economics, as 
Hodgson (2003c: 154) notes. As he also explains, in addition to Veblen (e.g., 1909), 
seminal institutionalist authors such as John R. Commons (e.g., 1934), Wesley 
Mitchell (e.g., 1910: 203), Clarence Ayres (e.g., 1944) and John Kenneth Galbraith 
(e.g., 1969) consider that “…the individual can be reconstituted by social 
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institutions”.402
 
 Following Veblen et al, Hodgson argues that individuals’ habits are 
created and moulded by social institutions, resulting in “a reconstitution of purposes 
and preferences” (Hodgson 2002: 172).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
402 Mitchell, W. C. (1910) ‘The Rationality of Economic Activity II.’ Journal of Political Economy, 18 
(3): 197-216; Ayres, C. E. (1944) The Theory of Economic Progress. Chapel Hill, NC: University of 
North Carolina Press; Galbraith, J. K. (1969) Ambassador’s Journal. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 
cited in Hodgson 2003c: 154. As Hodgson (2001: 153) notes, Commons mentions James in his early 
work, but by Institutional Economics (1934) had became more interested in Peirce’s pragmaticism. 
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Part Three: Constructivist approaches 
 
4.3.1) Critical realism 
 
 
Hodgson’s notion of “reconstitutive downward causation” is intended to challenge 
rationalist social theory. Hodgson also refutes the critical realist position in 
economics, which, as Bjorn-Ivar Davidsen (2005 [online]) notes, aims to alter 
mainstream economists’ view of social reality to one that comprises philosophical 
realism and an anti-foundationalist epistemology. This position is associated with 
Tony Lawson, for whom: “…the ontological presuppositions of the methods of 
mathematical modelling used by economists are rarely questioned or even 
acknowledged, at least not in any systematic or sustained way...” (Lawson 2003: 12). 
Lawson is influenced by Roy Bhaskar’s (e.g., 1978; 1991) sociological critical realist 
position.403 However, whereas Bhaskar retains a close identification with Marx (e.g., 
1973: 146),404
As Peter Nielsen (2002: 734) explains, however, this approach demonstrates 
Lawson’s insensitivity to “…real differences of opinion of methodology, theory and 
politics” between these authors, particularly between Smith and Marx. As discussed 
in 3a, an important difference between these authors is the causal power that Marx 
attributes to the role of structural factors in determining agency. This is echoed by 
Lawson (2003: 50), who argues that: “[s]ociety acts on, and shapes the individual, just 
 Lawson stresses his affinity with a broader collection of theorists, as is 
evident in Economics and Reality, where he states:  
 
Keynes, Hayek, Marx, Dobb, Veblen, Marshall, Smith, Shackle, Menger, 
Boulding and Kaldor…in one form or another, they already express many of 
the fundamental tenets of the basic thesis [of the book] (Lawson 1997: xiii).  
 
 
                                                 
403 As Chris Brown (2007: 410) points out: “…the ur-text of critical realism is Roy Bhaskar’s A Realist 
Theory of Science”. Like Bhaskar, Lawson is also influenced by Anthony Giddens’s (e.g., 1991) theory 
of structuration (Davis 2002a: 17). 
404 Marx, K. (1973) Surveys from Exile: Political Writings, Volume 2, edited by Fernbach, D., 
Harmondsworth: Penguin cited in Hodgson 2002: 164. 
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as individuals collectively (if mostly unintentionally) shape the social structures that 
make up society”. However, despite appearing to offer an intersubjective account of 
agency here, Lawson fails to explain how individuals affect social structures.  
 
Arguably, this is due to the temporal privilege that he grants these structures over 
individual agency. As Lawson states “…the constituents of social reality include 
positions into which people essentially slot…” (Lawson 2003: 39 [italics in original]). 
This view of agency is reminiscent of Bhaskar, whose collapse of the self and society 
is in turn influenced by Mead’s overly social account of the self, as is noted in 3b. 
Despite referring to the “self-determination” of the agent,405 Bhaskar suggests that: 
“[p]eople do not create society. For it always pre-exists them and is a necessary 
condition for their activity…”406
In contrast to Bhaskar and other critical realists such as Margaret Archer (e.g., 1995), 
Hodgson intends to retain agency by stressing the “…significance of reconstitutive 
downward causation on habits, rather than merely on behaviour, intentions, and 
preferences” (Hodgson 2002: 171). In addition to his rejection of critical realist 
economics, Hodgson’s suggestion that habits “…provide a reconstitutive causal 
 Bhaskar’s notion of agency is heavily criticised by 
Hodgson:  
 
…in Bhaskar’s writing…allusions are made to a vague and inconsistent notion 
of the ‘self-determined’ agent. There are two problems here. One is the failure 
to examine causes behind reasons. The other is to assume, as an act of mere 
definition, that all action is motivated by reasons. In contrast, an approach 
building on the earlier instinct-habit psychology of James, Dewey and others 
offers a way out of this dilemma...All reason and deliberation makes use of 
previously acquired habits of categorization, inference and calculation. The 
existence and role of these habits makes reconstitutive downward causation 
possible… (Hodgson 2002: 172). 
 
 
                                                 
405 Bhaskar, R. (1975) A Realist Theory of Science. Leeds: Leeds Books, p.72, cited in Hodgson 2002: 
172. 
406 Bhaskar, R. (1989) Reclaiming Reality: A Critical Introduction to Contemporary Philosophy. 
London: Verso, p. 36, cited in Hodgson 2002: 163. 
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mechanism…” thus reflects his attempt to posit an alternative response to the 
structure-agency problem from an institutionalist perspective. For Hodgson:  
 
[i]nstitutions are the kind of structures that matter most in the social realm. 
They matter most because of their capacity to form and mould the capacities 
and behaviours of agents in fundamental ways…and change individual 
dispositions and aspirations (Hodgson 2001: 328). 
 
This is a shift from his earlier position, in which he claims that: “…neither individual 
nor institutional factors have complete explanatory primacy” (Hodgson 1998: 184). 
Despite this, Hodgson clearly grants structures temporal primacy, as he argues that: 
“[w]e are all born into a world of pre-existing institutions, bestowed by history” 
(Hodgson 2001: 328). In order perhaps to incorporate agency into this explanation, 
Hodgson grants ontological primacy to instincts in order to explain the origins of 
habit beyond social factors. According to Hodgson (2007: 332): 
 
[t]his understanding of the dual and complementary roles of instinct and habit 
in the formation of preferential dispositions was central to the psychology of 
William James (1890), which was hugely influential for Veblen (1914). 
 
 
However, despite this claim to engage with James, Hodgson’s is a highly structural 
account that suggests that his understanding of James is influenced to a greater extent 
by Veblen’s adaptation of it than James’s own thought. Indeed, Hodgson argues that: 
“[t]he infant individual has to be “programmed” to discern and respond to specific 
stimuli so that the repeated behaviors that lead to the formation of habits can become 
possible…” Certainly, this is not a view that could be accurately associated with 
James’s view of instinct or habit.  
 
As discussed in 3.3.1-3, James (1992 [1878]: 370-372) does explain that instincts are 
modified by experience. However, this does not refer to the “programming” of 
instincts via socialization processes. Rather, James explains that habits provide 
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information to the individual about how to respond efficiently to contradictory 
instincts.407
Hodgson’s criticism of critical realism’s overly structural approach inadvertently 
highlights the inability to account for intentional agency in both institutionalist and 
critical realist accounts beyond the pre-existing structures in which the agent is 
embedded. As Edward Fullbrook (1998: 437) notes, critical realism therefore lacks 
“…a coherent and ontologically grounded model of the intersubjective agent”. This is 
 Moreover, he is clear that each individual chooses these habits in the first 
instance. As such, James, like Smith - and unlike Veblen and Hodgson - retains 
intentional agency for the individual. Rather than reflecting James’s view, Hodgson’s 
notion of habits thus appears to be wholly derived from Veblen’s institutionalist 
account, whom he cites: “[t]he situation of today shapes the institutions of tomorrow 
through a selective, coercive process, by acting upon men’s habitual view of things” 
(Veblen 1899: 190 cited in Hodgson 2002: 170).  
 
Despite Hodgson’s claims (e.g., 2007), neither he nor Veblen provides an adequate 
alternative to the overly structural view of critical realists such as Bhaskar or overly 
agential accounts as put forward by Menger, new institutionalists, behaviourist 
economists, orthodox economists and rational choice sociologists. This is important 
since the notion of reconstitution of habits is a central tenet of institutionalist 
economics:  
 
This notion that the individual is not given, but can be reconstituted by 
institutions, pervades the tradition of ‘old’ institutionalism from its 
predecessors in the historical school to its successors today. This is what 
distinguishes it from mainstream and new institutionalist economics… 
(Hodgson 2002: 174). 
 
                                                 
407 As James points out in Psychology: Briefer Course, these instincts can also vary between 
individuals: “Some children will cry with terror at their first sight of a cat or dog…Others will wish to 
fondle it immediately” (James 1992 [1878]: 382). 
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significant since critical realists such as Andrew Sayer (2003a; 2003b) and Leonidas 
Montes (2004) claim Smith as a forerunner of their approach, and David Wilson and 
William Dixon (2006) suggest that critical realism may deepen understanding of the 
Adam Smith Problem.  
 
As discussed in 3b, Sayer fails to move beyond Charles Griswold’s faulty account of 
Smith’s supposed aporia and Bhaskar’s Meadian collapse of the self and society in 
his reading of TMS. Montes also identifies Smith with critical realism. According to 
Montes, Smith’s “…ambitious intellectual pursuit was to uncover the real structures 
underlying social and moral phenomena…” This, Montes suggests, is similar to 
critical realists’ intention to “…reveal the ‘concealed connections,’ that is to uncover 
the mechanisms that exist at a deeper level”:  
 
Smith’s definition of philosophy as aiming to ‘lay open the concealed 
connections’ [in HoA] clearly reflects his conception of the nature of reality as 
not always actualised. Therefore we can infer that Smith’s philosophical 
position presupposes existence, while acknowledging that it is usually 
concealed (Montes 2004: 160-162). 
 
 In order to support this claim, Montes cites Lawson to suggest that Smith’s 
discussion of the development of knowledge via “surprise, wonder and admiration” in 
HoA is similar to the view held by critical realists: 
 
Theoretical explanatory enquiry is likely to be initiated or further stimulated 
where contrastive demi-regs occasion a sense of surprise, doubt or 
inconsistency, either between the observed phenomenon and a set of prior 
beliefs, or between competing explanations of it, and so forth (Lawson 1997: 
211 cited in Montes 2004: 162). 
 
 
However, as I discuss in 3.3.1, Smith does not discuss the sentiments of surprise, 
wonder, and admiration in HoA in order to demonstrate that there is a hidden reality 
that is waiting to be discovered through philosophical investigation. Rather, this 
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discussion pertains to the psychological processes that lead to the evolution of 
philosophical knowledge. As Smith states, psychological unease “…prompts mankind 
to the study of Philosophy, of that science which pretends to lay open the concealed 
connections that unite the various appearances of nature” (Smith 1980, HoA, II.12; 
III.3 [my emphasis]). As such, rather than claim that any understanding derived from 
such a process uncovers “reality” Smith is investigating how current knowledge has 
been established and how future knowledge might be developed. Indeed, as I argue in 
3.3.1, Smith is clear that such systems of knowledge are “mere inventions of the 
imagination” (Ibid, IV.76). This is arguably why he employs the word “pretends” – a 
part of the sentence Montes omits – as Smith is clear that final truth cannot be 
established. Rather, it needs only to be contemporaneously plausible, so that the 
imagination is temporarily “soothed” (Smith 1980, HoA, II.12). Indeed, the ominous 
implications of making grander claims for knowledge are demonstrated in his 
warnings regarding “men of system” in TMS and in WN. As I also suggest in 3.3.1, 
Smith’s suspicion of dogmatic claims to knowledge is comparable to James’s (1907: 
107) view, for whom:  
 
[t]he ‘absolutely’ true, meaning what no farther experience will ever alter, is 
that ideal vanishing point towards which we imagine that all our temporary 
truths will some day converge…Meanwhile we have to live today by what 
truth we can get today, and be ready tomorrow to call it a falsehood. 
 
Wilson and Dixon “draw heavily” on Montes’ “magisterial survey” of Smith (Wilson 
and Dixon 2006: 255). Despite this, they argue against Lawson (2003), for whom, 
they suggest, the individual is “embedded” in society. In contrast, Wilson and Dixon 
suggest that for Smith: “…the human self is an irreducibly social self…The self does 
not become socialised, moralised or ethical, but is in itself social, moralised and 
ethical” (Wilson and Dixon 2004: 122 [italics in original]). Like Sayer, however, they 
fail to explain how this self arises beyond the social structures they suggest it impacts 
 299 
upon. This is perhaps unsurprising, as Wilson and Dixon characterise Smith’s 
conception of the self as “proto-Meadian”: 
 
The ‘passionate’, partial side of being (Mead would say the ‘I’), and its 
‘impartial’ counterpart, the man within the breast (Mead would say the ‘me’), 
together constitute the self…action emerges as a result of what Mead calls a 
‘conversation’ between the two [the I and Me] (Ibid, 128-129). 
 
 
Smith’s impartial spectator is neither of the ‘I’ nor of the ‘you’. It is however 
of the self since…for Smith the self is the ‘I with you in mind’. Smith’s talk of 
an impartial spectator is his way of expressing the norms that we live by… 
These are standards that are not external at all but, according to Smith’s lights, 
inhere in me: they are my norms; norms that are somehow taken into myself. 
Better, this ‘man within’ is the ‘me’ (Wilson and Dixon 2006: 268). 
 
Wilson and Dixon illustrate this claim via Smith’s comment in TMS in which he notes 
that an individual “…lower[s] his passion to that pitch, in which the spectators are 
capable of going along with him…” (Smith 1981 [1790], I.i.4.7 cited in Wilson and 
Dixon 2006: 269). However, Smith does not make this observation in order to claim 
that individuals have an “internal conversation” or indeed that sympathy is mere 
contagion, as Mead suggests:  
 
We feel with him and we are able so to feel ourselves into the other because 
we have, by our own attitude, aroused in ourselves the attitude of the person 
whom we are assisting. It is that which I regard as a proper interpretation of 
what we ordinarily call “imitation”, and “sympathy”, in the vague, undefined 
sense which we find in our psychologies, when they deal with it at all (Mead 
1934: 299). 
 
Rather, Smith’s comments demonstrate the active nature of the sympathetic process 
between two people. It is therefore interesting to note that while Mead supposedly 
adopts Smith’s concept of sympathy, he does not once refer to TMS. Indeed, as 
Costelloe (1997: 88) admits: “…Mead was genuinely unaware of Smith’s moral 
psychology”. Mead also appears to be similarly unacquainted with the sophisticated 
nature of James’s account of the self, as his conceptualisation of the self employs an 
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inferior version of James’s I/Me distinction that is unable to account for agency, as 
noted in 3b. Indeed, as Mead argues: “[i]n the crowd there is an organisation of 
individuals without the emergence of any self”.408  
 
It is also interesting, therefore, that Archer criticises both James and Mead regarding 
their alleged neglect of the “internal conversation”: 
 
Mead remained at exactly the same point where William James ground to a 
halt – the fundamental inability to conceptualise how we are capable of any 
form of internal conversation with ourselves (Archer 2003: 90 [italics in 
original]). 
 
Archer notes that James refers to individuals’ “premonitory perspective” in the 
chapter on ‘Consciousness’ in PP. For Archer, however, James’s recognition of 
individuals’ capability for internal reflection does not go far enough: “James 
conceptualised thought as an inner monologue, but never as a dialogue” (Ibid, 61-64). 
Significantly, Archer prefers Peirce’s “stratified view of the self” that, she notes, 
enables him to 
                                                 
408 Mead, G. H. (1914) ‘Class Lectures in Social Psychology’, in Miller, D. L. (ed.) The Individual and 
the Social Self: Unpublished work of George Herbert Mead. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 
pp.149 cited in Leys 1993: 299. 
conceptualise “a dialogue between different phases of the ego” (Peirce 
1933: 6 cited in Archer 2003: 71 [italics in original]). As Archer (2003: 71-72) 
explains, for Peirce, this involves a pre-existing self that is made up of habits and an 
elaborated self that post-dates the dialogical dispositions and activities that have 
shaped it. According to Archer, it is this temporal stratification that facilitates Peirce’s 
avoidance of Mead’s externalism:  
 
The Peircian ‘Me’, as the personal conscience which is regularly consulted, is 
thus very different from Mead’s ‘Me’, as the generalised other, which 
furnishes society’s guidelines to action. The former is a personalised 
sentiment, the latter a socialised deposit (Archer 2003: 73). 
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Despite this comparison, Archer notes that:  
 
 
…rather surprisingly, neither Peirce, nor Mead after him, gives us one line 
from an internal conversation. It is as if, because thought itself is held to be 
dialogical, we can all be expected to furnish our own examples, by reference 
to our own conversations (Ibid). 
 
It is perhaps more likely that neither Peirce nor Mead emphasised the internal 
conversation to the extent that Archer might prefer. Despite this, Archer utilises this 
alleged aspect of Peirce’s thought in order to compare it favourably to Mead’s 
externalism. This is perhaps reasonable, as Mead’s concept of the self involves its 
reduction to social processes, as noted. However, Archer also uses this discussion to 
criticise James’s alleged “trenchant subjectivism” (Archer 2003: 78). 
This is inaccurate. For James, habits do not wholly constitute the individual. Rather, 
the present acting self - the “I” - chooses which habits interact with the “Me”. In 
contrast, Peirce does not account for this, as the “I”, or “judge” is simply the “critical 
self” or remembered past. In addition to avoiding a Meadian reduction of individual 
action to social processes, James thus provides a far more thorough account of the self 
than Peirce’s scant explanation via the “internal conversation”. 
For Archer, 
James: “…did not take the final step and conceptualise this mechanism as 
dialogical…James conceptualised thought as an inner monologue, but never as a 
dialogue”. Consequently, in contrast to Peirce: “James leaves us well short of a model 
of internal deliberations through which the reflexive agent could actively mediate his 
or her objective social structure” (Ibid, 64 [italics in original]). 
 
As discussed in 3.1.3, 
James’s conceptualisation of the self is also comparable to Smith’s view insofar as 
both thinkers account for an analytically distinct part of the self with which the 
individual communes that is not separated from the wider self and the context in 
which the self-evaluation takes place. 
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4.3.2) Poststructuralist and social constructivist approaches 
 
 
Vivienne Brown (1994) appears to echo Mead’s notion of the “conversation” and 
Peirce’s concept of the “internal dialogue” in her utilisation of Mikhail Bakhtin’s 
(1981) distinction between “dialogical” and “monologic” texts when interpreting 
Smith.409
                                                 
409 Bakhtin, M. M. (1981) The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays. Austin: University of Texas Press. 
 Brown uses this distinction in order to explore the “stylistic differences” 
that she alleges to exist between TMS and WN and to challenge the “commonsense 
presupposition” that “correctly reading Smith’s work…gives us the meaning that 
Smith intended”. Echoing Skinner (1998), Brown argues that:  
 
[i]t is…not the author but the interpreter who is the “final authority” 
concerning what the author was doing in a particular work. This raises the 
question of the relationship between the intended illocutionary force of an 
utterance and the actual illocutionary force of an utterance as interpreted by 
the historian (Brown 2003: 538 [italics in original]). 
 
This wholly subjective approach informs Brown’s argument (1997: 688-689) that 
there is an “ironic” and “complex interplay of meanings in The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments which unsettles any notion of a straightforward reading”. Following 
Bakhtin, Brown argues that TMS reflects the “dialogic model of conscience” (1994: 
208) found in Stoic moral philosophy, in which “the moral agent engages in internal 
dialogue” (Ibid: 21). In contrast, “WN is an amoral text in that it is not concerned with 
the dialogic experience of conscience” (Ibid: 209). Arguably, this is a restatement of 
the Adam Smith Problem in novel terms, as it reiterates the false separation of the two 
“Smiths” via a sophisticated reiteration of the sociable, moral individual of TMS and 
the selfish, isolated agent supposedly found in WN.  
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In addition to advocating a particularist view of Smith’s “real” meaning in a manner 
that perhaps recalls the gap-filling of orthodox economists and heterodox accounts 
such as that given by Rothschild (e.g., 2001), Brown wrongly attributes to Smith an 
overly social view of the self that is not explained beyond her idiosyncratic reading of 
the impartial spectator. For Brown: “…although the impartial spectator represents a 
private moral domain, this is premised upon the social existence of the moral agent” 
(Brown 1994: 208). This is perhaps unsurprising, as Brown also cites Bakhtin scholar 
Tzvetan Todorov’s Meadian understanding of the impartial spectator, which, Todorov 
argues, is “a generalized other, the internalized gaze of others” that guides moral 
behaviour (Todorov 1997: 6-8 cited in Brown 1997: 698). For Todorov:  
 
…the impartial spectator is the distillation of those who have had influence 
upon us, what in the twentieth century, George Herbert Mead would call the 
‘generalized other,’ and Mikhail Bakhtin, ‘the superaddressee’.410
According to Shapiro, therefore, Smith’s self is an “immanently socialised subject” 
(Ibid, 10; Shapiro 2006: 43). Despite the inaccuracy of this account, Shapiro’s view of 
Smith is cited by Mariek De Goede in her discussion of the merits of poststructuralist 
thought, which, she argues: “…offers a way to take seriously the role of ideas, 
ideology and discourses within the study of IPE while avoiding the limits of 
economism” (De Goede 2003: 94). De Goede agrees with Murphy and Tooze (1996) 
that there is an ongoing false separation of economics and politics in orthodox IPE 
  
 
 
This overly social view of Smith’s account of the self is echoed by Michael Shapiro: 
 
 
The Smithian individual is not the sovereign, self-contained owner or author 
of actions but, rather, a dynamic, reflective, immanently social system of 
symbolic exchanges…Smith’s person is not a self-contained, sovereign actor 
but a bifurcated or double self, containing both an actor and an imagined 
observer through whom action predicates are mediated… (Shapiro 1993: 9). 
 
                                                 
410 Todorov, T. (1996) ‘Living Alone Together’. New Literary History, 27: 1-14, p.8 cited in Rizvi 
2002: 246. 
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owing to the dominance of the states and markets approach taken from mainstream IR 
theory. However, according to De Goede:  “…critical IPE has not yet examined how 
the politics of representation and practices of discourse analysis have a bearing on its 
field of study” (Ibid, 80). In order to address this, De Goede notes Shapiro’s reading 
of Smith, in which, Shapiro claims, such a false separation was first put forward:  
 
According to Shapiro, modern economics as written by Smith, amongst others, 
assumes value to be derived directly from objects. This is a metaphor of 
intrinsicality, in which ‘objects satisfy senses…their value derives from their 
material relationship with the body’. In this way, modern economics forgets 
the (social, cultural, discursive) contexts through which objects take on value, 
and the interpretative struggles that determine what ‘value’ is to mean. In 
contrast, Shapiro argues, practices of value and valuation are less ‘an 
individual choice than an enactment of a social code…the value of an object 
for a subject emerges within a linguistic act that is…anchored in history’. In 
other words, ‘interpretation produces value’, instead of value existing 
objectively and prior to interpretative struggles (Shapiro 1993: 62; 66; 81 cited 
in De Goede 2003: 91 [italics in original]). 
 
However, Smith does not suggest such “intrinsicality”. Indeed, despite positing a 
“natural price” involving “natural rates of wages, profit, and rent” in WN, he does not 
refer to this as a wholly objective value. Rather, he is clear that these are the “ordinary 
or average rates…at the time and place in which they commonly prevail” (Smith 1981 
[1776], I.vii.3). As discussed in 3.1.3, Smith is therefore able to incorporate social 
processes but refrain from reducing agency to these factors. Similarly, Smith is also 
able to avoid economism, as his pre-disciplinary approach to political economy 
ensures that he does not separate “economics” and “politics”. To argue otherwise is to 
re-state the Adam Smith Problem, as Shapiro, De Goede and Brown appear to do. 
 
 
As in Brown’s account, Shapiro’s focus on the importance of linguistic exchanges on 
the development of value and identity reflects the influence of Mead’s symbolic 
interactionism. Mead’s influence is also apparent in social constructivist thought. As 
Odell (2002: 180) explains, social constructivists follow Mead in assuming that: 
 305 
…individuals in society adopt roles and behave as they do because they 
believe others expect them to behave that way…Institutions like families, 
schools, religious organizations, and governments and mass media accomplish 
socialization to these roles and shared beliefs. Social norms of appropriate 
behavior then guide action and even help constitute the individual’s sense of 
‘who I am’.    
 
 
To be sure, Mead is influential upon the thought of social constructivist International 
Relations theorist Alex Wendt (e.g., 1999), who claims to overcome individualism 
and holism via a combination of positivism, Mead’s symbolic interactionism and 
Bhaskar’s version of structuration theory (Christiansen, Jørgensen and Wiener 2001: 
7). For Wendt, symbolic interactionism can aid rationalist explanations of identity- 
and interest- formation. As such, Wendt follows Mead’s (1913: 374-380) notion of 
the self as arising from social interaction, via the reflected appraisals of others within 
one’s social group: “[t]he process by which identities and interests get formed is 
called ‘socialization’. Socialization is in part a process of learning to conform one’s 
behaviour to societal expectations” (Wendt 1999: 170). As such, “…socially shared 
knowledge plays a key role in making interaction relatively predictable over time, 
generating homeostatic tendencies that stabilize social order” (Ibid, 187).411
Wendt claims to grant agency and structure “equal weight” in his account, which, he 
suggests, are “…mutually constitutive and co-determined” (Ibid, 184 [italics in 
original]). Like Hodgson’s old institutionalist reading and Archer’s critical realist 
approach, however, Wendt’s emphasis is on structure, as he readily admits. This 
preference, he suggests, is due to two practical reasons. Firstly, according to Wendt, 
rational choice and game theory already supply the social sciences with a “fairly well-
developed framework for thinking about agency and interaction”. As such, this needs 
to be complemented with a structural account, which he provides. The second reason, 
 
 
 
                                                 
411 Wendt transposes this view to the international level, arguing that: “[i]t is the “generalized other” 
(Mead 1934) that decides whether the US is a hegemon, not the US by itself…” (Wendt 1999: 177). 
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Wendt suggests, “…is that structural theorizing is likely to yield a high rate of 
explanatory return”. As he states:  
 
[e]ven if we lack detailed knowledge about actors and their intentions, we 
should be able to explain, and even predict, patterns of their behaviour if we 
know the structure of rules in which they are embedded (Wendt 1999: 184). 
 
 
According to John Kurt Jacobsen (2003: 45), despite constructivists such as Wendt’s 
“unduly restrictive social-psychological view of identity”, their approach “improves 
upon rational choice theory in its view of the beings inhabiting its modelled universe”. 
However, it is difficult to see how this view might be sustained. To be sure, authors 
such as Wendt may utilise a structural approach that is uncommon within orthodox 
social science, yet aiming to explain and predict behaviour from such a perspective 
does not imply a move beyond rational choice theory, nor indeed the model given by 
mainstream economists. Rather, by aiming to complement existing approaches, it 
again demonstrates the dominance of rationalist conceptions of the individual in the 
social sciences. This is certainly the case in IPE. As Higgott (2006: 9) notes, orthodox 
IPE theorists such as Peter Katzenstein, Robert Keohane and Stephen Krasner attempt 
to account for agency “…by bolting on constructivist thinking to its rationalist 
method. It does so not to demolish rationalist understandings of actor behaviour but to 
modify and contextualise them…”412
                                                 
412 Katzenstein, P. J., Keohane, R. O and Krasner, S. D. (1998) ‘International Organization and the 
Study of World Politics’. International Organization, 52 (4): 463-85 cited in Higgott 2006: 9. 
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4.3.3) Rortian neopragmatism and neo-Gramscian IPE  
 
Higgott suggests Richard Rorty’s neopragmatism as an alternative basis for IPE to 
rationalist, constructivist and neo-Gramscian accounts. In an article from 2003 with 
James Brassett,413
The method is to redescribe lots and lots of things in new ways, until you have 
created a pattern of linguistic behavior which will tempt the rising generation 
to adopt it, thereby causing them to look for appropriate new forms of 
nonlinguistic behaviour…
 Higgott emphasises the normative aspect of Rorty’s thought, 
finding “an imaginative springboard for launching a reformist agenda…” in his ethic 
of “redescription” (Brassett and Higgott 2003: 31-32). As Keith Topper (1995: 954) 
explains, this involves “…describing what unfamiliar people are like and redescribing 
what we ourselves are like”. According to Rorty, this pre-analytic exercise has the 
potential to transform our moral imaginations in a manner that avoids obstructive 
universalistic narratives:    
 
414
Despite pointing out the “intensely relativistic” nature of this concept, Brassett and 
Higgott suggest Rorty’s notion of redescription as the basis of a “positive agenda for 
change” in the global polity (Brassett and Higgott 2003: 46; 52-54). Arguably, this 
reflects the influence of John Dewey’s pragmatism on Rorty’s thought. For Dewey 
(e.g., 1948), philosophy should provide an ideal that can be used to understand and 
assist social reconstruction.
  
 
415
                                                 
413 Brassett, J., Higgott, R. (2003) ‘Building the Normative Dimension(s) of a Global Polity’. Review of 
International Studies, 29: 29-55. 
414 Rorty, R. (1989) Contingency, Irony and Solidarity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.xvi; 
p.9, cited in Topper 1995: 954; Deibert 1997: 182.   
415 Dewey, J. (1948) Reconstruction in Philosophy, Boston, MA: Beacon Press, p.124, cited in Cochran 
2000: 178. 
 In a manner reminiscent of Bhaskar’s (2002: 86) view 
of the “emancipatory role” that he alleges philosophy ought to play in society, and 
also the “man of system” that Smith warns about in TMS, Dewey: “…believed that 
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reformers could solve basic economic and political problems by acting directly on 
minds, morals, and culture” (Cohen 1998: 429). 
 
As Molly Cochran (2000: 176; 189) notes, despite citing Dewey as his intellectual 
hero,416 Rorty “…aims to divest Dewey’s work of its foundationalism…so as to make 
pragmatism more radically contingent, interpretivist and linguistified”. Ironically, this 
echoes Dewey’s naturalisation of the work of his philosophical hero: William James. 
As Richard Gale explains, Dewey (e.g., 1940) deliberately distorts James’s 
philosophy in order to render it compatible with his naturalistic ontology.417
…Rorty argues…that ‘James and Dewey were not waiting at the end of the 
dialectical road which analytic philosophy traveled, but are waiting at the end 
of the road which, for example, Foucault and Deleuze are currently travelling’. 
(Rorty, 1982: xviii)…This interpretation enables Rorty to place pragmatism in 
the context of contemporary debates, but at the price of giving a distorted 
image of the movement, as he has several times admitted.
 As Gale 
argues: “[b]y this act of philosophical usurpation Dewey adds to the lustre of his own 
bandwagon by getting James aboard” (Gale 2004: 154-156; 162-163; 1997: 49-57). In 
a similar manner, Rorty claims James and Dewey as forerunners of his anti-
foundationalist approach, as Leszek Koczanowicz (1999: 63) explains:  
 
418
Indeed, as established in 3.1.2, James certainly does not reflect the antifoundationalist 
view that Rorty grants him here. As Gale (2004: 151) notes, although James’s 
multivocalism in PP may be interpreted as reflecting a type of ontological relativism, 
in his later works such as VRE, APU and Some Problems of Philosophy James clearly 
endorses “…nonrelativized reality claims based on mystical experiences, which also 
include the Bergsonian conceptless intuition of a cotton-candyish processual flux”. As 
   
 
 
                                                 
416 See Rorty, R. (1985) ‘Comments on Sleeper and Edel’. Transactions of the C. S. Peirce Society, 21 
(1): 39-48. 
417 For James’s opinion of Dewey, see “The Chicago School”, in James 1987 (1904): 1136-1140. 
418 Rorty, R. (1982) Consequences of Pragmatism. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 
p.xvii cited in Koczanowicz 1999: 63. 
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James explains in APU, individuals do not lose their identity in this process; rather, it 
is here that different aspects of individuals’ identities are developed and displayed 
(James 1987 [1909]: 751). This reflects the chapters on “Attention” and “Will” in PP, 
in which James stresses that habit is not akin to passive enactments of socialisation 
processes, but is the outcome of repeated exposure to a particular form of activity that 
is initially chosen by the individual.419
…human beings and all objects and events are treated as if they were 
individual and nothing but individual…The result is that identification of 
human beings with something supposed to be completely isolated which is the 
curse of the so-called individualistic movement in economics, politics, and 
psychology.
 Arguably, this demonstrates the paucity of 
Dewey’s attempt to portray James as a methodological individualist. According to 
Dewey, in James’s work:  
 
420
                                                 
419 As discussed in 3.1.4, there are clear similarities with Smith’s and James’s views here. 
420 Dewey, J. (1989) The later works of John Dewey, 1925-1953, ed. by J. A. Boydston, volume 15. 
Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, pp.4-5, cited in Gale 2004: 158. 
 
 
 
This is inaccurate, as Gale points out, since James’s notion of the importance of 
individualism “…was really concerned with the value of each individual in virtue of 
its uniqueness, not its separateness or isolation within a society or economic system” 
(Gale 2004: 158). Arguably, Dewey’s critique of James highlights the complete 
socialization of the individual in his own account, which shares Mead’s naturalization 
of the self. As James Schellenberg points out, Mead’s exclusive focus upon - and 
subsequent distortion of - James’s social self was viewed by symbolic interactionists 
such as Dewey as “…a significant step forward in the development of self theory” 
(Schellenberg 1990: 770). As Gale suggests, therefore: “[i]t is no accident that Dewey 
never wrote anything about the identity of the self, for, according to him, there is no 
such thing” (Gale 2004: 159). 
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As Patrick Baert (2004: 358-359) argues, Rorty’s ambivalence towards Dewey’s 
naturalism relates to Rorty’s discussion of the Methodenstreit, which he portrays as 
the struggle between naturalist and anti-naturalist approaches. As Baert explains:   
 
…Rorty disagrees with both sides of the debate. For him the controversy is an 
ill-conceived one, because it is not actually about method. Debates about 
method would require a common goal, and this is absent here. It would be 
preposterous to hold that naturalist and anti-naturalist ‘readings’ of the social 
have the same objective; they obviously do different things. Whether either 
position is a plausible route to take depends on what we want to achieve. If we 
want to predict and control, naturalist approaches will do; if we want to treat 
human beings as moral individuals, then surely anti-naturalist approaches are 
likely to be called for.421
This is evidence of the “practical” emphasis to Rorty’s neopragmatism, which appears 
to be a distant relation to James’s notion of “cash value” as expressed in Pragmatism, 
in which the truth of an idea rests upon its explanatory power.
  
 
 
422
Arguably, Brassett and Higgott are correct insofar as Cox’s distinction between 
critical theory and problem-solving theory reflects an outdated approach to IPE in 
which it is considered an events-led adjunct to international relations theory.
 This is significant 
here since it is this “practical” aspect of Rorty’s notion of redescription that Brassett 
and Higgott draw upon in their attempt to move beyond orthodox and critical 
explanations of globalisation. For Brassett and Higgott: 
 
[t]he scholarly study of globalisation and an emerging global polity must 
develop a critical problem-solving purpose that takes us beyond Robert Cox’s 
once useful, but now inhibiting, distinction between international relations 
scholarship as either critical theory or problem-solving (Brassett and Higgott 
2003: 51 [italics in original]). 
 
 
423
                                                 
421 Rorty, R. (1982) Consequences of Pragmatism. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 
pp. 196-197 cited in Baert 2004: 159. 
422 As discussed in 3.2.1, this does not represent relativism, as for James true beliefs must be verifiable. 
423 Cox 1986 (1981): 207 [italics in original]; Cox 2001: 59; Watson 2005: 11; Keohane 2009: 35. 
 To be 
sure, Cox’s transformative agenda - informed as it is by Marx’s historical materialism 
and Gramsci’s class-based account of the self - cannot account for agency in a serious 
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way.424
For Cohen (2008: 55-56) Strange’s view of intellectual inquiry was “to right the 
wrongs of the world”. In order to support this, Cohen cites Ronen Palan (2003: 123), 
who views the philosophical pragmatism of James and Dewey as “hold[ing] the key” 
to Strange’s brand of IPE. As noted, however, James does not advocate 
interventionism aimed at changing the world; even a cursory reading of his work 
demonstrates this. As such, one might consider that Strange is influenced by Dewey. 
  This criticism that can also be aimed at David Lake’s (2009) “open economy 
politics”, which, he explains: “…assumes the interests of actors are derived from their 
position within the international division of labor, and examines how strategic 
interaction and institutions condition the pursuit of those interests” (Lake 2009: 49). 
Such an overly structural agenda is also reflected by “old” institutionalists, critical 
realists and social constructivists, as has been discussed. Furthermore, despite their 
criticism of Cox, Brassett and Higgott’s utilisation of Rorty’s notion of redescription 
provides IPE with a similarly normative agenda and an equally poor explanation of 
agency. Arguably, this use of Rorty’s distortion of pragmatist thought fails to move 
beyond Cox, therefore, as it combines an interventionist approach with Dewey’s 
failure to account for agency and a relativistic explanation of social change.  
 
The practical aspect of pragmatism to which Rorty appeals is perhaps reflected in the 
work of Susan Strange (e.g., 1988). Despite retaining a structuralist viewpoint, 
Strange (1988: 16) argues:  
 
[w]hat we have to do [in IPE], in short, is to find a method of analysis of the 
world economy that opens the door of student or reader choice and allows 
more pragmatism in prescription; and secondly, a method of analysis that 
breaks down the dividing walls between the ideologues and makes possible 
some communication and even debate among them. 
 
 
                                                 
424 Berry 2007: 20; De Goede 2003: 89; Devetak 1996: 152; Germain and Kenny 1998: 8-12; Murphy 
1998: 424; Jacobsen 2003: 55. 
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However, unlike Dewey who, as noted, does not consider the self worthy of 
discussion, Strange recognises the importance to IPE of accounting for agency:  
 
…all we have [in IPE theory] so far are competing doctrines - sets of 
normative ideas about the goals to which state policy should be directed and 
how politics and economics (or, more accurately, states and markets) ought to 
be related to one another…What we need is different. It is a framework of 
analysis, a method of diagnosis of the human condition as it is, or as it was, 
affected by economic, political, and social circumstances. This is the 
necessary precondition for prescription, for forming opinions about what could 
and should be done about it (Strange 1988: 16). 
 
Arguably, like Cox, Strange’s structuralism limits her ability to incorporate agency 
into IPE in the manner that she intends. However, her insight at least demonstrates 
that this need has largely gone unfulfilled since her seminal intervention in the subject 
field. In order to begin to remedy this situation, Strange suggests that we “…go back 
and start again at the beginning”.425
[i]dentification of IPE as a proper subject of study was inaugurated in the 
United Kingdom by Strange’s 1970 article in International Affairs…followed 
by her book, Sterling and British Policy (Strange, 1971), which traced 
connections between politics and economically [sic] historically. The key 
markers in the United States were three special issues of International 
Organization during the 1970s - on transnational relations (Keohane and Nye, 
1972), politics and economics (Bergsten and Krause, 1975), and foreign 
economic policies of advanced industrialized states (Katzenstein, 1978).
 This is not, however, the point at which Cohen 
(2007: 197) and Keohane date IPE’s commencement. For Keohane:  
 
426
In contrast, Strange is referring to the tradition of classical political economy that 
existed prior to the “…fragmentation of the social sciences in the nineteenth 
 
 
                                                 
425 Strange, S. (1998) ‘International Political Economy: Beyond Economics and International 
Relations’. Economies et Sociétés, 34 (4): 3-24, p.21, cited in Watson 2005: 241. 
426 Bergsten, C. F., Krause, L. B. (1975) World Politics and International Economics. Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution; Katzenstein, P. J. (ed.) (1978) Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic 
Policies of Advanced Industrial States. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press; Keohane, R. O., 
Nye, J. S. (1972) (eds.) Transnational Relations and World Politics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press; Strange, S. (1970) ‘International Economics and International Relations: A Case of 
Mutual Neglect’. International Affairs, 46 (2): 304-315; Strange, S. (1971) Sterling and British Policy: 
A Political Study of an International Currency in Decline. Oxford: Oxford University Press cited in 
Keohane 2009: 35. 
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century”.427
As Watson suggests, this tradition facilitates understanding of economic relations via 
the appraisal of individuals as “socially situated moral agents” (Ibid, 242). As such, 
recognition of this tradition perhaps breathes new life into Strange’s claim that IPE 
can rescue political economy from mainstream economics.
 This view is echoed by Watson, who points out that: “…political 
economy has a much longer history than as a sub-field of International Relations…” 
(Watson 2005: 241). As such, he argues: 
 
[i]n the search for suitable foundations for IPE, it is necessary to go back 
further than the beginning of IPE itself, to the origins of the broader tradition 
of political economy. That tradition, in turn, has its roots in moral philosophy 
(Ibid, 28). 
 
428
                                                 
427 Cohen 2008: 56. Cohen acknowledges that IPE’s lineage can be traced back to the eighteenth 
century. However, he considers Strange’s 1970 article to be “…as good a candidate as any to mark the 
moment of the new field’s birth” (Ibid, 17; 21). 
428 Strange, S. (1998) ‘International Political Economy: Beyond Economics and International 
Relations’. Economies et Sociétés, 34 (4): 3-24, p.21, cited in Watson 2005: 240. 
 To be sure, such a pre-
disciplinary approach avoids rationalist explanations of agency. However, as I have 
discussed, attempts by institutionalist and constructivist IPE theorists have so far 
failed to challenge such a characterisation successfully as they utilise overly structural 
accounts of agency as provided by figures such as Dewey, Mead, Peirce, Simon and 
Veblen. Indeed, the danger exists that by self-consciously framing individuals as 
wholly socially situated agents, IPE theorists will continue to reproduce the post-
Methodenstreit separation of economics and politics whilst falsely claiming to have 
overcome the inductive-rationalist account of agency that they criticise.    
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4b) Chapter Four conclusion 
 
 
According to Cohen (2009: 137) “…there seems little doubt in the minds of many in 
the IPE community that the divide [between US and British IPE] does indeed exist - 
and, more importantly, that it matters”. The extent to which this view is accepted in 
the subject field is perhaps borne out by the recent special issue of Review of 
International Political Economy (RIPE) - a journal as closely associated with 
“British” IPE as International Organisation is to “American” IPE according to Cohen 
(2008: 47) - in which the “American school” of IPE is debated by a number of 
prominent British and North American theorists.429
For Phillips (2009: 85-87), these represent important contributions to the acute 
theoretical and methodological homogenization of IPE in the US, which, she argues, 
is characterized by a commitment to liberalism, rational choice theory and 
quantitative methodology, a view that is shared by Henry Farrell and Martha 
Finnemore (2009: 60-63) and Robert Wade (2009: 106). For Kathleen McNamara 
(2009: 73), this signals an intellectual “monoculture” that ought to be dismantled. 
 These include Nicola Philips, 
current editor of New Political Economy, who points to Daniel Maliniak and Michael 
Tierney’s study of the Teaching, Research, and International Policy (TRIP) project  - 
“…a multi-year study of the international relations (IR) field in order to discern the 
major characteristics of international political economy scholarship in the United 
States today” (Maliniak and Tierney 2009: 6) - as providing evidence of the 
widespread occurrence of editorial “gatekeeping” among the leading US journals and 
the associated “self-selection” by theorists hoping to negotiate this process. 
 
                                                 
429 These contributing authors are: Jerry Cohen, Henry Farrell and Martha Finnemore, Randall 
Germain, Peter Katzenstein, Robert Keohane, David Lake, Daniel Maliniak and Michael Tierney, 
Kathleen McNamara, Nicola Phillips, Robert Wade and Catherine Weaver. According to Germain 
(2009: 100), the “American school” should instead be referred to as the “’Harvard’ school of IPE”, as 
he argues that the alumni of Harvard University dominates IPE in the US. This view is refuted by 
Katzenstein (2009: 128-129). 
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Cohen (2009: 141) concurs. As he suggests: “…as the creep of economism 
accelerates [in IPE], the space for truly interdisciplinary work may be gradually 
squeezed away”. In order to remedy this, Cohen (2007: 199) argues that: “…bridges 
must be built across the transatlantic divide”: 
 
…we need to cultivate more debate about and between the two schools…we 
need to resurrect the theme of [Susan] Strange’s open range…Ultimately, the 
aim should be to restore something of a lost sense of solidarity to our common 
research community (Cohen 2009: 141-142).430
To be sure, Cohen’s call for intellectual compromise is undermined by his statement 
that: “[t]he transatlantic divide can never be eliminated entirely, of course…” (Cohen 
2009: 142). As such, his notion of “bridge building” does little other than reiterate the 
 
 
 
…the two schools are really rather complementary…why not seek to take the 
best from both, for their mutual gain? The American school could learn much 
from the British school’s broad multidisciplinarity…The British school, 
conversely, could learn much from the American side’s more rigorous 
methodologies, which help bring consistency and replicability to theoretical 
analysis (Cohen 2008: 177). 
 
 
In contrast, Higgott and Watson (2008: 4-6) suggest that, as Cohen’s identification of 
a geographical divide equates “American” IPE with ontological atomism and 
“British” IPE with ontological structuralism, which “…differ so completely in 
essence that there is no way of simply moving between the two realms of analysis in 
order to provide a unified explanation combining the two”, his calls for reconciliation 
are “self-defeating”:  
 
His [Cohen’s] identification of a hostile transatlanticism in IPE centres on the 
assumption that there are two traditions within the subject field, which are 
constructed upon very different notions of both the goals and the methods of 
social scientific research. Taken literally, two such traditions could not talk to 
one another, because they would have no shared ontological or 
epistemological elements on which to base a genuine dialogue. 
 
  
                                                 
430 Strange 1984: ix cited in Cohen 2009: 142. 
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view that there are two incommensurable versions of IPE. As Higgott and Watson 
(2008: 8) point out, this poses a similar threat to a pluralistic IPE as that caused to 
economics by Menger’s victory in the Methodenstreit, which prompted today’s 
narrow convergence around a neoclassical approach. As Higgott and Watson explain: 
“…a forced retrenchment of the subject field around Cohen’s American variant would 
sideline many of the most important recent developments in IPE” (Ibid, 12). Among 
these is the connections being made between political economy and political 
philosophy, which they suggest “…will continue to define the cutting edge of IPE for 
the foreseeable future” (Ibid, 13). According to Higgott and Watson (2008: 9-10), 
Cohen’s separation of IPE into two hostile camps threatens to disrupt such a move, as 
it reflects Schumpeter’s (1994 [1954]: 31) “avowedly post-Methodenstreit view” that 
“the garb of philosophy is removable…in the case of economics”. As such, it also 
reflects Schumpeter’s rationalist separation of economics and politics that informs his 
view of the two “Adam Smiths”.  
 
Gamble (1995), Higgott (e.g., 2006), Murphy and Tooze (1991) and Watson (e.g., 
2005; 2009; 2010) are therefore correct to suggest that contemporary IPE is 
influenced by the pre-disciplinary thought of Adam Smith. Moreover, this longer 
view demonstrates the reasons for the different approaches to the subject-field, which 
Cohen et al. fail to take into account. When these reasons are considered, as I have 
attempted to do in this chapter, it is possible to see that both “sides” begin with a 
shared acceptance of the rationalist separation of economics and politics that has been 
in place since the Methodenstreit. In my view, it is for this reason that orthodox IPE 
theorists are unable to move beyond the positivist monoculture that McNamara 
identifies. It is also for this reason that critical IPE theorists fail to articulate an 
alternative account of agency to that which they identify in mainstream accounts.  
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An important aspect of McNamara’s argument is that attempts to incorporate more 
sophisticated notions of agency are occurring in other fields: 
 
The two disciplines most closely related to IPE, economics and sociology, 
have seen a flourishing of heterodox perspectives on how markets work. 
Economics has moved into decision making, and unpacked and upended 
rationality, with Daniel Kahneman receiving a Nobel Prize for his path 
breaking scholarship with the late Amos Tversky. Economic sociologists have 
developed and applied very sophisticated quantitative techniques to their 
studies of the ways in which culture shapes markets and social institutions 
impact a variety of economic policy outcomes, demonstrating that one can 
study social constructivist outcomes using many different methods 
(McNamara 2009: 80). 
 
This is particularly interesting, as, as discussed, the notion of the two separate “IPEs” 
reflects the post-Methodenstreit division between economics and sociology. However, 
as I have shown, behavioural economists and economic sociologists fail to provide an 
alternative account of agency to neoclassical explanations of the self. As discussed, 
these accounts involve a form of rationalist determinism in which individuals are 
considered to be passive, rational dupes that are easily manipulated by socialisation 
processes based on assumptions about behaviour taken from mainstream economics. 
As I suggest in 4.1.1, rather than provide a credible account of agency, these authors 
merely demonstrate the dominance of rational choice theory - and its attendant 
reduction of individual agency to the universal “rational economic man” - across the 
social sciences.  
 
As Watson (2008: 54) notes, critical IPE continues to define itself against such a 
reductive account of agency. However, as I have shown, this oppositional stance is no 
more successful at elucidating an alternative concept of agency to that which it 
criticises. Indeed, it is possible to argue that critical IPE is simply unable to provide 
this alternative, as it implicitly accepts the rationalist divide that was put in place after 
Menger’s victory in the Methodenstreit, in which sociologists “backed off” from the 
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subject matter and methodology that was deemed appropriate for economists 
(Swedberg 1987a: 18). Arguably, this form of implicit self-selection is ongoing, 
which ensures the perpetuation of assumptions regarding one’s own “camp” as well as 
those on the other “side”.    
 
As discussed in 4.2.1-2, attempts are made to overcome such a divide by new 
institutionalist economists and “old” institutionalists. Interestingly, the overly 
individualistic account of agency provided by new institutionalists such as Horwitz 
(e.g., 2001) and the overly structural account provided by “old” institutionalists such 
as Hodgson (e.g., 2007) are informed by distorted versions of Smith’s and James’s 
ideas via the views of Menger and Veblen. As discussed in 4.3.1, a similar distortion 
of Smith’s and James’s views are made by critical realists such as Archer (e.g., 2003) 
and Wilson and Dixon (e.g., 2004), whose notion of the “internal dialogue” owes 
more to Mead and Peirce than it does to Smith and James. As I argue in 4.3.2, Brown 
(1994; 2003) also uses Mead’s concept of the “internal dialogue” to reiterate the 
Adam Smith Problem in novel terms. The overly structural account of Smith’s view of 
agency is echoed by Shapiro (2002; 2006), a view that De Goede (2003) suggests can 
be of use to critical IPE. The influence of Mead is also shown in the overly structural 
account of agency given by social constructivist Alex Wendt (1999), despite his 
claims to have dissolved the opposition between agency and structure.  
 
As noted, Higgott (2007: 155) points out that this form of constructivism is utilised by 
orthodox IPE authors such as Katzenstein and Keohane in order to “bolt on” an 
institutional account of agency to rationalist understandings of actor behaviour. In 
contrast, Higgott and Brassett advocate Rorty’s neopragmatism. As I demonstrate in 
4.3.3, however, Rorty’s view is based upon a distortion of Dewey, whose own ideas 
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are in turn a distortion of James’ views. Despite these misrepresentations via other 
thinkers, the figures of James and Smith loom large in these explanations. As I have 
shown, unlike those with whom they are wrongly conflated, they each account for 
agency rather than reducing it to the reproduction of social forces as in “old” 
institutionalist and constructivist accounts, whilst avoiding the methodological 
individualism of rationalist and new institutionalist accounts.  
 
As discussed in this chapter, attempts have been made to move beyond rationalist 
explanations of agency by behavioural economists and economic sociologists, moves 
that have been advocated by IPE theorists such as McNamara (e.g., 2009), Deborah 
Elms (e.g., 2008) and James Odell (e.g., 2002). However, as I have shown, these 
explanations of agency are inferior to those provided by Smith and James as they fail 
to move beyond rationalist descriptions of the individual in society, a fate that is 
shared by institutionalist and constructivist explanations. The Smith-James approach 
therefore offers a route past the “no through road” that Strange (1998: 21) identifies, 
as it provides IPE with a pre-disciplinary link to moral philosophy that avoids 
atomistic and structural accounts of agency.431
 
 In my view, this framework also 
emphasises IPE’s unique ability to transcend artificial disciplinary boundaries whilst 
offering a way beyond the characterisation of two “IPEs” that authors such as Cohen 
(2007; 2008), Denemark and O’Brien (1997) Keohane (2009), McNamara (2009), 
Murphy and Nelson (2001), Phillips (2009) and Ravenhill (2008) implicitly or 
explicitly reiterate. 
 
 
                                                 
431 Strange, S. (1998) ‘International Political Economy: Beyond Economics and International 
Relations’, Economies et Sociétés, 34 (4): 3-24, p.21, cited in Watson 2005: 240. 
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In this thesis I have attempted to contribute to the emerging effort within IPE to dig 
back to its intellectual roots. In so doing, I have demonstrated IPE’s pre-disciplinary 
connections to the areas of psychology, economics and sociology, which highlights 
the subject field’s ability to provide intellectual space in which a complex account of 
agency can develop. As I have argued, this account can be provided via the ideas of 
Adam Smith and William James. As I have explained, there is a growing appreciation 
within IPE for the need to re-engage the subject field with its pre-disciplinary origins 
through Smith. I have investigated the value of such a claim via a thoroughgoing 
analysis of his thought. To this I have added a detailed assessment of the thought of 
James, who I have suggested provides a complementary conceptualisation of agency 
that provides IPE with an alternative to that currently employed in the subject field 
which reflects marginalist economists such as Carl Menger’s (e.g., 1950 [1891]) 
catallactic separation of economics and politics, and John Stuart Mill’s (1844) concept 
of “rational economic man”.  
 
As I have observed, this account of agency has been erroneously attributed to Smith. 
As William Grampp (1954: 315) suggests, however: “…rational economic man is as 
alien to the thought of Adam Smith as it is to the observable facts of social behaviour 
or to any reasonable preconception of them”. I have demonstrated this via a thorough 
investigation of Smith’s oeuvre, his influences and his ongoing influence. As I have 
also shown, this is aided by a detailed study of the views of James, whose seminal 
contribution to the social sciences was made during the period in which the 
institutionalised separation of the newly formed disciplines occurred. James thus 
provides us with an intellectual connection to Smith’s account of the self and a 
historical link to the point at which sophisticated accounts of agency were divorced 
from economics and, latterly, from IPE.  
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As I have noted, despite recent attempts to introduce more reflexive accounts of 
agency into the social sciences, Menger’s reductive conceptualisation of the self has 
remained the standard view since the late nineteenth century. As I have argued, Smith 
and James can provide IPE with a pre-rationalist account of agency that transcends 
the inductive-deductive divide that has informed the social sciences since then. As I 
claimed in Chapter Four, IPE theorists are currently unable to countenance such an 
alternative account of agency owing to their implicit acceptance of the analytical 
separation of economics and politics that became institutionalised in this period. As I 
have suggested, this is largely masked by critical IPE theorists’ self-conscious 
commitments to socio-political ontology and normative interventionism, an approach 
that is consistent with that taken by figures in the Younger German Historical School, 
sociologists and “old” institutionalist economists, who similarly identify themselves 
with a reflexive approach. As Watson argues:  
 
[t]he substantive content of much work within IPE highlights the adverse 
social consequences of purely self-interested actions within the economy. 
However, few attempts are made to challenge the assumption that behaviour 
itself is predicated upon self-interested norms. 
 
This failure is arguably aided by IPE theorists’ unawareness of their discipline’s 
intellectual heritage (Watson 2010: 3). As noted, most IPE authors date the birth of 
the subject-field to the early 1970s (e.g., Keohane 2009: 35). As Craig Murphy and 
Roger Tooze suggest, however, this has potentially hazardous consequences for the 
future of IPE: “…accepting that history without comment may help reinforce the 
practice of contemporary orthodoxy. Adam Smith was certainly ‘doing’ IPE in the 
1770s” (Murphy and Tooze 1991: 30 footnote 2). As they propose, therefore: “[t]o 
recognise that there is a new IPE that shares some of Smith’s concerns is to recognise 
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that today’s orthodoxy represents a break in a longer tradition”.432
Tooze and Murphy therefore draw attention to the practical consequences of a crucial 
lacuna in IPE that I have attempted to address in this thesis: the absence of a complex 
 For Murphy and 
Tooze, Smith’s “ultimate concern” is: “fostering human dignity and the ethical life” 
(Ibid, 27). As discussed in Chapter One, this is a more accurate appraisal of his 
thought than that given in canonical accounts, in which Smith is represented as a 
dogmatic advocate of self-interest and laissez-faire. However, Murphy and Tooze 
arguably conflate Smith’s concern with the well being and dignity for the poor with 
an interventionism that he does not advocate. 
 
This is significant since Tooze and Murphy (1996) suggest that orthodox IPE and IR 
theory marginalizes the world’s poor through its commitment to the tenets of rational 
choice economics, which, they argue: “…constructs economic life as a universal 
experience in space and time…thus making the recognition and interpretation of 
economic and political life outside of this frame almost impossible by definition”. In 
order to remedy this, Tooze and Murphy suggest that a “complex psychology” ought 
to be articulated that employs a broader understanding of human behaviour than that 
currently conceived within IPE. They advocate an “ameliorative epistemology” in 
order to achieve this end, which, they argue, can aid the active promotion of 
interventionist strategies aimed at “making life better for those who are less 
advantaged” (Tooze and Murphy 1996: 688-689; 697-704). I would argue that this is 
a laudable aim. Indeed, as Carl Knight (2008: 713) observes:  
 
…two and a half billion people – two-fifths of the world’s population – live on 
less than $2 per day. Over a billion people do not have access to clean 
drinking water and 800 million suffer from hunger and malnutrition. 
 
                                                 
432 Tooze and Murphy (1996: 682) characterise orthodox IPE as that which employs a positivist 
methodology, an empiricist epistemology, and methodological individualism. 
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concept of the self within the subject field. However, they fail to elucidate how such a 
“complex psychology” is to be achieved. As such, they arguably reflect critical IPE’s 
characteristic “outcome-oriented notion of morality rather than an ontologically-
oriented notion” (Watson 2007: 6-7) as they point to the dire consequences of failing 
to supply an adequate explanation of agency whilst neglecting to provide such an 
account themselves. This constitutes a move away from Smith, who, as my 
comparison with James has shown, provides such an explanation whilst 
demonstrating the dangers of interventionism based on supposedly immutable 
standards. As I have argued, this does not however reflect a commitment to 
methodological individualism or to a laissez-faire approach. Indeed, as discussed, 
both thinkers consider poverty to be an affront to justice. As also noted, this 
demonstrates the theme of self-determination that runs through both authors’ work 
and which relates to their commitment to evolutionary accounts of morality and 
knowledge production and thus their opposition to interventionist dogma of any kind 
(e.g., Smith 1976 [1776], IV.ii.10; James 1981 [1890]: 277).
Despite the limited connection between their interventionist strategy and Smith’s and 
James’s more modest meliorism, Tooze and Murphy demonstrate the practical 
importance of Smith’s and James’s provision of a complex concept of the self to IPE. 
I have suggested that a clearer understanding of their views, which I have aimed to 
elucidate here, can provide this. As I have argued, Smith’s and James’s pre-
disciplinary accounts of the self provide a non-rationalist framework that lends itself 
to inquiry rather than to prescription. Indeed, as D. P. O’Brien (1990 [1976]: 157) 
notes, Smith: “…believed in the evolution of systems of knowledge, not in the arrival 
at a final and immovable truth”. This approach, evident throughout Smith’s oeuvre, is 
shared by James, who similarly “…turns away from…bad a priori reasons, from fixed 
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principles, closed systems, and pretended absolutes and origins” (James 1987 [1907]: 
508). As I have argued, this shared antipathy towards universalist claims to truth and 
objective moral standards contributes to these authors’ ongoing relevance to IPE. To 
be sure, a more thorough understanding of their thought provides a clear warning as to 
the dangers of prescriptive interventions based upon universalist claims to knowledge, 
an issue that is of particular salience in the subject field.  
 
As Anne Showstack Sassoon (2001: 8) suggests: “…those who ‘do’ the [IPE] theory 
frequently come from the Anglo-American world”.433
Hobson’s reference to “the Self” and “Other” here is at the level of “civilizations”, 
i.e., “East and West” (Ibid, 94). However, in his ‘everyday IPE’ (EIPE) approach, 
developed with Leonard Seabrooke, Hobson aims to address the issue of agency at the 
level of the individual. Perhaps echoing other poststructuralists such as De Goede 
(e.g., 2003; 2006), for whom “the economy is not an autonomous entity in its own 
right but is constituted by everyday practices that are ideologically imbued” (Watson 
2007: 11), Hobson and Seabrooke argue that: “…conventional work in international 
 According to John Hobson, this 
universalism is reflected in critical IR theory, which, he argues, is “…contained 
within a ‘Westphilian straitjacket’ that at once renders racist hierarchy and racism 
invisible in the world while simultaneously issuing racist Eurocentric explanatory 
models of the world” (Hobson 2007: 93 [italics in original]). In order to remedy this, 
Hobson proposes a “post-racist emancipatory politics” that, he explains, “…seeks to 
bring the world to heal…Accepting the Other in the Self and recognising that the Self 
is therefore hybrid must be central to the process of global reconciliation” (Ibid, 113).  
 
                                                 
433 This is arguably reflected in civil society engagement of global governance, in which “…the 
privileged claim to speak for the subordinated, often with only limited if any direct consultation of the 
would-be constituents…”, as Jan Arte Scholte (2002: 296) points out. See also Brassett and Holmes 
2008: 20-23. 
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political economy (IPE) has little to tell us about how our everyday actions transform 
the world economy” (Hobson and Seabrooke 2007b: 1). As such, they attempt to 
challenge orthodox accounts that rely upon rationalist explanations of agency through 
the creation of a “sociological framework for IPE” in which individual choices are 
envisaged as “being informed by historically and socially contingent identities and 
interests” (Ibid, 2; 9). However, they neglect to discuss how these identities and 
interests are developed beyond the social norms they are supposed to replicate.  
 
Hobson and Seabrooke also provide a critique of neo-Gramscian IPE (e.g., Gill 1995) 
which, they suggest, discusses the imposition of hegemonic forces upon behaviour, 
but fails to explain: “…how the subordinate mediate and at times shape these so-
called top-down processes”. In contrast, they: “…further the call for emancipation by 
revealing sites of agency, including cases where one would assume that there was 
little or no capacity for voice” (Hobson and Seabrooke 2007b: 4). In addition, Hobson 
and Seabrooke (2007a: 210) suggest that EIPE: “…opens up the ‘policy imagination’ 
that provides detailed and practical imagination for policy-makers”.434
Seabrooke reiterates Cohen’s (e.g., 2007; 2008) distinction between British and North 
American IPE and his call for their reintegration in order to respond to orthodox IR 
 For Seabrooke 
(2007b: 392), this is to be achieved via engagement with historical sociology: 
 
British political economy scholarship has trumpeted the cause of 
‘historicizing’ the field of International Political Economy (IPE) for some time 
now (Amoore et al., 2000). But ‘heterodox’ British scholarship has been less 
forward in arguing that historicizing IPE would lead political economy to have 
greater policy relevance. And this is precisely where we can build a bridge to 
North American ‘orthodox’ IPE scholarship, as well as substantiate a broader 
claim on the relevance of the discipline as a whole.  
 
                                                 
434 Johnna Montgomerie (2009: 17) draws on Hobson and Seabrooke’s EIPE, which, she argues, 
“…provides a bottom-up framework for evaluating the impact of everyday actions of debt-based 
consumption”. 
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theorists’ Peter Katzenstein, Robert Keohane and Stephen Krasner’s (1998) critique 
that IPE “…suffers from limited policy relevance”435. In addition to his uncritical 
acceptance of the “split” between North American and British versions of IPE, 
Seabrooke’s suggestion that greater policy relevance is necessary arguably highlights 
an example of the widespread view of the latter form of IPE as being synonymous 
with interventionism. Seabrooke’s call for IPE to widen its “policy imagination” to 
include everyday activities is also influenced by Weber’s (e.g., 1978 [1922]) notion of 
rationalization - the “constructs that an individual uses to make sense of their lives” - 
which Seabrooke relates to his notion of axiorational behaviour, which he defines as 
“belief-driven actions that are informed (not determined) by conventions and norms” 
(Seabrooke 2007b: 403).436
Arguably, this reflects a step towards Tooze and Murphy’s call for an interventionist 
subject field that incorporates a complex notion of agency. However, like them, 
Seabrooke again fails to provide a clear explanation of from where agency is derived 
beyond these conventions and norms. In this he replicates the overly structural 
accounts of agency as displayed by figures such as Mead (e.g., 1934), Dewey (e.g., 
1940) and Veblen (e.g., 1919 [1909]) and others that self-consciously identify with a 
reflexive ontology yet fail to explain where agency resides beyond social structures 
(e.g., Archer 1995; Bhaskar 1989; Hodgson 2002; 2007; Lawson 2003; Sayer 2007). 
Arguably, this is also due to the influence of Weber, whose acceptance of the partition 
of economic and non-economic rationality aided the separation of economics, 
  
 
                                                 
435 Katzenstein, P. J., Keohane, R. O. and Krasner, S. D. (1998) ‘International Organization and the 
Study of World Politics’. International Organization, 52 (4): 645-685 cited in Seabrooke 2007b: 392. 
436 Seabrooke is also influenced here by Jens Beckert’s (e.g., 2003) notion of intentional rationality 
(Beckert, J. [2003] ‘Economic Sociology and Embeddedness. How Shall We Conceptualize 
Economic Action?’ Journal of Economic Issues, 37 [3]: 769–787 cited in Seabrooke 2007b: 404). 
Seabrooke also draws more broadly on James. C. Scott’s (e.g., 1976; 1978) notion of everyday politics 
(Scott, J. C. [1976] The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in South East Asia. 
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press; Scott, J. C. [1985] Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of 
Peasant Resistance. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press). 
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sociology and psychology in the post-Methodenstreit period, as discussed in 4a. To be 
sure, Hobson and Seabrooke’s attempt to incorporate a complex notion of agency via 
the framework of everyday IPE fails to challenge rationalist assumptions of the self in 
a significant way.    
 
As noted in 3.3.3, Smith demonstrated the importance of everyday knowledge over 
one hundred years before this rationalist separation occurred, the period in which 
James also rejected a priori judgments in favour of the conclusions that can be drawn 
from ordinary experience. As I have shown, both thinkers’ focus on the importance of 
everyday knowledge production and its role in moral and economic growth reflects 
their arguments regarding the benefits that are brought to the individual and the 
society in which they inhabit when they are free to decide their own truths, morals, 
investments, mode of labour, and futures. Indeed, as Smith and James’s shared 
opposition to “common sense” suggests, obstacles to such self-determination are 
contrary to natural liberty. As such, rather than entail a rejection of contemporary 
poverty alleviation strategies, Smith and James therefore facilitate a deeper 
understanding of their universalistic, top-down nature.  
 
As I have discussed, Smith’s (1976 [1790]) account of multiple impartial spectators 
and James’s (1981 [1890]: 294) notion of alternate selves can additionally facilitate 
countenance of a plurality of moral standards that exist across time and space and 
among and within individuals whilst being cognisant of the contextual influences that 
affect and are affected by these individuals’ actions. As such they supply to IPE a 
framework of the self that facilitates explanation of the fantastically complex nature 
of human agency in a manner that transcends the latent methodological prejudices that 
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are implicit in mainstream economics, in rationalist, institutionalist and constructivist 
accounts, as well as in orthodox and critical IPE.    
 
I have attempted to show this in an ordered manner in this thesis. In Chapter One I 
analysed the development of the secondary debate on Smith in some detail. Whilst 
refuting mainstream interpretations of his thought, I also challenged heterodox 
authors that seek to assert Smith’s “real” meaning via ironic or deistic interpretations 
of his “invisible hand” metaphor. In contrast to these authors, I argued that Smith’s 
thought is best understood through recurring themes in his oeuvre. This enabled me to 
reject the Adam Smith Problem upon which orthodox views depend whilst 
demonstrating its ongoing significance. This permitted me to highlight the disparate 
nature of the heterodox debate whilst challenging those that consider the Problem to 
be of limited significance. As I argued, it is being reiterated across the social sciences, 
a point that I discussed in further detail in Chapter Four.  
  
In Chapter Two I assessed the nature of the advances that Smith makes on his 
influences and his contemporaries that are versed in similar sources. This enabled me 
to demonstrate that, in contrast to his peers’ appeal to an objective standard of virtue, 
Smith’s notion of morality is based on individuals’ reflection upon their own and 
others’ motives. As I argued, this approach enables him to demonstrate the 
compatibility of economic and moral progress in the absence of religious teleology, a 
position that is unique among his peers. As I noted, Smith’s emphasis upon self-
determination is a key theme in his oeuvre, and is reflected in his account of a 
plurality of moral aptitudes and viewpoints that exist within society, an approach that 
I argued is developed through his conceptualisation of multiple impartial spectators. 
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As I suggested, Smith is also able to avoid moral relativism, as he observes common 
traits that are contextually interpreted by each individual.  
 
As I argued, this focus on self-determination allows Smith to retain agency for these 
individuals whilst asserting the role of imagination in economic and moral growth. 
This relates to his commitment to the provisional nature of knowledge, a view also 
held by James, whose work I discussed in Chapter Three. Taking a holistic approach 
to James’s thought enabled me to stress the compatibility of his views with those 
expressed by Smith. In particular, I focussed on these thinkers’ concepts of the self, 
which, I have argued, can provide IPE with an alternative to that currently provided 
by neoclassical economics’ reductive account of “rational economic man”.  
 
In Chapter Four, I demonstrated the necessity of such a framework. As I argued, 
Smith and James transcend the inductive-deductive divide that originated in the 
Methodenstreit, and which I suggested is demonstrated in the current tendency to 
bifurcate IPE into two opposing “camps” along methodological and geographical 
lines. I argued that this ignores IPE’s pre-disciplinary roots, and Smith’s polymathic 
thought in particular, which grants the subject field its unique position: “…at the 
interface of events which naturally straddle the artificial disciplinary boundaries of 
academic professionalisation” (Higgott and Watson 2008: 10).  
 
I also argued that attempts to bridge this perceived methodological gap via the use of 
behavioural economics masks the shared rationalist underpinnings of both “camps” in 
IPE, which I suggested reiterates the Adam Smith Problem. As I argued, this 
highlights the obstructions that exist to the development of an alternative account of 
agency to “rational economic man” that critical IPE theorists ostensibly desire. I 
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demonstrated this through an investigation of Smith’s and James’s influence upon 
behavioural psychologists, rational choice sociologists, symbolic interactionists, new 
and “old” institutionalist economists, neopragmatists, critical realists, 
poststructuralists and social constructivists, whose attempts to move beyond the 
account of agency provided by neoclassical economics are being incorporated into 
IPE. As I argued, these attempts fail owing to their implicit commitment to the 
rationalist separation of economics from other areas of life that was instituted in the 
aftermath of the Methodenstreit. As I also highlighted, this failure is of particular 
significance to contemporary IPE as theorists are currently attempting to incorporate 
these accounts of agency into their analysis at a point when determined efforts to 
define the subject field are being made.  
 
As I have demonstrated in this thesis, Smith and James provide a framework through 
which more complex accounts of the self can be introduced into IPE. As I have also 
shown, numerous attempts to engage with these figures have occurred and continue to 
take place across the social sciences. As such, my inquiry is not entirely atypical. My 
innovation here, however, is to have mapped connections between Smith and James in 
a detailed manner. This has facilitated my tracing of the influences of these thinkers 
on the social sciences, and identification of points at which their arguments have been 
distorted via figures on each “side” of the post-Methodenstreit divide. This has 
enabled me to contextualise IPE historically and theoretically in a manner that 
highlights its central position in the social sciences whilst allowing me to demonstrate 
the intellectual space that exists in the subject field for a Smith-James framework of 
the self, through which future research in areas such as poverty alleviation can be 
undertaken in a more complex and less prescriptive manner. 
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